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
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
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

MES.

PLAT. *Rep.*

Platonic soul . . .
spirit of the master, but . . .
dered by the fewness of those who . . .
Φιλοφρονούμεθα δι' ἐρημίαν. But the region of Attic tragedy
has been so long occupied and fenced about, and that by a
race of giants, that the simple traveller, whose one object is
to note the features of the country, may find himself com-
pelled at unawares to try a fall with some Antaeus, and may
have to pay dearly for his rashness in having crossed the sacred
boundary, even if in his discomfiture he have the satisfaction
of murmuring to himself that his adversary, like certain
persons in the *Lysis*, ὑποβαρβαρίζει. The shrine of the Muses
in these parts is hard by that of Achelous, so that you may
chance to be swept away by the torrent if you approach too
near. And the Heroön of Dr Bentley is not far off.

Dr Kennedy, however, is a goodnatured (if not quite a

good-humoured) giant. He threatens terribly, but his anger dissolves in blessing. "You are so discourteous," he says in effect, "so ungenerous, so good-for-nothing that"—"I will point out your errors!" A pleasant *lathos* indeed! I shall certainly not repent of having rushed into print (εἰκίστω ἔτεϊ, as I may almost say), perhaps not adequately even of my "ungenerous" conduct, if I can have the mistakes of my edition pointed out to me by Dr Kennedy, who is an excellent touchstone, having knowledge and outspokenness, and being really, I think, not unfriendly to myself. For he has told me that in interpreting Sophocles I am more often right than wrong, and this is no faint praise. I may almost assume that when Dr Kennedy agrees with me, I am right. And where he differs, whether on re-consideration I hold to my opinion or not, my book will have the advantage of attentive criticism.

But this is unseemly lightness. I must not forget that I am labouring under a "grave imputation."

I. I do not admit that in adding one more to the many editions of Sophocles, I was bound at every step to define my position relatively to those who have preceded me. My object has been to give my own opinion of the meaning wherever I thought that there could be any doubt, and to indicate the grounds of my opinion so far as this seemed necessary for the sake of clearness. It now appears that I have sometimes failed in this. "Brevis esse laboro; Obscurus fio." For this error, if it be one, I have only to plead that the brevity was not altogether of my own choosing. I wrote within strict limits, imposed on me, perhaps wisely, by the Clarendon press. If within these limits it was possible to be more intelligible, I have missed my purpose. For I certainly desired to be understood. But I refuse to plead this enforced shortness as an excuse for the omission of distinguished names¹, though it may have often been a cause of such omissions. For there is a gain to the student in clearing our notes to the classics as much as possible from the element of authority, and in asking

¹ Amongst these would have been that of Mr R. C. Jebb, Public Orator

of Cambridge, certainly one of the most graceful scholars of our time.

him to consider what is said in each instance rather than by whom. There is of course a certain penalty which an editor must pay for such recklessness. He cannot expect to have much credit for originality, at least in detail. He will often be thought to have borrowed, where his judgment has coincided with another, and to have ignored suggestions which he has rejected after long consideration. But it is better that he should suffer this amount of loss than that the attention both of editor and reader should be distracted, by mere personalities, from the meaning of the author. "But," it will be said, "there ought to be a list of authorities in the Preface." I do not see the necessity for this in an edition of Sophocles. It is time that it should be held as a matter of course that the new editor has not formed his judgment without consulting previous editions. The sources of an edition of Sophocles in the present day are patent to all. I have probably taken too little from them rather than too much, but I have no wish to "*suppress*" my obligations to them. I am fully sensible how much, in this kind of commentary, must be matter of tradition, and that there must be many debts, which it would be impossible for me to acknowledge in detail, as for instance to Professor Lushington, of Glasgow, with whom I read the *Oedipus Tyrannus* in the winter of 1847—8¹. If any authorities are to be mentioned, I think those have the strongest claim which are recent or comparatively unknown or hitherto not sufficiently recognised. And generally I think that a paper in a scientific journal, such as Dr Kennedy's, has a stronger claim to notice than an edition that is more readily accessible. But Dr Kennedy's contributions to Sophocles have been so long known, and some of them have been so much discussed by scholars, that one is naturally led to place them on a level with the editions.

I have been pleading hitherto for a certain division of labour. The interpreter who forms his own judgment on the materials before him, which he may have used more or less exhaustively, and lays that judgment open to criticism, has

¹ I must be content to share Dr Kennedy's blame with Schneidewin, who (eighteen years ago) was, however, allowed to pass with the observation that his proceeding in omitting authorities was "neither fair nor wise."

made a certain contribution, though it be a modest one, to the knowledge of his subject. The man who undertakes to estimate the labours of his predecessors and to adjust their relation to his own, is one who may be described as "a laborious and not very fortunate person," but he has undertaken a different task. That task, however, I have undertaken, and hope to execute it according to my ability. But as the most delicate and thorny part of my work (how much it is so I only now begin to perceive) I had reserved it for my second volume. And it is a flattering thought that this announcement may conspire even with the love of Sophocles to create "anxiety" in the serene breasts of mighty scholars. Meanwhile I may fairly claim that it should be borne in mind, when any fault of omission is in question, that my edition of Sophocles, like Dr Kennedy's article, is "to be continued."

This is all I care to say on the question of citation. The only concern which I feel about it on personal grounds is the desire to have it understood that what is censured in my procedure in this matter has arisen out of a theory which I hold: and not from any failure of respect for one whom I have long been taught to regard as amongst the foremost of living Grecians, and as a most generous and high-minded English gentleman. The tacit compliment that is implied in his thinking it a matter of importance to the cause of literature, whether he is fairly treated in my book or not, would be a source of unmingled gratification to me, but for the pain of seeing that I have unintentionally wounded him. And I frankly own that I feel a certain regret, when I think that a slight difference of treatment would perhaps have won for me his full and hearty recognition.

II. For in our principles of interpretation it would really seem that we are at one. At least I can hardly take exception to Dr Kennedy's statement of his design.

"To shew the possibility of solving many difficulties of ancient literature, by applying to them a logical method of criticism: that is, by first observing what the nexus of thought in the place requires, and then carefully considering whether from the existing text the sense so required can be reasonably drawn."

So far as this means that the context must have the first place in determining the sense, every word of it has my most hearty concurrence. Only two expressions require some explanation. By "a logical method of criticism" applied to poetry Dr Kennedy does not mean that we are to ask "what it proves." And by the "nexus of thought" he does not mean the accidental interlacing of the branches, but the vital correlation of leaf, branch and stem. I say this because some of his reasoning might give the opposite impression.

Instead, however, of using these two phrases, which are rather cumbrous and possibly misleading, I would prefer to speak simply of "context." Now the law of context is different in different kinds, and in different authors of the same kind. No one requires that the logic or connexion of ideas should be similar or similarly rendered in a piece of music and in a public speech, in Wagner and Mendelssohn, in Gladstone and Bright. The "logic" of Hamlet's soliloquy is different from that which may be discerned in the conversation of Imlac with the Prince of Abyssinia. And the first rule of interpretation is to ascertain the nature (or, as Plato would say, the *εἶδος*) of this connexion in the author who is to be interpreted.

The connexion of a passage in Sophocles is always severely harmonious, but the harmony is ruled, not by what is commonly understood under the name of logic, but by dramatic and poetic feeling. What are the elements of this harmony? For these will give us the elementary laws of our interpretation.

There is first the *leading motive* of each tragedy, which, in every play of Sophocles, inspires and permeates the whole. Hardly a line in any of the seven can safely be studied without reference to the *plot*, since every touch contributes, in due subordination, to the main effect. But this prime rule may be easily abused, as has been the case notably in the Oedipus Rex, unless full account be taken, secondly, of the *situation*. When the Scholiast on O. T. 337, tells us that Teiresias, in saying τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ | ναίουσιν οὐ κατείδες, is alluding to Jocasta, no verbal criticism is needed to enable us to reject such a view. Further, in studying the connexion, the *characters* must not be

lost sight of, for they are always preserved. And so we come to the drift, or main feeling, of the particular scene, of the speech, of the paragraph, of the words immediately preceding and following. In reading Sophocles, as in rendering a piece of music, it is a capital fault ever to lose the key-note. And as there is a key-note of the whole composition, so there may be a special mood of the particular movement. This brings me lastly to the question of emphasis. Without insisting on the view, that the former of two words is commonly the more emphatic, I assert strongly, that (excepting sudden interjectional utterances such as Ant. 32), the *following* sentence is connected, not with the concluding words of that which *precedes*, but with whatever is felt to be most important in it. This dwells in the mind and naturally calls up the next thought. Hence frequent trajections or "hyperbata" of clauses as well as of words. By requiring the minute verbal correspondence of antecedent with consequent in such cases, we should not only be in danger of "æsthetical sins," but should destroy the simple strength and essential "logic" of the connexion. We should often be doing as Nature would do, if she took to hanging boughs on twigs. This short-sighted logic has led many a Byzantine critic into error, and has been a fertile source of the corruption of texts.

III. Professor Kennedy dwells at length on three passages. The first of these is Oed. Tyr. 44, 45, which he interprets thus: "I see that men of experience are also most accustomed to compare their counsels together."

1. I hold that this interpretation is frigid and out of place. It drops the tone of entreaty to introduce a parenthetical caution, so injuring the effect both of ll. 40—46, and ll. 47—51, and destroying the impressiveness of the transition to the tone of warning which I have noticed in l. 47. The caution itself is rudely inconsistent with the laudatory tone which is the key-note of ll. 33—46. Oedipus, who solved the riddle of the sphinx without information or suggestion from any Theban (ll. 37—39), is supposed to need "comparison of counsels" with other minds before he can find help against the plague.

But the logic of the passage is urged, and by this is meant chiefly the connexion with the immediately preceding words, εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθά που. Dr Kennedy has not observed that my interpretation of these words is different from his own. To complete their sense he seems to supply φήμην ἀκούσας. I supply ἀλκὴν from the main sentence. He takes που as an indefinite adverb of manner, I, as an indefinite adverb of place. The argument from the logic of these words (even granting its importance) will be answered, if I make good my interpretation of them. So much for the general and immediate context. Now for the words themselves.

Dr Kennedy lays great stress on ζώσας. He seems to imagine that because poets can speak of a storm, or a calamity, or the Eternal Laws, or the oracular voice from Pytho, as having life and power, therefore Sophocles, when he wanted to say calmly, "Wise men are wont to take counsel together," was capable of expressing himself thus, "The habit of comparing counsels *lives* amongst experienced men." He may find persons to agree with him, perhaps many: ἐγὼ δὲ εἰς ὧν οὐ συμφέρομαι. This would seem to me a trivial use of a rare and impressive metaphor. For I cannot persuade myself that the use of ζῆν in such passages is other than figurative, or that a *metaphor* so seldom employed has already passed into an ordinary prosaic word. I am unwilling to admit that the laws so finely personified in the Antigone are there only said to be "*in viridi observantia*," or that the "storms of calamity" in Aeschylus are merely spoken of as a "prevailing" wind. Something more is meant of the oracular voices in the Tyrannus than that they retain their accustomed value, something more of virtue in Euripides than that it remains in operation. Here is the gist of my remark, that Dr Kennedy's interpretation increases the difficulty of ζώσας.

Now, does τὰς συμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων mean "the habit of conferring counsels"? I do not say this is impossible. I am glad to own that in this and other instances Dr Kennedy shows an acute perception of the *fluxile* diction of Sophocles. But the word συμφορὰ in the sense of "event" is so extremely common, that strong reasons would be required for giving to it

here a new *etymological* sense. And (although this is a matter of feeling) the phrase wears a strained and un-Sophoclean aspect.

Before considering my own interpretation, I am obliged to notice that of Mr Shilleto, who, without seeming to be aware that he is differing from Dr Kennedy, interprets ζώσας as I do. I am glad to have this confirmation from one so distinguished in being "laudatus a laudato viro," for what Dr Kennedy pronounces to be inadmissible. But whatever objection may be raised against "the events of counsels being alive," i.e. "prosperous," would seem to lie with greater force against "the conference of counsels being alive," i.e. "prospering," or "being effective."

I will not follow Dr Kennedy's example in attempting to state my adversary's case for him. No one can state his case more effectively or pointedly than he has done. But I will now try to explain my own view of the passage, and then to defend my view.

I think that in lines 42, 3, the priest, after lauding Oedipus' former wisdom, is intended by the poet to suggest the two courses which Oedipus by his own unaided counsel actually took, viz. to send to Delphi, and to seek aid from Teiresias. In both cases no doubt the aid sought is in the form of advice, or rather direction, but in neither is any "conference of counsels" in question.

Further, I think that πον in this and other hypothetical sentences has the locative meaning: i.e. that εἴ πον signifies not "if, as is possible" (which involves an awkward condensation), but "if anywhere" (Phil. 44), or with a slight transference "if on any occasion" (Aj. 521), or as, I think, here, "if in any quarter."

And I would paraphrase the two lines thus: "to find some help for us, whether help from any god, or help from a man, if you know of help in any quarter from a man." Compare the similarly alternative appeal to Teiresias in 310, 311, μήτ' ἀπ' οἰώνων φάτιν μήτ' εἴ τιν' ἄλλην μαντικῆς ἔχεις ὁδόν. (Most of this is already given in my notes, but seems to have been φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν.) Then I connect the following line, not

immediately with the little clause *εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθα πού*, but, as more frequently happens, with the main tenour of what precedes. "We beseech thee to find some help for us, for I see" (the priest is the coryphæus of the suppliants and passes easily to the singular verb) "that experienced men are most successful in their plans."

I say that the simplicity of such a maxim is no objection to its use here, and I quote a sentence from Herodotus (who has so many correspondences with Sophocles) to the effect that "likely plans are likely to succeed." He distinguishes there between the likeliness of the plans, and the blessing of providence on them: and I maintain that no Greek of the 5th century B.C. would feel that there was anything strange in distinguishing between the wisdom or excellence of a plan and the happiness of its issue¹.

Having thus *in transitu* disposed of the interpretation of *καὶ*, I pass on to consider my interpretation of *ζώσας*. I have admitted in my notes that this word presents some difficulty under either interpretation. But I presume that if *ζῆν* can mean "to be prosperous," there is no great harshness in predicating this of actions as well as of persons, and of the results of actions as well as of the actions. Now I observe, first, that in each of the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν*, there is a slight shade of difference in the meaning, relative to the thing spoken of. The storms of calamity do not abate their violence, the oracles do not cease to threaten, the laws maintain their authority. Why may not the results of counsel "prosper" or be full of success? [To the metaphorical uses of *ζῆν* should be added *El. 1419, ζῶσιν οἱ γὰρ ὑπαὶ κείμενοι. Trach. 1169, χρόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ παρόντι νῦν. Time is frequently personified in Sophocles. Fr. Inc. 717 (Nauck), ζῶντι ποδὶ χρώμενος.*]

There is also an *emphatic* use of *ζῆν* which has not been sufficiently noticed. As applied to persons, it often approaches the significance of *εὖ ζῆν*, i.e. "to enjoy the fulness of life." I trace this shade of meaning with more or less of certainty in

¹ I do not except even the real Socrates. See, however, the difficulty which the Platonic Socrates has in

convincing his hearers of the identity of *σοφία* and *εὐτυχία* in *Euthyd. 280.*

the following passages of Sophocles: Dan. fr. vi. 171 Nauck, ζῆ, πῖνε, φέρβου. Fr. Inc. 753 Nauck, τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐστίν. Phil. 1021, σὺ μὲν γέγῃθας ζῶν. Antig. 1169, καὶ ζῆν τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων. O. C. 1147, ζώσας, ἀκραιφνεῖς τῶν κατηπειλημένων. Trach. 235, ἰσχύοντα τε καὶ ζῶντα καὶ θαλλόντα. O. T. 1188, ὡς ὑμᾶς ἴσα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ζώσας ἐναριθμῶ. El. 156: οἷα Χρυσόθεμις ζώει. ib. 456, ζῶντ' ἐπεμβῆναι ποδί. ib. 811, ζῶντα τιμωρόν.

When these two facts are connected, first that ζῆν has sometimes the figurative meaning "to have power," and this with various modifications; secondly, that ζῆν has often the *emphatic* meaning, "to live successfully," I do not feel much difficulty in interpreting the passage as I have done. For I do not admit that in joining τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν βουλευμάτων there is any difficulty at all, especially since the genitive is added after an interval to complete the expression. The passage in Thucydides is sufficiently parallel, and according to Dr Kennedy's own method the phrase may be resolved into τὰ βουλευματα αὐτοῖς ξυμφέρει (or ξυμφέρεται) ταύτῃ. And the ξυμφοραὶ may be said to "live," just as in El. 999, the δαίμων is said ἀπορρεῖν, "to fade away."

2. The second of the interpretations, on each of which Dr Kennedy stakes his reputation as a scholar, is that of O. C. 308, 9. I certainly do not mean to "offer a similar *expositio*" on any single passage, for though I have some faith in my method, my application of it may be not infallible. But, in the present instance, my reputation seems to be endangered in another way. For I am accused of the unpardonable sin of unintelligent plagiarism, ὅπερ χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰάν τις μὴ καλῶς κλέψῃ.

Without insisting here on my theory, which I have already enunciated, I should like to state the fact, for the satisfaction of Dr Kennedy and those who may be inclined to agree with him.

First, then, I did not take the general explanation from Dr Kennedy, and, secondly, our interpretations are essentially and widely different.

There was a time when I prided myself more on origin-

ality in Sophoclean interpretation than I do now. When my attention was called to Dr Kennedy's papers by the late Mr Conington, soon after they appeared, I know that I had previously communicated to that gentleman several interpretations of Sophocles which we both thought to be original¹. I am as certain as I can be of any minute fact so far remote that my present explanation of O. C. 308, 9, was one of them. And, unless memory deceives me, on perusing what Dr Kennedy had written on this passage, I was more struck with the difference of the two interpretations than with their resemblance. Indeed, if I had "lippedened," as the Scotch say, to commentators of any sort in those days, I need not have gone further, for what he calls the general explanation, than to the Scholiast, who, in saying φίλος, ἀντὶ τοῦ χρήσιμος, is surely directing a "covert polemic" against those who referred τίς γὰρ—φίλος to ἐμοί. That I cannot remember the time when I was guilty of this enormity, is a fact which I hope may soften the asperity of Dr Kennedy's resentment against me, for the greater offence of having seemed to ignore the partial coincidence of our views.

Beyond this point, my interpretation is almost entirely different from Dr Kennedy's. We both follow the Scholiast², who interprets φίλος, χρήσιμος, in taking the words τίς γὰρ—φίλος to mean "Goodness is profitable to the good man." But it is evident to me that this interpreter rightly connected the γνώμη with the *main current* of the preceding sentence, namely, with the assertion, couched in the form of a hope, that the princely condescension of Theseus, in visiting the poor blind man, would be fraught with blessing to the city, whose interests were inseparable from Theseus' own. It appears to me to involve a radical misconception, as well as a breach of the law of parsimony, where a motive can be supplied from the general feeling of the play, from the immediate situation, and from the drift of the preceding words, to intercalate a strain

¹ Professor Conington's paper on Sophocles in the *Journal of Philology*, for 1854, has been neglected by me equally with Dr Kennedy's. I have not stated

either the coincidence of our views on Ant. 310, 311, or the grounds on which I dissent from his other suggestions.

² This applies also to O. T. 1085.

of reflection, in itself, no doubt, "signally beautiful" (so beautiful, as to be hardly præ-Platonic), but having no relevancy either to the immediate situation or to the whole of the action. Oedipus is not there to be a teacher of absolute morality, or to enforce the doctrine of the Gorgias before the time. But he is there to find peace and rest and to bless Athens. That in blessing Athens he will bless Theseus, is a proposition, which, while it is repeatedly assumed by Oedipus in the course of the tragedy (I might have added to my citations ll. 1508, 9, and 1518, 9), I conceive to have been more self-evident to an Athenian audience than to the modern reader. Indeed the feeling which by an inseparable association was called up by the expression *τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει* (cp. Plato, Rep. II. 380 B) was such as to render any direct mention of the individual superfluous. I am far from denying, however, that some mental expansion of the preceding words is necessary in order to account for *γάρ*. According to my view the expression is considerably condensed. Oedipus has no doubt that the coming of Theseus will be a blessing to Athens. His chief anxiety is that (according to the assurance of the chorus) Theseus may come. But in speaking to those who could not have understood his real thought, he expresses his anxiety and his confidence in a single prayer, "Let him come and bless me and his own city." From this it is not difficult to elicit the *hypothetical* sentence, "If he comes, he will be a blessing to his own city." But this is not all. The missing *αὐτῷ* is not utterly suppressed. It is implied in *εὐτυχῆς*, which strikes the *key-note*. For it would be pleonastic to say *εὐτυχῆς αὐτῷ*. And I may own that Dr Kennedy's strictures have here suggested what I believe to be the true motive for the substitution of the adjective for the adverb in this passage.

3. It is, of course, with a sort of tremor that I contradict the former Head-master of Shrewsbury School on a point relating to the structure of Greek Iambic Verse. But I can have no hesitation in asserting, as strongly as I am able, that Sophocles never could have written in *Antigone*, 31, 32 :

Κρέοντά φασι τὸν ἀγαθὸν τοιαῦτα σοὶ
κάμοί.....κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν,

and that he *can* have written what stands in my text, provided always that σοι does not depend upon ἀγαθόν, but upon κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν. He could not have placed Κρέοντα, which is the least emphatic word (except σοι if enclitic), in the most emphatic place, in preference to τοιαῦτα, which has by far the strongest emphasis. And σοι, whether emphatic or unemphatic, coming at the end of a line but in the middle of a clause, necessarily points forwards, and creates an expectation which is most naturally fulfilled at the end of the line following. Compare O. C. 1518, 19, ἦ σοι | γήρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσεται πόλει. Ibid. 1010—12, where a whole line intervenes between ἐμοὶ and ἐλθεῖν ἀρωγούς to which it is joined. I will even assert that from their relative positions in the versification, σοι is brought nearer to τοιαῦτα κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν than it would have been by actual juxtaposition. A similar thing occurs in El. 254, 5, where ὑμῖν is separated from δοκῶ by the greater part of a line, but is brought in while expectation is sustained by the flow of the verse. It is only fair to add that in speaking of a "possible want of emphasis" Dr Kennedy betrays the fact that the line which he has printed "rings false" to his own inmost ear.

I have more to say in defence of the unemphatic σοι (which was the reading of the editions before Schaefer). Dr Kennedy takes the trouble of proving that neither Antigone nor Ismene had heard or were likely to hear the decree, and that Creon did not contemplate them in proclaiming it. This might have some force if σοι were said to be the dative of direct reference, though even then I might have asked whether "*all the citizens*" (l. 27) had heard the decree, and if so, how there could be any that knew not of it (l. 33). But as the *dativus ethicus*, or dative of remote reference, σοι is eminently in place. Look at all that has prepared the way for it: νῶν in l. 3, τῶν σῶν... κακῶν in l. 6; πανδήμῳ πόλει in l. 7 ("it is an aggravation of our sorrows that they are extending to the state"); ἔχεις... ἥ σε λανθάνει in l. 9; ἐμοὶ in l. 11; οὐδὲν οἶδ' ἀτωμένη in ll. 16, 17; νῶν in l. 21. After all this, σοι comes in so naturally as to be easily understood, even if separated from its immediate context.

Dr Kennedy says the presence of *φασὶ* forbids the very idea of any such dative. Even if this were not a mere "canon for the nonce" (I do not see why a Greek author might not have written

ἄ σοι
γῆρως ἄλνυπά φημι κείσεσθαι πόλει), "

the energetic rapidity of the speech (of which more presently), would make light of such an obstacle, and *φασὶ* is a mere resumption from l. 27. Besides, in this respect there is no difference between *φασὶν ἔχειν* and *ὥς φασιν, ἔχει*.

With the same bluntness of vision which he has shewn in bringing together our explanations of O. C. 308, 9, Dr Kennedy identifies my account of the words *καμοὶ, λέγω γὰρ καμὲ* with Schneidewin's. It is true that I have so much in common with that editor (and, I think, with Seyffert) that we both pass from the unemphatic to the emphatic dative, but that is almost the extent of our agreement. In rendering, "Observe, even to me too, whose character he little knows" (for convenience sake I adopt Dr Kennedy's translation of his words), he takes *λέγω* in the sense of "I mean to say," and *καμὲ* as a mere repetition of *ἐμοὶ*, attracted into construction with *λέγω*. And he makes Antigone refer to the action of Creon, rather than to the effect of that action upon herself. I take *λέγω* to mean "I count," or "I do not omit" (cp. Aesch. *Prom.* 973, *καὶ σὲ δ' ἐν τούτοις λέγω*), and *ἐμὲ* as the regular accusative after it. To make my explanation as explicit as I can, if the reader will exonerate me from accusing Sophocles of speaking in this cumbrous fashion, for I can call it nothing else, I take the words to mean: "Such is the decree which Creon has proclaimed, affecting you,—ay, and affecting *me*, for I do not hold myself exempted from the number of those whom it touches." If any one objects that the ethical dative is never emphatic, I would remind him that "ethical dative" is only a convenient phrase, and that there are various degrees between the most direct and the most remote uses of the dative.

Dr Kennedy says that this explanation is in violation of dramatic taste and propriety. I am sorry for Antigone. She is

misunderstood by her latest champion, and I fear that even he, could he understand her rightly, might prove to be a "modern Creon." The Antigone of Sophocles is supposed by him to come on the stage with a disposition to make "a modest acknowledgement of error," and to avoid anything like an assumption of superiority in addressing her sister. "I own I thought better of my uncle than to expect this of him; I know that you esteem him highly, and I confess I once did so too." That is the tone of the maiden, who has already spoken of Creon as an enemy, and, before she has uttered ten lines, has intimated with ill-suppressed scorn, the suspicion that her sister will be slow to apprehend the coming evil!

It is true that she would win Ismene to share her purpose, but she would win her by sheer impetuosity or not at all. At the same time, no comparison of herself with Ismene is implied in my construction of these words. When she is carried away by her feeling into this brief outburst, she is not thinking of her sister, but of her own passionate resolve¹.

It is only out of respect to Professor Kennedy that I would urge a further objection to construing the datives with *ἀγαθόν*. It is that such an epexegetis, which seems to me tame at best, is wholly out of keeping with the rapidity of such a speech as this. It is not the language of feeling at all. And it sadly interrupts the rhythm.

IV. Whatever may be the faults of my Sophocles, Dr Kennedy has not convinced me that I am in error in the points criticised by him. In reply to him I can, of course, only state my own opinion with its grounds. On the other hand, I can have little hope of convincing him—for instance, that Sophocles could hardly have used *ξυμφέρεσθαι* for *προσφέρεσθαι*, even if *ὁ τρόπος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς* could mean *ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ξυμφέρεσθαι*.

V. Dr Kennedy's fame rests on a sounder basis than these his favourite interpretations of Sophocles. The man, who has raised the level of Greek scholarship over a great part of England, to whom some of the best scholars in the country

¹ The negatives in the first speech are enough to shew that Antigone is in a white heat from the very beginning of the play.

both dead and living, have been proud to refer the origin of their acquirements, who by the energy and acuteness of his intellect and his genuine enthusiasm, has done so much to keep alive the opinion that Greek philology is more than a jargon of words, has no need to be solicitous—though he is true to his character in being so—about the fate of his cursory annotations on a special subject. It is simply impossible for such a man, however in his chivalrous abandonment he may desire it, to stake his title to the character of a Greek scholar on a few subtleties of his invention, for which he happens to have conceived a fond and inalienable affection.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

P.S. Since my reply to Dr Kennedy was printed, I have received a communication from Dr James Browning, Assistant Classical Examiner in the University of St Andrews, from which I extract so much as has reference to the questions now in dispute. His letter to me is dated St Andrew's, 15th Feb. 1873. I will only add that the time when Dr Browning was a "student in St Andrews" was many years previous to 1854.

"I need not say any thing of the second and third passages, in the former of which Kennedy's supplement seems unnatural and uncalled for, and in the latter of which both your versions and his have been familiar to me since I was a student in St Andrews; but it may interest you to know that the meaning he gives to Oed. R. 44, 5, was suggested by Dr Thomas Young, the decipherer of the Rosetta Stone, as early as 1795, when he was a Student of Medicine in Edinburgh, and was then accepted as the true rendering by Prof. Andrew Dalzel, and afterwards by Prof. Dunbar in 1808. Dunbar's translation, though inelegant, as was to be expected, is virtually the same with Kennedy's: "For I perceive that the communication of opinions chiefly prevails among men of skill (or experience)."

Dalzel's note, which is really Dr Young's, is the following: "*Ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι...*] *Usu enim peritis video felici quoque eventu consilia maxime vigere.* Brunck. Ita interpretes; sed

συμφορὰν pro *eventu consilii* sumi posse non credo; ea enim vox fortuitum aliquid semper innuere videtur: hic autem potius in primitivo sensu sumi, locusque adeo totus ita reddi potest. *Sicubi alicujus deorum vocem audîsti, vel etiam a mortalium quocunque quicquam acceperis; video enim apud prudentes expertosque viros etiam collationes consilii maxime in usu esse.* Ipsius sapientiam suprâ laudaverat, jam etiam alios consultâsse posse addit: qui sensus vulgato multò melior videtur; otiosum enim aliàs foret *καὶ*, neque tota sententia loco suo digna."

This note is from Dalzel's *Collectanea Græca Majora*, a work which has been in the hands of Scottish students for 70 years.

ON THE WORD ΒΟΥΤΑΙΟΣ.

Il. XIII. 824. *Αἶαν ἀμαρτοεπὲς, βουγάϊε, ποῖον ἔειπες ;*
Od. XVIII. 79. *Νῦν μὲν μήτ' εἷης, βουγάϊε, μήτε γένοιο,*
εἰ τοῦτον τρομέεις, κ.τ.λ.

IN the first of these passages Hector is addressing Ajax, who is determined to stay his onward progress: in the second Antinous is reviling the bully Irus. Heyne on the former passage in his smaller edition quotes a short scholion on the word *βουγάϊε*, which interprets it *μεγάλως ἐπὶ σαντῶ ἀγλαϊζόμενος καὶ γαυριῶν. Ἡ, βουεργέτα*. This scholion sums up the differences of opinion which existed among the Greek critics on the word: some (with Aristarchus) referring it to *γαίω*, others (with Zenodotus) to *γῆ*. Thus Apollonius, *Lexicon*, h.v. (quoted by Heyne in his large edition): *βουγάϊον δὲ λέγουσι τὸν ἐργατὴν βοῦν· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι*: Hesychius, *βουγάϊον· ἀναίσθητον καὶ ἀλάζονα καὶ μέγανυχον*, which is possibly a mixture of the two explanations. For Eustathius on this passage mentions an interpreter in his view the most successful of all (*μάλιστα ἐπιτυχής*), *ὁ μεταλαβὼν τὸν βουγάϊον εἰς βόσκημα ἀναίσθητον*: it appears also from another scholion worked up into Eustathius' note, that among the people of Dulichium and Samos persons who lived on milk and were feeble of frame (*οἱ γαλακτοφαγοῦντες καὶ μηδὲν ἰσχύοντες*) were named (nick-named?) *βουγάϊοι*. This interpretation, considered most successful by Eustathius, has not found much favour with the modern commentators on Homer, who prefer explaining *βουγάϊος* as = a braggart, a great boaster ('Grossprahler', Faesi, virtually following Heyne, and so the word is explained in Liddell and

Scott's Lexicon). It seems to be assumed by them, as by the Greek critics quoted on the same side by Eustathius, that *βου-* is a mere prefix implying magnitude, as in *βούπαις*, &c., and that *-γάϊος* is connected with *γαίω*. Both assumptions seem to me unwarranted: there is nothing to shew, in the first place, that *βου-* is ever used as a prefix in Homer as it is in later Greek (*βούβρωστις* is the only word that gives any colour to such an idea, and that can be explained otherwise), and, in the second place, though *γάϊος* might be connected, so far as form goes, with *γαίω*, as *πυρκᾶϊή* is with *καίω*, *γαίω* does not mean to *brag*, but to *exult* or *rejoice*: so that this etymology would not bring out the required meaning.

Let us therefore try the other track indicated by the scholiasts. The interpretations of *βουγάϊος* as = *βούς ἐργατής*, or as = *ἀναίσθητος*, coincide on the whole with those given by Hesychius and Eustathius to the word *γαιός* or *γαῖος*. *Γαιός* is explained by Hesychius as = *βούς ἐργατής*: and Eustathius 142, 40 (188, 28), partly quoted by Schmidt on the word, says ἡ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς γαίας καὶ γαῖος ἀπόγειος ἄνεμος καὶ βούς γαῖος ὁ ἐργατικός· καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ γέα ὃ γράφεται διὰ τοῦ ἐ ψιλοῦ γέϊος· ἡ καὶ ἄλλως γαῖος παρὰ Ἰταλιώταις καὶ Ταραντίνοις ὁ μίσθιος· ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ ὁ παχὺς καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἄνθρωπος. Now is this *γαιός* or *γαῖος*, which it is surely difficult to connect with the Homeric vocative *βουγάϊε*, related etymologically to *γαῖα*, or, as G. Curtius in his *Grundzüge* suggests, to the Sanskrit *gaûs*, an ox? The Sanskrit derivatives *gavaya* (*bovis species*, the 'Gayal')¹ and *gavyas* (*bubulus, bovinus*)¹ are quoted by Curtius, and indeed offer a tempting similarity of form to *γάϊος*. If *γάϊος* then = *γάϊος*, it must mean properly 'belonging to an ox': and may thus easily have come as a term of reproach to mean either 'loud' (comp. Aristophanes' *βόεια ῥήματα*, *Ranae* 678), or 'hulking' or 'stupid': and *βούς γάϊος* (of which *βουγάϊε* may be the vocative, to be written as two words) must either mean 'a hulking ox', or be merely, like *σὺς κάπριος*, two words to express one thing. If *γάϊος*, on the contrary, be derived from *γῆ*, *βούς γάϊος* will simply = 'an

¹ Bopp, *Glossarium Comparativum*.

ox of the field'. In any case *βov-* turns out not to be a mere prefix signifying bigness, but a word retaining its proper meaning. The nickname 'hulking ox' or 'ox of the field' would be appropriate enough in the mouth of an enemy to Ajax, or of a contemptuous patron to Irus.

The Latin proper name *Gaius* has been connected with *gaudere* by some, by others with the root *ge-* in *genus*, &c. No one, so far as I know, has thought of connecting it with the *γαιός* of Hesychius: but when we consider how homely was the meaning of many of the Roman proper names (as e. g. *Stolo*, *Scipio*, *Bubulcus*, even *Brutus Bubulcus*), it will not appear impossible that 'Gaius' may originally have meant 'a man who had to do with oxen', if not 'a man like an ox'.

ON *VIS* (2ND PERSON OF *VOLO*), *INVITUS*, AND *INVITARE*.

Corssen, *Kritische Nachträge*, &c. p. 52—54, seems right in arguing that the base of the word *invitus* is the Sanskrit root *vî*, which, according to Benfey, has in the Vedas the meaning of *wishing*. I cannot help suspecting that *vis*, which does duty for the second person of *volo*, is really the second person of a lost verb *vio*, of which *vi-tus* would be the participle, meaning *willing*. From *vi-tus*, *in-vi-tus*, *unwilling*, would be naturally formed. Scholars generally assume that *vis* stands for an older form in which the *l* of *vol-o* had not disappeared. But such a disappearance of the *l* would be far more against Latin analogy than its retention. There is no reason for supposing that the Romans would have objected to say *vuls* or *vils* from *volo* any more than they objected to saying *fers* from *fero*, though as a general rule the combination *ls* and *rs* stood with them for *-lts* and *-rts*.

Corssen¹ connects *invitare* with the root *vî-* (= *to wish*), and would make it mean originally *to wish a person here*: G. Curtius² refers it to the root *voc-* (= *to call*), making *invitare* = *invicitare* from *invocitare*. Corssen's account of the word is, as far

¹ *Kritische Beiträge*, p. 18: *Kritische Nachträge*, p. 54.

² *Grundzüge*, &c. 3rd ed.

as form goes, less strained than this: but both etymologies are based on an assumption which is at least doubtful, that the first meaning of *invitare* is *to invite*. There are two other meanings of the word, closely connected with each other, quite as old as this, *to cheer* or *enliven* (mostly of food and drink), and *to entertain*: and it is worth while considering whether the idea of *inviting* did not grow out of these. Let us examine the evidence. *Invitare* has apparently the sense of *cheering* or *enlivening* in Plautus, *Amph.* i. 1. 130: 'Mira sunt, nisi *invitavit* sese in cena plusculum'; *Rudens* ii. 3. 32: 'Neptunus magnis poculis hac nocte eum *invitavit*' (though here the sense of *entertaining* would do as well): comp. *ib.* v. 3. 30, where it is used with a comical play on *invitus*. In the *Rudens*, ii. 7. 32 'si *invitare* nos paullisper pergeret, Ibidem obdormissemus: nunc vix vivos amisit domum', the word may as well mean *to cheer*, or *to ply with cups*, as *to challenge to drink*. So Turpilius (ap. Non. pp. 320, 1): 'Non *invitavit* plusculum sese, ut solet'; '*Invitavit* vir plusculum hic se in prandio' (*invitavere* Luc. Müller); 'Coronam, mensam, talos, vinum, haec hujusmodi, Queis rebus *vita* amantum *invitari* solet'; Lucilius (30. 54): 'Scito etenim bene longincum mortalibus morbum In vino esse, ubi qui *invitavit* dapsilius se'. Nonius quotes instances of the same use from Sallust and Varro; and Virgil's '*Invitat* genialis hiems curasque resolvit' may best be explained in the same way: 'winter cheers us and loosens our load of cares'.

Invitare means *to entertain* in Cicero, *Verr.* iv. 11. 25: 'Rex denique ecquis est qui senatorem P. R. tecto ac domo non *invitet*'; *publice invitare* in the same passage may be taken indifferently as = *to entertain* or *to invite* at the public expense. In *Phil.* xii. 9. 23 Cicero says ironically of Clodius' house '*tota familia occurret, hospitio invitabit, propter familiaritatem notissimam*', where it seems more natural to take *hospitio* as abl. and *invitare* as = *to entertain*, than to make the words = *vocabit in hospitium*. Comp. Virgil *Aen.* viii. 178: 'Accipit Aenean, solioque *invitat* acerno'. It is of course easy to see how the senses of *entertaining* and *inviting* run into each other.

Now supposing that *invitare* is derived from *vita* as *infor-*

mare from *forma*, the sense of *cheering* or *enlivening* would be the natural and primary sense of the word. And this hypothesis agrees quite sufficiently with the facts adduced above. The sense of *cheering* is at least as old in Latin usage as that of *inviting*: and the transition of meaning, *to cheer, to entertain at table, to invite*, seems a more natural one than the reverse, especially when the phrase *invitare se* is considered. Turpilii's 'quibus rebus *vita amantum invitari* solet' seems to point to a consciousness of connection in meaning between *vita* and *invitare*, though it is unsafe to build much upon such plays on words. It is, meanwhile, worth while to quote from Schleicher's Glossary the Lithuanian word *vitó-ti*, 'aufnehmen, bewirthen'.

ON THUCYDIDES I. 37.

In this chapter the Corinthians say to the Athenians about the Corcyraeans καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα, αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη, παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ὧν βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίνεσθαι. The commentators mostly explain this difficult passage by assuming an ellipse: understanding the sentence as equivalent either to παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς...μᾶλλον ἢ (δικαστὰς) γίνεσθαι κατὰ ξυνθήκας, 'makes them judges in their own case rather than that judges should be appointed by agreement': or to παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς μᾶλλον ἢ (ἐγένοντο αὐτῶν) κ.ξ., 'makes them judges more than they would have been if an agreement had been entered into'. Classen again takes κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίνεσθαι together, comparing such phrases as κατὰ ξυλλόγους, κατὰ ξυστάσεις γίνεσθαι, and makes the clause = 'gives them the opportunity of acting as judges rather than according to arbitration'. But if the sense of αὐτοὺς, in connexion with the preceding word αὐτάρκη, be pressed, the sentence can be brought to yield very good sense without supposing any ellipse: 'gives them the chance of acting as judges according to their own will, irresponsibly, rather than according to agreement with others'. Classen remarks that the idea of being a δικαστής at all is contrary to that of acting κατὰ ξυνθήκας:

that you cannot be 'judge according to agreement' at all¹. But surely the relation which existed in matters of jurisdiction between the Athenians and their subject-allies proves that a Greek city might be *δικαστὴς ὧν τινα ἔβλαψε*, 'a judge in the case of its own wrong doings', and at the same time a *δικαστὴς κατὰ ξυνθήκας*: the Athenians would have represented themselves as exercising their judicial functions over their allies *κατὰ ξυνθήκας*, according to agreement with the allies, while the allies, if a case went against them, would probably complain that the Athenians judged *αὐτοί*, without responsibility.

VIRGILIANA. Ecl. iv. 15.

'Ille deum vitam accipiet, divisque videbit
permixtos heroas, et ipse videbitur illis,
pacatumque reget patriis virtutibus orbem'.

The prophecy is of a king reigning in righteousness, like Saturn according to the Roman myth, or Numa, and the commentators refer the words 'deum vitam accipiet' to the return of the golden age, when men (according to Hesiod, *Ἔργα*, v. 112 foll.) *ὥστε θεοὶ ἔζων ἀκήδεα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, Νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων*. The words 'divisque videbit' &c. are in like manner referred to that familiar intercourse between gods and men supposed by the Roman poets (not, be it observed, by Hesiod) to be a characteristic of the golden age. Now, though Virgil's words will bear this plain and obvious meaning, no one has observed, so far as I know, that the poet has not expressed it in at all an ordinary manner. 'Deum vitam accipere' does not seem the most obvious way in which Virgil might have reproduced *ὥστε θεοὶ ζῆν*: and as, elsewhere, he uses the simple expression 'fruitur deorum colloquio' for intercourse with the gods, it seems strange that he should have used the less obvious

¹ 'Ein Vertragsverhältniss (*ξυνθήκαι*) überhaupt die Möglichkeit ausschliesst, dass der eine Theil sich zum Richter aufwerfe.' But the Athenians were

said *δικάζειν τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων*: see the discussion on Thuc. i. 77, in Grote, Chap. XLVII., and Classen's own note on that passage.

expression 'divisque videbit Permixtos heroas', &c. This criticism may appear far-fetched, but it should be remembered that Virgil chose his words with extraordinary care, often repeating himself with little or no variation when the language appeared to him to be a perfect expression of his thought, and, hardly ever, in important matters, using language which had not, to his mind, if not some cherished association, at least some more or less exquisite justification. I suspect that in this passage, though its first and most obvious reference is to a renewal of the golden age, Virgil is using language tinged by association with the mysteries, Eleusinian or other. 'Vitam accipere', 'to receive or take to one's self a life', is a phrase requiring comment: now 'accipere sacra' was the regular phrase for 'being initiated into mysteries': see Lampridius, Heliogabalus 7, 'Matris etiam deorum sacra accepit', and other passages in Hildebrand's note on Arnobius v. 19. Then as to 'deum vita', this expression might also have been caught from the mysteries: for Plato, Phaedo, p. 81, says of the soul, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα: comp. ib. p. 69, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει: passages which seem to shew that the idea of a participation in a divine life was popularly associated with the mysteries¹. The words 'divisque videbit' &c., carry out the idea which I have started: one of the chief points in the Eleusinia being that statues of the gods were exhibited to the gaze of the initiated: see Themistius, quoted by Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 52. I do not mean that Virgil literally means that his king will be a μεμνημένος, but that his language was originally suggested by the circumstances of the mysteries, and that thus 'deum vitam accipiet' might fairly be translated 'shall be initiated into', or 'partake in', 'the life of the gods'.

¹ This idea is further illustrated by Plato, *Phaedrus*, p. 250, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῶ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλων θεῶν, εἰδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο. Theo

Smyrnaeus, quoted by Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 39, speaks of τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεοῖς συνδίαιτον as the privilege of persons initiated into the Eleusinia.

Aeneid, ii. 615.

‘Jam summas arces Tritonia, respice, Pallas
insedit, nimbo effulgens et Gorgone saeva’.

It requires some courage to defend ‘nimbo’ in this passage when most modern critics prefer ‘limbo’, the variant mentioned by Servius. Whether the variation is as old as the time of Virgil, whether indeed he may have left it doubtful himself which he finally intended to write, cannot, I suppose, be decided: but it is in any case hard to imagine whence ‘nimbo’, decidedly the most difficult reading, can have come, except from the poet’s hand. Though it is not easy, it is not, I think, impossible, to translate ‘nimbo effulgens et Gorgone saeva’ Pallas shines out ‘with her surrounding of storm-cloud and with her dread Gorgon’: ‘nimbo et Gorgone saeva’ being a kind of descriptive ablative. But my purpose is not so much to discuss the construction of the words as to bring forward two passages which, so far as I know, have been hitherto overlooked by the advocates both of ‘nimbus’ and ‘limbus’. The first is from Homer, Il. xviii. 203 foll.

Αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ὦρτο Διὶ φίλος· αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη
ᾠμοῖς ἰφθίμοισι βάλ’ αἰγίδα θυσσανόεσσαν·
Ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ κεφαλῇ νέφος ἔστεφε δῖα θεάων
Χρύσειον, ἐκ δ’ αὐτοῦ δαΐε φλόγα παμφανόωσαν.

Here the aegis and the cloud are coupled as they are in Il. xv. 308 (of Apollo): εἰμένος ὦμοῖν νεφέλην, ἔχε δ’ αἰγίδα θούριν, which Conington, in his note on this passage, maintains, apparently with good reason, that Virgil intended to translate. Meanwhile, for what seems to me the far tamer reading ‘limbo’, we may add to the passages quoted by Henry (Notes of a Twelve Years’ Voyage, &c. p. 109) a passage from Prudentius, contra Symmachum, ii. 576:

‘Nec Paphiam niveae vexere columbae,
cujus inauratum tremeret gens Persica limbum’.

Aeneid, iii. 525.

‘Magnum cratera corona Induit’. Is it possible that in this and similar passages Virgil was mistranslating Homer’s *ἀνθεμοέντι λέβητι*, Odyssey, iii. 440?

Aeneid, vi. 126.

‘Facilis descensus Averno’. The nearest Greek parallel to (perhaps the origin of) this passage seems to be Aeschylus, quoted by Plato, *Phaedo*, 108 a: *ἐστὶ δ’ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Αἴδου φέρειν.*

Ib. 273 foll.

‘Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci
luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae:
pallentesque habitant Morbi, tristisque Senectus,
et Metus, et malesuada Fames, et turpis Egestas,
terribiles visu formae; Letumque, Labosque;
tum consanguineus leti Sopor, et mala mentis
gaudia’, &c.

Conington, following Germanus, has shewn that Virgil is here thinking of Lucretius, iii. 65 foll. Another passage in the same book was probably also present to his mind, v. 459 foll.:

‘Huc accedit uti videamus, corpus ut ipsum
suscipere inmanis *morbos* durumque dolorem,
sic animum *curas* acris *luctumque metumque*,
quare participem leti quoque convenit esse.
Quin etiam morbis in corporis avius errat
saepe animus, dementit enim deliraque fatur,
interdumque gravi lethargo fertur in altum
aeternumque *soporem* oculis nutuque cadenti’!

Comp. ib. 825 foll.

‘Advenit id quod eam de rebus saepe futuris
macerat inque metu male habet curisque fatigat,
praeteritisque male admissis peccata remordent’.

Of the last passage we are reminded by Virgil’s ‘ultrices Curae’: of the first by more expressions than one. It should be added, that if I am correct in supposing Virgil here to have been working upon Lucretian material, the theory which makes ‘consanguineus Leti Sopor’ mean ‘lethargy’, not ‘sleep’, receives new confirmation.

In the list of crimes punished in the infernal regions ‘Hic quibus invisi fratres’ &c. v. 608 foll., Virgil may also have been thinking of Lucretius iii. 70 foll.

Ovid, Fasti ii. 676 (of the god Terminus).

Here Merkel reads ‘Clamato, Suus est hic ager, ille tuus’. ‘*Tuus* est hic ager’ is the reading of the great majority of his MSS., including A: ‘ille tuus’ the first reading of A, though its second reading and the reading of the other MSS. is *suus*. The line is a far better one if we keep to A throughout: ‘Clamato, *Tuus* est hic ager, ille *tuus*’: *tuus* and *tuus* referring to the two neighbours, just as Horace makes Oppidius say to his two sons (S. ii. 3. 175),

‘*Tu* Nomentanum, *tu* ne sequerere Cicutam’.

H. NETTLESHIP.

ON AN UNCOLLATED MS. OF DEMOSTHENES, OF SÆC. XIV.

ON looking over the library bequeathed by the late Mr Kerrich to the University, I came upon a MS. professing, on a slip of paper written perhaps a century or more ago, and inserted loose in it, to contain some writings and grammatical treatises of Libanius, Ulpian, and Hermogenes, with the Preface to Demosthenes and the arguments to the Orations, as usually assigned to Libanius.

The MS. is a small, but rather thick quarto, of 657 pages, the size being about nine inches by six. Though a good deal stained by damp, and a little injured by the book-moth, it is for the most part in fair condition, and, though full of contractions, everywhere legible. It is on paper, of the thick glossy kind used in the fourteenth century, and bearing, among other paper marks, a kind of triple leaf, which Professor Wright, a high authority, as one conversant with the MSS. in the British Museum, tells me fixes the date at about 1360. The water-marks however vary, and so does the handwriting, of which at least six, if not seven, distinct kinds may be traced; some of them, especially the part containing the grammatical works at the beginning, perhaps not earlier than the commencement of the fifteenth century¹.

On examining this MS. a little more closely, I found with equal surprise and satisfaction that it contained a large number

¹ Fac-similes of the different kinds of handwriting were exhibited at the reading of this paper before the Cam-

bridge Philological Society, 13 Feb. 1873.

θαυμάζω· καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, ἡμὰ δὲ θῆτες ἡμῶν
 ὁσὶν ἀρετὰς ἀθηναῖοι δυνάσται κατὰ νόμον
 πολεμὲ τεχνόνον φίλοι ποιοῦσιν καὶ τι ποιοῦσιν
 ὁρῶντες ἀποδοτέον ἡμῶν· ἵππε γὰρ δὴ
 τοῦτο δὲ τὴν μεγάλαν τὸν ἡμῶν· ἑτέρους τινας
 ἐκ τῶν τούτων πρῶτον, αἱ τὴν οὐκ ἀλλήλοισιν
 κρινόντων.

MS. Demosth. p. 139

ἡμὰ τὰς σεφάνων· ἐπὶ μὲν δὲ ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν
 χρησὶ φωνὴν δὲ ἡμῶν· ἡμῶν μὲν ὅτι πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν
 σεφάνων· ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐν δὲ τῷ τῷ δὲ οὐκ ἀσφάλειαν
 πρὸς τὴν ἐλλήνων ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν ἐλλήνων· ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν ἐλλήνων

p. 589.

ὁ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας, ὅτι τὰ
 ὅτι τοὺς ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας· πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας
 ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας· πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας
 ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας· πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας

p. 493.

τῶν ἀθηναίων ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας, σφοδρὰ τὸν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας
 σφοδρὰ τὸν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας· πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας
 πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας· πρὸς τὴν ἀνὰ μὲν μνήσας
 παιδῶν.

p.

of the Orations of Demosthenes in a perfect state. The Lep-
tines, the Androtion, the De Corona, and the De Falsa Lega-
tione, are the largest and perhaps the most important of these.
But it also contains the earlier orations; viz. the Olynthiacs,
Philippics, De Pace, *περὶ Ἀλουνήσου, περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ,*
πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, περὶ συντάξεως, ἐπιστολὴ Φιλίππου, περὶ
τῶν συμμοριῶν, περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλ. συνθηκῶν, περὶ τῆς Ῥοδίων
ἐλευθερίας, and ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν. I have collated the
greater portion of the De Fals. Leg., and can pronounce the
MS. to be of high character, very carefully and accurately
written; occasionally, chiefly in the earlier Orations, with mar-
ginal scholia, and frequently with varieties of readings recorded
also in the margin by the usual formula *γρ. so-and-so.* I have
found so many varieties, notably in the inverted order of words,
not recorded by Bekker, that I cannot doubt the MS. would
well repay a complete collation. It seems to have been well
thumbed in ancient times; but I believe that, for editorial pur-
poses, it has never yet been critically used.

It seemed to me, at first glance, probable that leaves had
been lost at an early period from different parts of the Orations,
and supplied by later hands, as occasion presented itself. This,
of course, would make it likely that the readings did not always
follow one family or class of MSS.; and the difference in the
paper-marks, or water-marks—of which I have made out twelve,
and I think there are still more—points to different periods as
well as the marked and frequent changes in the handwriting.
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that the work
was rather slowly carried on, and by a succession and inter-
change of transcribers, or if chiefly by the same, then at inter-
vals sufficient to account for considerable variations in the style
of writing.

The text of Demosthenes begins on page 124, with the
first Olynthiac. From p. 59 preceding we have the introduc-
tions of Ulpian and the arguments and catalogue of the extant
speeches by Libanius. This portion, up to p. 118, is all in one
hand (No. 1), very small, neat, and closely contracted, and
written in a brown ink, apparently at the close of Sæc. XIV.
The paper-mark in all these pages is the same. At p. 119 is

Libanius' Preface to the Orations, and this, with the handwriting of the Olynthiacs (nearly to the end of the second), is the same as far as p. 139 (2), where a leaf is interposed by another hand (3), and again another begins at p. 141 (4), and there are alternations of these three styles (all of which are of Sæc. XIV, though very distinguishable), the third predominating, as far as p. 367, where apparently a fourth hand commences (though not certainly different from the first) and continues for five pages; then No. 3 resumes the work, and continues to p. 423, or *περὶ Στεφ.* p. 283. Here, up to p. 434, we have a new and very inferior hand (No. 5), which at first sight I was disposed to regard as somewhat later, but p. 434 is written by two hands, the latter half in this, the former half in No. 3; and therefore both are, probably, at least nearly coeval. This inferior hand continues as far as p. 494, or *De Fals. Leg.* p. 356, getting more and more slovenly and irregular, when No. 3 continues for five pages, and then again No. 5 commences and on the back of the *same* page (viz. 500) with No. 3; and is therefore contemporaneous. From p. 495 to 499 No. 3 takes up the work. From p. 500 to 504 we again have No. 5. Again at p. 505 No. 3 recommences, again taken up by No. 5 at p. 511 to p. 519, when another one, viz. the hand that wrote the Olynthiacs, commences again and goes on to p. 568. I think we have here even a 6th hand, though it is not unlike No. 3 as far as 587, when again a lighter ink and finer handwriting begins, though I think it is by the same hand as the last. Then at p. 590, where the *Leptines* begins, we have yet another hand, the same as that which wrote Libanius in the first part of the MS., and in the same light-coloured ink. There follows (p. 628) a short treatise on *ῥητορικὴ* by the same hand, and at p. 631 is a *Πασχάλιον* or Easter table, full of symbols and years of indiction, very difficult to make out, but probably tending to throw a light on the exact age of the MS. At p. 641 to the end is some ecclesiastical treatise which I cannot identify, and have not had time to decipher, the writing being extremely difficult, especially as the last few pages are very tattered and damaged by damp. As far as I can judge however, the MS. is entire except the loss of one page at the beginning. Of the first fifty pages I cannot now give a very

exact account; but they contain only grammatical treatises and are not likely to prove of great value.

I have been at the pains to collate very carefully above half of the De Fals. Leg. by this MS., and I will now mention a few readings in which it differs from all the copies collated, at least as mentioned in Mr Shilleto's rather full critical notes.

In p. 342, init., the MS. has ἄκυροι πάντων ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθε, for γενήσεσθε. In p. 343, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι for οἶδ' ὅτι, and ὁ μέντοι τὸν νόμον τιθεὶς Σόλων, where Σόλων is wanting in all other copies, and may of course here be a mere gloss. At the end of the same page, ἔταξεν ἑαυτὸν for ἑαυτὸν ἔταξεν, as it has ἕκαστος ὑμῶν for ὑμῶν ἕκαστος quite at the beginning of the Speech; εἶπεν οὗτος for οὗτος εἶπε in p. 349; ἐν πύλαις ὁ φίλιππος for ὁ φίλιππος ἐν πύλαις in p. 359; and in fact, transpositions of this kind are remarkably numerous, and often well deserving of attention. In p. 344 we have πρέσβεις πέμπειν for πρέσβεις πέμψαι, and a better reading, I think. In p. 349 init., for ἵνα μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ἐπειδάν τι λέγοντος ἀκούῃ μου τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ δοκῇ δεινὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπερβάλλον εἶναι, we have the remarkable reading ἐπειδάν τι λέγοντος ἀκούῃ μου καὶ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων, δοκῇ δεινόν, &c. In p. 350, for ὅτι ὄντιν' ἂν ὑμεῖς κατεστήσατε, which Mr Shilleto translates "whomsoever you might have placed in this post," the MS. has εἰ καὶ ὄντινούν, &c., which I believe is the true reading. In p. 362, MS. has δικαίως ἂν ὑποληφθεῖεν, which is again better than the vulg. δικαίως ὑποληφθεῖεν ἄν. In p. 366, for οἱ δ' ὅτιοῦν ἂν ἀργυρίου ποιήσαντες, we have the remarkable variant οἱ δὲ μηδ' ὅτιοῦν ἄνευ ἀργυρίου ποιήσαντες. Another good reading given in this MS. is μετεκομίζεσθε for κατεκομίζεσθε in p. 368; and again κατηγορεῖ for καταμαρτυρεῖ in p. 377 ad fin. I could multiply these examples many times over; but I think I have given sufficient evidence that this really is a MS. of very considerable interest, not to say importance. My collation is in Mr Shilleto's hands: and no one is better able to use it or to judge of the value of the *variae lectiones*.

F. A. PALEY.

ON THE PREFIX *A-* IN ENGLISH.

THE value of the prefix *a-* is the first question that invites our attention when we open our Dictionaries at the beginning. The account of it in most Dictionaries is meagre and imperfect. In Webster, for example, we are told that the word *aloft* is from the prefix *a-* and *loft*. This shirks the whole question as to the value which it there possesses.

The best accounts are perhaps those given in Dr Morris's *Outlines of English Accidence*, Haldeman's *Affixes to English Words*, and the *English Grammars* by Mätzner and Koch. The last seems to give the best information, and may be consulted in preference to the others. Good examples may be found in Stratmann's *Old English Dictionary*. Leaving out the words in which this prefix is derived from Latin or Greek, Haldeman assigns fifteen different meanings to it. But these are merely such as have arisen from differences of usage, and have nothing to do with etymology. From an etymological point of view, I make out as many as eleven distinct values of the prefix, and I take as representatives of these values the following words, viz., (1) *adown*; (2) *afoot*; (3) *along*; (4) *arise*; (5) *achieve*; (6) *avert*; (7) *amend*; (8) *alas*; (9) *abyss*; (10) *ado*; and (11) *aware*. For convenience, I shall give different forms to the apparent prefix, and distinguish them as OF-, ON-, AND-, US-, AD-, AB-, EX-, A-, AN-, AT-, and GE-.

We must be careful to exclude words in which the prefix is not *a-*, but something else; such as e.g. the word *alone*, which is really short for *all one*, from which the word *lone* has been formed by mere contraction; and also *atone*, which—if we may trust the evidence—is formed from *at* and *one*.

One source of difficulty is this—that the oldest English sometimes exhibits as many as three prefixes, where at present we have only one. Hence cases arise in which it is almost impossible to say whence the *a-* is really derived, though we can limit it to three or two sources. This will appear more clearly as we proceed to consider each of our words in order.

(1) The prefix OF- in ADOWN.

The oldest spelling of *adown* is *of-dúne*, i.e. off the down or hill, and so *downwards*. Contrast this with Fr. *aval*, from *ad vallem*, which also means *downwards*; with its derivatives *avalier* and *avalanche*. The full form of the prefix is shewn in *offspring*, *offshoot*, and *offset*, where the spelling with two *effs* is modern. In *offspring* and *spring of a watch*, for instance, the *off* and *of* are identical. So also in *of-fal*.

This prefix is, of course, cognate with the Latin *ab-*, and therefore with *a-* in *avert*; but words from native and foreign sources should be carefully distinguished.

It is also cognate with *apo-* in *apostle*, *apology*, and *apogee*, which appears as *ap-* in *aphelion*, &c.

Other examples beside *adown* are uncommon. The following ought perhaps to be referred here, viz. *anew*, *athirst*, *an-hungered*, and *akin*.

Anew is spelt *ofnewe* even in Chaucer, in the last line of part v. of The Clerkes Tale.

Athirst is the A.S. *of-pirst*, where the prefix has an intensive force; just as in the Icelandic *ofdrykkja*, indulgence in drink. *An-hungered* is a corruption of *a-hungered*, from which it was easily corrupted (in the thirteenth century or later) for greater ease in pronunciation. The A.S. verb was *of-hingrian*, to *feel excessive hunger*, whence came not only the forms *ahungered* and *anhungered*, but also the curious form *afyngred*, as in the phrase—‘Boþe *afyngred* and *afurst*’; i.e. both a-hungered and athirst; Piers Plowman, C. xii. 43. Koch explains this correctly; see his Englische Grammatik, vol. III. p. 131.

Akin I am unable to trace with certainty. Such phrases as *of his cynne*, *of Adames cynne* (of his kin, of Adam’s kin)

are common; and we still have the phrase *next of kin*. I therefore place it here for the present.

Words like *adread*, *afear*d, *aghast*, and *ashamed*, which may possibly belong here, will be discussed in dealing with class 4.

The word *an-hungered* may be further illustrated by the example given by Dr Morris of a similar change, in the word *Jack-an-apes* from *Jack of apes*; compare also *Jack-a-lantern* and *man-a-war* as they are sometimes spelt.

(2) The prefix ON- in AFOOT.

Examples of this are exceedingly common; so much so that, when other evidence fails, we shall commonly be right in assuming *a-* to represent an original *on*. In the following words, the form *on* actually appears in Old English, so that we can have no doubt about them. They are—*aback*, *abaft*, *abed*, *ablaze*, *aboard*, *about*, *above*, *abroad*, *adays*, *afield*, *afire*, *afoot*, *afar*, *afore*¹, *ahigh*, *ajar* (for *on char*, i.e. on the turn), *aland*, *alive*, *aloft*, *amidst*, *among*, *anights*, *aright*, *arow*, *aside*, *ashore*, *asleep*, *asunder*, and *away* (which occurs in the form *on weg*, not *of weg*). Also in such words as *a-hunting*, *a-fishing*, &c. In some cases the prefix was originally the preposition *on*, but it comes to the same thing.

Probably we ought to add *alike*, Icelandic *á-líkr*, where *á* is the A.S. *on*, but I shall speak of this word again; see class 11. Another form of *on* was *an*, which is still preserved in *anon* and *anent*. Of these, *anon* is the A.S. *on án*, lit. in one, i.e. in a moment, immediately. The etymologies of *anent* given by Webster and Wedgwood are wide of the mark. The right derivation is that given by Mätzner, who traces it to the A.S. *on-efne* (later *an-emne*) and the Old Saxon *on evan*, lit. on even; and hence, on an equality with, beside, regarding. It is worth observing that the modern German *neben* is formed nearly in the same way, viz. from the old phrase *in epan*, where *in* is the preposition, and *epan* is the English *even*.

In the word *acknowledge*, the prefix has been turned into *ac-*, and the suffix *-ledge* (A.S. *-lác*) has been added. The A.S. form was *oncnáwan*, which at a later period became *aknowe*.

¹ The A.S. has *æt-fóran* as well as *on-fóran*.

We may therefore bear in mind that *acknowledge*, *anon*, and *anent* all contain this same prefix *on-*.

The common use of the above words with this prefix led to the formation of a number of others, in which, if we cannot find them used with the spelling *on-*, we may at least feel sure that they were formed by imitation, and so are really due to this prefix. Of this there can at least be no doubt when the substantives are of native origin; so that we may safely add to the list these words following. They are these;—*abreast*, *adrift*, *afresh*, *aground*, *ahead*, *agape*, *agog*, *aground*, *alight*, *aloof* (from *luff*), *aloud*, *alow*, *anigh*, *askew* (Icel. *á ská*), *askance*, *aslant*, *aslope*, *astir*, *astray*, *astride*, *atilt*, *atop*, *awork*, and *awry*. We may also add *athwart*, as the expression *on þweorh spreca*n, to speak athwart, i.e. perversely, occurs in Cædmon, ed. Thorpe, p. 145. Yet a commoner form was *overthwart*, which occurs in Chaucer.

Also *akimbo*, on the strength of a quotation from the Tale of Beryn, for which see Wedgwood's Etymological Dictionary.

The prefix *a-*, from *on-*, being thus well established, it was prefixed even to words of French origin, the borrowed words being made to conform to the English habit. This seems to me a better explanation than to have recourse to the French *à*, though the signification of the latter was much the same. Amongst such words I should reckon these, viz. *across*, *apace*, (which is not the French *à pas*), *arear* (which in French would be *par derrière*), *around* (French *à la ronde*), and several others. The only exception I should be inclined to make is *apart*, which was probably borrowed entire from the French *à part*; see class 5. Indeed, the word *aparte* is found in Spanish. In modern times, the word *apropos* has been borrowed, and is almost naturalised.

(3) The prefix AND- in ALONG.

The word *along* is easily traced back to the A.S. *andlang*, and the exact correspondence of this to the German *entlang* and the Old Friesic *ondling* at once helps us to understand it. Cf. *endelong* in Chaucer.

This prefix appears in Icelandic, Old Friesic, and Old Saxon in the form *and-*; in Old High German as *ant-*; in Moeso-

Gothic it has also a fuller form *anda-*, which answers to the Greek *ἀντί*, the Latin *ante*, and the Old Sanskrit *anti*.

This prefix is also exhibited by the word *answer*, which is the A.S. *andswerian*, and (as far as the prefix goes) the German *antworten*.

Another possible example is the word *abide*. We find not only the A.S. forms *onbīdan* and *anbīdan*, but also the fuller form *andbīdan*; and this answers to an Old High German *enbīten*, in which *en* is short for *ent-*. If *abide* be refused admission here, it must go into class 4.

It should be added here that there is one instance in which the prefix *and-* has passed into *e-*, viz. in the word *elope*. This is a borrowed word, from the Dutch *ontloopen*, which is the German *entlaufen*.

I have no doubt about referring hither also the words *again* and *against*, which are commonly referred to the prefix *on-* because the A.S. form is *ongean*. But it appears to me that the prefix *on-* is here a corruption of *ond-*, another spelling of *and-*. Indeed, our word *answer* occurs in A.S. in all three forms *andswarian*, *ondswarian*, and *onswærian*; so that the A.S. *ongean* exactly corresponds to the German *entgegen*.

(4) The prefix in *ARISE*, answering to the Mæso-Gothic *US-*.

We find in Mæso-Gothic a preposition *us*, meaning *out of* or *from*, answering in fact to the Latin *ex* in signification, though it hardly seems to correspond with it as far as the vowel is concerned. It occurs frequently in composition, and answers to the Old High German *ar-*, *ir-*, *ur-*, and the modern German *er-*, but in Old Saxon and Anglo-Saxon becomes *a-*. The principal words with this prefix are *abide* (?), *adread*, *afear*, *affrighted*, *aghost*, *ago*, *arise*, *arouse*, *ashamed*, and *awake*. *Abide* is A.S. *abīdan*, *anbīdan*, *onbīdan*, or *andbīdan*, so that it may belong, as just suggested, to class 3. We find, however, the Old German *erbīten*, and the Mæso-Gothic *usbeidan*, which give it some claim to come in here.

In *adread*, we find in A.S. all three forms *adrædan*, *ondrædan*, and *of-drædan*, but I place it here in company with *afear-*

ed, *affrighted*, and *aghast*; cf. Germ. *erschrecken*. *Afeard* is A.S. *afæred* or *of-færed*, both forms being found; but the O.H.G. has the verb *erværen* or *erveren*. *Affrighted* is A.S. *afyrht*, and in Old High German we meet with the verb in the various forms *arfurihtan*, *erforahten*, *erfurahten*, later *ervürhten*, *irvurhten*, or *ervurchten*. *Aghast*, now spelt, like *ghost*, with an intrusive *h*, is found in Old English in both forms, *agasted* and *ofgasted*. It seems best to refer it at once to the Mæso-Gothic *usgeisnan*, to be terrified, and *usgaisjan*, to terrify. *Ago* is often wrongly said to be a corruption of *igo*, the past participle of the simple verb *gán*, to go. But it is easily traced back to the A.S. *agán*, the past participle of *agangan*, to pass by; for *ago* still has the sense of *past by*. Besides, we find the same verb both in the Old Saxon *agangan* and the Old High German *ergan* or *argan*, now spelt *ergehen*. The Old Saxon past part. *agangan* was used precisely as we now use *ago*; see *Heliand*, ed. Heyne, l. 47. *Arise* is the A.S. *arísan*, Old Saxon *arísan*, and the Mæso-Gothic *ur-reisan*; it being a rule in Mæso-Gothic that *us-* becomes *ur-* before a following *r*. *Arouse* is parallel to the transitive verb *urraisjan* in Mæso-Gothic. *Ashamed* has in A.S. the double form *asceamod*, or *ofsceamod*; compare, however, the Old High German *erschamen* or *irscamen*. *Awake* is the A.S. *awacan* or *onwacan*; compare, however, the German *erwachen* and the Mæso-Gothic *uswakjan*. To shew how capriciously these prefixes were used, I may observe that whilst we find *erwachen* in German, we find *ontwaken* in Dutch. So that I must confess that I do not see how the four prefixes *of-*, *on-*, *and-*, and *us-*, can always be separated with perfect certainty. Each word ought to be investigated separately, and the result can only be certain in a few cases. In others some doubt must of necessity still remain.

Perhaps we may add to this list the word *abear*; though here again we are met by double forms, viz. the A.S. *abéran* and *onbéran*. Unfortunately, the signification of these prefixes is rather slippery; so that even this guide fails us.

The word *amase* has not been satisfactorily traced. One account connects it with the Icelandic *masa*, to chatter or talk idly, which is not very satisfactory. Dr Stratmann puts it in

this class. Perhaps it arose in a similar way to *appal*; and if so, it belongs to class 5.

I here collect, for convenience, the words in which the prefix may have arisen from one of several sources. They are:—*alike* (from *on-* or *and-*); *abide* (from *and-* or *us-*); *adread* (from *of-*, *on-*, or *us-*); *afear'd*, *aghost*, *ashamed* (from *of-* or *us-*); *awake*, *abear* (from *on-* or *us-*); *amase* (from *us-* or *ad-*). Also *afore* (from *on-* or *at-*); see class 10.

(5) The prefix AD- in ACHIEVE.

Properly speaking, the words containing the Latin *ad-* ought to go into two classes; (a) those which we have taken directly from the Latin, and (b) those which we have taken through the medium of the French. I put them together because they present no particular difficulty, and the dictionaries are generally correct in their information concerning this prefix.

(a) For further remarks on *ad*, see Haldeman's English Affixes, p. 43; and Koch's Eng. Gram. III. (b) 171. It assumes, as is well known, several forms, viz. *a-*, *ac-*, *ad-*, *af-*, *ag-*, *al-*, *an-*, *ap-*, *ar-*, *as-*, *at-*, according to the nature of the following consonant. There are very few words in which it is cut down to the simple *a-*. Examples of this are seen in *ascribe*, and *astringent*, in which the root contains *s* followed by a consonant. Several words of the same character, such as *ascend*, *aspect*, *asperse*, *aspire*, also occur, but these may have come to us through the French, whereas *ascribe* and *astringent* were borrowed directly.

(b) The French *à*, from Latin *ad*, appears evidently in such words as *abate*, *abandon*, *achieve*, *adieu*, *adroit*, *agree*, *alarm*, *alert*¹, *amort*, *apart*, *aver*, and many others. Sometimes it seems to make but little difference to the sense, as in the Old French *avengier*, from Lat. *vindicare*, whence Eng. *avenge*; neither do I see clearly how to tell (in some cases) whether this Old French prefix is to be referred to the Latin *ad-*, to the Latin *ex-*, or to the Old French *es-*, which is said, however, to be from the Latin *ex*. A remarkable instance of the free use

¹ The extraordinary phrase *on the alert* contains an English and a French preposition, and an English and a French definite article.

of the prefix *a-* (probably *ad-*) is seen in the word *appal*, formed from a Welsh root. The Welsh *pall* signifies *loss of energy, failure*; and the verb *pallu* is *to fail*. To this the middle-English *a-* (partly a reminiscence of the A.S. *on*, and partly an imitation of the Lat. *ad*) was prefixed, to give it a transitive force. The resulting word *appal* has some resemblance to the Old French *appalir*, to grow pale, and hence has frequently been referred to the Latin *pallidus*. It is, of course, quite possible that some confusion in sense with the word *pale* may have influenced the formation of the word from the very first.

(6) The prefix AB- in AVERT.

See, on this prefix, Haldeman's *English Affixes*, p. 42; and Koch's *Eng. Gram.* III. (b) 170. This class is also subdivisible into two classes; (a) words taken directly from Latin, and (b) words adopted through the French. The prefix generally appears in a fuller form, viz. either *ab-*, as in *abjure*, or *abs-*, as in *abscond*, *abstain*, and *abstract*. The word *avert* is almost the only one in which it is cut down to the simple *a-*. The most noteworthy example is in the word *advance*, where the *ab* has ignorantly been turned into *ad*. The derivation is from the Latin *ab ante*, whence the French *avancer* and Old Eng. *avance*.

(7) The prefix EX- in AMEND.

There can be little doubt that the Fr. *amender* was a corruption of the Latin *emendare*. Hence the prefix is really the Lat. *ex*. For the change of *e* into *a*, compare our *anoint* with the Old French *enoindre*, from the Lat. *inungere*.

In another instance, the form of the prefix is *as-*, or *es-*. I refer to *essay* or *assay*, which is from the Lat. *exagium*.

Probably the word *afraid* is to be referred hither also. It is from the O.F. *effraier* or *esfraier*, and the Provençal form *esfreidar* points to a probable Low Latin form *exfrigidare*. The original sense of *afraid* is, accordingly, *chilled*, and hence, *chilled with terror* or *terrified*.

I now draw attention to some very puzzling words, which have hardly been satisfactorily solved, viz. *await*, *award*, *abash*,

and *astonish*. These are easily traced to the Old French *eswaiter*, *eswarder*, *esbahir*, and *estonner*. All the authorities, including Littré, Diez, Burguy, and Brachet, agree in the account of this prefix *es-*, which they declare to be a corruption of the Latin *ex-*, used with various significations. It may be so, but I cannot refrain from advancing the rather bold suggestion that this *es-* was at any rate to some extent influenced by a reminiscence of the Mæso-Gothic *us-* or the Old High German *ar-*. According to this view, *eswarder* is parallel to the German *erwarten*; and *eswaiter* to the German *erwachten*, for it is well known that *wait*, *watch*, and *wake* are mere variations in spelling of the same word.

So also, instead of taking *estonner* to be from an imaginary Latin *extonare* (a strengthened form, we are told, of *attonare*), I make it parallel to the German *erstaunen*. Indeed, the form *astound* may have been pure English. We find an A.S. *stunian*, the modern *stun*, and also an A.S. compound verb *astundian*. The only drawback is that the latter word seems to have meant *to put up with*, and so does not agree with *astound* so well in sense as in form. Still it is made equivalent to our *astound* in Bosworth's Dictionary.

I may perhaps put the result in this way. All French etymologists divide the word *astonish* into *as-* and *-tonish*, and they admit no value of the Old French *es-* but that derived from the Latin *ex-*. My proposal is to divide it into *a-* and *-stonish*, connecting the verb with our *stun* and the German *erstaunen*. I then proceed to suggest a connection between the resulting French prefix *e-* and the Old High German *ar-*. An alternative suggestion is that the initial *e* in the Old Fr. *estonner* meant just nothing at all, but was added for convenience of pronunciation, like the *e* in *espérer*, from the Lat. *sperare*.

(8) The A- in ALAS!

Here the prefix is simply an interjection, answering to the English *ah*, Fr. *hé*, Ital. *ahi*. The same value is to be attributed to the *a* in *alack*, which seems, indeed, a mere corruption of *alas*. So also in *ahoy*, the prefix in which has not been accounted for. Yet *hoy* is clearly the Du. *hui*, an interjection

meaning "come up! well!" according to the small dictionary published by Tauchnitz; for *hoy* and *hui* would be pronounced almost exactly alike, and many sea terms are known to be Dutch. If then *hoy* is itself an interjection, the prefix *a-* must be one also.

The word *avast*, according to Webster, is a corruption of the Dutch *hou vast*, i.e. hold fast or "hold hard." This looks very likely; but if so, it increases the number of values of the prefix *a-* from *eleven* to *twelve*.

There is an *a* in the middle of *wellaway* or *welladay* which may be explained here. The older form of the two is *wellaway*, and this is known to be a corruption of the A.S. *wá la wá*, which means literally *woe! lo! woe!* The *a* is therefore a part of the A.S. *lá*, which is the modern *lo!*

(9) The prefix AN- in ABYSS.

This Greek negative prefix is well understood. It occurs in full in *anecdote*, *anodyne*, and *anomaly*; but it is commonly cut down to *a-*, as in *aneroid*, *abyss*, *achromatic*, and *adamant*. It answers to the Lat. *in-* and the English *un-*; and is well discussed in Prof. Key's Essays, p. 127. His suggestions that a fuller form of it is seen in the Lat. *ve-* in *vesanus*, and the Eng. *wan-* in *wanhope*, deserve consideration; I can hardly go with his next step, which would bring us to the same root in a supposed word *uam-alus*, bad, of which the latter part is preserved in the Latin *malus*.

(10) The prefix AT- in ADO.

I doubt if even the above nine values quite exhaust the subject. Besides the word *avast*, where *a* may stand for *hou*, there is the word *ado*, which may point to a prefix *at*. The only explanation I can find of this word is the ingenious one given by Mätzner, in his Englische Grammatik, vol. II. pt. ii. p. 58.

The word *at* is used with the infinitive mood in Icelandic, Swedish, Danish, &c. The same practice, borrowed from the Danes, prevailed in Northern English. Thus in the Towneley

Mysteries, p. 181, we find 'We have othere thinges *at do*,' i.e. to do. This Mätzner compares with l. 5082 of the *Romaunt of the Rose*, 'And done all that they han *ado*;' where *ado* certainly means *to do*, and seems to be a contraction of *at do*. Conversely, the poet Gascoygne, in his *Jocasta*, Act I. Sc. 1, has the expression, 'And so with much *to doe*,' where we should now say 'with much *ado*.' This helps to confirm the supposition. According to this view, *to-do* in the phrase 'here's a *to-do*,' is a translation (as it were) of the Northumbrian *at do*.

Another word which may exhibit *at-* is *afore*. We find in A.S. both *onfóran* and *ætfóran*, as I have said, and the former form is more likely to have been the real source, since the prefix *on-* was so common. Yet we find the other form sometimes; Layamon, for instance, has *at-foren*, and Robert of Gloucester *atvore*.

(11) The prefix GE- in AWARE.

This is somewhat doubtful, yet it is difficult to assign any other source. The A.S. has *gewær*, but in later Old English we find *war*, *i-war*, or *y-war*. The evidence is distinctly in favour of a corruption of *iwar* into *aware*, loath as I am to admit such an unlikely change. We must remember, however, that the extreme frequency of *a-* as a prefix in words like *above*, *aloft*, and the like, may have greatly contributed to suggesting the alteration. In this case, the English *to become aware* of a thing exactly corresponds to the German *gewahr werden*.

The word *ilik* is found frequently in Early English, but we may escape the deduction that *alike* is a corruption of it. We may safely refer *alike* to A.S. *onlíc*, corresponding to the Icelandic *á-líkr* and the Mæso-Goth. *analeiko*; whence *o-like* in Robert of Brunne, p. 301 (according to Richardson), and *aliche* in Gower and in the *Testament of Love*. *Onnlicnesse* for *likeness* occurs in the *Ormulum*. We find also in A.S. the form *andlícnesse* (Gen. i. 27), which raises a suspicion that *on-* is short for *and-*, and makes it doubtful whether *alike* belongs to class 2 or to class 3.

I cannot say that I feel quite sure of all the results, owing to the imperfect state of our Old English Glossaries; but I wish

to call attention to their probable correctness, and venture to express a hope that future lexicographers, when they have occasion to mention the prefix *a-*, will condescend to explain *which* prefix *a-* they mean; since there are very nearly a dozen of them.

WALTER W. SKEAT.

ON HYPERIDES.

I. Orat. Fun. c. IX. 34 foll. οὐδεμία γὰρ στρατεία τὴν τῶν στρατευομένων ἀρετὴν ἐνεφάνισεν μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν γεγενημένης, ἐν ᾗ γε παρατάττεσθαι μὲν ὁσημέραι ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, πλείους δὲ μάχας ἡγωνίσθαι διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας πληγὰς λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ etc. Different conjectures have been made by learned men. Professor Fritzsche (Ind. Lect. in Acad. Rostoch. 1861, 1862) conjectures: πλείους δὲ πληγὰς λαμβάνειν ἐν μάχαις ἡγωνισμέναις διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους etc. This would imply that the Athenians and their allies sustained in this war a great number of defeats; but up to the time when Hyperides delivered this speech, they had always been victorious. Hyperides says expressly regarding Leosthenes' engagements with the enemy: συνέβη δ' αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων ὧν προεῖλετο κρατῆσαι, τῆς δ' εἰμαρμένης οὐκ ἦν περιγενέσθαι (c. VI. 38 foll.). Dr Blass in his edition and Dr Mähly in Neue Jahrb. f. Phil. und Pädag. 1872 p. 611 propose respectively ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας συμβαίνει ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χ. and ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας πολίτας συμβαίνει ἐν τῷ π. χ. Professor Cobet in his edition of this speech p. 16: 'arena sine calce. exime πληγὰς λαμβάνειν et sana erunt omnia.' Professor Babington defends the reading of the papyrus in his second edition: 'To myself at least the text of the MS. seems perfectly sound. Hyperides in his rhetorical flourishing fashion declares that Leosthenes and his men had passed through more battles in one campaign, than other people had received blows in all their lifetime. It may be hyperbolical enough to affirm that the number of the former exceeds that of the latter, but that is no reason for suspecting the cor-

rectness of the text; although it must be owned that *εἰληφέναι* would have been more natural.' I am inclined to think that *πληγὰς λαμβάνειν* is used in the meaning of 'clades accipere.' In a small essay (printed in Professor G. Curtius' *Grammat. Stud.* 1870, p. 101—114) I have collected a number of words which are more or less peculiar to Hyperides; some of them are not to be found in any other writer, some Hyperides used in common with one or other of the Comic poets, some occur in later writers, especially in Polybius; e.g., whilst Aeschines II. 176 etc. has *ἀψιμαχία*, Hyperides fragm. 134 and Polybius XVII. 8, 4 use the verb *ἀψιμαχεῖν*; Demosthenes XVIII. 13 etc. has *τραγωδεῖν* (to tell in tragic phrase, to exaggerate), whilst Hyperides II. c. 10, III. c. 37 and later writers employ a noun *τραγωδία*, cf. Polybius VI. 56 etc. In like manner Hyperides may have used *πληγή* in the sense of 'defeat,' whilst Herodotus and Thucydides use *πλήσσεσθαι* in the sense of 'to be defeated.' Cf. Photius s.v. *πέπληκται ἡττηται*. *Μένανδρος* (Dobree, *Adv.* I. p. 606). We again meet with *πληγὰς λαμβάνειν* in this sense in Polybius, e.g. I. 15, 2, II. 32, 3; cf. Schol. on Thucyd. III. 18 *πληγέντες· μεγάλως νικηθέντες οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι. πληγή γὰρ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ τραῦμα ἢ ἰσχυρὰ ἦττα*. I quote the translation of the passage by M. Caffiaux (*Quelques observations sur la dernière récénsion du texte de l'Oraison Funèbre d'Hypéride* p. 12): 'Il fallait, en une seule campagne, gagner pour recouvrir l'hégémonie, autant de victoires que, dans le passé, il avait fallu, pour la perdre, essuyer de défaites.'

II. There is a passage in [Longinus] *περὶ ὕψους* c. 34 regarding Hyperides which seems to require a closer attention than has been bestowed upon it. Hyperides is there compared to a *πένταθλος*. *εἰ δ' ἀριθμῶ, μὴ τῷ μεγέθει κρίνοιτο τὰ κατορθώματα, οὕτως ἂν καὶ Ὑπερείδης τῷ πάντι προέχοι Δημοσθένους. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ πολυφωνότερος καὶ πλείους ἀρετὰς ἔχων καὶ σχεδὸν ὕπακρος ἐν πᾶσιν, ὡς ὁ πένταθλος, ὥστε τῶν μὲν πρωτείων [ἐν ᾗ πασι—Professor Jahn places these words in brackets in his edition] τῶν ἄλλων ἀγωνιστῶν λείπεσθαι, πρωτεύειν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν*. Professor Kayser (*Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1853, p. 642) does not put a favourable construction on this comparison,

exclaiming: 'Ein schönes Lob in der That für einen Künstler unter den Laien der erste zu sein.' On the other hand Dr Boehnecke (Demosthenes, Lykurgos, Hyperides etc. p. 107) draws from it a conclusion in support of his opinion that Hyperides was an orator rather by nature than by education. I think the comparison of Hyperides with a *πένταθλος* cannot be fully understood without a thorough investigation of the system of the *πένταθλον* and the qualities required in a *πένταθλος*. Such an investigation has been made by Dr Pinder (*Über den Fünfkampf der Hellenen*, Berlin 1867). He has established quite a new theory. According to him the *πένταθλον* consisted of *ἄλμα*, *ἀκόντιον*, *δρόμος*, *δίσκος*, *πάλη*: in the leaping-contest all the competitors took part; to the spear-throwing those only were admitted who had shown a certain proficiency in leaping; in the subsequent contests the number of the competitors was limited: the four best spearmen entered for the race, the three best runners were admitted to the trial of throwing the discus, finally the two best discus-throwers wrestled, and the victorious wrestler was declared victor in the *πένταθλον*. I have only quoted so much of this interesting essay as is required for my purpose, which is to show how much value may be attached to the title of *πένταθλος* given to Hyperides. Dr Pinder (p. 85) says: 'The judgments of the philosophers and rhetoricians as to the *πένταθλοι* appear as the natural consequence of such a system. They blame the mediocrity of the performances, admitting at the same time their many-sidedness. This is a just censure. For in fact the victor in the *πένταθλον* was not required to be the best man in any one of the four first contests; his performances were only not allowed to be below a certain mediocrity. His final opponent could not be very bad at jumping or running or throwing the spear and discus, but might possibly be a poor wrestler. The victory over him, considered as a victory in wrestling, might be anything but brilliant. Therefore, the *πένταθλοι* are praised for many-sidedness and censured for their mediocrity.' Cf. Aristides Panath. p. 318 Dind.: *ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδὲ πένταθλοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάντα νικῶντες τοσοῦτον τοῖς πᾶσι κρατεῖν*; and Photius cod. 249 p. 440 Bekk.: *καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ πένταθλος πάσας ἔχων τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ἀθλημάτων*

ἐν ἐκάστη ἡττων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τι ἐπιτηδεύοντος; and Suidas s.v. Πένταθλος. Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ἥσκητο γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ, τὰ ἠθικὰ, τὰ μαθηματικὰ, καὶ τοὺς ἐγκυκλίους λόγους, καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν πᾶσαν εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν. The πένταθλος may be considered inferior to any one who gave himself entirely to a single art. So Plato Amat. c. 4, p. 135: ἄρ' ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἀθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτοίς. From this passage we see clearly that the πένταθλος compared with a runner or wrestler, i.e. with one who cultivated exclusively running or wrestling, is his inferior, but still gets the victory on account of his many-sidedness, being the best of the competitors who cultivated all five branches of the contest. The passage of [Longinus], which is not mentioned in Dr Pinder's essay, is to be understood in the same way; ἰδιῶται are not lay-men in the general sense of the word, but only in opposition to the professional spear-throwers etc., in the same way as ἰδιῶται are sometimes contrasted with the professional orators.

In my essay above mentioned, I added a fragment (taken from E. Miller, *Mélanges de Littérature grecque*, p. 121) to those in Dr Blass' edition of Hyperides. This fragment I prefixed to his fragm. 100, so as to form the following: ἀκούω γὰρ Αὐτοκλέα τὸν ῥήτορα πρὸς Ἰππίνικον τὸν Καλλίου περὶ χωρίου τινὸς ἀμφισβητήσαντα καὶ λαιδορίας αὐτοῖς γενομένης ῥαπίζειν αὐτὸν Ἰππόνικον ἐπὶ κόρρῃς. ἔπειτα καὶ Ἰππόνικος ὑπ' Αὐτοκλέους μόνον ἐῤῥαπίσθη τὴν γνάθον etc. I may here mention that the Deliac speech of Hyperides is referred to in the Schol. on Aeschines III. 108: τὸ δὲ Προνοίας Ὑπερείδης ἐν Δηλιακῷ συνιστορεῖ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐστίν (F. Schultz, *Aeschinis Oratt.* p. 334).

HERMAN HAGER.

ON THE DERIVATION AND THE MEANING OF ΕΠΙΟΥΣΙΟΣ.

THERE are four possible derivations of the word *ἐπιούσιος*;—*two* from *εἶναι* (which are really distinct), and *two* from *ἵεναι*, (which are only slightly divergent). Thus

1. Referred to *εἶναι*, the word may be

- (a) from the participle, *ἐπι-ών*, or
- (b) from *ἐπὶ* and *οὐσία*.

2. Referred to *ἵεναι*, it may be

- (a) from [ὁ] *ἐπ-ιών* [*χρόνος*], or
- (b) from [ἡ] *ἐπ-ιοῦσα* [*ἡμέρα*].

Of recent writers, Dean Alford, in his note on S. Matt. vi. 11, follows Tholuck in contending for 1 (b): whilst Professor Lightfoot, in a very able and interesting Essay appended to his treatise “on a Fresh Revision, &c.,” pleads in favour of the second of the above pairs; with a strong leaning towards 2 (b).

A question, on which so eminent scholars have held opposite opinions, may fairly be considered open to re-examination.

In the present paper each of the four possible solutions will pass under review; but it will be convenient to take them in an order the reverse of that in which they are given above.

I. *Is it from ἐπ-ιοῦσα?*

1. There is *no need* to draw the feminine form into the discussion¹.

¹ Although our great Lexicon does in one place countenance this, by giving “*οὐσία, ἡ, (ὦν, οὔσα, εἰμὶ).*”

As *γερουσία* comes from *γέρων* directly, so will *ἐπιούσιος* from *ἐπιών*. If the interval between *γέρων* and *γερουσία* is to be abridged, we must call in the help of the Spartan form *γεροντία*. For, as the analogy of the Latin and Sanscrit verbs leads us to think *λέγοντι* an earlier form than *λέγουσι*, so *γεροντία* may well take precedence of *γερουσία*.

2. There is a serious reason against doing so.

Such a prayer as "Give us this day the bread of to-morrow," is both harsh in itself, and at variance with what Christendom generally has understood by the petition.

In any case, then, 2 (b) may be dismissed.

II. Or, from *ἐπ-ιών*?

Against either of the derivations from *ἵεναι* there is the following weighty objection.

From the time of Origen downward, almost all critics have felt that the word *ἐπιούσιος* was, in all likelihood, formed on the model of *περιούσιος*. Therefore, as there is no doubt about *περιούσιος* being from *εἶναι*, we should naturally take *ἐπιούσιος* also from *εἶναι*—unless there be some insuperable obstacle in the way of our doing so.

It is, indeed, urged that such an obstacle actually exists; because the form of the word, if derived from *εἶναι*, would (it is said) be *ἐπούσιος* (with the iota elided).

To this it has been replied¹, that the rule respecting the elision of the iota cannot be considered absolute; since we have *ἐπίοπτος*, as well as *ἔποπτος*, and *ἐπιανδάνω*, as well as *ἐφανδάνω*. This appears to be a sufficient answer to the objection: though, when we come to speak of 1 (a), we shall take much stronger ground.

III. Is it, then, from *ἐπὶ* and *οὐσία*?

Once more we refer to the analogy of *περιούσιος*. Since the substantive *περιουσία* is not from *περὶ* and *οὐσία*, but directly from *περι-ών* (as *οὐσία*, *ἀπουσία*, *ἐξουσία*, *μετουσία*, *παρουσία*, *συνουσία* are from *ών*, *ἀπών*, &c. directly), the obvious

¹ Alford, u. s.

course is to derive the closely associated adjective *περιούσιος* also from *περι-ών*. As *περιουσία* is "the state in which one has *περίοντα*, a surplus," so *περιούσιος* is "such as belongs to, or forms, a surplus."

So far, then, the balance of probability seems to be on the side of *ἐπι-ών*.

IV. It remains to be considered how far this derivation, from *ἐπι-ών*, satisfies the conditions of the problem.

It does so completely. As *περιούσιος* signifies "corresponding to τὸ περίον,—what is over and above, or surplus," so *ἐπιούσιος* will denote, "corresponding to τὸ ἐπίον,—what is close by, or at hand." Accordingly, *ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος* would mean "bread suited to our ordinary, or immediate, wants."

We may now revert to the grammatical objection noticed above. The following consideration will, it is hoped, entirely remove all scruple that might be felt on this score.

It is unquestionable that no such form as *ἐπών* is anywhere to be found. Consequently, we must admit that the present participle of *ἐπεῖναι* is *ἐπιών*; unless some good reason can be produced for leaving *ἐπεῖναι* destitute of a present participle. In fact, however, we have very strong reason for concluding just the reverse. For, when we find in actual use¹ the two following correspondent sets of phrases,

(1) τὸ παρόν, ὁ παρὼν νῦν χρόνος, ἡ παρούσα νῦν ἡμέρα,

(2) τὸ ἐπίον, ὁ ἐπιὼν χρόνος, ἡ ἐπιούσα ἡμέρα,

it seems little short of a certainty that the participles of the latter set, no less than those of the former (with which they stand in sharp contrast), are to be taken as coming from *εἶναι*.

To complete our view of the subject, let two remarks be added.

1. The meaning most commonly assigned to the word *ἐπιούσιος* by Greek writers does, as a matter of fact, supply an exact antithesis to *περιούσιος*.

¹ See Liddell-and-Scott, s. vv.

For, as Polybius¹, on the one hand, uses πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας χρείας in contrast with πρὸς περιουσίαν:

So, on the other hand, Theophylact² explaining ἐπιούσιον says, οὐ τὸν περιττὸν πάντως, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον: whilst both Chrysostom³ and Theodoret³, when commenting on Phil. iv. 19 ("my God shall supply all your need,"—χρείαν), call to mind this petition of the Lord's Prayer.

2. The view we have been led to take does away with the antithesis, so strongly pressed by Dr Lightfoot, between the "temporal" and "qualitative" meanings, which various writers, in their comments or paraphrases, have assigned to the word (e.g. καθημέρινος and ἀναγκαῖος). The two sorts of meaning do, in reality, interpenetrate. Thus:

(a) In S. James ii. 15, 16, we have ἡ ἐφήμερος τροφή and τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος³ used as equivalents.

(b) In the account of the manna in Exod. xvi. 4, where the Septuagint has τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας εἰς ἡμέραν, the Vulgate has "*quæ sufficiunt per singulos dies*:"—"Daily bread for daily needs," as the hymn says.

(c) The connexion between "daily" and "needful" food is met with in Rabbinical comments on Exod. xvi:—e.g.⁴

"*What was needed for each single day.*] He who created the day, created its supply of food (פרנסתו). Whence R. Eliezer said: He who has so much as is needed for to-day, and yet can ask, How am I to get provision for to-morrow? such a man is lacking in faith (מחוסר אמונה)."

¹ *Ib.* s.v. περιουσία.

² Quoted by Dr Lightfoot, *u.s.*

³ St. Cyril, on Exod. ii. 1 (ap.

Lightfoot, *u.s.*) explains ἄριστος ἐπιούσιος by τὰ εἰς ζωὴν ἐπιτήδεια.

⁴ Mechilta; ap. Nork, *Rabb. Quellen*, p. 44.

W. KAY.

ON CICERO EPP. AD FAMILIARES, 4. 5. 3.

IN Vol. IV. of this Journal, p. 249, Mr Munro has a critical notice of the phrase AN CREDO which he, after Lachmann, had condemned as a solecism in Lucret. v 175 and in Cicero, Ep. ad Fam. IV. 5. 3, and had corrected by the plausible substitution of AT for AN. He now, while holding still that the phrase is a solecism, sees his way to a different correction.

I wish to confine my observations to the latter passage: for the two passages do not stand or fall together necessarily, though they invite comparison, and though Lambinus seems, by fair inference, to have revoked his first criticism on Cicero by his recollection of the parallel form in Lucretius.

The phrase occurs in the well-known letter of condolence from Sulpicius to Cicero, and it is introductory to the second argument by which Sulpicius seeks to divert Cicero from his grief for his daughter's death.

He had begun by urging: (1) "Can you let yourself be thus stirred by personal domestic sorrow? Have we not had losses far greater and such as should make the mind callous to annoyance?"

Then comes the next reflection: (2) "Nay, you will say, I grieve not for myself but for her. Is that it? Yet have we not often felt in these days that they are well off who have died painlessly; that there is little left to live for?"

The third argument is: (3) "But you will say grief for such a loss is natural. True; if it be an escape from a worse alternative."

The Latin runs thus: (1) *Quid est quod tanto opere te commoveat tuus dolor intestinus?* (2) *An illius vicem, credo, doles?* (3) *At vero malum est liberos amittere.*

I submit that AT is more to be expected in sentence (2) than AN. For AN would mean, *Is it possible that? Can it be*

that? implying some unlikelihood. But as a simple suggestion of a different point of view, AT finds place no less naturally in (2) than in (3); and AT ILLIUS not only corresponds to but is confirmed by, AT VERO.

It is objected that AT CREDO is ironical and therefore ill-suited to the occasion. But irony need not be satirical; irony is that which under one mode of expression hints at its opposite; e.g. under the affirmative *credo* veils a negation. CREDO may be rendered (as by Mr Munro, p. 242) '*I trow*', '*I will suppose*', '*perhaps*'. It occurs some three sentences lower in the sense '*no doubt*', where the objection of its being ill-suited to condolence would equally, if at all, apply.

The textual error however may lie not in AN but in CREDO. Mr Munro proposes AN ILLIUS VICEM, CICERO, DOLES?

Would he understand the name to be thrown in as a term of affection and sympathy? Even in that case it would come more naturally in sentence (1). But I think it would rather imply what is said below (§ 5), NOLI TE OBLIVISCI CICERONEM ESSE; and perhaps this paragraph might be thought at first sight to countenance the reading, but it is clear that NOLI TE etc. is but the application of the foregoing reflection, MEMINISSE HOMINEM TE ESSE NATUM.

I have been surprised to see that in very recent editions of this Letter of Sulpicius, no notice whatever is taken of the questions here discussed. I doubt whether, in the face of these difficulties, I can do as I had resolved in continuing my Edition of Cicero, viz. introduce the correction of AT for AN: but it is certain that no editor ought to pass by the reading without notice or comment. I have met however with like instances of neglect. The last editor of Tacitus ignores Mr Hort's *Adversaria* in the earlier series of this Journal, Vol. III. No. ix., and his elucidation of the difficult LIMITEM SCINDIT in *Annal.* I. 50. Still more remarkable is the omission in the *Thucydides* of the *Catena Classicorum* of all reference to Dr Donaldson's perfect correction and explanation of the text B. 2. 7.

J. E. YONGE.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE PENTATEUCH, JUDGES, AND 2 KINGS.

Benoní or Binyamín. Gen. xxxv. 18.

“AND it came to pass, as her soul was in departing (for she died), that she called his name Ben-oni: but his father called him Benjamin.”

The English Version has in the Margin,

*the son of my sorrow for בן-אוני,
the son of the right-hand for בנימין.*

In the interpretation of בן אוני the verse, Gen. xlix. 3,

רֵאשִׁיבִן בְּכֹרִי אֶתָּה כָּחִי וְרֵאשִׁית אוֹנִי

Reuben, my first-born thou, my strength and the *firstling of my vigour*,

should perhaps be borne in mind. A very plausible interpretation is “*filius roboris*, in quo supremum robur consumpsi;” a name which Jacob replaces by another, which signifies *strength, dignity, &c.* in a higher degree, and is less suggestive of mournful associations. But perhaps the best explanation is that which has been given by Nachmanides:

And the right in my eyes is that his mother called him Benoní, and meant to say, Son of my Mourning, from “bread of אֲנִים” (Hos. ix. 4), “I have not eaten בָּאֲנִי” (Deut. xxvi. 14). And his father made out of אוֹנִי, *my strength*, from the use of the word in רֵאשִׁית אוֹנִי (Gen. xlix. 3), וְלֵאמֹר אֲנִים (Is. xl. 29), and therefore called him Binyamín, Son of Strength, or Son of Might, for in the right-hand is power and success,

according to the signification of the Scripture, "A wise man's heart is at his right-hand" (Eccl. x. 2), "Thy right hand shall find out all thine enemies" (Ps. xxi. 9), "The right hand of the LORD is exalted" (Ps. cxviii. 16). He meant to call him by the name that his mother called him, for so all his sons were called by the name that their mothers called them, and he interpreted it of *excellence* and *power*.

For *Binyamín*, Son of the Right Side or Hand, compare אִישׁ יְמִינִךָ (Ps. lxxx. 18), and בֶּן חַיִּל (1 Sam. xiv. 52). In 1 Sam. ix. 1 occurs בֶּן אִישׁ יְמִינִי. Even to the right eye a preeminence is assigned (Zech. xi. 17; Matt. v. 29).

It seems on the whole very probable that there is a play on the good and bad senses of *Benoní*; but in any case it would be well to recognize in the margin the two classes of renderings, *Son of my Sorrow*, and *Son of my Vigour*.

The Second Commandment. Exod. xx. 4, 5.

Mr W. A. Wright has, in this *Journal*, Vol. iv. p. 156, given reasons for objecting to the A. V. rendering of the second commandment: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of *any thing* that is in heaven above, &c.;" and has shewn that while פֶּסֶל is rightly translated "graven image," תְּמוּנָה is rather a natural *object* than a "likeness" or representation of such an object. It is suggested that the commandment might be expected to prohibit not only image worship but also the worship of external objects, such as the sun, the moon, and the like; and the following new rendering is proposed:

"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image; and (as to) any form that is in the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth, thou shalt not bow thyself down to them, &c."

1. But it is an objection to this rendering that, by disturbing the punctuation, it introduces too great a variation

from the parallel passage in Deut. v. The whole passage (Ex. xx. 2—6) differs from the קרי of Deut. v. 6—10 by inserting ו before תמונה, and omitting it before על שלשים. Perhaps we ought to read in both cases תמונה, omitting ו, thus:

“Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image of any form that is in the heaven above, &c.”

It seems natural that we should here read

פסל כל-תמונה,

instead of

פסל וכל-תמונה,

since in all of the analogous verses where the words פסל and תמונה occur together, the former seems to be in the *status constructus*:

Deut. iv. 16 : ועשיתם לכם פסל תמונת כל-סמל

Deut. iv. 23 : ועשיתם לכם פסל תמונת כל

Deut. v. 8 : לא תעשה לך פסל כל-תמונה

2. It is still doubtful to what להם in ver. 5 refers. According to the LXX., which the A. V. seems to have had in view, it would be possible to take the commandment as prohibiting, (i) the making of images; (ii) the worship of the objects which the images represent, αυτοῖς referring to ὅσα. This would be in accordance with Deut. iv. 16—19, where ver. 16—18 is a prohibition of image *making*, and ver. 19 of star *worship*.

But we might also connect ver. 3, 5, and take ver. 4 as a parenthetic sequel to ver. 3, thus:

“Thou shalt have no other GODS before me—(thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image of any form, that is, &c.)—thou shalt not bow down thyself to THEM, nor serve them: for I am the LORD thy God, &c.”

the expression GODS being applicable to the images mentioned in ver. 4. See Exod. xxxii. 1, 4; xxxiv. 17; Lev. xix. 4.

3. In the latter part of Exod. xx. 5 we might supply the ו which it was proposed to omit before תַּמוּנָה, and thus assimilate the passage still further to Deut. v. 9, by reading:

עַל בָּנִים וְעַל שְׁלִשִּׁים וְעַל רַבְעִים

where three distinct generations, viz. the *second*, בָּנִים, the *third*, and the *fourth* are specified. Here also the A. V. is inexact.

Elsewhere, שְׁלִשִּׁים = בְּנֵי בָנִים
and, רַבְעִים = בְּנֵי שְׁלִשִּׁים

Moses striking the Rock. Numb. xx. 7—13.

This passage—briefly noticed in the *Journal of Philology*, No. 2, p. 60—runs as follows in the Authorized Version:

“And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, Take the rod, and gather thou the assembly together, thou, and Aaron thy brother, and SPEAK YE¹ unto the rock before their eyes; and it shall give forth his water, and thou shalt bring forth to them water out of the rock: so thou shalt give the congregation and their beasts drink. And Moses took the rod from before the LORD, as he commanded him. And Moses and Aaron gathered the congregation together before the rock, and he said unto them, Hear now, ye rebels; must we fetch you water out of this rock? And Moses lifted up his hand, and with his rod he smote the rock twice: and the water came out abundantly, and the congregation drank, and their beasts *also*. And the LORD spake unto Moses and Aaron, Because ye believed me not, to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not bring this congregation into the land which I have given them. This is the water of Meribah; because the children of Israel strove with the LORD, and he was sanctified in them.”

¹ וְדַבַּרְתֶּם אֶל-הַסֵּלַע

With this compare the description of a similar occasion in Exod. xvii. 5—7:

“And the LORD said unto Moses, Go on before the people, and take with thee of the elders of Israel; and thy rod, wherewith thou smotest the river, take in thine hand, and go. Behold, I will stand before thee upon the rock of Horeb; and thou shalt SMITE¹ the rock, and there shall come water out of it, that the people may drink. And Moses did so in the sight of the elders of Israel. And he called the name of the place Massah, and Meribah, because of the chiding of the children of Israel, and because they tempted the LORD, saying, Is the LORD among us, or not?”

The remarkable agreement of these narratives in other particulars suggests a doubt as to the accuracy of the rendering SPEAK YE UNTO THE ROCK, which might, without detriment to the sense, be assimilated to the parallel, “thou shalt SMITE the rock;” nor do I know of any serious objection to a change of rendering in the former passage. It is indeed an obvious remark that דבר generally means *to speak*, but since it is equally certain that it sometimes has a different meaning, its rendering here must be regarded philologically as an open question. In relation to the context, the idea of *speaking to the rock* must, if it does not explain the sin of Moses, be regarded as an excrescence, since there is little to be said for the middle course sometimes adopted of keeping so strange a rendering, and then depriving it of all significance.

In regulating Numb. xx. 8 by the very similar Exod. xvii. 6 our translators would only be doing the like to what they have done more than once elsewhere, as the annexed examples plainly shew.

(a) 2 Chron. xxii. 10; 2 Kings xi. 1:

וַעֲתִלְדוּ אִם אֲחֻזָּיו דָּאֲתָה כִּי מֵת בְּנָה וַתָּקָם וַתִּדְבֹּר
אֶת-כָּל-זֶרַע הַמַּמְלָכָה לְבֵית יְהוֹרָה :

¹ וְהָפִיךְ בַּצֹּד

“But when Athaliah the mother of Ahaziah saw that her son was dead, she arose and DESTROYED all the seed royal of the house of Judah.”

Here the meaning of **וַתִּרְבֵּר** has been inferred from 2 Kings xi. 1, a passage which¹ is word for word the same in the English, but differs in the original by reading **וַתִּמְאַר** in place of **וַתִּרְבֵּר**.

(β) Ps. xviii. 48; 2 Sam. xxii. 48:

הָאֵל הַבּוֹתֵן נִקְמוֹת לִי
וַיִּדְבֵּר עַמִּים תַּחְתָּי

“It is God that avengeth me,
And SUBDUETH the people under me.”

Here in like manner the doubtful word **וַיִּדְבֵּר** has been interpreted with reference to the parallel verse, 2 Sam. xxii. 48, which gives **וַיִּמְוֵרֵךְ**, “*and that bringeth down* the people under me.”

Perhaps it would be rather better to read *smite* for **דָּבַר** both in (α) and (β): thus, “she arose and SMOTE all the seed royal” (2 Chron. xxii. 10); “and hath SMITTEN down mine enemies under me” (Ps. xviii. 48). The same word suits the passage under discussion: “Take the rod...and SMITE the rock before their eyes” (Numb. xx. 8).

The Mother of Sisera. Judg. v. 30.

“Have they not sped? have they *not* divided the prey; to every man a damsel *or* two; to Sisera a prey of divers colours of needlework, of divers colours of needlework on both sides, *meet* for the necks of *them that take* the spoil?”

¹ As far as “seed royal.”

There is not sufficient reason for accepting the renderings,

רַחֵם רַחֲמַתִּים

a damsel or two,

לִצְנֵאֵי נֶשֶׁל

meet for the necks of them that take the spoil,

difficult as it may be to establish really satisfactory renderings in their place.

1. רַחֵם is a rarer form of רַחֵם the *womb*, and is said to be here used by way of contempt for a *female*¹; but this view is not supported by the usage of the language or by the ancient versions of the passage. Another serious objection arises from the addition of a second and unique form רַחֲמָה, which is said to be used in the same sense. But the combination of the masculine and feminine forms might be expected to denote something more extensive as regards number or quantity. Compare Isai. iii. 1, where in a description of the entire removal of supports the expressive combination מִשְׁעָן וּמִשְׁעָנָה is used. Rosenmüller aptly quotes from el-Harírí, *Makam*. 3:

أُرِيغَ الْقَنْيَصَ بِهِ وَالْقَنْيَصَةَ

and writes: “*Scipionem marem et scipionem feminam*, i. e. omne fulcrum atque præsidium; nam voces ejusdem potestatis, sed generis diversi, conjunctæ, universitatem ejus rei de qua susceptus sermo significant.”

A striking illustration is afforded by Judg. xv. 16:

חֲמֹר חֲמָרָתִים

or

heaps upon heaps,

according to the Authorized Version. It even suggests itself that the expression under consideration may have arisen by

¹ רַחֵם, joined with רַחֵם, רַחֵם &c. occurs as a masculine proper name in 1 Chron. ii. 44—47. רַחֲמִים, and the

Assyrian רַחֵם, *self*, are used without distinction of sex. See Oppert's *Gram. Ass.* p. 37, and Sayce's, p. 47.

metathesis from the above; and it will be found that some slight confirmation of this hypothesis is afforded by the Ancient Versions quoted below:

הלא מדמשכחין מפלגין בותא

ידבין גבר וביתיה כל חד וחד בוא סג

“Is it not because they are finding, dividing the spoil,
Giving a man and his house, each single one, much spoil?”

ܠܠܐ ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ

ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ ܫܠܥܐ

“Perhaps he has gone and found much spoil,
And distributed a mule to the heads of the men.”

لعل ظفر بنهب كثير في طريقه

فقسم لكل امرئ حِمْلَ عسل وزيت كثير

“Perhaps he has got possession of much booty on his way,
And distributed to each man a load of much honey and oil.”

The LXX. reads,

οἰκτίρμων οἰκτειρήσει εἰς κεφαλὴν ἀνδρός, κ.τ.λ.

It will be observed that,

(i) None of these Versions favours the rendering *damsel*.

(ii) The Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic speak expressly of *much* spoil, while the LXX. by its construction of emphasis hints at the same.

(iii) The Syriac may be supposed to have read ܡܕܡܪ, *ass*.

(iv) The Arabic may either have read the same, or may have read ܡܕܡܪ, *heap*, since under حِمْل we find: “ONUS; pilenta camelina; tum CAMELI in quibus sunt pilenta” (Freytag).

It is very suitable to the context that a *great quantity* of spoil should be spoken of. Such a meaning might be arrived at without metathesis, by assuming רַחֵם, *uterus*, to have had some other meaning which is now obsolete. But without attempting to define how the required meaning is to be obtained, I shall merely assume that *heaps upon heaps* is a rendering which suits the context.

2. The rendering, "*fit for the necks of them that take the spoil*," has been reasonably objected to. The construction is harsh, and the idea of exquisite embroidery to be worn on the necks of soldiers is unsuitable; nor is it much better to read, "*for the necks of beasts of burden that are themselves spoil*." But the idea of distributing some of the spoil to the men's households is natural: it is suggested by the Targum, and, as some would say, by Ps. lxviii. 13. I would therefore read, with a change of pointing,

either

צִוְאָרִי

or

צִוְאָרִי,

arranging the whole verse as follows:

הֲלֹא יִמְצְאוּ יַחֲלִקוּ
 שָׁלַל רַחֵם רַחֲמִיתִים
 לְרֹאשׁ גִּבּוֹר שָׁלַל צִבְעִים
 לְסִיסְרָא שָׁלַל צִבְעִים רִקְמָה
 צִבֵּעַ רִקְמֹתַי לְצוּאָרִי שָׁלַל :

"Are they not finding, dividing,
 Spoil HEAPS UPON HEAPS?
 For each man a spoil of colours,
 For Sisera a spoil of colours of broidery,
 A pattern of double broidery FOR MY OWN NECK a spoil?"

where there is (1) a distributive parallelism, the *finding* belonging to the second line, and the *dividing* to what follows; and (2) a natural gradation from the dyed stuffs which go to the common soldiers, to the choice piece of "needlework on both sides," which the speaker, "Fœmineo prædæ ardore" (*Æn.* XI. 728) would be glad to secure for her own neck.

Elisha and Naaman. 2 Kings v. 13.

The *locus classicus*,

וַיֹּאמְרוּ אָבִי דָבָר גָּדוֹל
הַגִּבִּיָּא דָבָר אֱלֹיךְ הֲלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה
אֵף כִּי אָמַר אֱלֹיךְ רַחֵם וְטַהֵר :

is usually misquoted in the sense of the Authorized Version :

"And (they) said, My father, *if* the prophet had bid thee *do some* great thing, wouldest thou not have done *it*? how much rather then, when he saith to thee, Wash, and be clean?"

which takes no account of the emphatic position of **הַגִּבִּיָּא** before its verb; and, as the italics partly shew, fails to render the tenses in a simple and direct way.

1. The idiom **דָבָר גָדוֹל** may be illustrated by reference to the following passages:

(a) רַק אֵין דָבָר בְּרַגְלִי אֶעֱבֹרָה

"I will only just—no matter—pass by on my feet."
(Numb. xx. 19.)

where the LXX. has *τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐδέεν ἐστι.*

(β) וַיֹּאמֶר דָּוִד מָה עָשִׂיתִי עָתָה
הֲלוֹא דָבָר הוּא :

“And David said, What have I now done? *Is there not a cause?*” (1 Sam. xvii. 29.)

Literally, οὐχὶ ῥῆμά ἐστιν; (Alex.).

(γ) “If I expressly say unto the lad, Behold, the arrows *are* on this side of thee, take them; then come thou: for *there* is peace to thee, and no hurt; as the LORD liveth.” (1 Sam. xx. 20.)

where the Hebrew text has,

כִּי שָׁלוֹם לְךָ וְאֵין דָּבָר חַיִּי יְהוָה :

and the LXX.

ὅτι εἰρήνη σοι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ζῇ κύριος.

I take the expression under discussion as an example of the idiom which occurs in the passages (α) (β) (γ). The word דָּבָר is susceptible of various shades of meaning, and cannot be exhaustively rendered by a single expression in English; but to pass by for a moment the question of the rendering of דָּבָר itself, an affinity will be at once recognized between

there is no DABAR.

אֵין דָּבָר

is it not DABAR?

הֲלוֹא דָּבָר הוּא

great DABAR.

דָּבָר גָּדוֹל

In the passage under discussion we may read either, *It is a great, a serious, matter*; or *There is great cause*. For the sense *cause, reason*, see Josh. v. 4, &c.

2. The obvious rendering of the next clause is somewhat as follows:

“The PROPHET hath spoken unto thee; wilt thou not perform?”

where there is a strong emphasis on רֹאֲשִׁיתָּ, indicated by its position before its verb דָּבָר. The correspondence between דָּבָר and the preceding דָּבָר cannot, perhaps, be given by any

English rendering; but it might be retained in a Greek rendering since λόγος is susceptible of almost the same varieties of application as רַבֵּר.

3. The servants of Naaman have urged upon him that the word of the prophet was either a serious *matter*, or a valid *reason* why the thing in question should be done. They now go on to say that in addition to all this there is nothing repulsive, but quite the reverse, in the thing commanded. It is both easy of performance, and very much to the man's advantage, to "*Wash and be clean.*"

Thus the sense of the whole address is as follows:

"My father, There is great cause,
The PROPHET hath bidden thee,
Wilt thou not do it?
The more so that he hath said unto thee,
Wash and be clean."

The LXX. fails to give the emphasis of הַגִּבִּיָּא, but it renders the tenses directly, and may be said to meet the above rendering halfway, thus:

Μέγαν λόγον ἐλάλησεν ὁ προφήτης πρὸς σέ
οὐχὶ ποιήσεις;
καὶ ὅτι εἶπε πρὸς σέ
Λοῦσαι καὶ καθαρίσθητι.

C. TAYLOR.

THE SOPHISTS.—II.

IN the last number of this Journal I argued in favour of the view put forward by Grote as to the common acceptation, in the age of Socrates and Plato, of the term Sophist. I tried to shew, that even after it had partly lost its vaguer and wider signification, inclusive of Masters of any Arts, Poets and *literati* generally—it still was not restricted to teachers of a particular sect or school, having common doctrines, or even a similar philosophic tendency: but was applied to all whom the vulgar regarded as teaching *λόγων τεχνήν*, whether they were rhetoricians and declaimers like Gorgias and Protagoras, or arguers and disputers, after the fashion that Socrates brought into vogue. It comprehended, therefore, several classes of persons besides the Professors of the Art of Conduct with whom Socrates is contrasted in the earlier Platonic dialogues. It included, for example, Rhetoricians generally, even though like Gorgias they disclaimed altogether the teaching of Virtue: in fact it is evident from Plato's Gorgias that the distinction which he there tries to draw between Sophist and Rhetor is but vaguely apprehended by the popular mind. It included also (as I was chiefly concerned to shew) Socrates and his disciples: who were considered—by all except themselves—as Sophists of the Disputatious, as distinct from the Declamatory, species. In fact even Plato, in his later works, and Aristotle, shew us, under the title of Sophist, a professor of quasi-Socratic argumentation: quite unlike the rhetorical lecturers on Conduct whom Socrates

confutes in the earlier dialogues. We may perhaps distinguish three stages in the signification of the term: or rather (as they are not strictly successive) three areas of an application narrowing gradually, but not uniformly, so that at any time the class would be conceived with considerable vagueness, and very differently by different persons.

(1) Even after the *σοφία* which a Sophist professed was generally understood to be something higher than mere technical skill in any department, still an eminent specialist who made any pretensions to general enlightenment might easily be called a Sophist: and so the term would be applied, by many persons, to such professors of music as Damon and Pythocles, to Hippodamus the architect and Meton the astronomer.

Then (2) I conceive that for about the period 450—350 B.C. the word was commonly used to denote all who professed, as Xenophon says, *λόγων τεχνήν*: including both the rhetorical and dialectical professors of the Art of Conduct (which the vulgar would persist in regarding as an Art of talking about conduct), and also rhetoricians like Gorgias, Polus, &c. down to Isocrates: not that the line between the two was very clearly drawn, as Isocrates claimed that his 'Philosophy' really involved instruction in morals, and it was matter of debate down to the time of Cicero whether the true orator must not necessarily possess a knowledge of things in general. However during the latter half of this period, after the death of Socrates, the appellation, being an invidious one, was probably repudiated with equal vigour and ultimate success by Rhetoricians and Philosophers.

But (3) we need not doubt that the still stricter manner in which Plato (in the *Gorgias*) conceives the class of *σοφισταί*, distinguishing them from the *ρήτορες*—was at least partially current in the time of Socrates. For when once cultivated society in Greece had become persuaded that *ἀρετή*—excellence of character and conduct—could really be imparted in lectures, and were willing to pay large sums for obtaining it: naturally the professors of this *Ars Artium* would be regarded as in a special sense, Professors of Wisdom,

σοφισταί. And it is such men as these that the term always suggests to readers of Greek history, however they may be vaguely conscious of its wider usage. The fresh light in which he placed the ethical teaching of these men was the most important result of Grote's discussion. If his argument had appeared generally so overwhelming as it seems to myself, the present paper would not have been written: but since the contrary view is still supported by the whole prestige of German erudition, I shall endeavour to re-state Grote's case in such a manner as to show most clearly on what a curious combination of misrepresented historical evidences, and misconceived philosophical probabilities, the opposite theory rests.

But before doing this, I wish to notice one or two points in which I cannot follow Grote, and by which he seems to me to have prejudiced unnecessarily the general acceptance of his theory. Although one may fairly say that to a mind like Grote's scarcely anything could be more antipathetic than the manner of Protagoras and his followers: and although it is evident to careful readers of his Plato, that he had the deepest enthusiasm for the spirit that dwelt in Socrates, and reigned over the golden age of Greek philosophy: still the intensity of his historical realization has made him appear as an advocate of the pre-dialectical teachers. He seems always to be pleading at the bar of erudite opinion for a reversal of the sentence on certain eminent Hellenes. Now with this attitude of mind I have no sympathy. There was at any rate enough of charlatanism in Protagoras and Hippias to prevent any ardour for their historical reputation—even though we may believe (as I do) that they were no worse than the average popular preacher, or professional journalist, of our own day. One might more easily feel moved to take up the cudgels for Prodicus, resenting the refined barbarity with which Plato has satirized the poor invalid professor shivering under his sheepskins. But justice has been done to Prodicus by the very German erudition against which I have here to contend. And as for the class generally—they had in their lifetime more success than they deserved, and many better men have been worse handled by posterity. It is only because they represent the first stage of ethical reflection in Greece, and therefore the

springs and sources of European moral philosophy, that one is concerned to conceive as exactly as possible the character of their teaching. The antagonism to that teaching, which developed the genius of Socrates, constitutes really so intimate a relation that we cannot understand him if we misunderstand 'Sophistik.'

But again, in his anxiety to do justice to the Sophist, Grote laid more stress than is at all necessary on the partisanship of Plato. No doubt there is an element of even extravagant caricature in the Platonic drama: and the stupidity of commentators like Stallbaum, who treat their author as if he was a short-hand reporter of actual dialogues, is provoking. Still, one always feels that the satirical humour of Plato was balanced and counteracted by the astonishing versatility of his intellectual sympathy. And the strength of Grote's case lies in what Plato actually does say of the Sophists, and not in suggestions of what he may have said untruly.

Before examining the evidence, it may be well to state clearly the conclusions commonly drawn from it which I regard as erroneous. What does a writer mean when he speaks of 'Sophistical ethics,' 'Sophistical theories on Law and Morality'? As far as I can see, he always means speculative moral scepticism leading to pure egoism in practice. He means a denial of the intrinsic validity of all traditional social restraints, and a recommendation to each individual to do exactly what he finds most convenient for himself. That nothing is really proscribed or forbidden to any man, except what he chooses to think so: that Nature directs us to the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure, and that the seeming-strong moral barriers to this pursuit become mere cobwebs to enlightened reflection: that "Justice is good for others" than the just man, and that the belief that it is good for him to be just is kept up by these others in their own interest—this is supposed to be the teaching which the youth of Athens thronged to hear. Whatever speculative and rhetorical garnish the Sophists may have added, this was "*der langen Rede kurzer Sinn*."

I might have abstracted this statement from almost any of the German writers whose works are text-books in our universi-

ties: but I will choose as my authority the generally judicious and moderate Zeller. He speaks of "Sophistik" as "Moralische Skepsis:" of the "Sophistische Theorie des Egoismus," the sophistical "Grundsatz dass für jeden recht sey, was ihm "nützlich," the sophistical "Satz von der Naturwidrigkeit des bestehenden Rechts:" to the Sophists, he says, "das natürliche Gesetz schien nur in der Berechtigung der Willkür, in der Herrschaft des subjectiven Beliebens und Vorthells zu bestehen": "das Sophistische Ideal" was "die unbeschränkte Herrschermacht."

I need not multiply quotations: and perhaps even these are superfluous. In Schwegler's smaller treatise, in Erdmann's more recent handbook, in the popular history of Curtius, views substantially the same are put forward. Now I would not deny that licentious talk of this kind was probably very prevalent in the polite society of Athens during the age of Socrates and Plato. But the precise point which I, after Grote, maintain, is that such was not the professional teaching of those Professors of the Art of Conduct whom it fell to Socrates to weigh in his formidable balance: that it was not for this that he found them wanting: and that it is a grave misapprehension of his relation to them to conceive him as shielding morality from their destructive analysis, and reaffirming the objectivity of duty in opposition to their "Absolute Subjectivität."

The indictment thus sweepingly drawn against a profession proceeds upon two lines of argument. It appeals to the evidence of contemporary authority, especially Plato: and it is further supported on a presumption drawn from the metaphysical doctrines believed to have been held by the Sophists. It will be convenient to take the two arguments separately: accordingly, in the present paper, I shall confine myself entirely to the first.

The only testimony which it is worth our while to consider at length is that of Plato. Aristotle's knowledge of the contemporaries of Socrates must have been entirely second-hand: and indeed what he says of the Sophists must be taken to refer chiefly to what I have ventured to call post-Socratic

Sophistry—the Eristical disputation which I conceive to have been chiefly imitated from Socrates, and to have borne at any rate less resemblance to the rhetorical moralizing of Protagoras and Prodicus than it did to the dialectic of Socrates.

Obviously we can make no use of the evidence of writers like Aristophanes and Isocrates, who lump Socrates and his opponents together under the same notion. And though Xenophon does not, of course, do this: still his conception of sophistical teaching is evidently of the vaguest kind. He probably would have included under the term physical theorists like Anaxagoras, for we find him speaking of “the Cosmos, *as the Sophists call it.*” So that we cannot refer with any confidence to his description of the class generally, but only to the notices that he gives of particular individuals. The most important of these is an account of a dialogue between Socrates and Hippias, which is noticed below: he further represents his master as borrowing from Prodicus the well-known fable of the Choice of Hercules: and this together with other testimonies has led to the general acquittal of Prodicus from the charges brought against his colleagues. But the main part of our historical investigation must turn upon the Platonic dialogues. Those in which the Professors of conduct appear or are discussed are chiefly the Hippias Major and Minor (if we admit the genuineness—or verisimilitude—of the former), and the Protagoras: the Meno, Gorgias and Republic. I have tried to shew that in the Sophista and Euthydemus the Sophist is a teacher of an entirely different type. And of the six dialogues above mentioned I think it may be fairly contended that the three former are most likely to represent the actual relation of Socrates to the ethical teachers of his age: for they are no doubt the earlier, and the obvious aim of each of them is to exhibit Socrates in controversy with Sophists: whereas in the Meno the Sophists are only mentioned incidentally; the polemic of the Gorgias is directed primarily against Rhetoricians, and the Republic is chiefly constructive and expository. Now suppose a person to know no more than that there were in Athens certain clever men whose teaching was dangerous, as being subversive of the commonly received rules of morality, and tending to establish egoistic maxims of conduct: and suppose that with this infor-

mation he is set down to read the three first-mentioned dialogues. He is introduced to Hippias, Protagoras and Socrates. Hippias has composed an apologue in which he makes Nestor recommend to Neoptolemus the different kinds of conduct that are considered Noble or Beautiful: Socrates, by ingenious questioning, reduces him to helpless bewilderment as to the true definition of the term *καλόν*. Again, Hippias has lectured on the contrast between the veracious Achilles and the mendacious Ulysses: Socrates with similar ingenuity argues that wilful mendacity or wilful wrong-doing generally is better than ignorance and involuntary error: Hippias protesting against the dangerous paradox. Again, he finds Protagoras explaining how it is that any plain man is, to a certain extent, a teacher of Virtue, having knowledge of the chief excellencies of conduct, and being able to communicate them to others: a Professor of Conduct is only a man who knows and teaches what all plain men know and teach, in a somewhat more complete and skilful manner. Socrates, on the other hand, argues that all Virtue resolves itself into a method of calculating and providing the greatest possible pleasure and the least possible pain for the virtuous agent. Can any one doubt that such an unprejudiced reader would rise from his perusal of the three dialogues with the conviction that Socrates was the Sophist as commonly conceived, the egoist, the ingenious subverter of the plain rules of morality? And though perhaps even at this point of his studies (and certainly when he had read a little further) he would decide that Socrates was not really a "corrupter of youth," he would see no reason to transfer the charge to Protagoras or Hippias. He would see that Socrates attacked their doctrines not as novel or dangerous, but as superficial and commonplace. Impostors they might be, in so far as they pretended to teach men what they knew no better than their pupils: but if they knew no better they knew no worse: they merely accepted and developed the commonly received principles. And thus—to come to the later dialogues to which I have referred—one finds that Socrates even half defends them in the 'Meno' against the popular odium which he shared with them: Anytus is made to confess, that whatever blame they may

deserve, his own abuse of them has been uttered in mere ignorance. So again in the Republic, where Plato's satire takes a bolder sweep, there is a sort of indirect and latent defence of the Sophists against the charge on which Socrates suffered as their representative. Plato clearly feels, that whatever quarrel Philosophy might have with the Sophists, Demos had no right to turn upon them: Demos himself was the arch-Sophist and had corrupted his own youth: the poor Professors had but taught what he wanted them to teach, had but conformed to the common manner and tone of thought, accepted and formulated common opinion. Nor is the view of 'Sophistik' presented in the Gorgias really different, though it has been differently understood. No doubt it is a "sham Art of Legislation," it does not give the true principles on which a sound social order is to be constructed: but that is not because it propounds anti-social paradoxes: rather, it offers seeming-true principles, which fit in with the common sense of practical men.

It is said, however, that there are other passages in Plato which clearly exhibit the anti-social tendencies of the Sophistic teaching: and that especially in the last two dialogues to which I have referred such evidence is to be found. Let us proceed to examine these passages in detail.

The most comprehensive and pregnant formula in which this anti-social teaching is thought to be summed up, is that τὸ δίκαιον, justice, or social duty generally—exists νόμῳ only, and not φύσει. It is clear from the references in his Ethics &c. that Aristotle found this doctrine very widely held by his predecessors: and we should draw a similar inference from a well-known passage in Plato's Laws (B. x. p. 8. 89, 90) where he speaks of "the wisest of all doctrines in the opinion of many" "...that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them." The commentators do not hesitate to treat these passages as referring to the Sophists: in fact they make the reference in such a matter-of-course manner, that one is startled to find how entirely unauthorized it is. Aristotle's allusions are quite general: and Plato simply

says that these are "the sayings of wise men, poets as well "as prose-writers." This no doubt does not prove that he is not referring to the Sophists: but when we consider that it is the great assailant of Sophistry who is speaking, it seems pretty strong negative evidence. It is said however that other passages in Plato shew so clearly that the doctrine was actually held by the Sophists, that there was no reason why he should mention them by name in the *Laws*. It is said (1) that Hippias in the 'Protagoras' draws precisely the same distinction between νόμος and φύσις, and that Plato's testimony is here confirmed by Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. c. 4): (2) that Calicles in the 'Gorgias' employs the same antithesis as a quasi-philosophical defence of his cynically avowed immorality: (3) that Thrasymachus in the 'Republic' puts forward a view of justice coinciding substantially with that of Calicles, though not couched in the same language. This cumulative evidence seems at first sight very strong: but I think that on a closer examination every part of it will be found to break down.

In the first place, it must be observed that the mere adoption or bringing into prominence of the distinction between the 'conventional' and the 'natural' as applied to the laws and usages of society is no evidence of egoistic, anti-social disposition or convictions. Rather, we may say, is the recognition of such a distinction an obvious and inevitable incident of the first beginnings of philosophical reflection upon society, especially in an age of free and active mutual communication among a crowd of little states differently organized and mostly in a state of rapid change. And the natural effect of such recognition upon an ordinary mind, sharing in the ordinary manner the current moral sentiments and habits of its society, is rather an endeavour to separate the really sacred and stringent bonds, the fundamental and immutable principles of social behaviour, from what is conventional and arbitrary in positive law and custom. And it is just in this attitude of mind that Hippias appears in the dialogue with Socrates that Xenophon records. After some characteristic sparring, Socrates has defined the Just to be the Lawful. This surprises Hippias: "Do you "mean they are identical?" he answers, "I do not quite under-

“stand how you use the words...how can one attribute much “intrinsic worth to laws, when their makers are continually “changing them?” That is, Justice in Hippias’ view is therefore not τὸ νομιμόν, because it must be σπουδαιότερον πρᾶγμα. And the few sentences in the Protagoras in which the Professor’s style of lecturing is somewhat broadly caricatured, are quite in harmony with Xenophon’s account: and indeed would suggest this view rather than the other if taken alone.

With Callicles the case is quite different. His use of the antithesis of φύσις and νόμος is no doubt flagrantly immoral: an open justification of the most sensual egoism. The only lacuna in the argument here—and it seems to me a sufficiently large one—is that Callicles is not a Sophist, and has no obvious connexion with Sophists. “No matter,” say Zeller and others, “he must be reckoned a representative of the Sophistische “Bildung.” Now here a distinction must be taken, the importance of which I shall presently urge at more length. If by “Sophistische Bildung” is merely meant what German writers commonly call the “Aufklärung”, or rather the frivolous and demoralizing phase of the “Enlightenment” diffused through polite society in this age, the negative and corrosive influence which semi-philosophical reflexion upon morality has always been found to exert—this is no doubt represented in Callicles. But if it is meant that Plato intended to exhibit in Callicles the result, direct or indirect, of the teaching of our Professors of Conduct: then I can only say that he dissembled his intention in a way which contrasts strikingly with the directness of his attack in other dialogues. For Callicles is not only nowhere described as a friend or pupil of Sophists: but he is actually made to express the extremest contempt for them. “You know the claims,” says Socrates, “of those people who “profess to train men to virtue.” “Yes, but why speak of these empty impostors” (ἀνθρώπων οὐδένοσ ἀξίων): replies Callicles. Certainly we have here a most unconscious “representative”.

It is said however that Aristotle speaks of Callicles as a Sophist, or at least as a Sophistical arguer: and that in respect of his use of this very antithesis. The passage referred

to is Sophist. Elench. XII. 6. Both Sir A. Grant and Mr Cope interpret it in this way: and as Aristotle's authority on such a point cannot be disregarded, we must consider the passage carefully. Sir A. Grant introduces it as follows:

p. 106. "One of the most celebrated 'points of view' of the Sophists, was the opposition between nature and convention. Aristotle speaks of this opposition in a way which represents it to have been in use among them merely as a mode of arguing, not as a definite opinion about morals. He says (Soph. El. XII. 6), 'The topic most in vogue for reducing your adversary to admit paradoxes, is that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of, and which was a universal mode of arguing with the ancients,—namely, the opposition of 'nature' and 'convention;' for these are maintained to be contraries, and thus justice is right according to convention, but not according to nature. Hence they say, when a man is speaking with reference to nature, you should meet him with conventional considerations; when he means 'conventionally,' you should twist round the point of view to 'naturally.' In both ways you make him utter paradoxes."

Now the words which are here rendered "that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of" are ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων. But what is "Callicles in the *Gorgias* described as saying"? Is he "reducing his adversary to admit paradoxes"? On the contrary, he is *complaining of this procedure on the part of Socrates*. ὥς τὰ πολλά, &c., he says, ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως τὰ τοῦ νόμου. It is Socrates who is the Sophist, or at least is charged with Sophistry: and Aristotle, intent on his subject, and not thinking of the reputation of Socrates, has simply quoted the passage as a good illustration of a particular sophistical topic. This piece of evidence therefore turns out most unfortunately for our opponents. It incidentally illustrates that close affinity between the later, Eristic

Sophistry, and the teaching of Socrates, which it was the object of my former paper to exhibit: but it has nothing whatever to do with the morals of Callicles or their origin.

When we attempt to speak exactly of the relation of Callicles to "The Sophists," the necessity of distinguishing the different meanings of the term *Σοφιστής* makes itself strongly felt. Callicles may be fairly or at least plausibly called a pupil of Gorgias, but expresses utter contempt for Professors of Conduct (a class in which Gorgias expressly declined to be included). I think the explanation of this is not hard to find, if we bear in mind the circumstances under which the dialogue was written. It must be later than the execution of Socrates: and it was probably composed not long after that event¹: at a time, therefore, when the orthodox-conservative reaction was at its height, and the odium attaching to the name of Sophist especially strong. The languidly contemptuous dislike and distrust, with which old-fashioned persons had formerly regarded all this newfangled lecturing and disputing on conduct, was now changed into loud and menacing hostility. This new art that had attracted the leisured youth of Athens, was not, they now saw, mere idle pastime and folly: it was a deadly seed from which aristocratic-revolutionary intrigues and the despotism of the Thirty had sprung. Hence every one was anxious to repudiate the invidious title: in particular, the teachers of Rhetoric would emphasize the distinction between them and the Professors of Conduct, which hitherto, in the view of the world in general, had scarcely been recognized. "We have nothing to do," they would say, "with the charlatans who pretend to impart virtue: what we profess is the harmless, practical, necessary art of Public Speaking." Thus Isocrates, who in the preceding age would have accepted the title of Sophist, and who at a later period² does not repudiate it, now insists on being called a Philosopher, and writes an oration *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*. Under these circumstances the polemical aim of Plato in writing the *Gorgias* was somewhat complex. On the one hand he endeavours to shew the substantial identity of

¹ Cf. Thompson's *Gorgias*.

² In the *περὶ Ἀντιδόσεως* written not long before his death.

Rhetoric and Sophistic: they were both aimed at the production of Appearances, not Realities: the benefits of both were equally hollow and illusory. On the other hand he has no sympathy whatever with the prevalent fury against the Professors of Conduct, the blind selfish impulse of the Athenian public to find some scapegoat to punish for the general demoralization which had produced such disastrous consequences. He does not say—as posterity generally have understood him to say—“It is not Socrates who has done the mischief, but “other teachers of virtue with whom you confound him.” On the contrary, he is anxious to shew that the mischief is not attributable to Professors of Conduct at all. It is with this view that he introduces Callicles, the “practical man” who despises professors, and thinks that the art of private and public life is to be learnt from men of the world. This is the sort of man who is likely to hold egoistic and sensual maxims of conduct. His unaided reflection easily penetrates the incoherencies and superficialities of the popular morality: his immoral principles are weeds that spring up naturally in the social soil, without any professional planting and watering, so long as the sun of philosophy is not risen.

This latter view appears still more clearly in the Republic, especially in the fine passage at the outset of Book II. (compared with B. VI.). There the *naturalness* of the evolution of audacious unrestrained egoism from conventional morality is made still more prominent. ‘We find,’ says the youthful interlocutor, ‘that people in general praise justice and try to instigate us ‘towards it, but we always find that they do so by speaking of ‘the rewards it gets from gods and men. They admit too that ‘justice is hard and irksome, injustice easy and pleasant. ‘Again, we find that they honour rich men in public and ‘private, even though wicked: and do not conceal their contempt for the virtuous poor. Nay the gods, since their forgiveness and favour is to be obtained by sacrifices, seem to do ‘much the same. Hence a spirited young man naturally thinks ‘that though successful lawlessness is no doubt difficult, and perhaps ordinary people had better keep to the broad road of law- ‘observance, still the former path is the nobler of the two in its

‘very difficulty, and he who can walk it successfully is truly ‘fortunate in the eyes of gods and men.’ Surely here we may read between the lines an answer to the charge against Socrates. “You corrupt youth,” said the Athenians to the sage, “and they make oligarchical revolutions.” “Not so,” retorts the disciple, “it is you who cause the demoralization, by “your low views of virtue and of the gods. An acute and spirited “youth pushes these to their logical conclusions: he decides “that consummate Injustice is one of the *καλά* which the “proverb declares to be *χαλεπά*: and thus inspired he enters “clubs and plots revolutions.”

What has been already said will have indicated the view that I take of the cynical deliverances of Thrasymachus. I see no reason to class him among the Professors of Conduct whom we are now considering. Plato does not call him a *σοφιστής*: and though no doubt he might be called so, in the looser sense in which the term was applied to Gorgias, he does not fall within the class either according to the earlier or to the later of its more limited definitions. He does not define justice as a professed teacher of virtue, but as a rhetorician, possessing the cultivated omniscience to which ancient rhetoricians commonly laid claim, and so able to knock off a definition of Justice, as of anything else. That “Justice is the interest of the stronger” is a plausible cynical paradox which a cultivated person might naturally and prosperously maintain in a casual conversation: but we are not therefore to suppose that Hippias or any other Professor of Conduct would take it as a thesis for a formal lecture on Virtue. Indeed, even if we had not direct evidence to shew that their discourses were much more conservative and commonplace, we might have concluded *a priori* that the Athenian youth would not have thronged to hear, with the simple earnestness described by Plato, such frivolous paradoxes as those thrown out by Thrasymachus.

We may now see with what justice Grote exclaims that the German writers “dress up a fiend which they call ‘Sophistik,’” which exists only in their imaginations. Analysing the historical costume of this scare-crow, we find it to consist chiefly

of unrelated fragments, illegitimately appropriated and combined. The framework, however, on which these fragments are hung, is supplied by the general scheme of development of Greek philosophical thought, which seems to be accepted in Germany. If this framework be left unassailed, it will still be believed that the earliest professional teaching of morality in Greece *must have been* egoistic and anti-social: although there may be no evidence to prove that it *was* so. I shall therefore try to shew in a subsequent paper that Grote's view of the teaching of the Sophists is no less strongly supported by general historical considerations than by particular testimonies: and that the adoption of the opposite theory has led Zeller and others into serious misapprehension of the true drift and position of both Socrates and Plato.

ON THE WORDS "NEAP" AND "EBB."

Is there any connection between the words *neap* and *ebb*? There seem to me to be two cogent reasons against the entertainment of the idea. These are (1) that the meanings of the words are very different, as will appear; and (2) that the true initial letter of *neap* is not *n*, but *k*, the word being shortened from *hneap*, as it were; and though there are instances of the loss of an initial *n*, I do not know that there are any of the loss of an initial *hn*.

It is sufficient to consider the words separately.

The *neap* is the A. S. *nép*, which is sometimes found compounded with *flood*, forming the compound *nép-flód*, a neap-flood or neap-tide. The word *nép* itself occurs in a splendid passage in Cædmon, which describes the overthrow of the Egyptians in the Red Sea; see Cædmon, ed. Thorpe, p. 207. The form *hnép* (with initial *h*) is not found in A. S., but this is not remarkable, since *n* and *hn* are confused; as, e.g. in *hnecca*, a neck, also spelt *necca*. The cognate word in prov. Swedish is *napp*, signifying stingy; but the usual Swed. word is *knapp*, scanty, with initial *k*, which connects it at once with the verb *knappa*, to pinch, which is obviously the Icel. *hneppa*, to pinch, whence Eng. *nip*. In Danish we find *knappe*, to scant or curtail, *nippe*, to twitch, *knibe*, to pinch or *nip*. But the Icel. also has the adjective *hneppr*, scanty, small, strait, nipped, narrow, pinched in; and this is at once the analogous word to the English *neap*, and explains clearly the sense of the word. A *neap-tide* is, in fact, a scanty tide, a tide which fails to rise as far as usual, and this is well known to be the ordinary sense of it. It is clear also that to *nip* is closely allied to the Suio-Goth. *nappa*, to

pluck, and the common Eng. *nab*. The Dutch has not only the adjective *knap*, signifying strait, close, narrow, and several other things besides, but also the verb *knappen*, with the various senses of to snap, to catch, to crack, to crush, and to eat. The sense of *cracking* shews that this is really the Eng. *knap*, to snap or break, and here we find at last the missing *h* of the A. S. (*h*)*nép* still represented in modern English by an initial *k*. That *kn* is here equivalent to *hn* is shewn by the Mæso-Gothic, which has *dis-hniupan* for "to break or *knap* asunder," and *dis-hnupnan* for "to be broken asunder," words which only occur in Luke viii. 29, and Luke v. 6. We may also connect with it the Eng. *snap*, and probably *snip*. The word *snipe* is also cited by Wedgwood as named from its long bill, the Platt-deutsch *snippe* or *snibbe* meaning both *snipe* and *bill*. The Dutch *sneb*, or *neb*, means a bird's *neb* or bill; which is spelt *nib* when we speak of the end of a pen. The *snipe* is the bird that *snaps* up things with its *neb*, or *nibbles* whatever it can *nab*. To return to the word with which I started, the evidence all goes to shew that a *neap-tide* means a scanty tide, and that the A. S. *nép* ought to have an initial *h* before the *n*.

But the word *ebb* has a different sense, viz. to recede; the *ebb* of the tide means the receding of the tide after its flood or rising, a phænomenon that happens twice a day, instead of very seldom, like the *neap-tide*. What the exact derivation may be, I cannot certainly say, but the spelling never varies. The same stem *ebb-* is found in Old Friesic, Platt-deutsch, North Friesic, Danish, and Swedish. In A. S. we have the verb *ebban*, as in the phrase *þæt wæter wæs geebbod*, the water had receded; also the compound word *sæ-æbbung*, meaning a bay, lit. a sea-ebbing. Wedgwood suggests a connection with the G. *ab*, which is the Eng. *off*, as though to *ebb* meant to *go away*, a sense which it will certainly bear, but I find no clear proof of this; unless we may class it with the numerous words that are connected with Ger. *abicht*, reverse, Icel. *öfugr*, retrograde, and the E. *awk* in *awkward*, the original sense of which is back-handed, reverse, whence the secondary sense of left-handed or clumsy. The word *ebb* is still preserved in the

Shropshire dialect as an adjective, with the sense of *shallow*. Webster suggests a connection with English *even*, as though the *ebbing* of the sea made up for the flood or made matters *even*. This also is conjectural; and, though we may illustrate such a letter-change by the Cumbrian word *Hwitehebben* for *Whitehaven*, and O. E. *habben*, to have, it seems still less satisfactory than the former. I find nothing to shew that *ebb* was ever spelt *nebb*, in any language.

My conclusions then are; that *neap* is for *hneap*, and must not be cut down to *eap*, which even then would differ from *ebb*; that the senses of the words *neap* and *ebb* are radically different; and that the phænomena to which the words refer occur at different periods and in different ways.

WALTER W. SKEAT.

ON ΣΚΟΠΟΥΜΑΙ AS A PASSIVE AS WELL AS MIDDLE VERB.

IN the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, under *σκοπέω*, it is said that the Present Passive of this Verb is 'rare and very late.' That it is rare in the Pres. Pass. may be true, but only because the form is little needed. It is probable that *σκοπούμαι* Pass. would be used by a classical writer whenever he needed it, and two passages will here be cited, where it appears to be so used, one in Plato, the other in Demosthenes.

But first let the point be argued *a priori*.

As to the Middle *σκοπούμαι*.

This is very frequent in Plato, occasional in Tragedy, used also twice in Isocrates: and although it is true that very little difference between the Act. and Depon. senses can often be drawn, yet on the whole it seems fair to say that the Middle implies a more deliberate and reflective consideration, like *ὀρώμαι* Middle as distinguished from *ὀρῶ*.

But this Deponent use of *ὀρώμαι* does not exclude its Passive use: as *ἡ παῖς ὀράται* Soph. Antig. 423. Why then should a Passive *σκοπούμαι* be excluded when occasion requires it?

But further.

The Verb, we know, has a double form; *σκοπε-* (for Pres. and Imperf.), *σκεπτ-* (= *σκεπ-*) for other tenses, *very* rarely found in Present.

Now the Perfect *ἔσκεμμαι* and its Participle *ἔσκεμμένος* are notoriously used both as Deponent and as Passive. That is (to take here the Participle only), *ἔσκεμμένος* may mean either *having considered* or *having been considered*.

We may ask then whether it is not unreasonable to deny that the Present Participle *σκοπούμενος* is open to mean either *considering* (in a Deponent sense), or *being considered* (in a Passive sense).

Having laid this foundation in 'the Reason of the case' (which seems conclusive in itself), let us proceed to consider the two passages in which *σκοπούμενος* is found to be Passive.

I. Plato, Leg. VI. 772 D.

Ὅποτε τις οὖν καὶ ὀπηνίκα τῶν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονότων ἔτη σκοπῶν καὶ σκοπούμενος ὑπ' ἄλλων κατὰ νοῦν ἑαυτῷ...ἐξευρηκέναι πιστεύει, γαμείτω κ.τ.λ.

Liddell and Scott cite this passage as an example of the Middle use, and translate "*inquiring and having inquiry made by others.*" Here would be a most remarkable instance of the Middle sense of indirect agency, were the version correct. But this is very questionable. Ficinus simply renders, *alios aspiciens ab aliisque aspectus*. That he is right, is probable from the consideration, that the other sense would rather require δι' ἄλλων as in Phaed. 83, where ὃ τι ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ is opposed to ὃ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν (ἡ ψυχὴ). And, if we refer to the previous context in 771 (at the end), we shall see that Plato recommends a legal provision that young people shall have a fair opportunity of inspecting each other (θεωροῦντάς τε καὶ θεωρουμένους), and that families shall have means of observing those who may come among them hereafter as bridegrooms and brides: ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξαιρεῖν παρ' ὧν τέ τις ἄγεται καὶ [ἂ καὶ] οἷς ἐκδίδωσι κ.τ.λ.

This shews that the young gentleman of 25 is not only to examine his future wife, but to be the object of examination by others, herself to wit and her guardians (*σκοπούμενος*).

II. Demosthenes, in Lept. 473.

Εἶτα ταῦτα νῦν εἰ χρὴ κύρια εἶναι σκοποῦμεν; ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος πρῶτον αἰσχροὺς τοῖς σκοπουμένοις, εἴ τις ἀκούσειεν ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι σκοποῦσιν εἰ χρὴ τοὺς εὐεργέτας εἶναι τὰ δοθέντα ἔχειν· πάλαι γὰρ ἐσκέφθαι ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνώσθαι προσῆκεν.

It is strange that commentators and translators should so

long have been content in this place to assume that *σκοπουμένοις* is Middle, and used (contrary to the practice of Demosthenes) in exactly the same sense as the Active form which twice appears in the sentence; while *ἐσκέφθαι* afterwards is Passive. Perhaps they would plead that Demosthenes uses *σκοπουμένοις* to avoid the confusion between *σκοποῦσιν* Partic. and the *σκοποῦσιν* (Verb) which follows. But this would hardly be a sufficient justification. On *every* ground, it must be clear that *σκοπουμένοις* is Passive and Neuter (Dative of Respect); and that the true version is:—

‘And are we then now considering whether these grants ought to remain in force? Why, the question, at the outset, is disgraceful *in the very subject-matter of consideration*, were any one to hear that Athenians are considering *whether they should allow their benefactors to keep their gratuities*. For this point ought to have been considered and resolved long ago.’

Surely no argument need be added to recommend an interpretation which seems to carry conviction of its truth on the face of it.

B. H. KENNEDY.

NOTES ON SOPHOCLES

(continued).

Oed. R. 329, Electr. 451, Trach. 553.

A PASSAGE of well-known difficulty, called by G. Dindorf in his Preface to the Teubner text, one of the "cruces criticorum," is the verse and a half in the dialogue between Oedipus and Teiresias,

ἐγὼ δ' οὐ μή ποτε,
τᾶμ' ὥς ἂν εἴπω, μὴ τὰ σ' ἐκφήνω κακά.

Teiresias has been sent for by Creon and Oedipus, that he may be questioned concerning the murder of Laius. The Seer, knowing that Oedipus was the perpetrator of the deed, is most reluctant to reveal it; but Oedipus presses him hard, and says his conduct is neither lawful nor friendly to the state; nay, shortly afterwards, in a rage at the Seer's persistent silence, he declares his opinion that it was *he* who plotted the murder, if he did not execute it;

ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ
καὶ ξυμφυτεῦσαι τοῦργον, εἰργάσθαι θ', ὅσον
μὴ χερσὶ καίνων (346).

Without stopping here to criticize Dindorf's wanton corruption of the text, as I consider it, in reading (325), what is even rather doubtful Greek,

ὁρῶ γὰρ οὔτε σοὶ τὸ σὸν φώνημ' ἰὸν
πρὸς καιρὸν ὀρθῶς μήτ' ἐγὼ ταῦτόν πάθω,

for ὥς οὖν μηδ' ἐγὼ ταῦτόν πάθω, i. e. εὐλαβοῦμαι μὴ &c., I come at once to Teiresias' reply, in which the main difficulty

lies; and I think the context shows clearly that what he meant to express was this, "Abuse me as you like, I will never reveal that it was you who did the deed." Οὐ μὴ ἐκφήνω τὰ σὰ κακὰ, ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς τὰ ἐμὰ κακά. Hence for εἴπω I propose to read εἴπῃς. The latter clause means, quite literally, and without the slightest forcing of syntax or sense, 'however you may speak of, or in whatever terms you may represent, the wrong that I am doing,' namely by preserving silence. This sense of ὥς ἂν, 'however', is perfectly legitimate; take a single example from the Symposium of Plato, p. 181 A, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὥς ἂν πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτο ἀπέβη, i.e. an 'act becomes good or bad, accordingly as it shall have been done.' I add a line from memory, from Euripides, I think,

ὅπως ἂν ἐκβῇ τῶν ἐρωμένων ὁ νοῦς,

'that is according as the mind of the objects of one's affection may turn out.'

There remains however a serious difficulty, viz. the repetition of μὴ, in οὐ μήποτε μὴ ἐκφήνω. To avoid this, for ὥς ἂν εἴπω it has been proposed to read ἐξανείπω (Blaydes), 'never shall I declare my thoughts or mind, lest I should reveal your misfortunes.' It is clear that this cannot stand, because the word 'thoughts,' not expressed, is contrasted with κακὰ, which is expressed. The contrast must lie in τὰ ἐμὰ κακὰ and τὰ σὰ κακά. Besides, the change of ὥς ἂν εἴπω into ἐξανείπω is itself not satisfactory in a critical point of view, especially as the compound itself nowhere occurs. I therefore agree with Elmsley and Donaldson, that the μὴ must be regarded as repeated, from the interpolation of the clause τὰ μ' ὥς ἂν εἴπῃς. Precisely similar, except that the οὐ and not the μὴ is repeated, is Philoct. 416,

ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ Τυδέως γόνος
οὐδ' οὐμπολητὸς Σισύφου Λαερτίῳ
οὐ μὴ θάνωσι.

I cannot therefore help thinking, that the slight change of εἴπω into εἴπῃς removes all difficulty, and supplies a meaning entirely satisfactory.

A very similar correction, ἔχει for ἔχω, I propose in another of the passages, Trach. 553, where Deianira has been expressing her fears that Hercules no longer loves her, and her distress at the suspicion. She adds, however, that she thinks she has a φίλτρον which will remove all her anxiety, viz. the application of a charm formerly given her by the dying Centaur Nessus,

ἦ δ' ἔχω, φίλαι,
λυτήριον λύπημα, τῇδ' ὑμῖν φράσω.

This is generally rendered, 'in what way I have a redeeming pain, I will explain to you'; and a redeeming pain is supposed to mean, by an inversion sufficiently harsh (to say the least of it), "a painful remedy."

Here again with a protest against Dindorf's monstrous change of τῆς νεωτέρας ἀνὴρ, 'the husband,' i.e. the real *man*, 'of the younger,' into τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἄρ' ἦ, I propose to read ἔχει for ἔχω, thus making λύπημα the subject and λυτήριον the object, 'in what way my grief has a remedy.' There is no difficulty at all in taking λυτήριον as a substantive, as in Pind. Pyth. v. 99, τὸ καλλίνικον λυτήριον δαπανᾶν, 'the consolation that victory brings for expenses incurred.'

It is not a little remarkable that Hesychius explains λυτήριον by φυλακτήριον. This so precisely suits the present context, that I am induced to suppose he had reference to the passage: and if so, it is obvious that he must have taken it in the same way, as an accusative of the object. The meaning in his view would be, 'how my trouble has a way of being removed,' or 'a precautionary measure to prevent its being realized.' He adds, it is true, λυτήριος φύλαξ, but it is not unnatural to suppose that he explained the adjective in the same sense as he had adopted for the noun.

In Electra 451, there is great difficulty about the sense of τήνδ' ἀλιπαρῇ τρίχα, which Mr Jebb, with the scholiast, interprets, 'This neglected hair,' ἀνχμηράν. Hesychius recognises the

word in ἀλιπαρῇ. αὐχμηρά, where αὐχμηράν seems an obvious correction. The Schol. on Soph. records a variant λιπαρῇ, i.e. *ικέτιν τρίχα*, while others take ἀλιπαρῇ to be the negation of this, 'hair unfit for suppliant offering'; to which Mr Jebb very justly objects.

There certainly were two wholly distinct words, λιπαρός, connected with λίπος, 'grease,' meaning 'bright,' shining, sleek, glossy, applied to Athens, (*ταῖς λιπαραῖς ἐν Ἀθάναις*, from the colour of the marble, which has a kind of oily or fatty look when nearly new,) and so a fit epithet for well-kept hair; and λιπαρῆς, implying the notion of long-continued and earnest supplication and importunity, connected with λίπτεσθαι and λελιμμένος. My contention is, that the two verses in Sophocles, 451—2, are interpolated, and are due to some late grammarian or transcriber who did not know the distinction. If λιπαρῇ was written, and intended as a synonym of λιπαράν (as I suppose), it was to be expected that ἀλιπαρῇ would be invented by those who had felt the difficulty. My belief is that the passage originally stood thus,

σὺ δὲ
τεμοῦσα κρατὸς βοστρύχων ἄκρας φόβας
κάμου ταλαίνης, (σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως,)
αἰτοῦ τε προσπίτνουσα &c.

The reason of the interpolation lay in the hyperthesis or incorrect position of the τε, a use which is very familiar to readers of Thucydides. The sense was, αἰτοῦ ἡμῖν τε μολεῖν αὐτὸν ἄρωγόν, καὶ παῖδ' Ὀρέστην &c. Or, as in Aesch. Ag. 99, the τε may serve to connect the verb with the participle. It may be remarked, that ζῶμα in the sense of ζώνη, a woman's girdle, occurs nowhere else in Attic Greek, but is an Homeric word to signify a flap or apron in the armature of a hoplite; and lastly, that though the offering and even the burning of clothes for the use of the dead was a Greek practice, it is difficult to find any parallel to this alleged custom of hanging up a plain girdle or unembroidered waist-band as a propitiatory offering for a male hero deceased.

F. A. P.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 337, 338.

Τειρεσίας. ὀργὴν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμὴν, τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ
ναίουσαν οὐ κατείδες, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ ψέγεις.

I VENTURE respectfully to dissent from Dr Kennedy, when in the 'Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,' Vol. I. p. 313, he gives his opinion, that Sophocles "uses ὀργή to imply a disposition, provoking anger, and not anger itself." To my mind the altercation has not proceeded far enough for any *angry* ὀργή to be remarked on Teiresias's part, and thus far I agree with Dr Kennedy. But it seems to me that although Teiresias *may* play upon Œdipus's word ὀργάνειας, yet his reference is rather to ἀτεγκτος and ἀτελεύτητος, as applied to himself, cognate qualities to which he asserts to be in Œdipus unknown to their possessor. Thus I should translate ὀργή simply 'temper,' as in Antig. 354, ὀργαὶ ἀσύννομοι, and countless other passages. It will then refer to the *obstinacy* of Teiresias in refusing to answer and of Œdipus in persisting to ask questions, which must have an evil result. "You have found fault with my temper, but didn't see that your own is next door to it, but are blaming me." ὁμοῦ ναίουσαν would mean literally 'in the same house with it,' or, as we say, 'in the same boat with it.'

Soph. Œd. Rex, 476—482.

φοιτᾷ γὰρ ὑπ' ἀγρίαν
ῥῆλαν ἀνὰ ἄντρα καὶ
πέτρας, ἅτε ταῦρος
μέλεος μελέῳ ποδὶ χηρεύων,
τὰ μεσόμφαλα γᾶς ἀπονοσφίζων
μαντεῖα· τὰ δ' αἰὲ
ζῶντα περιποτᾶται.

I think the words μέλεος μελέῳ ποδὶ χηρεύων ought to be taken in close connection with ταῦρος, as indicating the forlorn condition of a bull driven by a stronger one from the herd, and

thus in a state of widowhood. The condition of such a bull is described by Virgil, Georg. III. 224—227:

“Nec mos bellantes una stabulare, sed alter
Victus abit, longèque ignotis exulat oris,
Multa gemens ignominiam plagasque superbi
Victoris, tum quos amisit inultus amores.”

[The same reference is given by Professor Campbell, whose work I had not seen when this note was written.]

Soph. Œd. Rex, 914—917.

ὕψου γὰρ αἶρει θυμὸν Οἰδίπους ἄγαν
λύπαισι παντοίαισιν οὐδ' ὅποῖ' ἀνὴρ
ἔννους τὰ καινὰ τοῖς πάλαι τεκμαίρεται,
ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, εἰ φόβους λέγοι.

Can a reference to anger satisfy the requirements of the context in the interpretation of the first line of the above passage? Is there not rather a reference to the changeableness and inconsistency of a man who is in the power of the last speaker, if he do but say something to frighten him? I should be inclined to paraphrase this first line with reference to the sense of *μετέωρος* ‘at sea,’ and to translate: ‘Œdipus has his mind too far at sea through all manner of annoying thoughts.’

[My interpretation has since been supported by a reference to Eurip. Iph. in A. 919, sent me on the proof: ὑψηλόφρων μοι θυμὸς αἶρεται πρόσω.]

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1084—1109.

εἵπερ ἐγὼ μάντις εἰμὶ——αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίζει.

The words *σέ γε* occur twice in this chorus, and on the first occasion, i.e. in the strophe, involve a singular harshness of construction, there being no subject for the transitive verb *αὔξειν*, and its direct object being immediately afterwards the subject of the passive *χορεύεσθαι*. Besides this the usual punctuation appears to me extremely clumsy, especially in the antistrophe, where it seems to make *τῶν μακραιώνων* dependent upon *τίς*, and to leave *τις θυγατὴρ* completely out in the cold.

In the strophe, therefore, I propose to read *σέ με* for *σέ γε*,

thus supplying a subject for *αὔξειν* and mitigating the general harshness of the construction.

I will transcribe the whole chorus with my emendation and suggested punctuation in hopes that both may commend themselves to others, as this has done to myself.

στρ. εἴπερ ἐγὼ μάντις εἰμὶ
καὶ κατὰ γνώμην ἴδρις,
οὐ τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀπείρων,
ὦ Κιθαιρῶν, οὐκέτι τὰν ἑτέραν
πανσέληνον, μὴ οὐ σέ με καὶ πατρίωταν Οἰδίπου
καὶ τροφὸν καὶ ματέρ' αὔξειν,
καὶ χορεύεσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἐπίηρα φέροντα
τοῖς ἐμοῖς τυράννοις.

ἰήιε Φοῖβε, σοὶ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀρέστ' εἴη.

ἀντ. τίς σε, τέκνον, τίς σ' ἔτικτε;
τῶν μακραιώνων ἄρα,
Πανὸς ὄρεσσιβάταο
προσπελασθεῖς, ἣ σέ γέ τις θυγατὴρ
Λοξίου; τῷ γὰρ πλάκες ἀγρόνομοι πᾶσαι φίλαι·
εἴθ' ὁ Κυλλήνης ἀνάσσων,
εἴθ' ὁ Βακχεῖος θεὸς ναίων ἐπ' ἄκρων ὀρέων εὖρημα
δέξατ' ἔκ του

Νυμφᾶν Ἑλικωνίδων, αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίξει;

“If I am a seer and intelligent in mind, no more during another month, O Cithæron, I swear it by Olympus, shalt thou be untried without my magnifying thee as the countryman and fosterer and mother of Œdipus, and without being honoured with processional dances by us, as bringing things pleasant to my sovereigns. And, Ieïan Phœbus, may these things be agreeable to thee!

“Who, child, who was thy mother? Was it then some daughter of the divinities approached by mountain-traversing Pan or by Loxias?—for to him all the pasturage table-lands are dear—or was it the ruler of Cyllene or the Bacchic god dwelling on the mountain tops, who received the treasure-trove from one of the Heliconian nymphs, with whom he sporteth most?”

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1167, 1168.

Θεράπων. τῶν Λαῖου τοῖνυν τις ἦν γεννημάτων.

Οἰδίπους. ἡ δοῦλος ἢ κείνου τις ἐγγενὴς γεγώς;

It appears to me that the force of Œdipus's question is entirely lost by the commentators, so far as I am acquainted with them. When the servant says that the child was one of Laius's offspring, it seems to me absurd to suppose with Wunder, that *γεννήματα* is used *sensu singulari* to include Œdipus's whole household, both slaves and children. I would suggest that it is better to take ἐγγενὴς as = ἐν γένει, and to refer δοῦλος to the status of an illegitimate child, the son of a slave. Œdipus's question would then be: 'Was it by birth a slave, or a legitimate member of his family? Was it a Teucer or an Ajax? Was it an Ishmael or an Isaac?'

That I am not straining the force of ἐγγενὴς, I think, will be plain from 1430 and 1431:

τοῖς ἐν γένει γὰρ τὰγγενῇ μάλισθ' ὁρᾶν
μόνοις τ' ἀκοίειν εὐσεβῶς ἔχει κακά·

the sentiment of which is equivalent to the vulgar English proverb, that a family ought to wash its dirty linen at home.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1419, 1420, 1421.

Œdipus. οἴμοι τί δῆτα λέξομεν πρὸς τόνδ' ἔπος;

τίς μοι φανεῖται πίστις ἔνδικος; τὰ γὰρ

παῖρος πρὸς αὐτὸν πάντ' ἐφηύρημαι κακός.

Here πίστις is usually taken as a 'ground of confidence,' and I cannot say that this is wrong. Still the preceding line appears to me to indicate that the πίστις was somehow contained in the ἔπος, and therefore I would suggest, that πίστις is used in the sense so frequent in Aristotle's Rhetoric, where αἱ πίστεις signify 'the proofs,' i.e. the means of producing persuasion. 'What means of inducing Creon πιθέσθαι μοι (1434) with regard to my request, ὧν ἐπαιτῶ (1416), will be found for me, that is consistent with justice?'

[I find the reference to Aristotle also given by Professor Campbell.]

A. H. WRATISLAW.

ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF ΝΗΔΥΜΟΣ.

BUTTMANN, in § 81 of his *Lexilogus*, speaks of an epithet of sleep which is found in the MSS. of Homer in twelve passages, and elsewhere in early poetry, only thrice in the Homeric Hymns. In spite of the traditional connexion with ἡδύς, Aristarchus the grammarian was so much puzzled by the initial ν, that he invented a new derivation making the word synonymous with νήγρετος; but such an epithet is otiose and even nonsensical in some of the Homeric passages. Further there is evidence of the existence of a form ἥδυμος in Simonides, Alcman, and epic writers. Buttmann's theory is that having the digamma (as **F**ηδύς); when that useful letter dropped from the alphabet, persons as in other cases neglected to sound it, and put the separable ν at the end of the word preceding it, if that word ended with a vowel, as is the case with the majority of instances in Homer where it occurs. The commonest collocation is ἔχε **F**ήδυμος ὕπνος, which when the digamma was lost would be written for euphony ἔχεν ἥδυμος ὕπνος.

Physiologists, no doubt, could give a clearer account of this insertion of the separable *n* to avoid *hiatus*: but any one who tries the experiment will, I think, find that this is the easiest liquid to produce with the smallest exertion of the tongue after the enunciation of a vowel through the frame of the mouth. That the Greeks found it so, is notorious to every urchin who, passing from the stage of *amo* under the mild rule of his governess, begins to have presentiments of τύπτω, when in the first sheet of his grammar he shudders at ν παραγωγικὸν *sive* ἐφελκυστικόν. This letter at last became a regular parasite and such forms as εἶπεν and ἐστὶν are found even before words beginning with a consonant in MSS. of the Greek Testament from the 4th century

onwards, the earliest MSS. being the most constant in retaining it as Mr Scrivener says (*Introd. to Criticism of N. T.*, p. 414), premising that it was originally an integral part of the forms. In English we have now but few final variations; but among them we have *an* for *a*, and in poetry *thine*, *mine*, for *thy*, *my* before a vowel. This last word was originally *min*, the possessive case of the first personal pronoun.

The fickleness of use is curiously exemplified in the *Book of Common Prayer*, where, in the first sentence of the proper collect of Easter week, 'thine only-begotten Son' is printed for the Sunday, and '*thy* only-begotten Son,' for the Monday and Tuesday¹.

Now we may observe farther that this euphonic *n* has a tendency to coalesce with the succeeding word. We know that some half-dozen years ago Mr Toole used to amuse the audience of the Adelphi with 'a Norrible tale,' we also know that it is very easy to speak of 'a *norange* and a *negg*.' It is strange however that the original word was *norange* which (as Mr Skeat tells me) comes through the Spanish *naranja* from the Arabic *nārandg*, and lost the *n* in French, by a false derivation as *malum aurantium*, the golden apple. On the other hand *naye* is found in early English (e.g. *Morte Arthure*, quoted by Halliwell) as a corruption of *an aye*, an egg.

There is no lack of instances in English where final consonants are transferred to the initials of words which were used frequently to follow them.

I have known children amuse themselves with making a word's head out of its tail, for, like the slave in Aristophanes' play who said *μόλωμεν αὐτό κατεπάγων πυκνόν*, they will repeat the name *Alice* quickly until it becomes *Sally*. We get several instances of the final *s* of one word becoming attached to another in the sibilant which represents the possessive termination of a word suppressed from some half feeling of reverence and transferred to the next word in the oaths which are found so frequently in plays of the 17th and novels of the 18th century:

¹ A similar variation may be observed in the proper collect of Whitsuntide. The words '*Jesus Christ*' of

the Sunday are varied as '*Jesu Christ*' for the two days following.

the *s* being frequently modified into *z*: and in one case even an extra *n* is foisted in 'for they say odd's nouns' according to Mrs Quickly. Mr Skeat has given me an instance of the reverse process where *spink* the older form of the word *finch* has gone through a previous stage of losing its initial *s*.

Again we have instances of an adventitious *n* in several familiar names. *Nan* for *Anne*, *Nell* for *Ellen*, *Ned* for *Edward*, *Noll* for *Oliver*, *Numps* for *Humphrey*; and Grose in his *Provincial Glossary* (ed. 1790) gives '*Nickin*, *Nikey* or *Nizey*, a diminutive of *Isaac*.' It must have been by a similar conspiracy of vocal organs that *Euripus* has been metamorphosed into *Negro-pont*. Other words I have found in comparatively late writing.

'Mother's *nonly son*' in Cradock's epilogue to Goldsmith's *She Stoops to Conquer*, which came too late to be spoken.

'Into his *noun* Country,' [Eachard's] *Speculum Crape-Gownorum*, or, A Looking-Glass for the Young Academicks, 1682. *Nawen*-is still given in the *Craven Glossary*.

I think I have seen the word *naunt* for *mine aunt*, though I cannot find it in the dictionaries. *Nuncle* is of course familiar from Shakespeare, and is said by Halliwell to be still in use. He gives in his dictionary another word meaning uncle; *neme* (following *thy* and *my* in MSS. Cantabb. quoted by him): surely this is another instance of the same phenomenon; *eme* or *eyme* being an equivalent for *Oheim* (A. S. *Eám*), common enough in the poem of *Wallace* by Henry the Minstrel in the middle of the fifteenth century.

In the ballad 'Clavers and his Highlandmen' relating to Killicrankie, 1689, 'But her nain-sell, wi' mony a knock, Cried, "Furich, whigs awa', man."' *Jacobite Songs*, Maurice Ogle, 1871, p. 5. *Nonce* is perhaps rather an archaism preserved by such 'conceited' writers as C. Lamb. It was originally *for then anes* = for the once.

The following provincialisms are collected from Halliwell. *Nangnail*, a hangnail. *Nannle-berries*, anberries, warts¹ or excrescences. *Nappern*, an apron (Northern and also early). *Neen*, the eyes (Yorkshire), *nynon* was an older form. *Nif*, an

¹ Should we compare with this, 'It is such another *Nan*!'?

Merry Wives of Windsor, i. 3.

if (Somerset). *Nobby-colt* (Gloucestershire) is perhaps *an hobby colt*. *Nunc*, a large lump or thick piece (South) I should connect with hunk or hunch.

Obsolete forms are; *nale*, alehouse. *At then ale* is commonly written *at the nale*, and then even *at nale*, or *atten ale*, or *atte nale*; all these forms being (as Mr Skeat says) used indiscriminately, *then* being a later form of the dative *tham*. *Nall*, for an awl, the tool, is found in Tusser and in a writer rather later in the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Ni, a brood of pheasants. This being a word more often spoken than written, it is not easy to decide between the rival claims of *eye* and the form with an initial *n*.

Nias, an eyas, a young hawk (*Cotgrave*). Nares however suspects a connexion with the French *niais*.

'*Nigit* an ideot.' (*Grose, Prov. Glossary*.)

Nikle is a curious word for *icicle* in *Promptorium Parvulorum*.

Ningle, for mine ingles, or favourite, in old plays.

Nirt, hurt (*Gawayne*).

Noke, an oak. (*Nominale MS.*) *atte noke* = *atten oke*.

Norloge, a clock (*ibid.*).

Numbles, the umbles or entrails of a deer.

Mr Skeat gives the following instances of the *transference* of *n* from *William of Palerne* (reprinted by him for the *Early Eng. Text Society*).

(1) þan fond he nest and no neiȝ, l. 83 (*non eiȝ* = no egg).

(2) a noynement anon sche made, l. 136. [Autolycus uses the participle '*nointed*' in the *Winter's Tale*; but that is an abbreviated form of *anointed*.]

(3) alle my noȝer, l. 458 (all mine other).

(4) lacche me in þi narmes, l. 666 (clasp me in thine arms).

(5) Yister neue, l. 2160 (*yestern eve*, as in *gestern, hesternus*).

We even find *pink neyes* = *pinken eyes*. The reference for this has been given in *Notes and Queries* by Mr Skeat in a note

on *piggesnie* (*pigges ye* = pig's eye), a term of endearment in Chaucer, Udall's *Roister Doister* iii. 4, &c.

There are two remarkable words which I have noticed in Sir John Maundevile's *Voiage and Traueile* (about 1350). 'Thei maken a maner of hissynge, as a *Neddre* dothe' (*cap.* 19). It is natural to suppose that a *Neddre* is a corruption or change from an *adder*. It appears however from the existence of the A. S. *næddre*, the German *Natter* (and the Latin *natrix*), that the form with the *n* (which is still current in the north of England, *Halliwell*) was the earlier.

On the other hand Sir John Mandevile tells how in the convent of Mount Sinai 'ne entrethe not no Flye ne Todes *ne Ewtes*, ne suche foule venymouse Bestes, ne Lyzs ne Flees, be the Myracle of God and of oure Lady.' The word *ewt* corresponds with the A. S. *efete*: but the point about it which I would remark is that we now have two parallel forms, one with the *n* attached from the indefinite article, the other without; I mean of course *newt* and *eft*.

Mr Skeat tells me of three words which, like *adder*, have probably lost the initial. *Orange* has already been mentioned: *augur* = *naugur*; A. S. *nafu* the nave of a wheel, *gar* a spear or borer; thus *augur* means a *nave-borer*, whence the alternative name a *centre-bit*.

umpire, O. Fr. *nompair* the uneven or odd man, who settled a dispute between a pair of others: here *nom* = *non*, the *n* becoming *m* before *p*.

Again the negative *ne* is apt to coalesce with the following word in such cases as *n'ot* = *wot not*; *nist* = *wist not*; *n'as* = *was not*, &c., &c.

There is some evidence of a similar process in the case of other letters: as *the ton* and *the tother* for *that one* and *that other*.

Also *dapple gray* is thought by some to be equivalent to *apple* or *pomely gray* as Chaucer calls it.

But it is clear that *n* is the letter most subject to this kind of transmigration.

CHR. WORDSWORTH, JUNIOR.

Since writing the above my attention has been drawn to two philological essays by the late J. C. Hare, which were printed many years since and recently issued by Professor Mayor. The latter of the essays, that on *Words corrupted by False Analogy or False Derivation*, contains a passage (pp. 36—38) on the question in hand. One word which I had overlooked is there mentioned, *an ouch*, or *a nouche*, a 'broche,' the second being perhaps the original form (L. L. *nocia*, *nosca*, *nusca*; O. G. *nüschin*).

PHILOSTRATUS VIT. SOPH. I 22 § 2.

COBET in *Mnemosyne* 1873 p. 212 among corrupt passages of Philostratus, as printed in Kayser's last edition (in Teubner's bibliotheca), notices one, which he partly emends by one easy and certain conjecture, but confesses that a further remedy is required: 'Aliquid dispicio p. 523 [of Olearius] οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε θνητὰ νομισθείη τὰ ἀνθρώπεια οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἀ ἐμάθομεν εἰ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο ἀνθρώποις. Hoc unum video requiri: εἰ μὴ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο: reliqua corrigat qui poterit.' The words οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἀ ἐμαθόμεν suggest the required correction: read οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μαθητὰ νομισθείη τὰ ἀνθρώπεια οὐδὲ διδακτὰ ἀ ἐμάθομεν εἰ μὴ μνήμη συνεπολιτεύετο ἀνθρώποις.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

29 July, 1873.

THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER,

Edited, with marginal references, various readings, notes and appendices, By HENRY HAYMAN, D.D., Head Master of Rugby School. Vol. II. Books vii. to xii.

It would really seem that the world will never be tired of the "Homeric controversy." At the very time when attacks are being made upon the study of Greek, as a part of a liberal education in our schools and universities, new translations of Homer are being multiplied, and new editions of the text are following each other, taking up and discussing with unabated interest the old inquiry, "Who was Homer?" The second volume of Dr Hayman's *Odyssey* has deservedly attracted a good deal of attention. It is the work of a most painstaking scholar, is replete with information on almost every conceivable department of Homeric learning; it is even chivalrously conservative as against the "destructive" theory of Wolf and his followers: it is almost exhaustive in *self-illustration*, i.e. in the collection and comparison of Homeric passages; and lastly, it is written in a beautifully clear, unpedantic, and interesting style, especially in the Appendices. These, or most of these, points, will be acknowledged by all as high merits. If, in logical argument and inference, the long and really important Preface appears somewhat strained and far-fetched in its pleadings, we may attribute this rather to an excess of zeal in proving the genuineness of the Homeric poems against all assailants, than from any conscious unfairness or inability to grasp the subject in its widest range. The author deals at considerable length with a series of arguments that have of late been brought to bear against the claim of the *Iliad* and

the Odyssey, in their present form, to an antiquity greater than about the middle of the fifth century B.C. By their *present form* is not meant their entire composition, but their compilation and adaptation, and to a considerable extent even their reconstruction, out of really old materials, *i.e.* out of a much larger mass of unwritten epic poetry, that can be proved to have been current under the general name of "Homer" in the times of Pindar, Herodotus, and the tragic writers. Dr Hayman's Preface extends to more than 130 pages, and it touches on and discusses so many topics, that it becomes rather a difficulty how to reply to it as a whole, in a somewhat limited space. Dr Hayman addresses himself principally to a categorical answer to the doubts and difficulties as to the commonly received date of these poems, put forward in the paper on this subject, published by the Cambridge Philosophical Society¹. He does not grant the force of the objections as a whole, *i.e.* as a cumulative and presumptive argument: he disputes the correctness of some of the statements; and he is not deterred from asserting his belief in the genuineness of the poems by the antecedent improbabilities that are brought against it.

It is a curious feature of the Homeric controversy, that many of the arguments employed on either side are like two-edged weapons. They cut both ways, and deal havoc according to the training of the combatant. It is rather a favourite argument of Dr Hayman's to show, that the same reasons for bringing the Homeric poems (as we have them) down to so late a date as the "writing period," or about the Platonic age, may be used to prove them much later still. Whether the hint, or brief and even casual mention of an incident, in those poems, in itself furnishes, as one party contends, an inference that it came from a late epitomiser of older, fuller, and generally familiar stories; or, as the other party maintains, it was the original story, of which others (*e.g.* the tales in the Greek tragedies) were later developments,—the "cookings from Homer," 'Ομήρου τεμάχη, as Aeschylus is said to have called them,—is a question that ad-

¹ On the comparatively late date and composite character of our Iliad and Odyssey. (Vol. xi. Part ii. of the Transactions.)

mits, of course, of no definite settlement. We can only reason on probabilities; on the known analogies of myths and legendary ballads, and on the practice, as far as we know it, of rhapsodes and the composers of oral narratives. To take one example; the "Ἀβιοὶ in Il. iv. 23—6 are called a "just race"; they are mentioned as such in Herod. iv. 23—6, and in a fragment of Aeschylus, somewhat earlier (frag. 184, Dind.). In all these places they may have been adopted independently from the rhapsodists or the anecdotes of λογοποιοὶ, who had heard tales of some happy far-distant clime, where people neither stole nor wronged each other,—a kind of "Salt Lake" Utah, where everybody was as good as possible. Certainly Dr Hayman is not justified in saying that "the myth in Aeschylus' time had *grown to embrace* further their special exemption from the necessity of tilling the ground" (οὔτε γατόμος τέμνει δίκηλλ' ἄρουραν). This correlation between sin and labour, we need hardly remind Dr Hayman, is older than Aeschylus.

In answer to the objection, that our present Homeric texts contain the merest fragments of the tale of Troy which we know to have been current 450 B.C., and therefore that what we call Homer could not have been *the* Homer of the age of the Greek Tragics; Dr Hayman replies, that this is no valid argument, because Homer himself may have been an epitomist from earlier ballads; and that the subjects of the Tragedies on the Troica were the residue rejected by the Homer of B.C. 850. But how can he, how can any one, explain away the patent and undisputed fact, that these supposed ἔπη ἀπόθρετα, or rejected epics, were so much better known and so far more popular than an Iliad or an Odyssey, even four centuries later? What can we think of the "divine Homer," and of his alleged influence over the thought and poetry of Hellas, if after his poems had existed in nearly their present shape, for four centuries, they had not superseded those very different versions of the story which we find so persistently in Pindar, the Tragics, and the works of the vase-painters?

Still less satisfactory is Dr Hayman's answer to the argument of lateness founded on the generally virtuous and amiable

character of the Homeric characters, especially the women. It had been remarked, that whereas the tragics generally depict these characters, and especially that of Helen, in a bad light, there is much less of villany and *immorality*, if not of the mere savageries of war, in the Homeric account. And it has hence been argued, that the superstitious fear of speaking evil of Helen, (the penalty of which, as Plato tells us, was believed to be blindness,) and the general progress of a more advanced and philosophic age, would fairly well account for this in a late compiler; while the Tragics generally seem to have followed the older and more "sensational" account. Dr Hayman seems to have visions of a real golden age, and to believe in the general declension of the human race from virtue to vice; in other words, in the general chastity and virtue of primeval people. He concludes therefore that Homer's "experience of human nature was confined to a period before certain infamous vices existed." The tragics, he thinks, ought by the same argument to make *their* "Homeric" characters amiable; whereas it is certain that their conception of Helen, of Menelaus, Ulysses, was as bad as possible. Is it likely, we ask, if Homer really depicted his characters as virtuous B.C. 850, and if the Iliad and Odyssey were really known and regarded as of paramount authority four centuries afterwards, that the same characters should have turned out vicious in the hands of the Tragics? Or that, if the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus was as disinterested as we read of it in the Iliad, Aeschylus should have plainly described it as a relation between the heroes that was anything but reputable? Plato, in the Symposium, says Αἰσχύλος φλυαρεῖ,—that it is an idle tale. Dr Hayman does not see that in Plato's age the Iliad and the Odyssey had become the standard "Homer," and everything was tested by the poems as they were then accepted in their written and literary form. The simple explanation, then, of this discrepancy in the tragic and the epic accounts is, that the tragics followed the earlier and still generally popular conceptions, and either had not or knew not the Homer in which they are polished and adorned with a varnish of virtue. The argument, *per se*, may be worth

little; but it proceeds on a course of reasoning that is perfectly consistent with the theory of a late compilation.

It is a fact of the greatest interest, and one that must bear with almost crushing weight on the Homeric controversy, that no less than sixteen of the extant Greek tragedies, and fifty-eight of those now lost, but the titles and (to some extent) the subjects of which are known, refer to events and characters in the Trojan war, but are not, with very few exceptions, identical with those treated and described in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Dr Hayman labours to show, that the proportion of those which can be referred to those poems (or, as the advocates of the other side would with equal justice say, "to subjects included in or alluded to in those poems,") has been somewhat understated; *i.e.* that out of the seventy-four tragedies on the *Troica*, not half a dozen or so, but twenty, may with probability be regarded as founded on our Homeric texts. But Dr Hayman has not fully appreciated the point held in view in the compilation of the above list; which was to show, that these plays could not have been borrowed directly from our Homer, even though a few of them touched on some topics alluded to in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*. For instance, the "*Ὀπλων κρίσις*," attributed to Aeschylus, must have followed some poem, very celebrated at that period, that detailed the anger of Ajax, and his subsequent suicide, in consequence of the unfair award of the arms of Achilles to Ulysses. "Some poem," we say, because no absolute reliance can be placed on the alleged authorship of epics that were included with our Homer in the "Cyclus" of much later times. There can hardly be a doubt that all were, in the time of the tragics, the common stock of the rhapsodes, and were called by the common name of "Homer." We are sure of this, *viz.* that recourse was not had to "our Homer" for the subjects and materials of the drama. The *Ajax*, and in part, the *Philoctetes*, of Sophocles, are directly founded on the legend, which is merely alluded to in the briefest and most incidental manner in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*. Precisely the same may be said of the tale of the Wooden Horse, the capture and burning of Troy, the death of Achilles, his fight

with Memnon, and many other tales, which are so scantily alluded to in our texts that we are morally certain the tragics never took them from the "Homer" that Dr Hayman believes was their sole ultimate source. We may add, that in his effort to enlarge the list of "Homeric" tragedies, he rests on little more than the merest assumption that such plays as the Proteus, the Ostologi, the Philoctetes, had reference to actual scenes in the Iliad or the Odyssey. He has overlooked, too, the fact, that the Myrmidons, the *Ἐκτορος λύτρα*, and the *Ψυχοστάσια*, were not omitted, but expressly included by the compiler, in his list of tragedies referring to subjects in the Iliad. The same is true of the *Ἑλένης ἄρπαγή*, the *Ἑλένης ἀπαίτησις*, the *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος*, the *Ναυσικάα*, none of which were omitted, but the subjects of all were duly considered and discussed in their bearing on the Homeric question. On the whole, and in round numbers, it may fairly be granted that a dozen out of seventy Greek plays can be connected more or less clearly with our present Homeric texts.

The truth is, however, that the general question is not in the slightest degree affected by the precise number,—be it six, or ten, or twenty,—of Greek plays and of painted Greek vases representing Trojan scenes, that exhibit subjects common to them and to our Homeric texts. We are no nearer the proof that, because the subjects are in common, therefore Pindar, or the tragics, or the vase-painters, took them out of our Homeric texts. There is still a total absence of proof that, in the present form of those epics, they possessed them at all. The fact, at all events, is established by the most conclusive evidence, that our Homer was not in B.C. 450 *the* Homer, to which every other composer or "Cyclic" writer was held secondary and inferior. The contrary must, in reason, be admitted, that if these poems did then exist in their present form, or nearly so, they were much less known, much less cared for, much less *in ore vulgi*, than other legends of the Troica. No special pleading can ever overturn this primary and all-important fact. And whether the language of Homer is the *genuine* early Ionic, or merely embodies a number of traditional metrical words and forms, worked up with many comparative modern-

isms, many omitted and some spurious *digammas*, and even with some pseudoarchaic or imitative words; is a question that must be dealt with in rigid connexion with the foregoing facts.

The popular doctrine, repeated and enforced by Dr Hayman, that the Greek Tragedies contained Trojan legends "developed by post-Homeric manipulation," is, we contend, nothing more than assumption. "The Cyclic poets" (he says, § XXI.) "supplied the dramatists with what they wanted, and the latter turned it to account, and so far set aside as antiquated the simpler Homeric forms of their legendary themes." And this, he goes so far as to say, "instead of proving the modernness, directly suggests the antiquity of our Homer."

In fact, Dr Hayman forces the argument from its natural course, to suit his own view of the matter. To take a single example: the celebrated account of the shield of Achilles in Iliad XVIII. is nowhere ever alluded to by any writer earlier¹ than Plato, who cites (Phileb. p. 48) a verse from that book, about the "sweetness of revenge," so that we have therein a reasonable presumption (though nothing more) that he also had the description of the shield made by Hephaestus for Achilles. But, in the Electra of Euripides (445 seqq.) we have the description, and quite a different one, of the original shield, given by the gods to Peleus as a marriage-gift (Il. XVIII. 84), and lost by being lent to Patroclus. It is curious to find Dr Hayman confounding these wholly different stories; of which that in Euripides, from its place in the story, is likely to have been the earlier one. He asks (§ LXXXIII.) "where in the Iliad have we any more than *one* suit of divine armour, viz. that of Il. XVIII. ascribed to Achilles?" The mention of the original suit, and the capture of it by Hector, may be called the theme of the two preceding books. Dr Hayman's remark therefore (in the note on § XXIII.) loses all force, as a baseless assumption: "We know that Euripides gives Achilles a shield remarkably unlike the one given in Il. Σ; although this part of the Iliad *must certainly* have been current in his time." Where, we ask, is the proof of this? It certainly cannot be drawn from the fact that *δέησεν* assumes the Attic con-

¹ The Scutum Herculis, falsely attributed to Hesiod, we knowingly except.

traction δῆσεν (Il. xviii. 100, Ar. Ran. 266), that τέλος is used in the wholly mistaken sense of τέλος (544), or that Λίνον αἰδεῖν, "to sing the Linus" (570)—a strange anachronism—should have to be evaded by the non-natural interpretation of λινον "a lute-string." We might go further, and ask, where, in all the extant plays of Euripides, can we lay our hands upon a *single* passage that can be shown to have been borrowed or adapted from our Iliad? And if so, where is the proof, or even the ground of inference, that Euripides knew of the Iliad at all? Dr Hayman thinks it so obvious that he must have known it, that he says (p. xxiv.) the destructive argument proves too much; "because it proves that our Iliad and Odyssey were not generally known in the time of Euripides. A conclusion which seems to me to need no refutation." We can only say, that if such a statement were even made (which it has not been), a refutation of it would be more difficult than Dr Hayman supposes. The very verses he quotes on his title-page from the Troades of Euripides, while they show, as passages in Aristophanes show, that the tale of Ulysses' wanderings, in some form, was familiar to the Athenians at that period, do not in the least prove that the Odyssey then existed in its present complete and continuous state.

Again, we think Dr Hayman does not deal quite fairly (Pref. § xxix.—xxxv.) with the negative argument derived from the general absence of "Homeric," but not of Trojan, scenes from the earlier painted vases, which are supposed to claim an antiquity of five centuries or even more before the Christian era. Their evidence is most important: for if it can be shown that they very rarely treat of any scene described in our Homeric texts, then at least there is good ground for believing that they regarded other poems and other legends as of greater authority, or at least preferred them as more generally known. So far as we know, their evidence in this respect coincides entirely and most remarkably with the tragic writers. Dr Hayman contends that local interest would so far prevail, that general scenes from the Iliad or the Odyssey might have been omitted from the list of popular subjects of representation. The force of the argument on the other side really turns on the

fact, that the artists did represent very frequently, even primarily, scenes from the Troica, but *not* those in the Iliad or the Odyssey, though they are sometimes briefly hinted at in those poems, *e.g.* the "Judgment of Paris," or the "Marriage of Peleus." The "local" theory has no weight. These artists selected such scenes as were most familiar to all from the recitations of the rhapsodists; and, if they did not get these scenes out of our present Homer, they either did not know him, or they meant by that name something very different from what we mean, or they regarded "non-Homeric" stories about Troy as of more general interest.

The famous "Chest of Cypselus," supposed by Pausanias to be really archaic,—albeit his judgment is not by any means to be trusted absolutely in this matter,—is claimed by Dr Hayman on the one hand, as it is by his opponents on the other, in proof of the Homeric or non-Homeric character of the Trojan legends of the period. The date is thought by Dr Hayman to be "probably as old as 600 B.C.,"—an opinion worth nothing at all, as we have not the chest to examine, and as we know that Pausanias, like Herodotus and very many others, was extremely credulous about pretended antiquities, of which he had no critical knowledge. Anyhow, we get little out of this chest in favour of Homer as we now know him; the duel of Ajax and Hector was a hackneyed subject with the vase-painters; that of Coon or Iphidamas and Agamemnon finds its place in the eleventh Iliad; Thetis receiving the arms for her son may refer to a non-Homeric story, that the arms of Peleus were conveyed to him across the sea by the Nereids (*Eur. El.* 442); while Odysseus and Circe, Nausicaa and her handmaids, are undoubtedly stories found in our Odyssey, and we cannot deny that, (assuming the poem as then existing in some form, which no one wishes to deny,) they may have been taken directly from it. But then on this very chest there was a considerable preponderance of subjects from the Troica *not* in our Homer. Here then, as everywhere, there crops up the unquestioned existence of other than Homeric ballads, that apparently had a decided precedence in popularity. Dr Hayman concludes, with more subtlety, we think, than honesty of con-

viction, from the silence of Pausanias about other *written* poems in his time (about A.D. 150), that he "regarded the Homeric poems as already current, when other incidents represented on the chest floated in legend only." The mistake is to make the opinions (supposing even that he held them) of a man living nearly a thousand years after the supposed "Homer," any evidence as to what was the real source of the Troica of early art and of the early tragedies. For Pausanias, quite as a matter of course, attributed them, as far as he possibly could, to the Homer of the day,—the Homer as we have it.

It would take a great space to discuss this most important topic, the evidence of the Greek vases. Dr Hayman has attempted at considerable length to show that a fair number of them do represent scenes from our Homeric poems. The contention on the other side is, that extremely few of the really archaic vases now known to exist (and the aggregate number even of these is great) have paintings that can be assigned to our texts. It is evident, too, that even these prove nothing more than that the scenes they represent have been preserved in our Homer, supposing it to be a later composite text. *Some* of the vast mass of tales and legends about Troy must have found a place in an Iliad and an Odyssey, even if compiled in as late an age as that of Quintus Smyrnaeus, who lived in the fourth century after Christ. His extant poem is in fact an epitome of the stories not embodied in, though probably quite as old as, the Iliad and the Odyssey.

Dr Hayman takes too much on trust the supposed antiquity of the "Lamberg Vases," published in part in two vols. by Mr Laborde. Vases with written names seldom perhaps reach an antiquity of B.C. 500; and there are good reasons for thinking that, in the style of the writing, they are not unfrequently "pseudo-archaic." When Dr Hayman specifies ten subjects in this volume, which he says "correspond with scenes from our Iliad and Odyssey" (§ XLVI.), he merely guesses at the subjects of *four*, which may equally well mean something quite different; *three* are the commonest of subjects, sung, probably, by nearly every rhapsodist that ever rehearsed "Homer" at all, viz. the combat of Achilles and Hector, or Hector and Ajax. No one

ever doubted that such stories go back to a possibly great antiquity. But, because they find a place in our Iliad, they do not tend to prove that it is a composition of B.C. 850.

But, even granting these vase-paintings the antiquity that is claimed for them, we say of them, as of the "Chest of Cypselus," that they do at least conclusively prove this, that our Homer had no claim whatever in those early times to be the primary or paramount authority, or indeed in any way the source, of the history of the Trojan war. For they are so mixed up with non-Homeric Troica (call them "Cyclic" subjects, or what not) that it is as plain as anything can be that subjects such as those said to have been treated by Stasinus, Arctinus, Lesches, Agias, &c., the "Cypria," the Ἰλίου Πέρις, the "Return of the Heroes," were all "Homer" alike. The vast mass of orally recited epics had settled down at some period not long before Plato's time into a written "Iliad" and "Odyssey"; and then only they took a permanent precedence over the rest, which however, as we have said, lingered on till quite late times, with the reproach and almost the contempt unjustly attaching to them, of being merely "post-Homeric" imitations. Everything not in the Iliad and the Odyssey was palmed off on a "scriptor Cyclicus."

We may further illustrate this position, (which it is most important fully to expound, though, we fear, at the risk of some tediousness) from the famous "François vase," found at Chiusi in 1845. Mr Dennis, in his "Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria" (II. pp. 99, 115), calls this fine amphora "an Iliad, or rather an Achilleid, in pottery, for its subjects have especial reference to the great hero of the Trojan War, from the youthful deeds of his father, and the marriage of his parents, down to his own death, interspersed with mythological episodes." It is now preserved at Florence, and is referred to the second, or later-archaic, Greek style,—the figures being black, tinted with white and red, on the yellow ground of the clay. It was fairly, perhaps, to be regarded as not later than B.C. 500, the style of writing being very old, and in part βουστροφηδόν. Thus the maker's name is ΚΑΙΤΙΑΣ (qu. ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ?) ΜΕ ΕΓΡΑΦΕΝ (backwards), and ΕΡΜΟΤΙΜΟΣ ΜΕ ΠΟΙΕΣΕΝ. When Mr Dennis called this "an Iliad or rather an Achilleid," he expressed a

consciousness of the fact, that it was impossible to suppose its details were borrowed from our Iliad. Thus we have

1. Ajax bearing the body of Achilles.
2. Battle of Centaurs and Lapithae.
3. The Calydonian hunt.
4. Funeral games in honour of Patroclus, with five cars and the names of the drivers.
5. Marriage of Peleus and Thetis.
6. Achilles pursuing Troilus. Hector and Polites issuing from the gates of Troy for the protection of their brother (Troilus).
7. Return of Hephaestus to heaven.
8. Pygmies mounted on goats encountering the cranes.

Of all these subjects, only No. 4 can fairly claim to be a subject from our Iliad. For it is perfectly fair to argue, that the slight allusions to the Centaurs, the Pygmies (III. 6), and the Calydonian hunt (II. IX.), show clear indications of being epitomised from much fuller and older stories, such as these paintings were meant to illustrate. But critics of Dr Hayman's school persist in arguing, that because some scenes are common to early vase-paintings and to our Iliad, therefore the paintings must have been taken from our Iliad. We contend that this is a *non-sequitur* in every sense.

The large intermixture of apparently modern (*i.e.* comparatively modern) words with undoubtedly archaic forms and phrases in our texts, has been alleged as a presumptive argument that our texts cannot claim a genuine antiquity. Dr Hayman endeavours to answer the objection at great length. He compares the diction of Hesiod, Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Theognis, &c., and says, "in no one of these will there be found any less degree of modernism than in our Homer." That is not to the point, even if so vague a statement could be proved. By the "modernisms" of Homer it is meant, that a large class of words appear in our Homer which, so far as we can judge from the most careful study of the progressive development of the language (*e.g.* of such very marked differences as exist between the language of Thucydides and Demosthenes or Plato), belong

to quite an advanced period of epic composition. Such are, colloquial formulae such as *ὅτε μὲν, ὅτε δέ*, for "sometimes"; verbs like *κελητίζειν, ἀτιμάζειν, ἰσάζειν, ἀπαιτίζειν, παππίζειν, ἀγορτάζειν, ἐρατίζειν*, &c.; such medial forms as *μεγαλίζεσθαι, πληκτίζεσθαι, ἐπαγλαϊεῖσθαι, οἰνίζεσθαι*, &c., and a number of medical and anatomical terms, as *κοτυληδών, πρότμησις, κύστις*, &c., evidently much more suitable to the age of Hippocrates than to that of warlike heroes. This question, it is admitted, must turn largely on the intuitive feeling for the language which none but very good scholars can hope to possess. If any one believes that the Greeks of B.C. 850 had such a term as *κελητίζειν* "to ride on horseback," we cannot, of course, prove him to be in the wrong, though we may think him rather credulous. This is one of those presumptive arguments which have a cumulative rather than a special or isolated force. An Ionic diction, such as that of Herodotus, of B.C. 450, would be, in a prose writer, the natural and uniform language; but in an old poem recast or remodelled at about the same period, it would be largely mixed up with archaic words. These archaic words, being all conveniently metrical, would form the stock-in-trade of all the early poets; and thus Dr Hayman has only lost his labour in drawing up long lists of passages (§§ XLVIII.—LXII.) in other writers which contain the same "Homeric" phrases. Obviously, this does not in the least prove that they took them from "our Homer." It is just as tenable a view (as has already been said of the vase-paintings), that all came from a common source, viz. from a large mass of orally recited epics very long anterior to the period of a written literature.

It is singular that, with all his anxiety to establish the genuine antiquity of the Homeric poems as we now have them, Dr Hayman yet makes admissions that go nearly as far as the very objections he is endeavouring to meet. All they allege is, that our Homeric texts are a compilation from, and to some extent a remodelling of, early epics that had become well-nigh obsolete and more or less obscure in the period of a written literature about B.C. 450. He says (p. lxxix.), "I believe that our Homeric poems continued *for no few centuries* liable to the caprices of rhapsodists, adding, omitting, recombining, and re-

arranging, as best suited their immediate purpose." But, what others attribute to the efforts of a literary age, i.e. the first committing of these poems, in a continuous and dramatic form, to writing, Dr Hayman attributes, with much less probability, as we think, to the "interests of the rhapsodists." So difficult it is, in our times, to detach our minds from the idea of written lectures and written sermons. We know (if only from Plato's *Ion*) that memory was the very point on which these rhapsodists prided themselves most. Can we conceive them sitting at home and conning over MSS. at any early period of Greek life?

The fact, then, is perfectly undeniable, that Pindar and the tragic writers did not in the main follow our Homer. They had a "Homer," and they used his supposed poems. But he was something very different indeed from our Homer. Dr Hayman meets this difficulty by a kind of quibble; he replies, that "no *direct* reference occurs in Pindar and the older writers to the Cyclic any more than to the Homeric poems." Of course not: they had no idea of *any* author but Homer. And his attempt to account for the very secondary and partial repute in which *our* version of the tale of Troy was held (supposing it then to have existed in nearly its present shape), is weak. Great poets, he argues, are not appreciated at first, and require a philosophic period for their true merits to be discerned. Thus he would explain the fact, that out of more than forty allusions to the *Troica* in Pindar, only about six can in any way be connected with our texts. Even supposing that, by stretching probabilities somewhat far, not six, but ten Homeric episodes could be recognised in Pindar, the argument is not materially affected.

To recapitulate briefly; in the fifth century B.C. the tale of Troy was the fertile source of poetry and art, when poetry and art existed in their fullest and finest development. We look round to recognise the "divine Homer," and we find him not, except here and there under circumstances which are perfectly compatible with the late compilation of such poems as we have been accustomed to attribute to him.

(To be continued.)

ARISTOTELIA.

Eth. Nic. v. 1135 b 33.—ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ.

ARISTOTLE is speaking here of acts done under the impulse of anger and not denied by the agent, who believes himself to have been justified in what he did. But who is the ἐπιβουλεύσας, and how can an angry man be said to work insidiously against his enemy? The difficulty has been deemed so serious that Sir A. Grant has recourse to what may be termed an heroic remedy, that of giving ἐπιβουλεύειν a meaning not recognized by the lexicons. Mr H. Richards, also, in a former volume of this Journal (IV. p. 154), is led to devise an entirely new way of taking the passage, on the ground mainly that ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας cannot in any sense be identified with ὁ ὀργισθείς. “It is hard to see (he says) how ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας can apply to a man expressly said to act οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας, especially if we compare VII. 6, 3 [1149 b 14] ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος. If he nurses his anger and plots vengeance at his leisure, he must lose his character of ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν.” On this I would remark that the passage in Book VII. need not be taken into account: ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν is hardly the same thing as ὁ θυμώδης, and there is no manifest inconsistency in saying “passionate men are not treacherous,” and in intimating the possibility of a man nursing his wrath and plotting vengeance at his leisure. It would be strange if the legal mind of antiquity failed to recognise so obvious a fact as the case of a man who acts from anger and yet postpones his vengeance: Plato certainly has a great deal to

say about it in Book IX. of the Laws, where the punishment of homicide is under discussion. One who slays another in anger is to pay the penalty for involuntary homicide and also to go into exile for two or three years, according as he commits the deed without or with premeditation:—ὁ δὲ θυμῷ μὲν, μετ' ἐπιβουλῆς δὲ κτείνας τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν πρόσθεν αὖ, τρία δὲ ἔτη, καθάπερ ἄτερος ἔφευγε τὰ δύο, φευγέτω (p. 867 c).

Eth. Eud. ii. 1225 b 1.—δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὄν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἥτοι ὥς ὅτι μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὥς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον. τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

This passage, on the voluntariness of actions, is still (as Bonitz said of it thirty years ago) 'locus manifeste corruptus.' I observe that both Fritzsche and Spengel (*Aristot. Stud.* ii. p. 16) keep the dative ἀγνοοῦντι, not seeing that the form of the sentence (δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ εἰδότα τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι πράττειν) imperatively demands the accusative. But what are we to do with the ἥτοι ὥς in the parenthesis? If we refuse to follow Fritzsche who tampers with what is sound, and content ourselves with writing ἢ τὸ ᾧ for the corrupt ἥτοι ὥς, the place will be intelligible enough:—

δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὄν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες· ἢ τὸ ᾧ ὅτι μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὥς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

Pol. iii. 14, 1285 a 7.—αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἶον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀλδιός ἐστιν· κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ EN TINΙ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΙ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὁμηρος· ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γοῦν “ὄν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης <φεύγοντα νοήσω>, οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς. παρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.” One of the many ways of

dealing with the parenthetical εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ is to omit the last word and make the clause in its curtailed form mean, "except in certain cases," *ausser in gewissen Fällen*, as Bernays puts it. I would suggest, however, that if we eliminate anything, it should be the little word τινί, which looks like an interpolation intended to soften down the obvious absurdity of the traditional text; and further, that in ἐν βασιλείᾳ a couple of letters have been lost. An infinitesimal change in accordance with well-known paleographical precedents will then yield the following result:—

ENBASILEIAI = EN * KA * EILEIAS.

That is to say, ἔνεκα δειλίας—a reading which the quotation from Homer seems to render indispensable. The strange suggestion of Schmidt (ἐν τινι δειλίᾳ), and the still stranger one of Lindau (ἐν τινι βία δειλίας), involve the same idea.

Poet. iv. 1448 b 25.—οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ΕΤΕΡΟΙ ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια.

Ought we not to read ἄτεροι for ἔτεροι? A similar correction is required in ch. xi. also (1452 b 3):—ἐπεὶ δὴ ἡ ἀναγνώρισις τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀναγνώρισις, αἱ μὲν θατέρου πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον μόνον, ὅταν ἡ δῆλος ἄτερος [vulg. ἕτερος] τίς ἐστιν.

iv. 1449 a 7.—τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἂρ' ἔχει [so Vahlen] ἤδη ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἱκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτό ΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα, ἄλλος λόγος.

For κρίνεται εἶναι, or rather κρίνεται ἢ ναί, the reading of A°, I would write simply κρίναι, on the hypothesis that the vulgate implies an earlier stage in the manuscript tradition in which κρίνεται was corrected by the superscription of ηναι, the intention of the corrector being to restore κρῆναι, i. e. κρίναι. From Spengel's contemptuous note I learn that this suggestion has been anticipated by (if I understand him rightly) Forchammer, who appears to give a slightly different explanation of the genesis of the common reading.

v. 1449 a 38.—*ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν· καὶ γὰρ χορὸν κωμῳδῶν ὀψέ ποτε ὁ ἄρχων ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ' ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν.*

For *κωμῳδῶν* we ought perhaps to read *κωμῳδῶ*.

v. 1449 b 4.—*τίς δὲ πρόσωπα ἀπέδωκεν ἢ προλόγους ἢ πλήθη ὑποκριτῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἡγνόηται. τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις. τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης πρῶτος ἤρξεν κ.τ.λ.*

The asyndeton in the sentence *τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς* is, to say the least, suspicious, and moreover, as the text now stands, *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* is without a verb; for it is manifestly impossible to say *τὸ μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκαν*. Susemihl accordingly would have us omit *Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις* as a gloss; but there is another alternative, and that is, to suppose these words to be out of place. Improbable as this hypothesis may seem at first sight, I believe the truth of it to be all but demonstrated by the fact that the erudite Themistius must have had this very passage in view when he wrote the following (Orat. xxvii. p. 337 A):—

οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει τὰ παρ' ἑτέροις ἀρχὴν λαβόντα πλείονος σπουδῆς παρ' ἄλλοις τυγχάνειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἦστην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμος· κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη [Ἀθήνησιν ηὐξήθη?].

It is Themistius also, we must remember, who has preserved for us the valuable Aristotelian fragment about Thespis, which so aptly fits into another well-known gap (in ch. iv.) in the miserably mutilated book which has come down to us.

vi. 1449 b 36.—The conclusion that every tragedy is made up of six elements is the complex result of two separate arguments, each establishing the existence of three elements; the first treating of the music, scenery, and language in a drama; the second of the plot (*μῦθος*), characters (*ἦθη*), and thought (*διάνοια*). The second argument runs, or ought to run, as follows:—the fact which the drama seeks to counterfeit is action (*πρᾶξις*): action, however, implies agents with qualities

intellectual and moral: in a play, then, the action, i.e. the story conceived in an abstract or general form [*καθόλου*, as Arist. says in a later Ch.], is represented by the *μῦθος* or plot, while the purely personal or individual element is supplied by the *dramatis personae* introduced. But to get this sense out of Aristotle's words we must not only emend but also supplement the existing text:—

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πράττεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινων πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι φαμεν ποιίας τινας, πέφυκε δ' αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι διάνοια καὶ ἦθος, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσι πάντες) ἔστι δὴ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἦθη καὶ ἡ διάνοια. λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ ἦθη κ.τ.λ.

I agree, therefore, with M. Thurot in considering the parenthesis to extend to πάντες, and with Vahlen in writing πέφυκε δ' for the common reading πέφυκεν. My reasons, however, are not identical with Vahlen's, for I regard the πέφυκε δὲ as a sort of afterthought suggested by the preceding φαμέν, the appeal being in the first case to language and in the second to the nature of things. And, in accordance with Eucken's view, I write ἔστι δὴ for the manuscript ἔστι δέ, to shew that the apodosis begins at this point. As for the clause which I have provisionally introduced, I believe the insertion of it or something similar to be required by both sense and grammar. It certainly saves us from the necessity of finding an antithesis to τῆς μὲν πράξεως in πέφυκε δὲ or τὰ δὲ ἦθη, and moreover gives the following string of definitions the justification they at present lack.

vi. 1450 b 12.—Having discussed three of the six elements in a play, viz. the *μῦθος*, *ἦθη* and *διάνοια*, Aristotle proceeds to say:—

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ΜΕΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ ἢ λέξις (λέγω δέ, ...λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν...) τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέμπτον]

ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων· ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς.

After expunging πέμπτον (or rather πέντε) as a marginal gloss, there still remains the difficulty to find something for τῶν μὲν λόγων to stand in antithesis to. These words can hardly be opposed to the parenthetical λέγω δέ, nor yet to τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν: in the latter case the logical coherence would be a pure illusion, as we may easily see by examining the bare framework of the sentence: τέταρτον τῶν μὲν λόγων ἡ λέξις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἡ μελοποιία καὶ ἡ ὄψις. There is in fact no grammatical opposition to be discerned here, but there is nevertheless a real one. The four elements first enumerated, the μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια and λέξις enter into a drama as a purely literary work, as a thing to be read [comp. Poet. xxvi.] and not seen or heard. For τῶν μὲν λόγων, therefore, I propose to read τῶν ἐν λόγῳ.

vii. 1451 a 3.—Speaking of the length of the tragic plot Aristotle argues that the limit in one direction is fixed by the circumstance that the whole must be εὐμνημόνευτον, just as in material things (ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἔκ τινων) the possibility of beauty depends on the whole being εὐσύνοπτον. The argument is then summarized thus:—

ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ΣΩΜΑΤΩΝ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῶων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

Ueberweg wishes to substitute σχημάτων for σωμάτων, but the συνέστηκεν which precedes suggests a very different word, namely, συστημάτων.

vii. 1451 a 6.—τοῦ δὲ μήκους ὅρος ὃ μὲν [so Bursian] πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐ τῆς τέχνης ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἑκατὸν τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, πρὸς κλεψύδρας ἂν ἡγωνίζοντο, ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε ΦΑΣΙΝ.

If ἀγωνίζεσθαι, said of the dramatic poet, retains its etymological meaning of to *compete* or *contend* for a prize, we might

surely expect the dative *τραγωδίαις* here, as one certainly would with the kindred words *ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι* and *νικᾶν*. As for the parenthetical *ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ φασιν*, the clause is one of such notorious obscurity that Hermann proposed to transfer it to a more suitable place in the next Chapter. We may keep it where it is, however, if we alter a letter or two and write *ἄλλοτ' εἰώθασιν*.

xxiv. 1459 b 34.—In a discussion on narrative poetry (*διηγηματικὴ μίμησις*) and the special fitness of the hexameter for this form of literature, we read:—

τὸ γὰρ ἥρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα· περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων.

I do not see any meaning in the *καὶ* before *ἡ διηγηματικὴ* and suspect that a word has dropped out. Perhaps we should restore, *περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ταύταις ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων*.

xxv. 1461 a 34.—ὥδὲ Η ΩΣ μάλιστα' ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει.

The *ἢ ὡς* after *ὥδὲ* (which no one has hitherto succeeded in explaining) I take to be a dittographia of the *ἢ ὡς* in the next line.

xxvi. 1461 b 27.—The question as to the comparative worth of Tragedy and Epic poetry turns mainly on the point, Which of the two implies the better public? Tragedy, it may be urged, addresses an uncultivated audience (*πρὸς φαύλους*) whose dulness is the recognized excuse for the exaggerated style of acting now in vogue (*ὥς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινουῦνται*): whereas the Epic addresses a higher and more select class (*πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς*). This being the general meaning, it would seem that the omission of a word has not a little confused the sense of the opening of the argument:—

εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἡττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατὰς ἐστὶν αἰεί [so Vahlen], λίαν δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἅπαντα μιμουμένη φορτικὴ· ὥς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ κ.τ.λ.

Ought we not to read πρὸς ἅπαντα (i.e. πρὸς τοὺς τυχόντας) in lieu of ἅπαντα?

TWO PASSAGES IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

v. 476 A.—καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκαστον.

WHAT meaning can we attach to ἀλλήλων here? The recent interpreters seem to acquiesce pretty unanimously in Stallbaum's view that there is an allusion to the κοινωνία or union of Ideas with one another maintained in the Sophist. But the matter is not quite so clear as Stallbaum imagines. (1) The Sophist (if Plato's) must be a good deal later than the Republic. (2) The chronological objection apart, the inhuman obscurity which Stallbaum tacitly attributes to his author is sufficient to condemn his explanation as too recondite and far-fetched for the present passage. (3) If legitimate, the reference to the Sophist is not to the point. In the Sophist Plato, no doubt, talks of a κοινωνία of Idea with Idea, but the result of the union is still something Ideal; the process belongs from first to last to an eternal world of abstract metaphysical relations: we are not told or led to infer that, because Motion (for instance) partakes of Identity and Difference (ταύτου καὶ θατέρου), the union immediately renders Motion, Identity, and Difference phenomenal, and gives them a sort of secondary existence among the things of sense. But the κοινωνία of Rep. v. makes the

Ideas phenomenal: the whole motive for the argument, in fact, is to assert with all possible emphasis the dualism between *ὄντα* and *φαινόμενα*, and thus define the Philosopher as distinct from the *φιλόδοξος* or believer in phenomena. (4) Is it credible that Plato conceives 'bodies, actions, and Ideas,' to be an exhaustive account of things capable of participating in Ideas, *i.e.* of having predicates; or that we can be expected to find such a statement intelligible without some slight assistance or elucidation? My suspicion is that, just as the series of Ideas is cut short with the brief *πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περί*, the list of concrete things participating in Ideas must end with an equally comprehensive expression, and that the true reading accordingly is not *ἀλλήλων* but *ἄλλ' ἄλλων*—the general sense being, 'it is by their union with bodies, actions, and so forth, that Ideas come to be phenomenalized, and thereby appear many.' It is satisfactory to see that Dr Badham (Pref. to the *Phaedrus*) also pronounces *ἀλλήλων* corrupt, though I am unable to accept his suggestion *ἄλλη ἄλλων* as the right one.

vii. 533 E.—Summing up the discussion at the end of Book VI., Socrates reminds us that *διάνοια* was the name there given to the faculty employed in the abstract sciences: the name, however, he forthwith adds, is a very unimportant matter:—

ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων περί σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν προκεῖται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν σαφήνεια ἃ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ. Ἀρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.

So runs the passage in the Zürich text, which deviates from Par. A only so far as to add *ἃ* before *λέγεις*. The words *ἄλλ' ὃ—ψυχῇ* are the despair of critics; Schneider and Stallbaum, for instance, omit the offending clause altogether, in preference to accepting emendations like those proposed by Steinhart and K. F. Hermann. The latter, who wishes to read *πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφήνειαν ἃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρέσκει*, overlooks the circumstance that *σαφήνεια* must still mean what it meant in Book VI.; that it is, therefore, a psychological term denoting 'clearness of con-

ception'—the correlative in the subject of ἀλήθεια in the object of knowledge (Rep. vi. 511 E). As for ἀρκέσει, the addition is unnecessary, if we suppose Socrates to interrupt his interlocutor and take the word out of his mouth by breaking in with his own, ἀρέσκει γοῦν: a similar involuntary aposiopesis is found in Rep. iv. 439 A: ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος—; Ἐγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώματός γε. As a possible source of the manifest confusion in this passage, I would suggest that πρὸς is a corruption of πῶς, and that the original reading was something like the following:—

ἀλλ' ὁ αὖ μόνον δηλοῖ τὴν ἔξιν, πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας ἀ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ—Ἀρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.

I. BYWATER.

THE MSS. OF SOPHOCLES.

(For some account of the MSS. treated of in this paper the reader is referred to the 'Note on the MSS.' appended to the edition of the Text of Sophocles just published by the Oxford Clarendon Press.)

WILL the work of collating the MSS. of the great classical authors ever be completed? It is not in itself an endless task, but it is a laborious and ungrateful one, and those who have sufficient interest in the subject are either unqualified for this special function or are engaged in other labours.

It may be of some service, if one, who cannot himself hope to accomplish much in this direction, should be able to convince those who in this respect are better situated, that something still remains to be done, and that they must not be too easily persuaded that a sufficient approximation to completeness has been made—*ἵκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν*.

In the case of Sophocles there has arisen a hindrance of a peculiar kind. Since the publication of Elmsley's collation of the Medicean (or chief Laurentian) MS. in 1826, the belief has been gaining ground that this MS. is the veritable archetype of all the rest, and that the variations from it which are found in later MSS. are without exception the result either of fortuitous error, or of conjecture, or of both. Of course, if this is true, the only help afforded by the 'apographa,' as the more recent MSS. are now styled, is that trifling *quota* which Byzantine scholarship, through its peculiar difference, may have been able to add to the criticism of other ages. It would hardly be worth while to thresh the waggon-load for the sake of the

amount and quality of grain which might be got from this. But for even a single grain of authentic tradition it would be well worth while.

1. Cobet¹ in 1847, perhaps following a hint of Elmsley's, first enunciated the supposed fact, which Dindorf has since avowedly, though not always consistently, made his rule of criticism. Even if their verdict should not have unqualified confirmation in the end, we certainly owe to it one great boon, in the collation of the chief MS. made by Duebner for Dindorf's Oxford edition of 1860, *the only complete collation of the seven plays in any MS. which has ever been made public, if we except other collations of the same MS.*

The grounds of their opinion are briefly the following.

All the MSS. of Sophocles that have been examined, including L. a. (the Medicean), are found to agree in manifest errors, of which the important ones are indeed much less frequent than in the case of Aeschylus, but the slight blemishes, often proved to be such by the metre, are very numerous. Not to multiply instances, it would be a welcome surprise to find a MS. which in O. T. 258 should give ἐπεὶ κυρῶ and not ἐπικυρῶ (or ἐπικουρῶ), or which in Aj. 406 had some intelligible and metrical reading instead of τοῖς δ' ὁμοῦ πέλας: one which in El. 691 did not drag in the pentathlon in defiance of sense and metre, or in Tr. 840 were free from νέσσου θ' ὕπο, or in Philoct. 862 had something more harmonious and significant than ὁρᾷ, βλέπει, καίρια φθέγγει (or φθέγγου). Even if it be granted that a closer study of the language tends to reduce the number of *loci desperati* in the MS. text, there must always remain enough to justify the conclusion that all existing MSS. are derived from one MS., and one probably not of great antiquity, although many of its errors may have descended (as we know from citations in the case of some) from a very early time.

All scholars who have even looked into the matter must be so far agreed, and they must also be agreed that the archetype of our present text of Sophocles, whether more or less ancient,

¹ De Arte Interpretandi. Leyden, 1847.

must have been far more sound than that from which the Medicean Aeschylus was taken¹.

2. At this point there enters a presumption drawn from the analogous position of the text of Aeschylus. In the case of Aeschylus there exists positive proof that, *with two exceptions*, all other copies, *at least of the Agamemnon*, are derived from the Medicean. All but two have two great lacunæ, omitting Ag. 310—1066, and Ag. 1160—Choeph. 9. And in the latter case the two outer leaves of the quaternion, that should contain the missing part, remain, proving that it was there at first, as clearly as the husk shows where the chesnut has been. Here therefore we are on the ground of fact. But some caution is necessary, or we shall step off it again. For are we certain that when the first transcript of the Medicean MS. was made, there may not have been other copies of the minor sylloge (Prom., S. c. T., Persae), or of some single play (say the S. c. T.), and if these existed, are we certain that they were not used? This must be ascertained through the examination of each play separately, and M. Merkel² is to be commended for the caution of his proceeding in making every page the subject of a separate investigation. Then before applying the analogy to Sophocles it would be well to inquire how far the two MSS., which are certainly not derived from the Medicean in its present state, give evidence of a different text. If they do not, may we safely assume that their originals were copied from the Medicean before the earliest of the other extant copies, i.e. in the twelfth or early in the thirteenth century? This assertion has been made, but I am not aware that it has ever been subjected to thorough criticism.³

Before leaving the Medicean Aeschylus, some prevailing mis-

¹ The derivation of all existing MSS. from one archetype, which, even if not extant, cannot be proved to be very ancient, is common to several of the greatest writers. Does it show the tyrannical authority at some epoch of one great name, in giving currency to one recension and to one only,

until the traces of all others were lost?

² *Italienische Handschriften von Aeschylus.*

³ See a valuable series of papers on the Medicean MS. of Aeschylus by W. Dindorf in *Leutsch's Philologus* for 1862, 3. Also the Preface to his *Lexicon Aeschyleum*.

conceptions should be removed. The Aeschylus has formed part of the same volume with the Sophocles from very early times, if we are right in tracing the hand of one of the early correctors throughout, but it is not by the same hand as the Sophocles, nor on membrane of the same quality. The Sophocles is all in one hand (not unlike that of the Ravenna Aristophanes), and is written continuously, except that there is a break before the Oedipus Coloneus (which comes last), as if this play had been copied from a different original¹. Then comes the Aeschylus, which appears to have been at one time a separate volume—first the Persae, to l. 705, in a hand resembling the Sophocles; then the rest of Aeschylus (with the lacunæ) in a totally different hand, which M. Merkel thinks earlier, and on thicker vellum; then the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius in a hand (or hands) more resembling the Sophocles again². I mention this, because the frequent reference to the Medicean as *one* MS., has tended to obscure the differences between the fortunes of the two great tragic writers.

3. The controversy really turns upon the question whether the variants of the later MSS. are *without exception* such as can be probably attributed to subsequent emendation or depravation. The common errors, let them be ever so numerous, only go to prove a common archetype. The existence of MS. 'conjectures' by no means implies that these all originated with one of the MSS. in which they are found. And one strong instance of a reading which cannot fairly be accounted for except by authentic tradition, will raise a fair presumption that others, which by themselves would not have seemed beyond the range of Byzantine conjecture, are also traditional. For, assuming for a moment the hypothesis of a lost archetype, what might we reasonably expect if it were discovered? Of

¹ The same thing happens in L. b. with the *Trachiniae*; one of several reasons for doubting the opinion of Dindorf that this MS. (with its peculiar errors) was copied *directly* from L. a.

² At the end of the Apollonius,

under a great blot, there is a colophon (in what hand I cannot say), which some one may still be able to read. I have often tried, and always with the same result, indicating the tenth of September, A.D. 1000.

course it would have all the errors which are universal in our present MSS., barring a few accidental coincidences. If it were any gain to us, it would have some new readings, which for their intrinsic excellence we should immediately adopt against all our present MSS., and it would decide, in doubtful places, which of two readings was only a recent invention. It would also, perhaps, in some instances, confirm the witness of a later MS. against that of the earliest which we have now. *But these instances would probably be very few*, because in each case the probability of the early copy having preserved the reading of the archetype would greatly preponderate over the probability of the later copy having done so. The question for us is, whether we have any grounds for supposing that even a *few* readings of the later MSS. come from an earlier source than any now existing MS. It is a question which hardly admits of demonstration, depending as it does on a delicate balance of probabilities.

a. If l. 800 of the Oedipus Tyrannus is a genuine line, then *no* MS. of Sophocles written before the middle of the fourteenth century is wholly derived from L. a. For experts are agreed that this line, of which there is otherwise no trace in L. a., was written on the margin of that MS. either late in the fourteenth or early in the fifteenth century. Is the line, then, genuine? M. Dindorf has recourse to his favourite hypothesis of interpolation. The verse was, as he believes, the invention of some scribe of the twelfth century, which found immediate and universal acceptance. It most certainly deserved it. For how natural and touching is the expression of confidence repeated before the critical disclosure! How solemn the pause before the conclusion of the line! How essential that at this point of all others Oed. should add the epithet *τριπλῆς*, and not speak vaguely of 'this (part of the?) way'! And if we assume further that a previous lacuna has thus been happily supplied, by some one who caught at least the general meaning, how strange that a line so indispensable to the context that it is universally accepted as soon as suggested should ever have been lost!

β. But there may have been more than one copy of the

Oedipus Tyrannus even when L. a. was the sole repository of the other plays. The following instances of sound readings due to later MSS. are certainly less striking than the one already mentioned, but it seems less probable that they should be due to Byzantine conjecture than to continuous tradition:— and it should be remembered that the burden of proof rests with those who assert that in the twelfth century there was only one available MS. of Sophocles:—

O. C. 945, *κᾶναγον*, Par. A. *κᾶνανδρον*, L. a.

Ant. 29, *ἄκλαυστον ἄταφον*, most MSS. *ἄταφον ἄκλαυστον*, L. a.

— 235, *δεδραγμένος*, Par. E., Ven. 472 mg., Aug. b. mg. *πεπραγμένος*, L. a. *πεφραγμένος*, Par. A.

— 386, *εἰς δέον*, most MSS. *εἰς μέσον*, L. a.

— 757, *κλύειν*, most MSS. *λέγειν*, L. a.

Aj. 28, *νέμει*, Par. A., Ven. 468 M². *τρέπει*, L. a.

— 205, *ὁ δεινὸς μέγας*, Ven. 468. *ὁ δεινὸς ὁ μέγας*, L. a.

— 546, *που τόνδε*, Par. A., Ven. 467, 472, M² mg. *τοῦ τόνδε*, L. a.

— 1011, *ἥδιον*, Ven. 467. *ιλέων*, L. a. *ἴδιον*, c. gl. *οἰκεῖον*, Ven. 472. *γρ. ἥδιον*, L. a. mg., hand of 15th century.

Phil. 220, *ναυτίλῳ πλάτῃ*, most MSS. *καὶ ποιίας πάτρας*, L. a.

Trach. 331, *ἄλλην...λύπην*, Par. A. *λύπην...λύπην*, L. a. *λοιπὴν...λύπην*, cett.

Of a somewhat different character is the reading in

El. 1304, *δεξαίμην*, Ven. 472, Palat. Ven. 468 mg., Dresden mg. *λεξαίμην*, L. a. *βουλοίμην*, cett.

The force of some of these instances consists in their being found in the majority of MSS., others are commended by their excellence, which can hardly be due to the invention of Byzantine scribes. And the probability of this is further lessened when a reading which had rested on a single MS. is found in several.

The reading of L. a. in Phil. 220 is similar to the early variants which appear in the scholia and in the hand of the diorthotes on the mg. of L. a. The reading *ναυτίλῳ πλάτῃ* is extremely probable (cf. *πῶς δέ σε ναῖται | ἤγαγον* of the

Odyssey), while Nauck's conjecture *καὶ ποίας τύχης* weakens the important emphasis on *τίνας* and anticipates the question which comes more naturally a few lines below. (The conjecture however has considerable merit, esp. comparing l. 305, *πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε, κ.τ.λ.*, Philoctetes assuming that some misfortune has brought them to the isle.)

On Aj. 1011 it is important to observe the intermediate reading *ἴδιον* with the attempted explanation occurring in a MS. of the 14th century. Can the writer or the scholiast of this MS. have known of the reading *ἰλέων*? *Δεδραγμένος* in Ant. 235, though occurring in very few MSS., is manifestly right. Cf. Il. XIII. 393. It was misunderstood by one scholiast, who explains it by *νενικημένος*, while another rightly explains it by *ἀντειλημμένος*. But when once lost, could Byzantine criticism have restored it from these hints, and from the reading *πεπραγμένος*, when the more obvious *πεφραγμένος* was close at hand?

δεξαίμην is also manifestly right, and it appears from the corruption in L. a., as well as from the reading *βουλοίμην*, that the idiom, which is familiar to us from Plat. Phil., &c., was not obvious to the medieval scribes. Hence, while the appearance of *δεξαίμην* in a few MSS. may possibly be ascribed to conjecture or even to chance, it appears more *probable* that it has come down from an uncorrupted source.

γ. It remains to inquire whether the *errors* of the later MSS. are *without exception* such as may be most probably referred to a period subsequent to the 11th century, and to copies made from a MS. such as L. a. Many of the errors in L. a. itself are such as occur in uncial MSS. or happen in deciphering uncial characters. Are any of the mistakes of the later MSS. of this kind? The following amongst other instances deserve at least to be considered.

ω for *ο* and *vice versa* O. T. 200 ^{γρ. μικρὸν} *πυρφόρων*, Flor. Γ.
 Aj. 223 *αἶθωνος*, Flor. Γ.
 O. T. 771 *τοσοῦτῶν*, Flor. Γ.
 El. 163 *μολῶντα*, Ven. 468.
 Aj. 811 *χορῶμεν*, Ven. 468.
 „ 926 *στερεόφρον*, Ven. 472.

ω for o and <i>vice versa</i>	Phil. 226 ἀπηγριωμένων, Flor. Γ.
θ for τ „ „ „	Aj. 805 ἀνθηλίους, Ven. 468, 467, M ² . (ἀντολίους, Ven. 472). O. T. 827 κάξέτρεψε, Flor. Θ. O. T. 670 ἀποστήναι, Par. 2884. El. 1156 ταῦτ' ὁ, Ven. 468.
δ for λ „ „ „	O. T. 186 ὅμανδος, Par. 2884.
ϵ for o „ „ „	Phil. 350 θανέντος, Flor. Γ. El. 205 οἶδε, Flor. Γ. El. 222 λάθοιμ', Ven. 468, Flor. Γ. Δ. El. 370 μάθεις, Flor. Δ. El. 1378 Ἔχει μοι, Ven. 468. O. T. 11 θέλοντες, Flor. Δ.
$\alpha\iota$ for ϵ „ „ „	El. 757 καίαντες, Ven. 468. Aj. 768 κατακτήσεται, Ven. 468. El. 632 θῦσαι (γρ. θῦε), Flor. Γ. O. T. 158 χρυσαίας, Flor. Δ. O. T. 635 ἐπαισχύνεσθαι, Flor. Δ.

In one instance we have almost ocular proof that a corruption found in later MSS. already existed when L. a. was written. In Tr. 1106, L. a. has *αὐ...δηθεῖς*, the letters *θη* being faintly legible in the erasure. Paris A and others have *αὐθηδής*.

4. The recension of Triclinius, as Elmsley pointed out, was based on a previous recension, or at least on some MS. belonging to a very distinct family of MSS. which agree in certain peculiar readings. These are collected (so far as the Oed. Col. is concerned) in a valuable note of Elmsley's on l. 7 of the Oed. Col. Yet learned editors persist in attributing to Triclinius readings which existed at least a hundred years before his time. According to Bernhardt, Triclinius was the contemporary of Manuel Chrysoloras, and 'flourished' in 1397. But most of these readings are found in Ven. 616, which is attributed by experts to the 13th century, and in Vat. Palat. 293, collated by D'Orville, who assigns this MS. to the 11th century. (See his collation amongst the Dorvillian MSS. in the Bodleian Library, x. 1, 3, 6.) Before the theory of Cobet is finally accepted, it should at least be ascertained whether the

Vatican MS. of the Oed. Col. or the Medicean MS. is the earlier. It is indeed probable that L. a. is earlier by half a century, but it is not likely that so accurate a man as D'Orville should have gone wildly wrong.

5. The degree of affinity of any MS. to L. a. will be differently estimated, according to the conception critics may have formed of the general soundness of the text. Those who think a reading corrupt will regard the consensus of MSS. in that reading as indicating a common unauthentic source. Those who believe it to be genuine will regard such consensus as tending to confirm their belief.

6. On these grounds I venture to urge that this investigation is not yet closed. I do not promise that the fullest examination of the later MSS. will yield much result. But in the case of a writer like Sophocles, it is worth while to use to the utmost even the least hopeful means¹. There is no need of cumbering editions of Sophocles with absurd readings, and the MSS. of the 15th century may be neglected till the rest are used². But collations of a few MSS. of the 13th and 14th centuries with some well-known edition might be published separately, in the manner of Gaisford's *Lectiones Platonicae*. If this were done, the reader of Sophocles would be more nearly in the position of the student of Shakespeare (who has the Cambridge edition) or of Plato (who has that of Bekker). And he might then be invited to judge for himself, whether anything is to be hoped from the later MSS., or they deserve, without exception, to be entirely neglected, as mere 'apographa' of L. a.

L. CAMPBELL.

¹ An association for this purpose would be at least as useful as one for investigating the site of Troy.

² This applies with less force to the

Trachiniae and Philoctetes, of which so few copies remain, than to Aj., El., O. T., or even O. C., Ant.

NOTES ON THE AENEID.

I.

III. 482, 'Nec minus Andromache digressu maesta supremo
Fert picturatas auri subtemine vestes
Et Phrygiam Ascanio chlamydem, nec cedit honore,
Textilibusque onerat donis ac talia fatur.'

PROFESSOR CONINGTON, reading 'honori,' took 'nec cedit honori' to mean 'nor does she flag in the task of honouring him.' Heyne thinks Andromache does not yield to the liberality of her husband, Wagner that the mantle does not yield to the other presents, Henry (on second thoughts) that Ascanius does not retire from, decline, the honour. None of these interpretations seems very satisfactory, and I think the true one is still to be gathered from the line of Silius quoted in Conington's note. Speaking of Ennius he says (XII. 412) 'nec cedet honore Ascraeo famave seni.' Considering Silius' character as an imitator of Virgil, we may infer from his using 'cedet honore' that he found it (like 'Ascraeo seni') in his predecessor, as indeed we find it in several MSS., and have Servius' testimony that it was preferred by Scaurus. Heyne and Ribbeck both adopt it. We may suppose further that he used it in the same sense as Virgil, and therefore the latter must have intended Ascanius to be the subject of the sentence, and the words must mean that Ascanius is honoured as much as his father, that is to say, that the gifts given him are as valuable as those his father receives in 464 foll. The clause thus becomes closely parallel

to 'sunt et sua dona parenti' in 469. With the change of subject we may compare such constructions as

IX. 593, 'Cui Remulo cognomen erat Turnique minorem
Germanam nuper thalamo sociatus habebat;'

or VI. 284, 'quam sedem Somnia volgo
Vana tenere ferunt foliisque sub omnibus haerent.'

The change back again in what follows is certainly awkward, but this tells equally against Henry and Wagner, and in any case 'que' must mean 'both' and look forward to 'ac talia fatur.'

II.

V. 196, 'Extremos pudeat rediisse : hoc vincite, cives,
Et prohibete nefas.'

Silius (IV. 431 'primum hoc vincat, servasse parentem') perhaps understood the words to mean 'gain this point,' and Conington follows him. Others say 'overcome this disgrace and avert it.' Is it not possible Virgil meant 'vincite' to stand by itself parenthetically? Compare Ter. Ad. v. 7. 19 'tu illas abi et traduce:' Plaut. Aul. I. 2. 17 'cultrum, securim, pistillum, mortarium...fures venisse atque abstulisse dicito;' *ibid.* II. 3. 3 'vascula intus pure propera et elue.' A construction partly similar occurs Ov. Met. III. 433 'quod amas, avertere, perdes.' In Aeneid IV. 573 'praecipites vigilate viri et considite transtris,' 'praecipites' must go mainly with 'considerate;' and in IX. 466 'in hastis praefigunt capita et multo clamore sequuntur Euryali et Nisi,' 'multo clamore sequuntur' seems, as Conington says, to be a parenthetical clause. Virgil would not be unwilling to use a construction which he found in Greek authors, e.g. Soph. Ant. 1279 τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις εἰκας ἦκειν καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά, and Thuc. III. 68. 1 τὸ αὐτὸ ἓνα ἕκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες. See Riddell's *Apol. of Plato*, p. 234.

III.

x. 185, 'Non ego te, Ligurum ductor fortissime bello,
 Transierim, Cinyra, et paucis comitate Cupavo,
 Cujus olorinae surgunt de vertice pennae,
 Crimen amor vestrum, formaeque insigne paternae.
 Namque ferunt luctu Cycnum Phaethontis amanti
 &c., &c.

Filius aequalis comitatus classe catervas
 Ingentem remis Centaurum promovet.'

The fourth line is printed as it stands in Conington's text. He¹ refers 'vestrum' to Cinyras and Cupavo (whom he supposes from 'paternae' to be brothers), and adds 'this being granted, "crimen amor vestrum" can hardly refer to anything but the existence of a criminal passion between them.' This is also Heyne's view, who says 'statuere necesse est Cinyram et Cupavonem turpi se amore prosequutos esse, quo ducere videtur voc. *vestrum*.'

For the fact here supposed there is not the least external evidence. Ovid speaks of Cycnus and Phaethon, but he makes no allusion to Cycnus' sons. We have therefore only the lines themselves to go by, and in them we find that the whole story rests on the one word 'vestrum.' Cinyras and Cupavo are not spoken of as brothers, and the single 'filius' of 194 is an acknowledged difficulty. Why, too, does only one brother bear the swan's plumes²? It is strange that Virgil should give five lines to the father and make only an obscure allusion in three words to the story of the sons: still stranger that the two stories should be mixed up as on this hypothesis they are, 'cujus olorinae,' &c. referring to the first, 'crimen amor vestrum' to the second, and 'formaeque &c.,' with the narrative to the first again. But the greatest objection is perhaps to be found

¹ I refer to Prof. Conington because it is impossible to discriminate his share and that of Mr. Nettleship in this part of their commentary.

² Conington increases the difficulty

by referring 'cujus' to Cinyras. Contrast the way in which two brothers are made equally prominent in vii. 670 foll.

in the connection of the two parts of this line, for it cannot be denied that thus interpreted it makes either deplorable syntax or deplorable sense¹, and is by no means in Virgil's manner. These are serious difficulties and may well make us pause, before we allow the character of two captains to be blasted by a possessive pronoun.

There is, however, another way of explaining the words which has not been without advocates, as Brunck, Schrader, and Sprengel seem all to have preferred it, and more recently both Ribbeck and Madvig have adopted it. On this theory 'Amor' is the vocative, 'vestrum' referring to Love and his mother Venus, while 'crimen' and 'insigne' are in apposition to 'pennae.' It will be observed in the first place that this removes all difficulties of syntax. 'Insigne' stands naturally in apposition, just as it does in VII. 659 'clipeoque insigne paternum' 'Centum angues cinctamque gerit serpentibus hydram,' and VIII. 683 'cui, belli insigne superbum, Tempora navali fulgent rostrata 'corona', and as 'specimen' does in XII. 164 'cui tempora 'circum Aurati bis sex radii fulgentia cingunt, Solis avi specimen.' But by the usage of the poets 'crimen' also stands in natural apposition to 'pennae,' and in shewing this I will begin with an instance which seems particularly relevant. Propertius in I. 11. 30 writes 'ah pereant Baiae, crimen amoris, aquae,' which I understand to mean either that the waters of Baiae are a standing accusation against Love and a reproach to him, or that they are, poetically speaking, his guilt, 'crimen' being used not only of actual guilt but also of anything in connection with which a man is guilty, anything towards which he stands in a guilty relation. The latter seems to be its meaning in such places as Ov. Her. IV. 58 'enixa est utero crimen onusque suo;' M. III. 268 'concipit—id deerat—manifestaque crimina pleno Fert utero;' and *ibid.* x. 470, though it is impossible to say for

¹ 'Love was your joint crime; for love you wear the cognizance of your father's form,' is the rendering in Conington's prose translation.

² 'Insigne' here may be the accusative on the Greek model. It is re-

markable and can hardly be accidental, that in the seven or eight places where Virgil puts a word in apposition to a sentence he always uses a neuter noun. Other writers were not so nice.

certain¹. Mr Paley's explanation that 'crimen amoris' means 'of which love has so often had to complain,' seems to me less probable, when we compare the other passages in which 'crimen' is similarly placed. But the special importance to us of these words is in the 'amoris' or 'Amoris,' because thus explained it gives exactly the same expression as 'crimen Amor vestrum,' only omitting Venus, and it is perhaps not extravagant to suppose that one line may have arisen from the other. It is not indeed likely that Propertius imitated Virgil, because this poem must have been written not long after the Aeneid was begun, but I see no improbability in the idea that Virgil may have imitated him², especially as the phrase recurs in III. 22. 24 'hoc si crimen erit, crimen Amoris erit,' where it may be noticed that Mr Paley's former explanation will not fit. But however this may be, the similarity of phrase seems an argument for similarity of meaning. Before leaving Propertius I may compare IV. 19. 15 'crimen et illa fuit patria succensa senecta,' where Paley again makes 'crimen' = 'criminosa,' though the sense seems rather that to womankind Myrrha will be a reproach or accusation (personified in 'testis' 11 and 13: cf. 'objicitur' in the first line), and III. 20. 2 'Tam formosa tuum mortua crimen erit.'

We come next to a passage in the Metamorphoses which may also be thought to shew traces of connection with Virgil's line, and, though they are very faint, no one who has observed Virgil's influence on Ovid³ will find it very unlikely that the disciple was here thinking of his master. The lines run 'perdix...unica tunc volucris, nec visa prioribus annis, Factaque nuper avis, longum tibi, Daedale, crimen. Namque huic tradiderat,' &c., and the resemblance to Virgil's words lies first in

¹ Cf. 'facinus' for a cup of poison in Ov. Met. vii. 423.

² This may be the true history of 'Oricia terebenthos,' Aen. x. 126: Prop. iv. 749: see Mr Paley's preface (1872), note 3. Teuffel in his Hist. of Roman Literature (transl. by Wagner, p. 415) says, 'An allusion to Aen. vi. 287 sq. occurs in Horace (O. ii. 17, 17 sq. per-

haps in the year 727), who may therefore be supposed to have known this part beforehand,' but the passages are far from bearing him out.

³ Ovid's lines on Cynus (Met. ii. 367 foll.) contain two allusions to this passage, 'silvamque sororibus auctam,' and 'canae...plumae.'

the vocative 'Daedale' and then in the explanation beginning 'namque.'

We find a parallel use of 'crimen' in Ov. Met. vi. 131 'et rupit pictas, caelestia crimina, vestes,' ibid. x. 197 'videoque tuum, mea crimina, volnus:' Her. ix. 53 'una, recens crimen, praefertur adultera nobis:' Am. ii. 18. 37 'et Paris est illic et adultera, nobile crimen:' Tr. i. 7. 21 'vel quod eram Musas, ut crimina nostra, perosus:' also in Lucan v. 59 'Fortunae, Ptolemaee, pudor crimenque deorum,' which Forcellini explains 'propter quem Dii incusantur.' Compare ibid. vii. 112 'Pompeii nec crimen erit nec gloria bellum.'

It will be allowed that these passages make it easy to refer 'crimen' to 'pennae.' Turning now to 'vestrum,' we find at least four places in the Aeneid (i. 140; ix. 257, 525; xi. 687) where it is used thus in addressing one person, and this may very well make a fifth. Perhaps the most closely analogous use is in the Aetna 586 'tam nobile sidus, Erigone, sedes vestra est,' where 'vestra' refers to the virgin and her father, and, according to Mr Munro, the dog. For the 'socium regnum' (Ov. Met. v. 378) of Venus and Cupid we need not look further than their conspiracy against Dido in the first book.

The whole passage will therefore mean 'with swan's feathers rising from his head, your reproach, O Love, and your mother's, and the emblem of his father's form¹.'

Cinyras, however, is still a difficulty, for though we give up his special connection with Cupavo, it is still rather strange that he should be so hurried over. After 'non ego te' &c. we expect to have perhaps as many lines about him as are given in vii. 733 to Oebalus, ushered in by 'nec tu carminibus nostris indictus abibis.' Heyne mentions a 'vir doctus, qui omne

¹ A very apposite passage occurs in the sixth chapter of Redgauntlet: 'the cause of his mother's death and the evidence of his father's guilt was stamped on the innocent face of the babe, whose brow was distinctly marked by the miniature resemblance of a horseshoe.' Ariosto's words (O. F. 13. 4) deserve also to be quoted:—

'Isabella son io, che figlia fui
Del re mal fortunato di Gallizia:
Ben dissi fui: ch' or non son più di lui
Ma di dolor, d'affanno, e di mestizia:
Colpa d'amor: ch' io non saprei di cui
Dolermi più, che della sua nequizia—'
where 'colpa' is in apposition like 'crimen' here.

'vitium in verbis *Cinyra et quaerit et relinquit.*' Prof. Madvig, who in the second volume of his *Adversaria*, takes the same view of 'crimen Amor vestrum' as I have done, and regards any other as absurd, also suspects a corruption, and proposes to read 'sine re et paucis comitate Cupavo.' The MSS. referred to by Conington have *Cinyrae*, *Cinera*, *Cumane*, *Cinire*, *Cincere*, *Cinyre*;¹ and two quoted by Heyne have 'Cygnae,' another 'tacite.' Servius' note (a note, however, not found in all the editions: such are the perplexities of this passage) is 'Cycne. Cunare. Quidam duci nomen datum tradunt a Cunaro monte qui in Piceno.' Now, if Servius read 'Cunare,' there seems to be some difficulty about altering it to 'sine re.' How could so great a corruption have crept into the text so early? and how could the original reading have been wholly lost? Considering how familiar the Romans were with Virgil, it seems possible only on one hypothesis. If Virgil wrote 'sine re,' it must have been his original editors who corrupted it into a proper name¹.

There are, however, curious traces of another reading. Servius' words, as given above, seem to be a note on the word 'Cycne,' and it was the common reading in old editions. We have also some reference to this passage in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius. He says (v. 15) that Virgil 'nullum in commemorandis regionibus ordinem servat, sed locorum seriem saltibus lacerat,' and after giving some instances from this catalogue, adds 'hinc rapit illum Cinirus ad Liguriam, Ocnus Mantuam.' Later in the same chapter he says, 'Astur itemque Cupavo et Cinirus insignes Cycni Phaethontisque fabulis nullam pugnae operam praestant.' But in both these places there is some MS. authority, though not much, for 'Cycnaus' instead of 'Cinirus.' It must be observed also that in the second passage he speaks of both leaders as connected with Cycnus the friend of Phaethon; but if this indicates brotherhood it has still nothing to do with the story alluded to in the former part of this article. 'Cycne' is of course still farther removed from 'sine re' than 'Cinyra' or any cognate form. If there were only better

¹ Some similar corruptions are given by Madvig in his first volume, p. 150 foll., but all appear to be post-classical.

authority for the former, the conjecture might perhaps be admissible that Virgil wrote 'Cycni paucis comitate Cupavo,' on the same model as 'Scyllam Nisi' (E. vi. 74), 'Lycaonis Arcton' (G. i. 138), and 'Ajacis Oilei' (A. i. 41), or Livy's 'Hasdrubalem Gisgonis' (xxv. 37. 8); but as the evidence stands, there seems no adequate reason for changing 'Cinyra' or 'Cinire.' It may be remarked that in Homer's Catalogue there are many instances of two or more captains being named together, sometimes brothers, sometimes not. Virgil joins father and son in vii. 648—9, and two brothers in vii. 670; but, unless he has done so here, he has nowhere followed Homer in joining together two who are not related to each other. An *a priori* argument like this has very little weight, but ought perhaps to be mentioned. As for the omission of 'aut te' before Cupavo, which Madvig makes a point of, is it more remarkable than vii. 685 'quos dives Anagnia pascit, quos, Amasene pater,' even if there we read 'pascis'?

HERBERT RICHARDS.

AULUS PERSIUS FLACCUS.

MR CONINGTON'S edition of this author is worthy of his reputation. With its Prefatory Lecture, its easy translation, and notes of his wonted clearness and research, it is a model of completeness. I venture to sift and supplement some of its points: and in some places to compare with it Mr Pretor's work in the *Catena Classicorum*. Mr Pretor contrasts generally in his treatment of debateable subjects with Mr Conington, and follows the older school, but contributes also suggestions independent and new.

Sat. I. 5. NON SIQVTD TVRBIDA ROMA

ELEVET ACCEDAS ... NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Both editors affirm here that 'NON is for NE, though the usage is blamed as a solecism by Quintilian.' The accuracy of the statement is questionable. If true, NE might stand in the place of NON: nor is it clear why Persius went out of his way to commit the solecism; he could not plead exigency of metre as Juvenal might in S. xv. 89. But in reality NON ACCEDAS is better Latin than NE ACCEDAS. In spite of Madvig's authority (see his *Opuscula*, Vol. II. p. 105, and his rule summarised and qualified in my note on Horace, C. I. 33. 1) it is not sufficiently observed that the second singular of the present conjunctive is not properly used, either with or without the negative particle, in an imperative sense. In Hor. C. I. 3. 7 REDDAS is not = REDDE, but dependent on PRECOR, as is well shown in Lord Lytton's note. Madvig l.c. shows that VENIAS is not = VENI, but that Latinity requires FAC VENIAS or CURA UT VENIAS. If the sentence is negative NON will be more correct than NE, unless

taken dependently. NON SILEAS is right (Hor. S. II. 5. 91); NE DOLEAS, Hor. C. I. 33. 1, NE FORTE CREDAS, IV. 9. 1, are dependent in construction. Persius breaks the rule once (3. 96), where, however, he borrows a phrase from Horace, and cannot therefore be accused of negligence or post-Augustan licence; it may be that in each case the conjunctive NE SIS is to be understood inferentially and in connection with the preceding clause.

This point seems overlooked in the reference made to Quintilian, a reference made by Jahn, and in Conington's note also on Virg. Geor. I. 456.

Quintilian (I. 5. 50) protests against saying 'PRO ILLO *ne feceris, non feceris*.' Madvig observes that he does not say FACIAS but FECERIS. Probably he had in his mind Cicero's well-known example HOC FACITO, HOC NE FECERIS; but at all events his simple meaning is that NON is not to be used for NE in an imperative sense; and his rule is condemnatory of NON ACCEDE, NON ACCESSERIS; but not of NON ACCEDAS. How then is this use of NON to be accounted for or explained? Wagner has an elaborate note on Virg. Æn. XII. 78, to show that NON is the fitting particle to be used '*in distinguendis oppositis et contrariis*,' and his principle is undeniable, though perhaps exception may be taken to some of his instances. Thus in Ovid, ex Pont. I. 2. 103, it would be simpler to say that NON is only put with PETITO by a trajection, that it really belongs not to the imperative verb but to the governed clause, UT BENE SIT. So in Virg. Geor. I. 456, NON is inseparable from ILLA. Thus again the application of his principle to Horace's NON ETIAM SILEAS is strained; Obbar is a better interpreter in such a passage. His note on NON ULCERET, Hor. Ep. I. 18. 72, is as follows: "LENIOR ADHORTATIO ET VELUTI OPTANTIS NON JUBENTIS, UT PLERIQUE DICUNT, EST, ID QUOD RECTE OBSERVASSE Heindorfius ad Sat. II. 5, 91, et Dissen ad Tib. II. 1. 10, MIHI QUIDEM VIDENTUR." In other words, NON with the conjunctive present signifies not direct or authoritative prohibition, but general opposition, remonstrance, or counter-declaration: thus, NON ACCEDAS would be nearly οὐ δέῃ προσελθεῖν, NE ACCESSERIS = μὴ προσέλθης. And NON DUBITES in Sat. V. 45, is

correctly translated by Pretor, *you cannot doubt*, and by Conington, *I would not have you doubt*.

This discussion however, though invited by the commentary, is perhaps not pertinent to the line at all. NON SI ELEVET ACCEDAS is of the same stamp as NON SI ME SATIS AUDIAS SPERES, Hor. C. i. 13. 13; NON SI SOLVAS INVENIAS, Ib. Sat. i. 4. 60; NEC SI CERTES CONCEDAT, Virg. Ecl. ii. 57. The sentence is in a conditional form, its first clauses containing a general proposition, its final one (NE QUÆSIVERIS) a particular precept. Thus, 'you would (=should) not go out of your way, if public fashion decries a thing, to notice it or test the silly standard it sets up; and (as you would not do this, so) consult no judgment but your own.'

7. TE Q. EXTRA.

It is disputed whether EXTRA is adverb or preposition: the like question is raised on Horace C. iii. 19. 15, TRIS PROHIBET SUPRA.

13. NUMEROS ILLE HIC PEDE LIBER.

The difficulty raised by C. as to translating 'one verse and another prose' is considerable. We can hardly suppose Persius to mean the school declamations or essays mentioned by Juvenal, i. 16, as a preparatory training: nor again does it appear that the recitations, fashionable at Rome, were ever of prose pieces. Again it is rare to find NUMERUS used of poetry as contrasted with prose. There are two instances in Ovid Pont. iv. 2. On the other hand, the word is used of prose as well as poetry by Cicero Orat. 188. 190, NUMERIS ASTRICHTAM ORATIONEM ESSE DEBERE, CARERE VERSIBUS: and IN SOLUTIS ETIAM VERBIS INESSE NUMEROS. Again PEDE LIBER has a suspicious likeness to the NON ELABORATUM PEDEM of Anacreon's style, Hor. Epod. xiv. 12. If LIBER could be = LIBERIOR; and NUMEROS rendered after the analogy of NUMERIS ET ARTE, Hor. Ep. ii. 1. 261, and Ovid's NUMEROSUS HORATIUS; the contrast expressed here *might* be that between a finished and a careless style; regard to harmony or the want of it being overlooked by writers aiming at GRANDE ALIQUID.

14. GRANDE.

Illustrations of this word might come from Horace. But, as bearing on the preceding note, compare Cic. Orat. 192, JUDICAT HEROUM NUMERUM (= the Epic rhythm) GRANDI-OREM QUAM DESIDERET SOLUTA ORATIO.

23. CUTE PERDITUS.

Can this be *unblushing*? CUTE = FRONTE? So P. C. renders *bursting*. Judging by the use of CUTE CURATA for smartness and show, this opposite phrase should mean *worn-out age*.

40. VIOLÆ.

‘And from her fair and unpolluted flesh
May violets spring.’

Shakesp. Hamlet, ACT V. Sc. 1.

(Is there any link between these two parallels of poetry?)

53. LECTIS CITREIS.

couches of citron, C. And so he renders also SUB TRABE CITREA, Hor. C. IV. 1. 20, ‘*neath citron roof*.’

Is not this a confusion of terms? Is *citron* anything else than the Asiatic fruit tree, MALUS MEDICA? But the CITRUS so highly prized at Rome was an African wood; identified by Pliny with the *θύον*. See Plin. XIII. 29 and the Delphin notes; and Mayor on Juv. I. 137.

60. SITIAT.

There is a like, even greater, condensation of phrase in Hor. C. I. 16. 8, SIC GEMINANT ÆRA.

66. DERIGAT.

So C. reads, but quotes no authority. It is entered among my V. L. on Horace, C. IV. 9. 18, as the probably correct form. I find DERECTO in Cic. De Div. II. 127, ed. Baiter.

98. LAXA CERVICIS.

with a gentle bend, C. *without straining my throat*, P.

The expression really is the opposite of v. 14. It means 'without effort' or perhaps 'affecting an absence of effort,' *i. e.* in a languishing mode.

118. EXCUSO NASO.

C. follows Jahn in interpreting this = *emuncto*. But Pretor is surely right in taking it in the sense of '*smooth, unwrinkled*.' It is the opposite of NASO SUSPENDERE ADUNCO (Hor. S. I. 6. 5), and signifies the power of satirising without seeming or being felt to do so. Gifford's note on the word is as good as his version of the lines themselves.

SATIRE II.

12. The distinction quoted in C's note is pithily given by Orelli (Hor. S. II. 6. 10), *Mercurius apertis lucris...præerat, sic Hercules opertis*.

14. DUCITUR.

There should be no doubt as to this reading. CONDITUR, as C. remarks, is a less expressive word: it would signify the success of the usurer's schemes, DUCITUR expresses both their success and continuance.

74. C's note is misprinted. The stop after IMBUTUM is omitted. As illustrative of INCOCTUM, cf. Hor. S. II. 8. 58, INCOQUERE; a passage which I could fancy suggested to C. his version 'racy flavour of nobleness': unless indeed he found it in GENEROSO, applied as it is by Horace (E. I. 15. 18) to wine, and adopted in our familiar phrase '*generous* wine.' Really however, the adjective, as I think, contains and points the idea of v. 72, viz.: the contrast of transmitted and true nobility, and might be rendered '*ennobling*,' that which belongs to or confers true greatness.

SATIRE III.

3. DESPUMARE = COQUERE, *to digest*, C. This, though correct in result, tends to confuse terms. Virgil, G. I. 295, gives

the exact meaning: VULCANO DECOQUIT HUMOREM, throws out the steam by boiling and then FOLIIS UNDAM DESPUMAT, clears off the effervescence. And so C. well translates 'to carry off the fumes.' Cic. 2 Phil. 30 uses EXALARE nearly synonymously.

8. Jahn, quoted by C., notes a common inconsistency, viz.: that busy men are methodical and in no hurry, it is the idle who are hurried and hasty.

9. The text is not easy to determine. But if FINDITUR is adopted, would it not be better to refer it, with P., to the angry man himself, than with C. to BILIS. FINDIMUR would accord well with v. 3, STERTIMUS, and v. 12, 14, QUERIMUR, which C. reads with Hermann for QUERITUR though he translates otherwise.

MEMBRANA, C. supposes this a hit at the youth's luxury, in using parchment for ordinary writing. P. explains the word as = a parchment wrapper to hold the loose sheets.

I venture to doubt both explanations, and rather understand that the student will have all his materials at once; his CHARTÆ for the foul copies or rough notes, the MEMBRANA for the fair copies.

Cp. Hor. S. II. 3. 2, MEMBRANAM POSCAS; and A. P. 389, MEMBRANIS INTUS POSITIS; where it is usual, and seems necessary, to understand the word of the material on which the work to be revised, or that to be published, was written.

23. PROPERANDUS...FINGENDUS = propere fingendus, C.

Do we not lose something by this proposed hendiadys? PROPERO has a substantial force of its own, inculcating energy, rapidity, opposed to the listless temper. And FINGENDUS may then comprise the effect.

For comparison of words see Hor. C. III. 24. 54,

TENERÆ NIMIS MENTES ... FORMANDÆ STUDIIS.

29. CENSOREMVE TUUM VEL QUOD TRABEATE SALUTAS?

The doubt as to TUUM and the difficulties of VE, VEL are best met in P's note. "CENSOREM TUUM and TRABEATE convey

two separate ideas, and VE and VEL are both required to couple them: 'because you have a censor in your family or are yourself a knight of distinction.'"

C's explanation of TUUM, that "if CENSOREM is understood of Rome it will imply that the youth is related to the Emperor," comes round to the same meaning, since the Emperors absorbed the Censura to themselves: but he does not explain the repetition of the particles except as a tautology.

33. CARET CULPA, i.e. he is beyond (the reach of) reproach.

The state implied is one of hopeless, remediless insensibility. The next clause (nescit q. perdat) serves in part to define it, and then suggests, while it finds its climax in, the vivid realism of v. 38; the most marvellous personification, I suppose, to be found in the remains of classic antiquity. The *idéai* of Plato, or the suggestion in the Phædo of the shadows in which we live, compared with the purer brighter sphere attainable by the wise, may be held perhaps logically to contain in substance the same thought; and the Stoic notion of Virtue, and Cicero's personification of Happiness, are striking: but Persius stands alone in his ideal of a personal goodness in perfect beauty; of men admitted to a momentary glimpse of it and withering at the thoughts of what, in their selfish tyranny, they had lost.

66. DISCITE O MISERI.

This hiatus P. does not notice, C. compares it to Horace's MALE OMINATIS, C. III. 14. 11, but surely without reason. Horace's usage is defensible as a quasi-compound, and by the precedent of Catullus in SUAVEOLENS; not otherwise. At best the reading of it is debateable. But it has no bearing on such a non-elision as is accepted by editors in this line. It is strange that so few have acknowledged the manifest corruption, or seen their way to the easy correction, IO MISERI. IO may be used as equivalent to O in a simple appeal; but the change of construction and address in v. 63 sqq. indicates that the

moralist is summoning a circle of listeners : DISCITE IO is parallel to (Hor. S. II. 3. 80)

huc propius me
Dum doceo insanire omnes vos ordine adite.

It is no objection to this view, that he comes again to his first point (v. 71) and to the pupil whose indifference made him turn for a moment to the multitude. (Since writing the above I have perceived that Macleanne defends and adopts IO.)

SATIRE IV.

43. Compare Cicero's SIC VIVITUR, *Ep. ad Fam.* II. 15.

49. The question whether Nero is directly aimed at in this Satire is *adhuc sub judice*. Our editors espouse the different sides; wherein while I have no hesitation in preferring C's view of the Prologue, much weight must be given to P's view of this passage. I do not observe that any editor insists on the relation of v. 49 to the preceding: if with C. we simply understand it of usury, it is in meaning identical with or a continuance of v. 47, and yet separated from it by a fresh and different charge. The order of ideas is broken. If with P. we suppose Nero intended, there is a natural sequence: 1 avarice, 2 debauchery, 3 ruffian outrage. PUTEAL is, at first sight, in favour of the other interpretation: but it may well be taken for the Forum, and especially if we suppose the three accusations not alternative but accumulated. The covetous profligate in his wild frolic would resort to the Exchange as a well-known haunt, and half in bravado, half perhaps in anger at being fleeced, sweep the scene of NEGOTIA clear with his rioters.

The idea involved in CAUTUS, and the literal interpretation of FLAGELLAS, may be additionally supported by the description of a like supposed scene in Juvenal S. III., especially v. 278:

EBRIUS AC PETULANS QUI NULLUM FORTE CECIDIT,

and v. 284, which implies the care taken for impunity in such assaults.

But of the metaphor which applies FLAGELLAS to usurious dealing there is no other instance. A *scourge* may be a poetic emblem of reproach (e.g. VERBERA LINGUÆ) or of imperious sway as in Juv. x. 109, but hardly of a grasping spirit in business or, as Jahn suggests, in lawsuits.

One real difficulty attaches to the literal sense; viz.: that these vices are supposed to be CÆCA VULNERA (v. 44), vices which a self-deceiver may ignore in himself, and in spite of which he may seek for approbation. Still society excuses much in its favourites, and not only in Rome or Athens have such RIXÆ PROTERVÆ sometimes passed as venial.

SATIRE V.

14—17. VERBA TOGÆ.....LUDO.

The best elucidation of these three lines is to be found in Frere's essay, first printed with the introduction to Gifford's translation of Juvenal and Persius. I am surprised that it is not noticed or made use of by our editors. C. in his Preface (p. xxxi.) has an ingenious theory to account for the seemingly non-natural style of Persius; but these lines, rightly interpreted, are probably the truer key; the poet's mannerism represents the fanciful inflated taste of the day. "VERBA TOGÆ must have signified the language of good society at Rome."

The difficulty of the last clause, INGENUO DEFIGERE LUDO, may be seen in the contrariety of explanations given. Frere simply and excellently shows it to be a Circus metaphor, qualified by the adj. INGENUUS.

33. JAM CANDIDUS, 'yet unsullied,' C. There seems some slip here. JAM is not = ADHUC. P. rightly explains "JAM C. as contrasted with the prætecta."

Shilleto (Thucyd. i. 126. 6) has a note on the confusion of ἔτι and πω.

98, 99. These lines are equivocal in their wording. I take CONTINET to mean *withholds*, TENEAT *attains*, i.e. compasses. *Natural law withholds from weak ignorance the right of reaching*

(heights of) action impossible to it. TENEO is thus used as in the common TENEO COLLEM, PORTUM. And this I believe to be Jahn's way, though C. and P. understand him differently.

If we consider the context, vv. 97, 99 seem to bring out the notions of *may* and *can*. NE LICEAT (v. 97) refers back to LICET (v. 87). *Reason takes away that LICET. You MAY not do what you will only spoil, you cannot do (adds Nature) what is above your capacity.*

150. The variety of reading here is to be noticed. P. follows, with Jahn, the common reading. C. reads PERAGANT AVIDO SUDORE, but his notes are at variance with the text.

175. FESTUCA ... JACTAT. C. has thrown a new light on this line.

SATIRE VI.

39. MARIS EXPERS, '*unpickled*,' C. What does it mean?

There should be no doubt that P. is right in holding to Casaubon's interpretation of *emasculate*; but he would have done better in the conclusion of his note if he had fairly looked Horace's verse in the face, and seen consequently that Persius was not only reproducing his language, but his meaning. MARIS is in both authors the genitive, not of MARE, but of MAS. I may refer to my note on the line to show the simplicity and suitableness of so deriving it. The ingenuity of the Horatian scholiasts is very great. I will conclude by citing an example to show that those of Persius are not far behind. The Sch. on Pers. S. IV. 49 is, "Puteal dictum est quod ibi debitor creditori dans bona sua tanquam in puteum mittat."

J. E. YONGE.

CICERO DE NATURA DEORUM.

SINCE the edition of Davies, which appeared in the year 1718 at Cambridge, all subsequent editors of this treatise have been led into an error of which Davies himself was the cause, by the careless way in which he speaks of the corrections in a printed copy of Cicero's works (the one by Robertus Stephanus at Paris, in 1539), as though they were two manuscripts which existed at Ely. Any one who carefully reads his preface to his edition of the *de N. D.* will see that what he did collate was the edition of R. Stephanus before mentioned, a copy of which was lent or given to him by Bishop More of Ely, which contained marginal corrections by two hands, being the readings of two codices, and these corrections, according to the codex they are derived from, he calls codices *Elienses* 1 and 2. This is evident also from his preface to his edition of the *De Legibus*, where he says, "*Eliens. varias Lectiones significat quas ex Msto quodam vir doctus editioni Roberti Stephani A.D. MDXXXIX. adlevit. Iste codex quantum judicare datur non magnam prae se tulit vetustatem.*" This therefore is the *cod. El. 2*, of the *de N. D.* He calls these two codices "*optimi*" in his preface to the edition of the *de N. D.*, but he had no means of judging of their date or worth, and moreover he does not sufficiently distinguish between them. For example, in *i. 15. 39*, Davies gives "*vim*" as the reading of "*MS. Eliensis*," in place of the usual "*umbram*" for which I propose to read "*ueritatem*," and since writing this I see that Heindorf is only restrained by his respect for the so-called "*Cod. El.*" from doing the same. I may just remark here that I believe the true reading in that passage to be, "*tum fatalem necessitatem et ueritatem rerum futurarum*," slightly transposing the order (and transpositions are most frequent in the MSS. and early editions of this treatise), and comparing *sect. 40*, "*eandemque fatalem necessitatem appellat sempiternam rerum futurarum ueritatem.*"

J. H. SWAINSON.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

ON GLOSSOLOGY.

(Continued from p. 181, Vol. iv.)

V.

IN the consideration of *perinoematism*, or the continuous variation in signification of the words of a language, there are two points or steps: the first is to ascertain, as well as we can, what are the laws of it, if there are any; the second to determine the principles upon which we may draw conclusions from them as to their causes and circumstances in the mind of man.

In words which have anything of a moral signification, the law of *perinoematism* which most readily presents itself is that of *impejoration*, by which is meant that the meaning of words is liable to become morally worse in course of time.

A still more important law, inasmuch as it is more widely applicable, is that of *evaporation* or *trivialization*; by which I mean the gradual blunting of the force of a word, and evanescence of its proper and distinctive significance.

These may be considered perhaps the two most important laws: and it is evident that they arise from two customs or tendencies in speech, very distinct from each other; the first the custom of *euphemism*, the other that of *grandiloquence*.

Perhaps the most general tendency in human speech is to *grandiloquence* or exaggeration, but there is one case in which there is not this tendency to exaggeration in speech (whatever

there may be in feeling), and that is where there is a moral judgment involved. In such cases there is usually not exaggeration but, what is in a measure its opposite, euphemism. Both these facts might be described as the result of a *levity* in the use of speech, to a certain degree not regardful of truth, and (in the latter case) careless of moral wrong. But still we need not see nothing but ill in them. Some tendency to exaggeration, some over-force in speech, may be almost necessary, and may be a help to fuller expression. And the disposition, on the other hand, not to exaggerate moral offence, but to take a milder view of it, may be not *only* levity.

The two laws act, in the case of certain words, in opposite directions. Levity of speech may sometimes act in the way of good-natured exaggeration, so as to cause a thing to be called by a name morally *worse* than it deserves¹. In this case we have which may be called *immelioration*. The word becomes morally better in course of time.

Besides these there are two counter-laws, of wide application; the law of *generalization* and the law of *particularization*². Of these the latter contributes most to the earlier, the former most to the later growth of language. The former, generalization, is analogous in many respects to the law of trivialization before mentioned, and must arise partly from the same causes. The change of meaning which this produces has a tendency rather to undo and to dissolve language; while the change produced by particularization is, in a way, a carrying on of the process by which language was at first created.

To these laws we may perhaps add one other which is so vague as to be of little importance, though some sub-laws of it may possibly be determined, that which may be called the law of *deflection*, or side-change, change of meaning on the same level as to particularity or generality.

Philological considerations applied to our own language tend to make us look upon it in some respects with the *ab extra* view with which we look upon a foreign language. They will produce in this way a more conscious use of it; in fact

¹ e.g. Fr. *malice*, *envie*.

² Called in *Glossology*, p. 63, 'inspecification' and 'despecification.'

they are, thus applied, a part of the more general consciousness which belongs to our time.

When we see the word *consacrer* applied in French to the mere giving an hour's attention to something, we are ready to say perhaps that French is a language which applies great words to small things, and if it were translated 'consecrate,' we should talk of grandiloquence. But our own use of the word 'devote,' which would be spoken quite trivially and thoughtlessly by the speaker, and in which the hearer would see no grandiloquence, contains quite as much *dianoematism* as 'consecrate.' In a foreign language we attend to it, in our own we do not; because the foreign language is a matter of contemplation to us, while our own language is for use. And this is as it should be.

If the present generation can be taught to study the dianoematism of words in our own language as a matter of contemplation in the way in which we should deal with a foreign one, there is no harm done: our own language is then applied to two uses. But what is wrong is, when fault is found with our own language because in its ordinary use the dianoematism of each word can be but slightly present to the mind; as though this shewed a want of fulness and richness of thought, and were something belonging to the effeteness and senility of the 19th century. This is not so. In this particular of language our century is like every other. When we use our own language for the purpose of speech, the important things to be in our minds in full force and vigour are, first, what we ourselves mean, or wish to express, by the words; and next, what the person whom we address will understand by them; not what one person and another in the course of the world's history may have meant by them. In regard of the present use, words, like money, mean not what is told by anything upon *themselves*, but what the giver and the taker agree they shall represent or be worth: these things may or may not be the same. The giver in this manner imprints upon them a fresh stamp over the old. His attempt to alter the character of the *thing* only alters the meaning of the *word*, for the thing has a substance of its own which resists his attempts, whereas the word has not. If men have

continued calling evil good, this has not made the evil any better, but has only made the words which they have used pass from meaning the good to meaning the evil.

In the law of generalization, what we see is only the disposition to extend the application of a word by analogy, and in the law of particularization what we see is the disposition to limit the application of a word, by appropriation to what it has been used for most frequently, and by disuse of it for cases in which it has been used less. It is particularization which makes a word a word, turns metaphor into name, and the old *noematism* into *dianoematism*, thus in a manner destroying the vitality of words. Generalization, on the contrary, encourages the disposition to growth, weakening and spreading, not extinguishing, the separate vitality.

It is possible to look upon these laws as the result of *indolence* in the use of speech; but, on the other hand (and this is the more reasonable view), we may consider them natural results of the spontaneity and freedom of speech. Where there is a tendency in meanings to *drift*, the direction of the movement is more an index to us of truth than the original meaning is.

I will now proceed to consider a little what sort of conclusions as to the truth expressed may be drawn from this change of meaning in the words expressing it.

Of this change there are plainly two kinds: either the thing expressed and meant may be the same thing as was always expressed and meant, but the word may express it now in a different *manner* from that in which it formerly did, (implying e.g. some different judgment about it, or no longer expressing something about it which it did before); or the thing now expressed by the word may be something different from that which the word was used to express at first. Or the state of the case may be something intermediate between these two.

The first of these occurs when the original use of the word was one of decided euphemism or grandiloquence, more especially the former, i.e. when in the original use of the word, speech were designedly more or less falsified. In this case there has been evaporation of the meaning of the word; but the evaporation has not affected what it directly expressed or ap-

plied to, but what it implicitly said, or predicated, about this: the view taken becomes different. The former view, one of intention, purpose, effort, yields and drops to the more natural.

The second is the case where the expression was originally *bond fide*, but where people, for whatever reason (probably through euphemism or grandiloquence less conscious than the former), have used it to express what it was not meant for, and did not at first apply to, and then it has by degrees ceased to be used for what it *was* at first meant for and *did* apply to. In this case there has been *drifting* of the meaning in the sense of change of the application of a word.

If we divide the meaning of a word (with Mr Mill) into the *signification* and *application*, or, as he and his father (counter-changingly) call them, 'connotation' and 'denotation;' in the former case the signification of the word is changed, in the latter the application. About the use however of the word *signification* here something more must be said.

In the first use of a word the dianoematism may be meant to be itself expressive and significant, or it may be used for the purpose of application only, without any special significance. The former is when, as I have said, there is decided and conscious euphemism or grandiloquence. In most cases we perhaps cannot tell when this is so: but in some cases we can. It is the nature of language, that the dianoematism should die out of signification; and if such signification is designed, and it is wanted to keep it up, there must be a continual re-coinage of words to do so. We may conclude that the use of a word of such mild import as 'disease' was an intentional euphemism, because we find that when, in the course of language, the intended signification is gone, and the word has come simply to mean what it applies to, another word of equally mild import at first, 'illness,' comes into use, and when that follows in the same course, we talk of people being 'poorly,' and so on indefinitely. But though 'gold' has ceased now to suggest to us its dianoematism of yellowness, or 'wheat' of whiteness, we do not think it necessary to make new words for *them*: from which we may perhaps conclude that in these cases there was no such conscious care for signification and desire that the words should,

not only denote some object, but predicate something about it, or indicate some view of it: a word was needed, and colour supplied the dianoematism: henceforth the word cuts loose from the dianoematism, and has a separate meaning of its own.

Dianoematism has always been a ground of moral and philosophical combat, affecting many of the most important points on which man's mind can have to be made up. And those whose anxiety has really been in this way to make up their mind aright, must have been often puzzled as to what was right. Must we, whatever we wish to mean, really mean what our words will mean, and like prophets of old, when we want to express one thing, perforce express another? Was it impossible for a Roman to deny immortality because he could not help saying '*mortuus est*,' and thereby predicating of the dead continued existence? And does on the other hand our language, by the necessity and very form of it, bear witness of unconscious wisdom and nobleness of sentiment otherwise undreamt of?

There is no subject perhaps on which so much of assertion has been made on the one side, and in which on the other the phrases 'verbal quibble,' &c., have been used so without thought and summarily, as this. Let us see if we can find any principles.

Before entering on this question at all there is one thing to be remembered, and that is, that in any case it is useless to reason from the dianoematism of words, till we are fairly certain on philological, i.e. historical or etymological grounds, of its correctness. Sometimes a writer is desirous of uniting two merits which it is not at all likely will be united, ingenuity in hitting out a striking derivation of a word, and philosophy or wisdom in drawing consequences from this. The reasons (i.e. in fact analogies) for the derivation of a word must be philological, and till this derivation is fairly established for purely philological reasons, all application of it to any purposes of conclusion is simply waste of time. The amount of reasoning which has been built upon this sandy foundation is incredible. In the middle ages, such reasoning was, almost by the very form of it, acknowledged to be merely interesting speculation; for generally a variety of derivations of a word were given, of which

of course one only could be the true one, and conclusions were drawn from them all. In later times this has not generally been so, and writers like Mr Carlyle have given their *one* derivation, as of king, law, &c., and reasoned on it. Of course all such reasonings carry with them the uncertainty which belongs to the derivations on which they rest; an uncertainty upon which it is the etymologist, not the philosopher, who is to be consulted¹. The modern manner of this reasoning is generally bad, because the reasoner, perhaps rather uneasily conscious that it is in the power of another science than his own to blow his fabric to the winds, is very likely to attempt to carry this off by a contempt for the other science, and to proceed as if it were in the power of his philosophy to substantiate the derivation as well as to reason from it. But the derivation, if not established on its own basis, draws no strength from the reasoning built on it; while on the other hand this is something, which, if the derivation be invalidated, becomes absolutely *nil*.

Supposing, however, that from historical and philological considerations, we are fairly certain about the derivation of a word, there remains still the question on what principles we may reason, to any good purpose, from its dianoematism.

On this point I will say a little about Horne Tooke, and the *Diversions of Purley*.

VI.

Tooke deserves great credit for the view which he has taken of his subject. His system of derivation, and his system of concluding from derivation as to meaning, were both admirably methodical, and, considering how the sort of thing had been done before, were a very great step in advance. He, more than any one else, has laid the foundation of a science of the dianoematism of words.

Of course he is continually in error both as to the particular derivations, and as to the system or laws of the formation of

¹ Cf. *Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy*, p. 153, on Mr Mill's derivation of 'justum.'

words, which he considered to exist. But this is no wonder; and I will not speak of this now, except incidentally.

Much of the interest excited by the *Diversions of Purley* was owing to the manner in which Tooke made the real meaning of the word (as he conceived it) to depend on the derivation or dianoematism. Former etymologists had done this but little, or at least not at all systematically. His book virtually professed to be a new method of discovering and exhibiting, not only the origin of words, but their real meaning.

Let us examine his way of proceeding in this respect, and take as instances some words which he discusses at the beginning of his chapter on *abstraction*, as the grammarians and logicians before him had been in the habit of calling it.

Right and Left Hand.

‘The right hand is that which custom and those who have brought us up have *ordered* or *directed* us to use in preference, when only one hand is employed: and the left hand is that which is *leaved*, *leav'd*, *left*; or which we are taught to *leave* out of use on such an occasion.’ Vol. II. p. 10.

This is Horne Tooke’s account or definition, if we may call it so, of ‘right and left hand,’ given instead of Johnson’s, which he had just been criticizing. Johnson’s, to be sure, seems open to criticism, being simply ‘right—not left’ and then again, ‘left—sinistrous, not right.’ And Horne Tooke, noticing that the description of right and wrong is equally circular, ‘right—not wrong,’ ‘wrong—not right,’ dismisses Johnson summarily—‘Seek no further for intelligence in that quarter, where nothing but fraud, and cant, and folly is to be found, &c.’

It is to be observed that Johnson had in his preface declared that he meant purposely to make some of his descriptions thus reciprocal and circular; and there could not have been a better instance given of a case for such circular description than this of the hands. It is far better than the instance which he does give, that of ‘hart—the male of hind,’ ‘hind—the female of hart,’ as if these needed to be distinguished from nothing but each other. But in the case of the hands, ‘left’ and ‘right’ have

always, and necessarily, a reference to each other, and almost exist, as words in this application, for the sake of being distinguished from each other and from nothing else. However of course Johnson's account tells us little about them.

Let us now see Horne Tooke's.

His interlocutor is in doubt how the people of Melinda should be described, with whom it is the custom to use their left hand exactly as we use our right, and *vice versa*: was De Gama correct in describing them as all *left-handed*?

H. T. 'With reference to European custom the author describes them truly. But the people of Melinda are as right-handed as the Portuguese: for they use that hand in preference which is ordered by their custom, and leave out of employ the other which is therefore their left hand¹.'

Here we see that Horne Tooke, in consequence of his notion of the dianoematism of a word *being* its meaning, has omitted to notice that *right* and *left* are facts of nature, which may not be easily describable indeed, but are not on that account the less real, and which are at once recognized as facts by everybody. And this natural fact is what really underlies the words, as the thing to be conveyed from one intelligence to another by them: the fact of the one or the other being used for any particular purpose, is, as compared with this, an accident; though, from the difficulty of describing the natural fact, such a use may be chosen to supply the dianoematism for its name. But if Johnson's account of the words is incomplete as to the meaning, Horne Tooke's is beside it.

In reference to translation from the English tongue into that of the people of Melinda, if we could be certain that we should come across nothing but what had reference to the *employment* of the hands, we might be allowed to accept Horne Tooke's account, and to let the same word, in whichever language it is, represent the hand which *we* use and that which *they* use, and so again for the unused hand. But *employment* is not the only thing which may come into consideration about the hands: one might for instance be wounded: and it is perfectly possible (I

¹ Vol. II. p. 10.

know not) that there may be some physical difference between one arm and the other as to relation with other parts of the body, e.g. the heart, &c. We should then, by making the meaning follow the dianoematism, i.e. in this case the usage, come flagrantly to misdescribe a fact of nature. Surely these considerations show what is the substance, and what the accident, of the meaning.

Apply now what has been just said about the word 'right' in application to a fact of nature, to 'right' in its more difficult moral application. Horne Tooke gives a long list of such applications. I will mention one or two of them. 'To do *right*, is to do that which is *ordered* to be done.' 'A right and just action is such as is ordered and commanded.' 'A just man is such as he is commanded to be—qui leges juraque servat—who observes and obeys the things laid down and commanded.'

Now we will suppose the derivations good (as we did about 'right' and 'left,' though that of 'left' probably is not) and only consider the reasoning upon them.

This account of a right action is evidently just to the same extent a sufficient account or description of it, as that of the right hand was of it. It tells us the reason why the thing in question is called 'right,' rather than by any other name, and it gives us one circumstance or quality, perhaps the most conspicuous, which by those who gave the name was understood to belong to it. What is involved in the name need not exhaust the nature in the case of a right action, more than in the case of the right hand. A man has a notion, in the two cases, of a position and of an action which he wishes to speak of by names: the name in each case follows the notion, not the notion the name, and we in no case sufficiently describe the notion by describing the meaning of the name given to it.

The result which Horne Tooke comes to in the case of the words *right* and *wrong* is the common Hobbism:

'Everything then that is ordered and commanded is right and just?'

'Surely. For that is only affirming that what is ordered and commanded, is—ordered and commanded¹.'

¹ Vol. II. p. 12.

So far as Horne Tooke is concerned, the force of his Hobbistic conclusion as to the absence of a real distinction between right and wrong vanishes with the force of his conclusion, from the dianoematism, as to the real (or natural) distinction between right and left. He himself puts the cases as parallel: 'a thing may be at the same time both right and wrong, as well as both right and left¹.'

But in reality of course the notions of right and wrong are not as simple as those of right and left.

In the case of right and left, I said, however the description might be difficult, the fact was simple, clear, and patent. In the case of right and wrong, not only is the description difficult, but the fact is not simple or patent. Some will say, there is no fact corresponding to the notion at all, or, what is more intelligible, they will say that we have no sort of certainty that the people who use the word, and profess to have the notion, intend to convey the same thing by it.

In this doubt many, who would think very differently from Horne Tooke, nevertheless accept his appeal to the dianoematism (which they would explain differently), and say or allow that the notion means what the expressing word conveys, and no more.

In moral words, on account of the difficulty of the notions, there has always been a tendency this way. But it appears to me that the manner in which we should think on the subject is this:

First, that people using words of this kind have a notion antecedent to and independent of them, though we cannot be certain how far different people have the same notion. And of course by counter-assertions of individual consciousness we make no progress. What is needed for advance in this respect is, not conclusions from the dianoematism of the words (for a man means what he wishes to mean, not what his words, by any secret force of theirs, would make him mean), but examining in ourselves and others what it is that we and they want to express, what it is in our minds that makes us wish to use the word at all. In regard of words of this kind, which we cannot subject to sense, a common understanding is the first great pre-supposition for reality, as well as the essence of signification in language.

¹ p. 13.

Then, secondly, the study of the dianoematism or history is, of course, a great help to this. Whatever the true and complete notions may be, the giving the names to them of *right* and *wrong* of course had its reason.

We have seen then in regard of these words a specimen of Tooke's method of proceeding. His method differed in two respects from that of most of the etymologists, and grammarians, who preceded him, in so far as he aimed, first, to investigate derivations systematically on principles and by regular analogies; and, second, not to rest, as an etymologist would, in the derivation, but to apply it for discovering the real meaning of the word, which was his main aim. In both of these ways of proceeding he may be said, as to system and profession, to have opened a new course. On the valuableness of the former there can be no controversy. On that of the latter, which is my chief business now, there is more.

'What do you mean by the words right and wrong? he asks his interlocutor.

What every other person means by them.

And what is that?

Nay, you know that as well as I do:

Yes. But not better and therefore not at all.

Must we always be seeking after the meaning of words?

If important we must, if we wish to avoid error¹.

He then proceeds to say, '*Right* is no other than *rectum* the past participle of the Latin verb *regere*²,' and to give the account of it which I quoted before. This is the way in which he introduces the question of words of this kind.

He professes thus to do systematically what had been done in insulated cases abundantly before, and to provide a *method* by which the real meaning of words is to be ascertained. He will not accept as an account of the meaning, that it is the common and mutual understanding of men about them, because he says one man cannot tell what others mean by them: he considers that those who have made the most use of them have done so with a strange neglect of their meaning: yet that this mean-

¹ Vol. II. p. 3.

² p. 7.

ing always remains in them, and may be discovered in them by the key of the derivation.

Now it is this notion of the meaning of words which I wish to combat. Neither Horne Tooke's interlocutor, nor 'every other person,' nor 'those who had made the most use of the words,' may have known well what they were saying, or had a clear idea of what was meant by right and wrong: but, in this difficulty, on what principle is the dianoematism given as the meaning? Horne Tooke's interlocutor is more right than himself. Though there was not a *clear* communication and mutual understanding amongst the different people using the words, there *was* such an understanding more or less: the one to a certain degree understood what the other meant to say: the real meaning of the word is this commonly understood significance cleared as much as possible, and weeded of individualities. If this varied at different times, then the meaning varied: the man who used the words did not *neglect* the historical meaning of them, but never in the least intended to convey it. Horne Tooke's notion of 'meaning' rests upon a false idea of language, likely to arise in an age when philology and history are cultivated more than philosophy and logic: viz. that language consists in the mass of dictionary words, not in the living intercommunication of thought. Whereas the former are but the furniture and instrument of the latter. For historical and poetical interest, we may dig and redig into them with endless profit: but as to living meaning, it is not their structure which we are concerned with, but their use.

I do not care to dispute about words, and if we like to call the history or dianoematism of a word a meaning of it, of course we may: in this case we should say that there are three meanings, or three senses of the word meaning: first, this dianoematism; then that significance, vague or clear, which passes between mind and mind in the use of it: and last, whether such a thing exists or not, that reality which is conceived to exist correspondingly to the word by those who use the word, and the conception of which has been the cause of its adoption and use. In words like 'right' and 'left,' these two last coincide: there is no doubt but that there is a reality corresponding to the intended signification of the words: in words like 'right' and 'wrong,' there is

considered to be such by those who use them, but we have not the same means of ascertaining whether it is so. But nothing is gained, by substituting for that which is meant (even supposing the existence of such a thing to be a delusion), that which, however it may exist, yet is clearly not the thing meant. Thus the man who uses the word 'right' does not mean to convey the idea of 'commanded': he would not use the word instead, if you requested him: I am unable therefore to see the good of calling it the meaning.

Let us now, in further illustration, apply these considerations to the word *truth*, Horne Tooke's treatment of which has been rather celebrated. It is very similar to what we have just seen.

He again quotes Johnson (who here also defines circularly, 'false, not true,' 'true—not false;') and himself describes, much as he did 'right:' 'true—means simply and merely—that which is *trowed*, and instead of its being a rare commodity upon earth, except only in words, there is nothing but truth in the world¹.' Supposing his account of the grammatical origin of the word (what I should call his phonal account of it) to be correct, it is to be observed, that he does not argue quite fairly from this, or as I should say, does not correctly give the dianoematism. The Saxon word 'treowan' he defines 'confidere, to think, to believe firmly, to be thoroughly persuaded of, to *trow*.' The old significance of the root still preserved in the form 'trust' is evaporated in the word *trow*, so that 'I trow' suggests now scarcely more than 'I think;' and in accordance with this Horne Tooke's reasoning rather goes on the notion that that which is trowed, i.e. *truth*, is simply opinion. But the reader should observe that the real force of the dianoematism, so far as we seek the meaning there, is *moral*; 'truth—that which may be *trusted*, that which one man *trusts* another about.'

In reality, it would have been more reasonable for one arguing on Horne Tooke's principles to have maintained that, the dianoematisms of the notion *truth* varying so much in different languages, the *truths* in all such languages were different. He chooses, however, a much weaker line, and endeavours to prove,

¹ Vol. II. p. 401.

by a most startling derivation, that *verus* also means the same as *trowed*¹. As a matter of fact the more regular old English word for *true*, in an intellectual view of it, is 'sooth' or 'soothfast,' and if Horne Tooke could have found a derivation for this, he might have argued that even in English we have no certain idea what it is that constitutes truth or trueness: for the derivation of *sooth* certainly cannot be the same as that of *true*.

But supposing it was granted that Horne Tooke's account of the original meaning of the word 'truth' was correct, and that the corresponding word in every other language meant similarly, in the first instance, nothing more than opinion: let us examine the merits of the conclusion which he draws from this, viz. that if we mean now by the expression 'truth' anything immutable and everlasting, anything necessarily the same for one person as for another, we mean a mere delusion, and our own word rebukes us.

When our tongue tells others what is passing in our mind, this is 'truth,' 'truthfulness.' But when our mind tells us what exists in nature and reality, what expression are we to use for this fact, for this relation? *Possibly* no such fact may exist, *certainly*, if it does, it is very difficult of description (though *that* a most rudely natural fact may be, as we saw in the case of right and left): but in any case, it is a fact or relation most readily, and indeed necessarily, suggesting itself to our minds. How then are we to name it? Supposing Horne Tooke's account of the original meaning of 'true' to be correct, all that is to be said is, that to express the conformity between thoughts and things, a notion for which it is most difficult to find a dianoematism or means of expression, the word signifying the conformity between words and thoughts was taken in an extended or applied meaning, the one notion being considered to be a figure or resemblance of the other. This is the history of all language. The conclusion that there is no such possible fact as a conformity between thoughts and things, or, in other words, that there is nothing in things of such a nature that thoughts can be said with any significance to be conformed to them (which is meant by saying that there is no fixed, im-

¹ p. 404.

mutable truth), because the word which we use to express such conformity, expressed originally, and expresses still besides, the conformity of words and thoughts, is an attempt to draw a false philosophical conclusion from a mis-assigned fact of language.

I am not now considering what is the real philosophical character of the notion of trueness or truth, as predicated of thought and knowledge. I am only endeavouring to show that nothing can be determined in regard to it from language in Horne Tooke's way. The *notion* exists in man's mind: nothing more is needed to prove this than the fact of the surprise, to say the least, which Horne Tooke's account of the matter is sure to excite in those who hear it for the first time. Of the two truenesses, if we like so to call them, the one is comparatively on the surface, the other is one which, though unavoidably ever in our thoughts, is deep and difficult. No wonder in this case the name of the latter is taken by extension from that of the former. I do not enter into the philosophical question how far we ought to consider the facts distinct: the considerations are the same as if we were speaking of the Greek word *λόγος*: there is truth of the inward, and truth of the outward utterance. Horne Tooke's proceeding is as if a Greek of Plato's time should conclude there was no such thing as thought or reason, because *λόγος*, on the face of it, meant no more than speech.

Of course it is possible that by saying, 'there is no such thing as immutable truth', Horne Tooke merely meant to say that the fixedness or certainty in things, or in reality, which gives to thought, reason, and knowledge, a purpose and meaning, and which leads us to think of them as possibly correct or incorrect, is something which ought not be called by the name of 'truth', for truth belongs to speech, and means the correct rendering by the tongue of thoughts, not by the mind of things:—if this is all that is meant, it is then simply a question of right use of language. But conclusions as to the use of language, and conclusions as to the reality of things *from* language, are processes which lie in two entirely different regions of thought, the latter immeasurably higher than the former. To read, with this latter view, the great universal language of human thought as

shown in expression, we must do something more than find out derivations. Otherwise we have merely results and conclusions, of all possible the most utterly empty and misleading. That reality should be thus dragged in the chains of the infinitely various and inconsistent expression of men, that we should be made the slaves of our own ununderstood words, and afraid to use them lest some ingenious etymologist should convict us of having meant by them something utterly remote from our thoughts, or lest we should be helping by our use of them some monstrous conclusion from that use, such as this of Horne Tooke's which we are now considering: all this is an entire perversion of language from its natural and legitimate employment and purpose.

VII.

How far does what I have said apply to Mr Trench?

There is, in what seems to me the general bearing of Mr Trench's books, a greater amount of conclusion from the dianoematism to the proper force of the word now, than I should be disposed myself to go with. In some passages, it is true, he expresses exactly¹ what I consider to be the right view of the matter; viz. that while the present force, or meaning in usage, is the only proper meaning of the word, still the knowledge of its history may well give to this, with the cultivated man, a point, an edge, a delicacy, a discrimination, which could perhaps come from no other source. But elsewhere he appears in his reasonings to fall into the error which I have pointed out in Horne Tooke. Thus he says: "Every time people use the word *plague*," while they fain would assign natural causes for a disease of the kind, "they implicitly own the fact which they are endeavouring to deny: for plague means properly, and according to its derivation, blow or stroke; and was a title given

¹ Compare *Study of Words*, Ed. vi. p. 171. "The past history of a word, which history must needs start from its derivation, how soon soever that may be left behind, is surely a necessary element in its present valua-

tion. A man may be wholly different now from what he once was, yet not the less to know his antecedents is needful, before we can ever perfectly understand his present self; and the same holds good with a word."

to these terrible diseases, because the great universal conscience of men, which is never at fault, believed and confessed that these were strokes or blows inflicted by God on a guilty and rebellious world. With reference to such words so used we may truly say: *Vox populi, vox Dei*—a proverb which, shallowly interpreted, may be made to contain a most mischievous falsehood; but interpreted in the sense, wherein no doubt it was spoken, holds the deepest truth¹.”

The history of a word here seems to me applied differently from the manner in which it was viewed in the passage I referred to before. And though agreeing with the conclusion which Mr Trench draws, while I disagree with so many similar conclusions in Horne Tooke, I am unable to accept from Mr Trench, any more than from Horne Tooke, the notion of people implicitly meaning what they have no intention of meaning, and what the word which they use does not in the least convey to the person who hears it. It seems better, in all such cases, without any overstating, to consider the present meaning of the word as independent of any derivation of this kind which in no respect suggests itself, and then to treat of the *history* of the word as of any other history, drawing our conclusions from it as we may. And as to what Mr Trench says about the weight to be attributed to the *vox populi*, he has himself allowed on a former page that this may be something very different from an ‘attestation for God’s truth.’ We are in fact to compare it with what we know of God’s truth otherwise.

On the other hand, in p. 100, Mr Trench gives admirably the principle of the *use* of words according to present acceptation, and not according to dianoematism, citing the words *blackbird*, *journal*, *New Forest*, &c., and condemning the ‘ethical prudery’ of the Quakers. He speaks there of words becoming ‘wholly disengaged from their etymologies, which they had left altogether behind them²,’ and adds, ‘Moreover, had these precisians in speech been consistent they could not have stopped where they did; every new acquaintance with the derivation or pri-

¹ *Study of Words*, p. 40.

² *Ibid.* p. 101.

mary use of words would have entangled them in new embarrassments, &c.' His language about synonyms, in p. 169, seems to me less correct. I must own that I myself rather take part with what he condemns in the accomplished authoress, or in any case consider it an advantage that by the side of books tracing accurately the history of words, there should exist others in which "reference is seldom made to etymologies, the writer relying almost entirely upon present usage, and the tact and instinct of a cultivated mind for an appreciation of them aright." Take e.g. such a case as that of 'detest' in p. 168; "to detest is to bear witness against, not to be able to keep silence in regard of something, to feel ourselves obliged to lift up our voice and testimony against it." Here, while Mr Trench gives what is probably the right derivation of the word, he does not seem to give a proper account of its signification at the present time; surely he does not mean that when we read it in a book we are to understand that the writer always means by it an actual vocal protest, and that we are not to use it ourselves except where such is made?

The fact is that the process which Mr Trench calls desynonymization is not so much anything which does take place, as something which he thinks we should endeavour to bring about. Synonyms are words of originally different meaning which carelessness and thoughtlessness have made convertible, and to which he would again give a difference of meaning based upon their dianoematisms or derivations. Now supposing such a reformation desirable and practicable, still there ought previously to be a most accurate examination on the principles of the authoress whom Mr Trench quotes rather than on his own, to ascertain whether they are really now convertible in use, in the mouth of people who use these words with thought. For it is quite possible that in use delicate distinctions may have established themselves which the differences of derivation will not account for (as between *continuous* and *continual*, &c.), and Mr Trench, being no mere theoretical reformer, but an observant practical reformer, would not of course wish to alter these.

If the distinction in feeling which he considers to exist

between *felicitate* and *congratulate*¹ does exist, I think it must be of this kind; for I do not think the difference of the derivation will account for it. And Mr Trench here seems to be on the verge of that reformation of speech which he had condemned in the Quakers, and which I should call the application of conscience to dianoematism. 'I could not, without a violation of truth, congratulate a stranger whose prosperity awoke no lively delight in my heart, for when I congratulate a person (congratulator) I declare that I am sharer in his joy, &c.' We have surely here got the wrong principle, and one which would give a great deal of trouble to a conscientious man in such a case, e.g. as that of the word 'indolence;' of which we read, p. 209, 'What a lie lurks at the root of the word *indolence*...seeming to affirm that indulgence in sloth and ease is that which would constitute for us the absence of all pain.'

What are we to do then about the *use* of the word 'indolence.' Does it 'seem to affirm' what it does, in the sense in which the use of the word *Sunday* affords a presumption that we worship the sun; or in the sense in which the use of the word *congratulation* would show us to be *sharers* in joy? And how are we to distinguish between the living and the dead dianoematism? Does it not *in fact* come to usage?

There seem to me to be two principles involved in this: one, that language is not soliloquy, but it is a matter in which two parties are concerned, speaker and hearer. I can conceive no principle involved in our continuing to keep up such a distinction as that between 'felicitate' and 'congratulate' on account of our feeling of the difference of derivation, if the people we speak to recognize no difference in the meaning, and understand no principle in the difference of use. If they *do*, then there is difference of usage, and the matter is settled independently of derivation. If they do not, then we are really damaging language in our effort to improve it; for the essence of language is *communication* from mind to mind.

The other principle is that which Mr Trench must have had in his mind in reference to the Quakers, viz. that we must

¹ p. 172.

recognize and allow the course of language in these respects, and that it is of no use fighting against it, even if we were certain that we should serve mankind and truth by our success. As a reformer, however, Mr Trench is consistent in refusing to admit this principle. He protests against it, as we have seen, in regard to synonyms, and in speaking of what I have called the law of generalization or the course of evaporation of speciality of meaning in words, he sees in it a dire calamity, a corruption of language, which we are bound to do all in our power to oppose¹. As to this I must confess that I am imperfectly able to distinguish between the agencies which mould and develop a language, and the processes which are of the nature of corruption. If Mr Trench had lived in the early ages of the world, and had had his way, I do not think we should have had language at all. Language is the daughter of particularization and generalization: movement and perpetual flux of meaning are its essence: the evaporation of part of the meaning in one word leaves a vacant place to be occupied by another word, which has similarly shifted its meaning whether in the way of particularization or of generalization. 'Preposterous,' 'prevarication,' 'idea,' must go the way of so many predecessors, must lose all their youthful picturesqueness and suggestive signification (except to the fond philologist), must submit to be particularized into something accidentally special, or generalized into something dully vague. But then if other words had not so suffered before them, these words themselves would never have been what they are. The riches of philological antiquity arise from the fact that none could deal with language as Mr Trench wishes. If 'prevarication' could stop at 'collusion', it would probably never have arrived at it, but retained its original force of 'straddling with distorted legs.'

However this may be, it seems to me an entire mistake to attempt to regulate our use of words now by considerations of what is, or is not, a corruption or downward movement. I am inclined to think that language has always prospered best when the attention has been given most simply to its essential pur-

¹ *English Past and Present*, p. 144.

pose, the clear expression of thought. And it is because the necessities and pleasure of human communication have always ensured a main degree of attention to this, that in my view, in the midst of much oscillation, language on the whole has always prospered, and human knowledge is not only more in amount, but is better expressed than it was in its earlier days. We are to look upon language, in fact, as something like the processes of nature, in so far as that it has laws which it is our business to observe and not to criticize, and in so far as that it, like everything else connected with human knowledge, has *something* in it, we will not here discuss how much or how little, of advance and progress. No doubt there have been periods of depression and failure of the expressiveness and usefulness of language, but no conscious effort of those seeing the calamity could have prevented this. It was the animating mind which was in fault, and language simply recorded its failure.

Be sure then of your own meaning and find the words in which you can say it most distinctly and most unambiguously (this is the advice which I would give), and then you may leave language to take care of itself, secure (I think) that it will do so, and that you are *one* benefactor to it. According to your powers, there are various ways in which you may benefit and enrich it, but this is the first, the *sine quâ non*, the business of everybody. Now distinctness of thought undoubtedly requires close attention to these *synonyms*, or words at first sight identical in meaning, to distinguish what they do mean, and derivations are *one* help to this. But for unambiguity of language, it seems to me the cardinal axiom is, that words mean what they are simply used for, not what there may be in them of fossilized past meaning, or what their elements or components may mean. Unless we hold fast to this as our foundation, the drawing attention to exceptionalities of the kind which are allowed to genius, such as the employment by Milton of a word in a past and etymologic sense, is likely to cause perplexities in our use of language. No person can be more convinced than I am that the study of words is the study of things, if only we study the words rightly. But it is an old error of man's mind, when we cannot distinctly present to our mind a notion, to

think that we shall be enabled to do this by scrutinizing the word by means of which language expresses it. And this same error, which once drew nourishment from men's ignorance of comparative philology, now, strange to say, draws the same from their knowledge of it. We are in danger of forgetting that the word follows the thing or notion, does not lead or govern it. And if we do forget that a word has *one* meaning (in each application which may be made of it) at one time, and that this should be the same with all who use and hear it, and that *this* whatever it may be is the only right use of the word, we shall be introducing ambiguity at the root of language, and doing more for its corruption than the worst negligence or neology would.

I will make a moment's allusion to Mr Trench's mode of dealing with the subject of phonography, of which I have said something elsewhere. Though I agree generally with his view on this subject, yet his remarks with regard to it seem to me to be open to the same objection as his remarks with regard to the meaning of words. Language, as a great natural fact of humanity, has its laws, its regular course and flow. My interest is chiefly in the *observation* of these laws; those whose interest is more practical may look at things differently, but still practical improvements must be based upon, and regulated by the observation of the actual changes hitherto. Revolutions, in this as in many other things, are wild chimeras in the mind of him who desires them, and would be coarse vandalisms in the execution. But time is the great innovator in language as in everything else: language, as to every part of it, meaning, pronunciation, and writing, is ever in gradual revolution, and with regard to anything which we say should be done *now*, we should consider what would have been the case with us now, if others had done it some time back. Mr Trench hardly sufficiently considers that all languages existing at present have been indefinitely phonographed as time has gone on, and that the fact of their having been so is one of the things which make them distinct languages now. In French, for instance, thousands of 'secrets of words'¹ have already disappeared from the writing, in

¹ *Study of Words*, p. 191.

the same manner as picture after picture, image after image, has disappeared from the meaning of words. What Mr Trench says about *poids*, &c., really involves a principle of revolutionary restoration quite as bad as the revolutionary innovation of his opponents. What would language become if we returned to ancient spelling, and for the sake of the secrets of the words wrote 'presbtre' in French, 'qui' and 'que' in Italian, and I know not what more? Our writing is in its essence what I have called phonogrammatic, and ought to be maintained such in all its main particulars, i.e. it is the representation (by its vocal elements) of significant *sound*, not of significance independent of sound. It ought not to allow any other principle than this, however it may allow, so far as it is not inconsistent with this, occasionally something of expression beside it. The dependence of writing on speech is an essential feature of *our* branch of general human language, and anything which tends consciously to loosen this dependence is a step China-wards.

But now, leaving the *use* of words, let us consider how we ought to think about their history, and what conclusions we may draw from it.

In the history of each word there are two great facts: the one its formation; the other, the subsequent history of its use and application.

Each of these contains a human or moral element: and from each, if we put several instances together, something may be concluded as to man, his mind and history. On what principles did he give the names at first? What principles have governed the changes in their application since?

And then, as to moral *truth*, which is to be considered the truer, the sense and judgment of the givers, or that of the modifiers? the feeling of the first users, or the continued feeling which gradually swayed the word round into conveying something different?

I have stated that the most general law of change in the meaning of words containing a moral application, is that which I have called the law of *impejoration*: and it can scarcely be doubted that this arose, in the greater number of cases, from deliberate euphemism in the first application.

Now, with my view that the meaning of a word is not its dianoematism, but its present force in use, the way in which I should argue from this would be in a line opposite to Mr Trench's usual line of argument—I should consider it to show, that however man's good-nature and levity may attempt it, the impressing a falsehood or misdescription upon permanent human language is impossible: that the continued public sense of man, to which the course of language bears witness, revolts and protests against it, and makes good its protest by making the word gradually mean the thing as it is, not as men have endeavoured to look at it. And I should consider that wonderful, interesting, and full of significance, as the springing up of words and their dianoematism or original force of meaning might be; it was still more interesting to watch how the words once given were dealt with by the human mind expressing itself by its use of them in language, that the course of the great river of language was something better, and telling us more, than the observation, however interesting, of the refreshing of it by its affluents. It seems to me that we shall find both more of truth and more of interest in the history of words if we fully recognize their changed meaning at present, than if we try to undo history by putting them back to some point in the past, and considering that any change from that is something which had better not have been.

Looked at from this point of view, the general fact of the *impejoration* of moral words gives, in the contest between morality and immorality, a great advantage to the former. The reader will observe what this process of impejoration is: certain words having in them a meaning, if not good, yet not bad, have been condemned by man's good-nature to express bad things; but the words themselves have changed their meaning—refusing as it were to speak good of that which did not deserve it. Now if words are condemned for ever to mean their dianoematism, the half-immoral levity which first appropriated them is preserved for ever, and the better feeling of permanent language is neutralized and made worthless. It is not for the advantage of morality, that we should try to refresh and bring out again the lost dianoematic force in such words as *animosity*, their application remaining as at present, and so find ourselves again

calling mere hostility by the name of spiritedness or high spirit. If we could alter the application the case would be different: but, in respect of the force of the term, I imagine (it is a fact approximately ascertainable) that in following words upwards towards their source in order to find their meaning we should come upon a greater number of wrong and immoral conclusions, than of right and moral ones. The common feeling of mankind has acted not only in the making of new names, but in investing with fresh and changed meaning those which it has made: this latter is entitled to as much at least of our attention as the former, I think to more: I believe that, as to the truth of things, we may learn more from it.

In the extension of a word from signifying one notion to signifying another very different (a process often followed by the disuse of its application to the former), each notion, we may say, comes to meet the other, though, according to circumstances, it is at very different points of the middle space that they meet. Take e.g. the extension of the term *knave*, originally boy or servant, to mean, thief and rogue. When this was first done, was it good-nature calling the latter by a name too good for them, or ill-nature calling the former by a name too bad? It was doubtless something of the one, and something of the other. We see in the use of such phrases as 'little rogue,' &c. that, as 'a mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure,' and as 'stolen waters are sweet,' so there is a sort of pleasure in half jocular accusation and blame, with enough perhaps of reason in it just to *suggest* it, and likely enough no more. And of the careless readiness on the other hand, to call moral offence by names too light and easy, we have abundant instance. There is a want of consideration in this case that the term so used is ill-used, and that danger is run of doing injustice to what it properly belongs to, by the association of its name with this new application. I cannot but think that injustice of this kind is done unwittingly by Mr Trench in the case of this word which I have taken as an instance. From not sufficiently allowing for the element of euphemism, he seems to imply that what the word in its first application represents *deserves* the association of its name with the second notion. On the same principle one

might argue, in reference to the term 'disease,' 'How much of what is called sickness in the world must be mere restlessness and inconvenience, that men should be satisfied to call the whole by a negative term, so little indicative of actual suffering, as this word *disease*'!

Of the cases in which a word, which in its dianoematism contains little or no dyslogism (as Bentham would call it), or expression of blame, comes in the course of its changing use to convey a great deal, some seem due but little to euphemism, but simply to very gradual change of application, some almost entirely to euphemism, and some, perhaps, the larger number, to a mixture of the two, though in general I think more to euphemism than to the other. There is one large class of words, in regard to which it seems to me that Mr Trench's mode of reasoning leads to results which are very unsatisfactory and unfair to those whom, least of all, we ought to be unfair to, the unfortunate. The manner in which a number of words in all languages *begin* with meaning misfortune of various kinds, and end with meaning wickedness, is very remarkable. Take as a familiar instance in English the word 'wretch.' Now, if we consider this a result in large of that which we see exemplified every day on a smaller scale, the kind but unconscientious euphemism which talks of guilt as misfortune, I think we have sufficient to account for the phenomenon, and that we are concluding nothing but what facts will bear us out in. But if we adopt about them the manner of conclusion which is most frequent with Mr Trench, we are led to results about which I greatly hesitate. Take what he says about 'caitiff¹.' Captivity is not slavery: and the ode of Horace which Mr Trench refers to is one which I should call savage and cruel, and of a spirit which both Christianity, speaking so much as it does of the sad lot of prisoners, and civilization, directing our attention so much to the preventing needless severity to them, I should have thought would repudiate: even Mr Trench is obliged in a manner to veil it by speaking as if it were what we call *slavery*, and not captivity by enemies, which Horace is speaking of. But

¹ *Select Glossary*, p. 28.

even of slaves and slavery I should hardly like to say what Mr Trench does. I am willing to go as far as he can in saying of freemen, 'sua si bona norint,' if they know their calling, and taste and feel what they possess, that their liberty is likely to elevate their moral character, in a manner which perhaps nothing else would: but I do not think language pronounces that crueller sentence upon those who have not this blessing which Mr Trench thinks it does, or that we have reason to expect, from facts, it should.

In the case of a word like 'caitiff' it depends upon the continuous history of the use of the word whether we are to consider it as having passed through a stage, between its meaning 'captive' and its meaning 'wicked,' of meaning miserable in general, or something like it; generalized from one form of misfortune to the whole, and then used euphemistically for moral offence: or whether its change of meaning depends upon another principle, which I will proceed to mention.

An expression of disapprobation of whatever kind involves in it two elements: one the actual disapprobation or dyslogism, the other the particular significance of the term in which it is conveyed. Now in an exclamation or angry address, or account given under excited feeling, the dyslogistic element in the consciousness very far exceeds that of the particular significance. So much so, that words of very widely removed signification become under these circumstances convertible, the particular signification going almost for nothing. And where the feeling is strongly excited, there is no doubt that the attribution of misfortune is considered to convey something of disgrace: one man calls another by a string of appellations, one perhaps implying misfortune, the next moral offence, the next lowness of condition, and so on: and all these mean to him, in his actual use of them, not far from the same, for the one feeling in his mind is of depreciation and disapprobation, which swamps all the rest. So that there is a strong tendency, when a language is at all in a fluid state, for depreciatory terms in it to become to a certain extent interconvertible.

This is the real manner in which words like *lewdness*, *villany*, &c. have come to signify moral inferiority or offence: and

of course in this there is something to bear out Mr Trench in saying, e.g. as he does in relation to the former of these words: 'How forcibly are we reminded here of that saying of the Pharisees of old, "this people which knoweth not the law is cursed¹."'

But I think he should have considered that if he had reasoned about the word 'lewd' as he has about the word 'caitiff,' he would have put himself rather in the position of these Pharisees. And I scarcely find that Mr Trench gives any principle, upon which in the case of the many words of this kind, we are to reason in one or the other manner. Take *villain*: are we to conclude from it, after the analogy of caitiff, that agricultural labour depresses the moral character, or after the analogy of lewd, that there is too much, in the upper classes, of a supercilious and Pharisaic spirit? It is clear, that in concluding in the manner in which Mr Trench does, it is not *bond fide* from the words themselves and their history that we learn, and I think also it is clear that we *cannot*. If we could find principles upon which we could make our inferences, and similarly in all similar cases, then perhaps we might learn: otherwise, the observation of the history of the words merely supplies illustration of what we know independently of it. And this is important to observe, because there is some danger, lest less instructed readers of books, like Mr Trench's, might take the conclusions for more than this. As it is, except they are made upon regular principles, which must be in effect well understood laws of language, they add no fresh strength to any moral knowledge which we may have, and can prove nothing about it. If any who read Mr Trench's books feel more persuaded than they were before, either that slaves are likely to be mean, or the higher classes to be supercilious, from the history of caitiff and lewd, except so far as we are concluding in virtue of some rule which will bear application to every analogous case, I think they are so far in error.

This may be further illustrated from what Mr Trench says about 'happiness'. It is remarkable, doubtless, that the word

¹ *Study of Words*, p. 13.

expressing all that we most wish for, and the highest idea we can form of continued enjoyment, should in so many languages be similar in dianoematism, involving in some way or other the notion of chance. Now from what I have said, it will be understood that I do not enter into the *sort* of disapprobation which Mr Trench expresses, when he says, "How unworthy is this word to express any true felicity, of which the very essence is that it excludes hap or chance, that the world neither gave nor can take it away¹." I am delighted when the course of usage is to exalt inadequate dianoematism into something, in meaning and usage, noble, rather than, as we have seen is sometimes the case, to depress worthy dianoematism into the expression of something unworthy. But in this case I cannot consider the dianoematism unworthy. *Εὐδαιμονία* may be better than happiness, but either is better than that which is what they are both specially opposed to, the notion, viz. that we can make our happiness for ourselves. Better have fortune for our god than be each his own. This feeling of our insufficiency for happiness to ourselves I believe to be the real point of this various but similar dianoematism: happiness, after all that we can do, is something which comes to us, and for which we are dependent.

¹ *Study of Words*, p. 52.

To be continued.

ON THE WORD ΚΡΟΥΝΟΧΥΤΡΟΛΗΡΑΙΟΣ IN THE
EQUITES OF ARISTOPHANES, v. 89.

ΟΙΚΕΤΗΣ Β.

πῶς δ' ἂν μεθύων χρηστόν τι βουλεύσαιτ' ἀνὴρ;

ΟΙΚΕΤΗΣ Α.

ἄληθες οὗτος; κρουνοχυτροληραῖος εἶ.

The following communication, received from a former fellow of Trinity, Mr Douglas Denon Heath, seems to me to throw a new light on the epithet *κρουνοχυτροληραῖος* (in every MS. but one *κρουνοχυτροληραῖον*—corrected by Dobree). Mr Heath, it will be seen, puts Nicias and Demosthenes in the place they occupied in the older editions, but this does not affect the soundness of his view.

“In Aristophanes, when Nicias demurs to Demosthenes’s suggestion of strong potations, as the fit preparative for good counsel, the latter exclaims *κρουνοχυτροληραῖος εἶ*, which Liddell and Scott render by ‘a pourer-forth of weak washy twaddle, with collateral notion of a water-drinker.’ I think I saw at one of the public fountains of Reggio (Rhegium) the sort of man the poet had in his eye; and it seemed to me that a more appropriate and definite as well as more picturesque sense could be given to the passage.

“The fountain comprised four or five spouts (comp. *ἐννεά-κρουνος*), and there was, for a good hour, while I was pacing the road by the harbour, waiting for a steamer, a continuous succession of girls and old women filling waterpots and carrying them off on their heads, while abundance of gossip and joking was going on. In the crowd was a man who made it his business to amuse the ladies, young and old, by jokes and

grotesque tricks, as by lifting up a water-pot full of water, and in a manner simulating drunkenness pouring the water down his throat from a distance of a foot or so above his head.

“I conceive this individual to be a ‘representative character.’ It is likely that in Greece as in Italy, some such buffoon would frequently choose such place of resort for exhibiting his powers and accomplishments, and I accordingly understand Demosthenes to mean, ‘If you do not acknowledge the virtues of good wine as clearing the intellect for counsel, you are fit only to entertain children and old women at a public fountain among the water-pots.’”

D. D. H.

Aristophanic scholars will, if I mistake not, adopt this suggestion of Mr Heath’s, in preference to Meineke’s confident emendation—(-ληναῖος for -ληραῖος). The word is not more a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον than κεχνηαῖος which occurs later in the play, nor is there any formal objection to ληραῖος as a derivative of λῆρος.

While on the subject of Aristophanes, let me call attention to two or three difficulties in the received text of the Nubes, which Dindorf, in his last edition of the Poetae Scenici, seems to me to have failed to remove.

Nubes 463.

ἀρά γε τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐγὼ ποτ’

ὄψομαι ὥστε γε σοῦ πολλοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις ἀεὶ καθῆσθαι.

So Dind. after Meineke.

How is it that no Editor has adopted the better reading from Suidas, approved by Porson, ἀρά γε τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐγὼ ποτ’ ἐπόψομαι?

ἐπόψομαι is clearly the right word. ‘Shall I ever *live to see* this, I wonder?’ and if put at the end of the former instead of the beginning of the second line, the metre is helped as well as the sense.

Ibid. 489. ΣΩ. ἄγε νῦν ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβάλωμαι σοφὸν
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, εὐθέως ὑφαρπάσει.

It is strange that Dind. should have restored a reading corrected by Hirsch. and others. Gorgias is not said to have cried

to his audience προβάλλεσθε but προβάλλετε, and the middle is here a clear solecism. Read προβάλω σοι with Hirsch., not προβάλλω σοι with Meineke.

v. 1047. ἐπίσχε· εὐθὺς γάρ σε μέσον ἔχω λαβὼν ἄφυκτον.

So all the Edd., and if ἄφυκτον can be supposed the epithet of a suppressed λαβήν, perhaps rightly. But this seems harsh, and I should prefer to read ἔχω, λαβήν ἄφυκτον. Compare Dionys. Hal. de Demosth. § 18 τοῖς ἀθληταῖς προσεῖναι δεῖ ἀφύκτους τὰς λαβάς. The ordinary interpretation connects ἄφυκτον with σέ, in the unprecedented sense "ita ut nequeas effugere."

v. 1472. οὐκ ἐξελήλακ' ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοῦτ' ὥομην
διὰ τουτονὶ τὸν Δῖνον. ὦ μοι δείλαιος
[ὅτε καὶ σε χυτρεοῦν ὄντα θεὸν ἡγησάμην.]

So Dind., and this is better than Meineke's διὰ τουτουί. But much is to be said for Bentley's brilliant emendation

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τότ' ὥομην
Δία τουτονὶ τὸν δῖνον,

to which the possibly spurious third line is by no means necessary, though I think it highly probable that a χυτρεοῦς δῖνος stood in the street before Socrates' house by way of ἀγυιεύς (not "in the phrontistery"—as the Scholiast thinks—for Pheidipides and his father are outside of that abode). In this I can see no absurdity, but a quaint piece of drollery.

W. H. THOMPSON.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN GREEK SYNTAX¹.

MORE than thirteen years ago I called attention to some serious difficulties which seemed to me to beset the common theories of conditional sentences in Greek syntax, difficulties which extended in a less degree to Latin and even to English syntax. As the remedy then proposed was a radical one, involving the abandonment of many generally accepted doctrines, as well as a reconstruction of the classification in its most important parts, it cannot be amiss to review the whole question in the light of later experience, that we may determine, if possible, what system of classification best represents the present state of grammatical science. It is to be hoped that very few scholars, if any, still hold to the antiquated notion that grammar is not a progressive science, and that all its important principles have been handed down to us from some infallible authority in past generations. Such a doctrine would bring upon classical studies most deservedly the reproach which some popular writers ignorantly cast upon them, that of remaining stationary and refusing to recognize new truth and to be governed by scientific principles in a scientific age. Until the generation has passed away which can remember Porson's controversy with Hermann about the common rules of iambic verse, surely no one can be charged with impertinence for suggesting doubts as to the correctness of any generally accepted principle in Greek or Latin grammar.

The question which goes to the root of the whole discussion of conditional sentences is one which every schoolboy is taught

¹ The substance of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association in July, 1873.

to answer at a very early stage in his classical studies,—What is the essential force of the Greek subjunctive in protasis as opposed to the simple indicative, e.g. of *ἐὰν πράσῃ τοῦτο* as opposed to *εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο*? The various answers to this elementary question exhibit in the strongest light the vagueness and looseness of much of the common reasoning on the whole subject. Most grammarians agree in assigning to the subjunctive the idea of “possibility” with various modifications. The definitions “possibility with prospect of decision,”—“objective possibility,”—“what is possible now or in the future,”—“bedingte Möglichkeit,”—“eine Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit,” &c. are familiar to all scholars, and most of us have probably learnt and repeated one or more of them in the belief that they really contained the essence of the subjunctive in protasis. But what mind accustomed to the exactness of modern scientific definitions can rest satisfied with any such vague formula, when it professes to include two such dissimilar expressions as *ἐὰν ἔλθῃ, τοῦτο ποιήσω* and *ἣν ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται θνήσκειν*? A pupil who has brought his mind to accept such definitions, in a science which professes above all things to teach exactness of thought and expression, cannot be very strongly impressed with the boasted accuracy of Greek in expressing nice distinctions. It surely cannot require much reflection to see that, whether “possibility” or “tendency to reality” is, or is not, an essential part of these two expressions, there is a great deal involved in both of them which no one of the common definitions attempts to touch. All omission of the important matter of time, or the introduction of it by “now or hereafter,” is, to say the least, a marked defect. An enquiring mind might perhaps notice that *ἐὰν τοῦτο πράσῃ* sometimes means *if he shall do this*, and sometimes *if he ever does this*; but that in the former case it is essentially equivalent to *εἰ τοῦτο πράξει* (at least in respect to time), and would be regularly expressed in Latin by *si hoc faciet*; whereas in the latter it has no resemblance in meaning to *εἰ τοῦτο πράξει* or *si hoc faciet*, but would be commonly expressed in Latin by *si hoc facit*, occasionally even in Greek taking the form *εἰ τοῦτο πράσσει*.

The idea of “possibility” or something of the kind being

attached to the subjunctive, it was naturally supposed that the simple indicative¹ in protasis must have a corresponding idea at its foundation, and that of "certainty" or "reality" has generally been assigned to it. Some of the best grammarians (as Krüger) have avoided this rock, and have seen that no such idea is implied when we use the indicative in protasis, which can express the condition *if all men are liars* as well as the condition *if truth is eternal*. But this gain is more than balanced by the increased vagueness in the idea of "possibility," which now stands attached to the subjunctive with no corresponding "idea" in the indicative to contrast it with. If every condition that is "objectively possible," or "possible now or in the future," or "possible with a prospect of decision," or "uncertain with a prospect of decision," requires the subjunctive,—and what else is to be inferred from the rules?—in what cases is a pupil to be taught to use the indicative? How is he to know that he *must* use the indicative, and not the subjunctive, to express, for example, *if the enemy already knows our plans (which time will show), he is well prepared*? To take an actual case,—one which time has somewhat illustrated,—in a review of Farrar's Greek Syntax in the North American Review in 1868, I said that the condition *if Livingstone is now living* (or, if that is preferred, *be now living*) could be expressed in Greek or Latin only by the present indicative; and yet this was then a most striking example of "possibility (or "uncertainty") with prospect of decision." Now was there any view of the possibility or impossibility, certainty or uncertainty of Livingstone's safety at that time, which would have justified any one in using the subjunctive to express this condition? Would the indicative be any more correct, or the subjunctive any less a blunder, now (July, 1873) than when almost every one despaired of the great traveller's safety? And yet what schoolboy, if he had followed the common rules in his grammar, would have used anything but the subjunctive? If now any grammarian has subtlety enough to explain away this difficulty (which is fairly

¹ The expression "simple indicative" is meant to include all indicatives in protasis except the past tenses

implying non-fulfilment of the condition.

stated as it once actually occurred in my own experience), it must be done by refining "possibility" to an abstraction which will be entirely beyond the reach of schoolboys, and utterly ridiculous as an explanation of one of the most common forms of Greek syntax.

Probably no grammarian would now maintain the absurdity that the indicative in protasis expresses either *certainty in fact* or *what is believed by the speaker to be certain*. Here, however, has always been a fine field for grammatical logic. Few have the courage to take the bull by the horns as Jelf does, when he tells us (Grammar, § 853) that a speaker or writer sometimes suppresses his real opinion for politeness' (!) or for argument's sake, adding that it will generally be found that the protasis and apodosis *taken together* express his true opinion,—apparently forgetting that when "the protasis and apodosis taken together," i.e. the whole statement, does not express the speaker's real opinion, either in Greek or in English, it is a case of lying, not of false syntax! Most grammarians are eager to disclaim any connection between the "certainty" here intended and matter of fact or even of opinion; and they thus reduce the "certainty" to a harmless abstraction, which is utterly valueless as a definition. Thus Zumpt (Latin Gram. § 517, note) explains, with regard to the Latin indicative in protasis, that what is *assumed* as certain with respect to the inference (*in Bezug auf die Folgerung*) need not *be* certain either in fact or in the speaker's belief. In all this I can see nothing more than is necessarily involved in the very idea of a "supposition:" we *suppose* or *assume* something as happening, or some state of things as existing, in the past, the present, or the future; and we then state a result or conclusion which followed, follows, will follow, or would follow from the realization of the supposition or assumption. If this is all that is meant, it is hard to see why even suppositions implying non-fulfilment of the condition need be excluded from those which "assume something as certain (or "real") with respect to the inference:" when we say *if Philip had died, we should have remained free*, we suppose or assume something to have happened (although we imply that it did not happen) with a view to a result or

conclusion which we are about to state. What is there in the least more absurd in this than in applying Zumpt's principle to εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλυσμαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων (PLAT. Phaedr. 228 A)? Zumpt would include examples like *si naturam sequemur ducem, nunquam aberrabimus* under the same principle of "certainty" with *si vales, bene est*; but a Greek writer would naturally express the former protasis by the subjunctive, the latter by the present indicative.

The idea of "certainty" then must be deprived of its most characteristic attributes before it can apply to every present indicative in protasis; the same process is necessary before the idea of "possibility" can apply to every subjunctive in protasis. It is perhaps true, in one sense, that when we "suppose" a future event we assume its possibility; for how otherwise can we consistently suppose it to take place? For example, if we translate into Greek *if the sky falls, we shall catch larks*, we must use εἰ and the subjunctive; and it might edify some teachers to hear a docile pupil explain such a subjunctive as used to express "possibility with a prospect of decision." So far at least must the meaning of "possible" be extended: it thus becomes equivalent to "supposable."

What then is the distinction between the subjunctive and the indicative in protasis? I have not criticised the common distinction with a view to proposing another of a similar nature, but to justify myself in maintaining the position which I assumed with great hesitation thirteen years ago, that no distinction of this character was ever present to the mind of a Greek. I have nothing now to change in the statement which I made in 1864¹, although I am aware that it has been looked upon by many whose names I most highly respect as containing "dangerous heresies." "In one point all these authorities agree,—in looking for some principle on which the use of the subjunctive depends, to be found either in the nature of the act supposed or in the manner in which the speaker conceives it. This, it seems to me, is the rock on which they have all split. After the most careful study that I have been able to give to

¹ See Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for Dec. 6, 1864: Vol. vi. p. 367.

the subject, and especially after a comparison of several thousand classic examples, I am convinced that no such principle can be found. Every example that I have met with has only confirmed the opinion, which I can now express with the greatest confidence, that there is no inherent distinction between the present indicative and the present subjunctive in protasis (between *εἰ βούλεται* and *ἐὰν βούληται*) except that of *time*."

So far as the indicative is concerned, the inherent distinction of time is perfectly obvious; and if we had no other mood to consider, it would be plain that in both Greek and Latin we can express a supposition in any time by simply using the proper tense of the indicative. Thus we can express by the indicative *if he is doing*,—*if he did*,—*if he has done*,—*if he had done*,—*if he shall do*,—*if he shall have done*,—with no implied assumption of truth, certainty, uncertainty, possibility, or probability, and with no other distinctions than those which belong to the same tenses in any other kind of sentence. The trouble begins when we attempt to define the use of the Greek subjunctive. Here the whole difficulty—indeed, the whole supposed necessity for any definition at all except that of time—seems to me to arise from confounding two distinct uses of the subjunctive in protasis. In one of these the subjunctive always refers to future time, and hardly differs from the future indicative; in the other it expresses a shade of meaning which (so far as I know) no other language has ever undertaken to distinguish in its ordinary usage from that of the present indicative. Each of these has a use of the optative corresponding to it; and these optatives have generally been carefully distinguished by grammarians. No one now thinks of bringing under the same head (at least for practical use) such instances as *εἴ τις θορυβουμένους αἰσθοίτο, κατασβεννύναι τὴν ταραχὴν ἐπειρᾶτο* (XEN. Cyr. v. 3, 55) and *εἴ τις αἰσθοίτο, πειρῶτο ἂν*, &c., the difference in time here making that in construction too obvious to be mistaken. And yet there is just as important a difference between *ἐὰν τις αἰσθῇται, πειρᾶται*, *if he ever sees any, he (always) tries*, &c., and *ἐὰν τις αἰσθῇται, πειράσεται*, *if he shall see any, he will try*, &c.; although here the slighter distinction in time has caused that in the construction to be

overlooked. The neglect of this distinction, and the consequent attempt to unite both uses of the subjunctive under one "idea," have caused the whole difficulty. Where the cases to be accounted for were so dissimilar, the theory had to be loose and accommodating. If the Greek used its subjunctive in conditions of the latter class alone, it seems impossible that any one could overlook the simple truth, that εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο means *if he is doing this (now)*, and εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο means *if he shall do this*, the latter not differing, except in vividness of expression, from εἰ πράξει τοῦτο. In the other class (as εἰ τις αἰσθῆται, πειράται) the subjunctive clearly does not refer to the future, as is obvious if we try to substitute εἰ αἰσθήσεται in the protasis; neither does it refer to the present exactly, for there is a great difference between *if he is now perceiving* and *if he ever perceives*. This is a distinction which perhaps no language but the Greek ever expressed systematically by its construction, other languages generally contenting themselves by using the present indicative where the Greek uses this subjunctive, as they use the past tenses of the indicative for the corresponding optative. Such conditions, as they do not refer to a definite act or even to a definite series of acts, but *indefinitely* to *any one* of a series or class of acts, may be called "general conditions," *if* here having the force of *if ever* or *whenever*.

I cannot claim to have first called attention to the existence of these general conditions. As I have said, those referring to the past have been generally recognized; and at least one writer (Bäumlein) states that the Greek subjunctive in protasis is sometimes general in its nature. As I have been misunderstood on this point, I cannot state too distinctly here, that the chief peculiarity of the classification here proposed consists in showing (first) the close relation between the optative and the subjunctive in general conditions, and (secondly) the important result of this connection, viz. that, as the past general conditions expressed by the optative are a "variation" (so to speak) of the ordinary past conditions expressed by the indicative, so the quasi-present general conditions expressed by the subjunctive are a variation of the ordinary present conditions, which other languages (and sometimes even the Greek) express by the

present indicative. On the other hand, Bäumlein leaves the subjunctive in general conditions, as well as in other kinds of protasis, to be explained on his single principle as denoting a "Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit;" and he seems to have no suspicion that the two subjunctives stand in different relations to the present indicative. His remark therefore shows a sense of the weakness of his general theory, but does not help us to an understanding of the relation of the subjunctive to the indicative. A still more remarkable case of hesitation in stating a general definition of the force of the subjunctive is found in the new edition of Kühner's larger Grammar (§ 394), where he says that the subjunctive properly refers to future time, although sometimes in dependent clauses *it seems* to refer to present time, really, however, expressing only what is "assumed as present." It is almost needless to say, that the examples of this singular exception are found in the general conditional sentences above-mentioned. We must confess that, with all its looseness, Kühner's remark comes nearer a true definition of the subjunctive than any which omit the element of time altogether.

The distinction of general and particular suppositions is not confined to the two cases which have been discussed. It extends to all conditions in present, past, and future time; but as it affects the construction only in the cases in question, the others may be neglected in a classification which belongs to syntax alone. We need therefore set apart as a special class only the present and past general conditions above described, which the Greek so peculiarly expresses by the subjunctive and optative instead of merging them (as other languages generally do) with other present and past conditions which take the simple indicative. It will be borne in mind then that all the classes of "ordinary conditions" in the classification which follows, except the first, contain both particular and general suppositions, and even in the first the distinction is sometimes (though rarely) neglected¹. It seems to me that, when atten-

¹ I must here acknowledge and correct a former error. In the first edition of "Greek Moods and Tenses" (1860), the distinction of particular

and general suppositions was (in the classification) carried into future conditions, although no distinction in construction is there made; subsequently

tion has once been called to the true position of the subjunctive in present general conditions, it will need no further argument to show that its essential character in all other cases of protasis is its designation of *future time*; so that *ἐὰν τοῦτο γένηται* here must mean *if this shall happen*, and the subject may be *the sky falling*, or *to-morrow's sun rising*, or any other supposable event, whether possible or impossible. Any further definition would here seem superfluous.

The statement that *ἐὰν τοῦτο γένηται*, apart from present general conditions, always means *if this shall happen* may strike some with surprise, especially such as have been in the habit of drilling pupils in certain well-known "pattern" sentences, ingeniously written by modern grammarians to illustrate rules which (like the examples) are purely of their own invention. Thus *ἐάν τι ἔχω, δώσω* cannot possibly mean (as it seems expected to) *if I (now) have anything (which will hereafter be proved), I shall give it*; it is Greek only in the sense *if I shall (hereafter) have anything, I shall give it*. So *ἐὰν τοῦτο λέγῃς, ἀμαρτάνεις* can mean only *if you ever say this* (i.e. so often as you say this), *you err*; which is not at all what boys are expected to understand by it when they see it tortured into bad Latin *si hoc dicas, erras*, and into unintelligible English *if you say this, you err*, all the time innocently imagining it was written by some Greek and will teach them to imitate Demosthenes and Plato! If the discussion is confined to the writings of classic authors, no. examples of *ἐάν* with the subjunctive will be found which do not belong clearly to one or the other of the two classes above explained; and every scholar

(1865) this arrangement was given up as cumbrous, and it was stated in a note that general future conditions were included under the rules for particular future conditions. I am under great obligations to Dr B. L. Gildersleeve, Professor in the University of Virginia, for valuable criticisms on this arrangement; from these, and from a note in the latest edition of his *Latin Grammar* (under Conditional Sentences), it is evident that there is

no logical propriety in excluding the distinction in question even from the class (I. a, 2) of present and past conditions implying non-fulfilment. It has therefore seemed better to make a special class (II.) of present and past general conditions, to be treated as a variation of class (I. a, 1), and then to treat all other conditions (both particular and general) under the head of "Four Forms of Ordinary Conditional Sentences."

should enter an earnest protest against the common practice of instructing pupils by means of sentences which have been made to suit modern theories, and which conceal from view or violate the real principles involved in classic constructions. I do not quote classic examples here in support of my own theory, partly because I have done this elsewhere, and partly because I wish to ask any one who needs such confirmation to simply turn to any piece of classic Greek which contains conditional sentences and test the question by examples of his own choice.

The relation of the subjunctive to the optative in protasis remains to be considered. The most common doctrine is that the subjunctive implies "possibility with prospect of decision," the optative "possibility without prospect of decision." There is also a general opinion that the optative implies less probability or more uncertainty than the subjunctive. I confess, this question is by no means as simple as the former; and in first proposing the classification here advocated in 1860, I accepted the former of these distinctions in a modified form. But later consideration has made me more and more doubtful whether any such distinction ever occurred to the mind of a Greek. When the optative in past general suppositions is excluded, it is evident that the optative in ordinary protasis refers to the future. This important character of this optative is seldom made prominent by grammarians. But how does this futurity differ from that expressed by the subjunctive? Fortunately, we have the same distinction in English; for I cannot think any one will seriously doubt that, whatever difference was felt in Greek between *ἐὰν τοῦτο γένηται* and *εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο*, in the cases in question, is still felt in English between *if this shall happen* (or *if this happens*, in a future sense) and *if this should happen*. If this is granted, we may simply say that, wherever we should use the latter form in English, the optative would be used in Greek; and wherever we should use the former, the subjunctive or future indicative would be the natural Greek form. Now if any one is distinctly conscious of always implying greater "probability" or more "prospect of decision" when he says *if this happens* (or *shall*

happen) than when he says *if this should happen*, it will be hard to convince him that the Greek did not make the same distinction; and it may be that he has unconsciously conformed his own usage in English to what he assumes to be the correct usage in Greek. I doubt exceedingly whether any one who never studied Greek (if such a person could be a competent judge of modal forms in any language) would explain the English usage in this way; indeed, it is one of the hardest things in the world to state exactly the distinction which is felt between two such similar forms,—for which reason it is extremely easy to imagine it to be one of those in question or almost any other impalpable distinction that may be suggested. Every one will admit that it is often indifferent which of the two forms is used; and in such cases it is sometimes hard to attach the formula required by the common rules to each form of protasis. Does the proverb “If the sky falls, we shall catch larks” imply any greater “prospect of decision” than it would in the form “If the sky should fall, we should catch larks”? Did Demosthenes (Phil. i. p. 43, § 11) imply that there was any nearer prospect of decision on the question of Philip’s death when he referred to it in the words *ἀν οὗτός τι πάθῃ*, than when he repeated his supposition in the very next sentence in the form *εἴ τι πάθῃ*? Is not the *essential* distinction here merely one of vividness of expression or distinctness in the form of the supposition, entirely apart from any difference of the speaker’s opinion on any subject? If this is admitted for English, the burden of proof surely rests on him who maintains (as too many do, at least in practice) that the ancients had entirely different modes of thought from ourselves, and that what seems plain common sense in English may involve metaphysical subtleties in Greek: If this view is correct, the optative in ordinary protasis is merely a vaguer or less vivid form than the subjunctive for stating a future supposition, bearing a relation to the subjunctive somewhat similar to that which the subjunctive itself bears to the future indicative. Thus we have three forms which may be used to express a future condition, differing essentially only in the vividness with which they state the supposition,—*εἰ γενήσεται*, *if it shall*

happen; *ἐὰν γένηται*, if it happens (i.e. shall happen); and *εἰ γένοιτο*, if it should happen.

I am far from denying that, when the subjunctive and optative are brought into contrast in successive sentences, the subjunctive may be used in the supposition which the speaker regards as the more probable, the more likely to be fulfilled, the more dangerous, or which is for any other reason the more prominent in his mind. These distinctions, however, seem to me to stand to the more comprehensive one of greater and less vividness in the relation (if I may be allowed the expression) of species to a genus. If a speaker has at his command two forms for expressing substantially the same kind of supposition, one of which is more vivid than the other, he will naturally choose the former for a supposition which he wishes to contrast with another in any of the respects above mentioned. For this reason the future indicative may be used to express a more prominent supposition more vividly, and the subjunctive to express a less prominent one less vividly. Neither the future indicative nor the subjunctive nor the optative expresses any *absolute* amount of vividness or probability; it is only by contrast that these qualities sometimes appear *relatively*. In DEM. Cor. pp. 286, 287, § 176, we find *εἰ προαιρησόμεθα* in a supposition which the orator wishes to make especially vivid that he may warn his hearers against the consequences of the fulfilment of the condition; still, it is a condition which he hopes and prays may never be fulfilled, and which in fact never was fulfilled. In the next sentence he uses *ἂν πεισθῇτ' ἐμοί* to express what he hopes will happen and what does actually happen; but as he reserves the substance of his plan for the next sentence, the weaker form here would seem to give greater prominence to the warning of the previous clause. This, however, is dangerous speculation; for there can be little doubt that the two forms were sometimes used when it is next to impossible that any deliberate plan could have affected the choice. Thus, when Isocrates (Archid. p. 138 A.) says, *ἤν ἐθέλωμεν ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, εὐδοκιμήσομεν· εἰ δὲ φοβησόμεθα τοὺς κινδύνους, εἰς πολλὰς ταραχὰς καταστήσομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς*, it seems absurd to refine on the possible reasons

for using the moods as he does rather than in the inverse order. All we can say with certainty is, that the Greek language had this variety of forms, which *could* be used to express nice distinctions of thought, just as it had the distinction of the present and aorist subjunctive and others of the same nature; but it by no means follows that the Greeks *always* used their finest tools.

This not uncommon use of the future indicative and the subjunctive in successive conditions serves to illustrate the much rarer use of the subjunctive and optative in antithesis. The two favourite examples of the latter are in DEM. Cor. p. 276, §§ 147, 148; where it is said that the two optatives εἰ συμπεῖθαι and εἰ εἰσηγοῖτο introduce "the more improbable alternative" and "the condition which did not happen," as opposed to εἰάν αἶρεθῇ and ἂν ᾗ, which state "the very condition which was actually fulfilled," &c. (Holmes.) All this is very true. But it will be noticed that the two optatives belong to conditional sentences depending on past tenses in oratio obliqua, and *for this reason alone* are in the optative; in the direct form in the speaker's mind all four conditions would have the subjunctive, and after a present or future tense the subjunctive *must* have been retained in all alike. After a past tense, where the option between the original forms and the same tenses of the optative was allowed, the orator twice chooses the more vivid form, that in which the idea was originally conceived, to express what (he implies) Philip had most at heart, and the optative to express the opposite alternative. I cannot believe that there would have been any difference in the use of the moods here if Philip's plan had failed, for there would still have been the same ground for distinguishing the two sets of conditions in respect to vividness. This example suggests and illustrates the remark to which the preceding argument has been tending, that the subjunctive and optative in common protasis may be said to differ very much (if not precisely) as they do in the dependent clauses of oratio obliqua after past tenses. The comments which I have quoted on the passage of Demosthenes show a feeling that this is so. It will be generally admitted that the direct form εἰάν ἔλθω, τοῦτο ποιήσω can be

expressed indirectly either by ἔφη εἰ ἐλθῇ τοῦτο ποιήσειν or by ἔφη εἰ ἐλθοι τοῦτο ποιήσειν, with no essential difference of meaning, the former being the less common but more vivid form. What now could be more natural than that εἰ ἐλθῇ and εἰ ἐλθοι should differ here very much as they would differ in any other kind of sentence? The same principle, I believe most firmly, holds in all similar cases in which option is allowed between the subjunctive and optative or between the indicative and optative, in constructions which partake of the nature of oratio obliqua. No other principle accounts satisfactorily for the frequent use of the subjunctive in final clauses after past tenses in the same sense as the optative, a usage familiar to all readers of Thucydides, and often explained in the most wonderful manner by commentators on particular passages. No one can try to apply the common rule that the subjunctive "brings the action of its verb down to the present time" to ten passages in succession without seeing its utter absurdity. As all final clauses express the thought of the one who conceived the purpose, they are so far affected by the principles of oratio obliqua that they allow, after past tenses, either the original subjunctive or the same tense of the optative, the former being the rarer but more vivid form of expression.

All forms of conditions have now been considered except those of present and past time which imply non-fulfilment. These are too familiar to need comment: one caution, however, is sometimes necessary against our old enemy "possibility." This construction implies merely that the condition *is not* or *was not fulfilled*; the supposition of the protasis, however, may be a *possible* one or an *impossible* one, according to circumstances. There is no more impossibility implied when we say *if twice three were seven* than when we say *if twice three are seven*, unless no more is meant by impossibility than is already involved in the non-fulfilment of the condition,—in which case the addition is superfluous. This confusion is especially to be avoided in defining the forms of wishes, which are conditional sentences without the apodosis. Wishes are often divided into "possible," expressed by the optative, and "impossible," expressed by the indicative; as if the wish *O that our friends*

were here! were “impossible” except from the present being beyond the chance of change, or as if *O that the heavens would fall!* were “possible” except from the future being open to unlimited possibilities. It is clear that here, as in protasis, time is an essential matter in both classes, and possibility need not be considered.

To sum up the results of this discussion in a tabular form, we have

I. Four forms of Ordinary Conditional Sentences, two with present and past, two with future conditions.

(a.) 1. Present and past (particular) conditions implying nothing as to fulfilment. Indicative with *εἰ* in protasis: any verbal form in apodosis. *Εἰ πράσσει τοῦτο, καλῶς ἔχει, if he is doing this, it is well.*

2. Present and past conditions implying non-fulfilment. Past tenses of indicative with *εἰ* in protasis: same with *ἄν* in apodosis. *Εἰ ἔπρασσε (ἔπραξε) τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν (ἔσχεν), if he were doing (had done) this, it would be (would have been) well.*

(b.) 1. Future conditions (more vivid form). Subjunctive with *εἰάν* (sometimes future indicative with *εἰ*) in protasis: future indicative or some other future form in apodosis. *Ἐάν πράσῃ τοῦτο (εἰ πράξει τοῦτο), καλῶς ἔξει, if he shall do this, it will be well.*

2. Future conditions (less vivid form). Optative with *εἰ* in protasis: optative with *ἄν* in apodosis. *Εἰ πράσσοι τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι, if he should do this, it would be well.*

II. Two forms of General Conditional Sentences, one present and one past,—the apodosis expressing a customary or repeated action or a general truth.

(a.) Present general conditions after verbs of present time: subjunctive with *εἰάν* in protasis. *Ἐάν τις τοῦτο πράσῃ, καλῶς ἔχει, if any one (ever) does this, it is (always) well.*

(b.) Past general conditions after verbs of past time: optative with *εἰ* in protasis. *Εἴ τις τοῦτο πράσσοι, καλῶς εἶχεν, if any one (ever) did this, it was (always) well.*

N.B. The last two forms are variations of I. (a.) 1, and are the only forms of general conditions which are distinguished by the construction. All others, therefore, are included in the last three forms of ordinary conditional sentences, (a.) 2, and (b.) 1 and 2.

The discussion in this paper has been confined to general principles, and all such matters as the use of *εἰ* for *ἐάν* with the subjunctive, the omission of *ἄν* in the apodosis, as well as all the combinations of one form of protasis with another form of apodosis, have been excluded. It is important, however, to notice the exact correspondence between the forms of protasis and those of conditional relative sentences, which becomes clear, as it seems to me, only when the present classification is adopted. It will be sufficient to give examples under the proper numbers.

I. (a.) 1. "Ο τι ἔχει, δώσει, *he will give whatever he (now) has.* "Α μὴ οἶδα, οὐδ' οἶμαι εἰδέναι. PLAT. Apol. 21 D.

2. "Ο τι ἔσχεν, ἔδωκεν ἄν, *he would have given anything that he had* (implying that he had nothing, like *εἴ τι ἔσχεν*). Οὐκ ἂν ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἂ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα. PLAT. Charm. 171 E.

(b.) 1. "Ο τι ἂν ἔχῃ, δώσει, *he will give whatever he has (i.e. shall have).* "Οταν δὴ μὴ σθένω, πεπαύσομαι, *when I shall have no strength, &c.* SOPH. Antig. 91.

2. "Ο τι ἔχοι, δοίῃ ἄν, *he would give whatever he might have* (commonly, *whatever he had*). Φάγοι ἂν ὅποτε βούλοιτο, *he would eat whenever he pleased.* XEN. Mem. II. 1. 18.

II. (a.) "Ο τι ἂν ἔχῃ, δίδωσι, *he (always) gives whatever he has*¹. Συμμαχεῖν τούτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἅπαντες, οὓς ἂν ὁρῶσι παρεσκευασμένους. DEM. Phil. I. p. 42, § 6.

¹ Here we sometimes find the indicative, especially with *ὅστις*, that pronoun expressing the indefiniteness of the general condition sufficiently without the help of the verb. See SOPH. Antig. 178 (*ὅστις μὴ ἄπτεται*), and com-

pare Odyss. xiv. 157 with II. ix. 313. So sometimes in the past form. This neglect to mark the general condition by the form of the verb occurs sometimes in common conditional sentences. See SOPH. Trach. 944.

(b.) "Ο τι ἔχοι, ἐδίδου, *he (always) gave whatever he had.*
Οὗς ἴδοι εὐτάκτως ἰόντας, τίνες τε εἰεν ἡρώτα, καὶ ἐπεὶ πίθοιτο
ἐπήνει. XEN. Cyr. v. 3. 55.

In conclusion, I add a few remarks on the English subjunctive in protasis, although I am well aware of my inability to deal properly with this subject. The English of our time, especially the spoken language, generally makes no distinction between present and future time in protasis, using *if he does this* to express all the various meanings which the Greek expresses by εἰ τοῦτο πράσσει (in one sense), εἰ πράξει, and εἰὰν πράσῃ (or πράξῃ), and the Latin by *si facit* and *si faciet* (or *fecerit*). Some of our American Solons, among others those of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, have recently abolished the subjunctive as well as the future indicative in protasis, so far as they can, by expunging both from the statute-books; so that some of our laws have "Whoever steals," "If a clerk embezzles," &c., instead of the time-honoured forms, "Whoever shall steal," "If a clerk shall embezzle" or "If a clerk embezzle." In the Massachusetts riot-act we now find, "If any persons..... *are* unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously assembled in any city or town," &c. In Athens at least a law thus expressed would have been worthless against any rioters who werē not already assembled when the law was passed. Still there is no doubt that this is the common English form, authorized by modern usage; although it is to be regretted that our language should lose its power of expressing nice distinctions of thought,—a power which especially distinguishes the ancient languages, and the Greek pre-eminently, from the modern. For example, the English sentence, *he said that, if they should pass this vote, the State would be saved*, could be expressed in Greek in sixteen or more distinct forms, each depending on some delicate shade of meaning, or some degree of vividness or emphasis, which no modern language would attempt to express, the changes being confined to the last two verbs. It is one mark of the degeneracy of the modern Greek that it has lost the ancient distinction between the subjunctive and the indicative; γράφει and γράφῃ, not being distinguished in pronunciation, have now lost their distinctive

force to the mass of the people. The scholars in Greece are doing their best to revive this, as well as other distinctions of the ancient language of their country, by observing the proper spelling in the written language: it would seem as if our tendency were rather to abolish whatever distinction of the kind has been left to us, and to make our present indicative do the work of both present and future.

Still the English has a subjunctive, which is distinguished from the indicative in most verbs only in the third person singular; and it is still in good use, although it is to be feared that the levelling power of custom will soon obliterate it entirely. But on what principle do modern writers use the English subjunctive after *if*? I think that many writers would admit that they use it without thinking of any special distinction between *if it be* and *if it is*; while others are influenced by the supposed distinction between the corresponding classic forms, *if it be* being used where doubt is to be expressed, *if it is* where the writer believes his supposition is correct. How far such a distinction in English is now authorized by usage I will not pretend to say; it has been one of the chief objects of this paper to show that no such distinction is found in either Greek or Latin.

If we look at the English translation of the Bible, which represents the language when the subjunctive was in full use, we find the Greek subjunctive in the New Testament invariably translated by the subjunctive or the future (except where it is expressed by a participle), never by the present indicative. But this investigation proves too much; for the same translation is equally consistent in expressing the Greek present indicative by the English subjunctive. Thus “if it fall,”—“if any man shall say unto you,”—“if a house be divided,”—“if any man say unto you,”—“if thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him, and if he repent, forgive him,”—“if another shall come,”—are translated from *ἐὰν ἐμπέσῃ*,—*ἐάν τις εἴπῃ*,—*ἐὰν οἰκία μερισθῇ*,—*ἐάν τις εἴπῃ*,—*ἐὰν ἀμάρτη ὁ ἀδελφός σου*, *καὶ ἐὰν μετανοήσῃ*,—*ἐὰν ἄλλος ἔλθῃ*. But we also find, “if the light that is in thee be darkness,” *εἰ τὸ φῶς σκότος ἐστίν*,—“if Satan cast out Satan,” *εἰ ἐκβάλλει*,—“if he be Christ,” *εἰ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός*—“if David call him Lord,” *εἰ καλεῖ*,—“if any man have not the spirit of

Christ," *εἴ τις πνεῦμα οὐκ ἔχει*. It is plain that no principle as to the distinction of the subjunctive and indicative can be derived from this source; and yet here, if anywhere, the Greek distinction would have been followed if it had been recognized. But although no such forms as "if he does" or "if it is" are found in our Bible, it will be noticed that the form in *-est* and similar forms of the second person singular were allowed after *if*, as if these forms were looked upon as belonging to the subjunctive also. Thus (Matth. v. 23), "If thou *bring* thy gift to the altar, and there *rememberest*, &c." Compare (Exod. xx. 25) "And if thou *wilt* make me an altar, . . . for if thou *lift* up thy tool, &c." The form in *-eth* is very common in conditional relative sentences, where the future indicative is regularly used; thus, "whosoever *toucheth*,"—"whosoever *looketh*;"—but also, "whosoever *shall put away* his wife,"—"whosoever *shall marry*,"—"whoso *sheddeth* man's blood¹." We find as little help in the language of Shakespeare; thus we have in *Macbeth*, "If such a one be fit to govern, speak;" "If it be mine, keep it not from me;" "Let me endure your wrath if't be not so;" but just below the last example, "If this, which he avouches, does appear." In Bacon (*Maxims of the Law*, ix.) we find the following: "If I. S. *devise* land by the statute of 32 H. VIII., and the heir of the devisor *enters* and *makes* a feoffment in fee, and feoffee *dieth* seized, this descent bindeth." So, "If the land after *descend* to me, I shall never be remitted." Again (*Ibid.* xii.), "If a man *recovers* by erroneous judgment, and *hath* issue two daughters, and one of them *is* attainted, the writ of error shall be brought, &c." In turning over the pages of the *Spectator*, I find fifty instances of the present indicative after *if*, without meeting any of the subjunctive; this can hardly be accidental. The follow-

¹ In the Lord Chief Justice's charge in the Tichborne trial (170th day) are some excellent remarks on the accuracy of the French in saying "when he shall come," &c., where in English we say "when he comes," &c. The defect here noticed, however, is seen chiefly in modern English; for the English of the Bible is as accurate as French, and in some respects even more so. Thus

in 2 Cor. iii. 16, we have *when it shall turn*=*quand il se tournera*; see also 1 Cor. xv. 28; Luke xii. 10 *whosoever shall speak*=*quiconque parlera*; see also John xv. 16. But in John v. 43 (above quoted in Greek) we have *if another shall come*=*si un autre vient*, where the old English had the advantage; see also Luke xii. 38, xix. 31.

ing extract from Macaulay's Essay on *Church and State* will not disclose very plainly the principle which that writer followed: "If the propagation of religious truth *be* a principal end of government, as government; if it *be* the duty of a government to employ for that end its constitutional power; if the constitutional power of governments *extends, as it most unquestionably does*, to the making of laws for the burning of heretics; if burning *be, as it most assuredly is*, a most effectual mode of suppressing opinions, why should we not burn? If the relation in which government ought to stand to the people *be*, as Mr Gladstone tells us, a paternal relation, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that persecution is justifiable." Just below he says: "If a boy *plays* truant at church-time, a task is set him." Again, we find *if it be true* and *if experience shows*, both in the same paragraph. It might be thought that Macaulay was unwilling to use any other subjunctive than *be*, which indeed is the one that most frequently occurs in modern English. Mr Gladstone writes (*Studies on Homer*, i. p. 18), "If Homer *is* not fully studied in our Universities," and in the next page, "If my estimate of those purposes *be* correct." Again (p. 39), "If it *be* contended," and (p. 80) "If such there *has* been."

These instances are quoted here not by way of criticism, but partly to show the utter want of any principle in modern English on the subject, and partly to incite some one who can speak with authority on English syntax to investigate the question historically, and show us, if possible, what is the correct usage according to the traditions of the language. If it is true (or if it *be* true), as I fear it is, that no one can define the correct usage of the present day, even so far as to tell us what is the distinction recognized by our best writers between *if it be* and *if it is*, or if no two opinions on this question would agree, such uncertainty and such laxity of usage are surely no credit to our scholarship or to our language.

W. W. GOODWIN.

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PLATO, TIMÆUS, p. 40 c.

Γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἵλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, πρῶτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι. (See the Minor Works of George Grote, pp. 236—275.)

Mr Grote's opinion of this passage is so vigorously conceived and so clearly stated, that the reader finds it difficult to resist his argument. And yet, on returning to Plato and the Timæus, his interpretation is felt to be out of harmony, like a hard and definite substance wedged into a cloud. His view is briefly this, that in Plato's Timæus the Earth and Sky, together with the solid axle of the Universe, round the middle of which the Earth is "packed," are for purposes of motion to be regarded as a single rigid body, moving all together round the common axis. He remarks, at the same time, that the centre of the Earth is the original seat of the cosmic soul, from which it has been transfused through the Universe, and made to envelope it. And this is certainly true, whether or not we admit Mr Grote's inference, that the condition of immobility is inconsistent with such a position of the Earth, or with her being spoken of as the "artificer" of night and day.

But two objections occur to us at the outset.

1. "There is no principle so apparent in the physics of the Timæus, as that of continuity¹." But the continuity is not such a mechanical continuity as Mr Grote's interpretation implies. The "movement of the Same" pervades the whole universe,

¹ Jowett.

the "movement of the Other" gives an independent motion to the seven "planets." But there is no mechanical medium through which either motion is communicated from one of these bodies to another. The Sun, for instance, is not attached to the common axis. And if he were, from whence would he get his *diverse* (annual) motion? It is true that in the *Republic* we read of the spindle of Necessity, "through which all the revolutions move." But in this vision of Er, the spindle is not a natural spindle. For while the whole moves round, the several parts of it have also an independent motion, which is no more assisted or hindered by mechanical conditions than that of the tripods of Hephæstos who enter the divine concourse in Homer¹. The shaft, for instance, is said to be riveted through the eighth circle, and yet this has the swiftest retrograde motion. Again, in what mechanical sense can the spindle be said to be the medium of all the revolutions, direct and retrograde? (Observe, that this is said of the whole spindle, and not of the shaft only.)

2. Another objection of a general kind is that, instead of giving the earth greater dignity by making her move consensually with the axle and the sky, she is thus robbed of her independence. As a "governor" of the great machine, she becomes a mere adjunct of the solid axis, a mere incrustation on the central energizing soul. The revolution is provided for without her help—even if we grant that the axle was necessary for this, although the revolution embraces the sun, moon, and planets, who are *mechanically* not affected by the axis:—how then can such a mere extra burden be spoken of as the "artificer" of this diurnal motion?

3. It would seem as if Mr Grote were not free from the tendency which he blames in others, that of introducing modern physical conceptions into the interpretation of Plato's cosmogony². For while accusing him of a strange mechanical

¹ The inventor of perpetual motion who said "Arago is wrong, I want no motive power, my wheel moves of itself," recalls much of the spirit of early astronomy. See the passage of Proclus quoted by Mr Grote, *Minor*

Works, p. 247.

² Plato might have said of him, as Aristotle says of the Pythagoreans, οὐδὲν αὐτὸν δεῖ θορυβεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ πᾶν, —he might have left the Eternal revolution to take care of itself.

oversight, he attributes to his Cosmos a degree of mechanical coherence, which is not found there. The heavenly bodies move as they do, not because the axis of the sphere is rigid and is weighted with the Earth, but because the motions of the Same and of the Diverse are inherent in the Cosmic soul¹.

The following interpretation does not pretend to originality but is substantially the same with that of Plutarch quoted by Mr Grote². My object is to support it by the consideration of the words themselves, and to show that it is satisfactory "when all the points are taken together," which, as Mr Grote has rightly said, is the important thing.

1. No mention is made of the Earth in the earlier part of the *Timæus* in which all the heavenly motions are accounted for, nor is she represented in the "orrery" of *Rep. B. x.* Plato does not, as the Pythagoreans did, make the Earth one of the stars (*Ar. de Cælo*, cc. 13, 14). She is taken for granted as the point of observation. The first mention of her is in relation to the *ὄργανα χρόνου*, of which the Moon is said to be in the circle nearest to the Earth, and the Sun in the second from the Earth. Then it is said that a light was placed in this second circle "to shine unto the whole Heaven, and that those creatures to whom it belonged to partake of number might do so through learning from the revolution of the similar and same." The interpretation of this passage (p. 39 c) is of vital importance. For here or nowhere, Plato explains what he means by the making of day and night. Now from what do mortals learn to measure the diurnal motion? Not from observation of the fixed stars, but, as Plato clearly indicates, by the revolution of the Sun round the terrestrial globe. The Sun, like all the heavenly bodies, is included in the motion of the Same, and it is from his revolution that men first learn to measure that motion. It is true that he has also a diverse movement, which is referred to the "circle of the Other," in virtue of which he completes his orbit in the year. But the difference between the solar and sidereal day which this occasions is a later discovery, made by men long after they have learnt the elementary notions of

¹ See Note at the end of this paper.

² *Minor Works*, p. 269.

number and time. Indeed mankind would have been slower in observing the solar day, notwithstanding the brightness of the Sun, but for the difference, so striking to the senses, between day and night. For it is difference (see *Rep. B. VII.*) which first awakens the perception of number. Now this difference, so all important for the purpose in view, is directly caused by the Earth. So Empedocles had sung :

Νύκτα δὲ γαῖα τίθησιν ὑφισταμένη φαέσσιν.

The words that immediately follow (p. 39 c) may be thus paraphrased: "In this way" (viz. through the lighting of a fire in the orbit next but one to the Earth) "and for this purpose" (viz. that man might have perception of number) "day and night are made," (being in fact) "the revolution of the uniform and most intelligent motion" (that of the Same). These words are added to prepare the way for the description of the month and year. It is evident that the Earth here performs a very important function, in addition to that of nursing mankind, by co-operating with the Sun in producing the web of time, which may be figured and embroidered with the other units, but is in the first place woven, in the ordinary human consciousness, of nights and days. She weaves the warp, while he weaves the woof. She may be even said to create the difference without which Time would be, to sensible apprehension, one long indistinguishable day. As Plutarch has it, Earth is the gnomon of the great Sundial—but a gnomon that helps to make the time which it registers, for she makes the night.

Hitherto the Earth has been taken for granted, but in p. 40 c. the creation of Earth is spoken of, not in due course, but by the way, "because we partake so much of random accident," as was said about the Creation of the Soul (p. 34 E). According to the old tradition, which held that "In the beginning were the Heavens and the Earth," we are told the Earth is the oldest of the Gods within the Heaven, and her function is to be the guardian and artificer of night and day. She is the artificer in the manner we have seen. If he had said the weaver, *ὑφαντρίαν*, the same meaning would have been conveyed. "There she sits," sending forth her dark shuttle alternately with the bright one of the

Sun. To say that she must not be called *δημιουργός* unless she "does work" by revolving, is to fall into Mr Grote's *πρώτον ψεῖδος* of introducing conceptions belonging to modern dynamical science. And while Earth was a goddess, the nursing mother of men, the holy, swift-paced Night, the numberer of the stars, was something more than a nonentity. Especially when to have made night, was to have made perception of number possible, and when without night, the day could not have been as a measure of time. I take for granted that the words *φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας* belong to *γῆν*, and not (as grammatically they might) to *πόλον*, (1) because the Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle¹, made Earth the author of night and day, and this, according to Simplicius in his commentary on the passage, "by reason of her relation to the Sun," *κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον σχέσιν*: (2) because of the correlation of these words with p. 39 c: (3) because such an important function of the *πόλος* would hardly be mentioned in a parenthesis. With regard to the Pythagoreans, it should also be noticed by the way, though irrelevant to the present argument, that they spoke of a *φυλάκη* at the centre of things².

Earth is the maker of Night and Day because their difference would not exist without her, and she is the guardian of them, because, if she left her position for a moment, they would cease to be registered or measured. *φύλακα* is perhaps added to supplement *δημιουργόν*, because the function of the Earth is more passive than that of the Sun.

Is the Earth, then, stationary or in motion? As Mr Grote truly remarks, the word *εἵλλομένη* does not decide this question. For if *εἵλλειν* means to "compress," this does not at all preclude rotatory motion, and, as I may add, if *εἵλλω* means to "roll," still, supposing the axle to be carried round with the sky and to rotate freely within a cylindrical cavity, such as is described in the *Phædo* as piercing through the Earth, then, if the Earth were at rest, such rest would be equivalent to, and would probably be accounted for by, an opposite and retrograde motion. The all pervading circle of the Same

¹ *Ar. de Cælo*, c. 13, *νύκτα τε καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν*.

² *Ibid.*

would for once be not only retarded but arrested by the circle of the Other: and at least in relation to the πόλος the Earth would be in motion.

But the interpretation of *εἰλλομένη* is, notwithstanding, of great importance in trying to determine Plato's meaning. And with respect to this, two points have been often overlooked: (1) the force of the present tense, to which Buttman had called attention, and (2) the relative nature of the expression.

(1) The use of the continuous tense is significant. The Earth, like everything within the Heaven, is subject to a continual process, ever seeming to become water, air, and fire, and ever returning into her own form, but as a whole ever gravitating towards the axis of the world. Thus here, as in so many other instances, Plato tends to express the same thought which is defined by Aristotle. (De Coelo, c. 14.)

(2) The word is specially chosen to contrast the Earth, which by an inherent tendency is thus held in, with the other bodies which are allowed an ampler range. Compare the following passages:

a. Symposium 206 D. *συσπειράται καὶ ἀποτρέπεται καὶ ἀνείλλεται καὶ οὐ γεννᾷ.* (Said of the yearning nature when encountered by ugliness.)

b. Tim. 76 C. *ἀπωθούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ περιστῶτος ἔξωθεν πνεύματος πάλιν ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα εἰλλόμενον κατερριζοῦτο.* (Of the suppressed moisture forming the roots of the hair.)

c. Tim. 86 E. *ὑπὸν ἂν...ἔξω μὲν μὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἰλλόμενοι τὴν ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἀτμίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυμμίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι.* (Of peccant humours in the human body.)

Thus Plato uses *εἴλλω* in the same sense literally in which Aristophanes has employed it metaphorically:

Nub. 762. *μή νυν περὶ σαυτὸν εἴλλε τὴν γνώμην αἰεὶ,
ἀλλ' ἀποχάλα τὴν φροντίδ' ἐς τὸν αἶρα
λινόδετον ὥσπερ μηλολόνθην τοῦ ποδός.*

The only other place in which the word occurs in Plato is in Critias p. 109, *ἡ τῶν λόγων διέξοδος οἶον ἀνείλλομένη*, where the preposition has the chief emphasis, and it is a matter of in-

difference whether the word is understood to mean "being let out" or "unwinding."

After all that has been said about this word *εἴλλω*, there seems to be still some confusion about it, arising from the failure to perceive the connexion of the two meanings, "to compress" and to "roll." It may be worth while to ask whether the most general meaning of the word be not simply "to limit motion." (α) If the limiting force be equal and directly opposite to the outward impulse the result is a condition of rest. Thus in Thuc. II. 76, *ἐν τάρσοις καλάμου πηλὸν ἐνείλλοντες* is not "wrapping" (which implies the rotatory association) but "enclosing tightly," so that it remains and does not escape. (β) But if the limitation is partial only, the result is a curvilinear motion, of which the simplest case is motion round a centre. (γ) And from this to "rolling" round an axis the transition is easy. Hence *εἰλίσσω* is the frequentative of *εἰλέω*; and *εἰλέω* the derivative of *εἴλλω*, (which is modified from *εἴλω*), of which the radical meaning, and the usual one in the classical period, is simply "to confine." Thus *εἰλίποδες βόες* are the oxen whose feet do not move freely, but describe an awkward curve. "The oxen with their constrained gait," are thus distinguished from the horses with their free paces, *ἵπποι ἀερίποδες*.

The renderings "packed," "grasping" (Grote), "wound" (Sir G. C. Lewis), "compacted" (Jowett), are none of them quite exact. "Gravitating," would be nearly right, if it did not convey a modern association. "Held in," "restrained," "confined," may express the meaning if understood of a continual process.

I have attempted to shew that the function of the Earth which Plutarch attributes to her is sufficient to satisfy the meaning of *δημιουργὸν* and that it is supported by the context. I have also tried to explain exactly the meaning of *εἴλλομένη*. It remains to controvert Mr Grote's position, that the Earth, if thus confined about the axle, must be carried round with it.

We have seen that the circle of the moon in Rep. x., so far from being carried round by the adamantine spindle-shaft, about which it appears to cling, has an opposite motion. We have seen also that the Earth in the Phædo (111 E) is perforated.

Now if the description in Rep. B. x. is to be accepted literally, the adamantine spindle-shaft is enclosed within the pillar of light, which passes through the Earth and Heaven. Why may it not revolve freely there without affecting the Earth? It does not even pass through the Earth, for it rests on the knees of Necessity, and the lowest part of it is in the whorl of the spindle, which is visible from the surface of the Earth. But if this description is not to be accepted literally but only symbolically, there is no need of supposing an adamantine axis or a substantial and ponderable axis at all. Nor is it necessary to assume that the axis revolves, for it may have a pivot at either end (for which cp. Politicus 270 A, ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἵέναι). And if it does revolve, the Earth may still be independent of its motion, for her being confined about the axis does not imply contact or friction: she may be as free as the eighth circle in the orrery of Rep. x. All that is implied is that she has no orbit¹.

It is a reasonable enough conjecture that the axle, and the pillar of light, were the same thing, and were in fact an extension of the Pythagorean central fire, round which the Earth is conglobated (a tendency to this may be traced in the πυρι-φλεγέθων of the Phædo). The adamantine spindle-shaft is merely the symbol of the eternal revolution itself.

It may be asked: How can the Earth be supposed exempt from the motion of the circle of the Same which affects the whole Heaven? I answer that the Earth does not appear to be thought of in the passage where that motion is first asserted. And, although the point is too remote to be much insisted on, it is not strictly true that, if she does not revolve, she is unaffected by motion. As an Element, Earth is the most immoveable and passive of bodies (Tim. 55 E). But she is by no means altogether unmoved. By the working of fire and air, she has a continual interchange of particles (Tim. 58—60), and as we read in the Phædo, there is an αἰώρα or swaying to and fro of these elements from which she suffers inwardly (Phædo, 111 E). She thus partakes of the destiny of all things within the

¹ See Note at the end of this paper.

Heaven. But the great mass of Earth is kept in her place by the stable nature of her particles. She is less easily set in motion than the celestial bodies which are chiefly of "air and fire."

If it is objected to the preceding argument that the planets, as well as the Earth, contain creatures, who are to be taught number through day and night, to this it may be replied (1) that Plato (unlike Aristotle) may have greatly over-estimated the size of the Earth, while under-estimating in comparison the orbits of the planets. Hence the shadow of the Earth might be visible even from Saturn: or (2) that Plato in p. 40 is thinking of man only, and not of other intelligent beings. On any theory some oversights must be supposed.

If it is remarked, that the Pythagoreans attributed motion both to the Earth and Sky and did not see the inconsistency, it may be answered, (1) that all depends on what motion they attributed to each, and (2) that Aristotle expressly charges them with neglecting "appearances."

The one great difficulty remains. If Plato in the *Timæus* intended the Earth to be at rest, how can Aristotle quote these words of the *Timæus* as supporting the theory of those who held that it revolved? The difficulty would be greater if it were isolated. But Aristotle in quoting the later Platonists often seems to attribute opinions to Plato, which are not found in his writings. He was full of his own view (often an unconscious development from Plato) and he was alive to contemporary opinion. Of documentary evidence he was careless.

The solution offered by Simplicius, is, in all probability, substantially the true one. Aristotle is speaking of the interpretation given to these words by the later Platonists, who in many points returned to the "elements" of Pythagorean teaching. That they should have understood *εἰλλομένην* to mean "rolling" was the more natural, inasmuch as Plato's use of the verb *εἶλλω*, which he probably borrowed from the poets, was becoming obsolete, and in common parlance there was no difference between *εἶλλω* and *εἶλέω*¹.

¹ Mr Grote thinks that Aristotle also understood *εἰλλομένην* to mean "packed," "compressed," and that his

adding *καὶ κινεῖσθαι* is a proof of this. But these words have much more the air of an explanation of the preceding

But, it may be rejoined, at least Aristotle and those whom he quotes are unconscious of the enormous contradiction which they thus assign to Plato. This is undeniable. But it is one thing to err in referring to a very complicated writing in support of an opinion (as people quote Scripture now-a-days) and another thing for a great genius like Plato or Dante to make the same oversight when the "new creation" is a living organism in his mind, in every lineament, branch, shape and form¹. I am far from saying that Plato's creation is in all points consistent. But for the reasons stated, I do not think he is chargeable with this particular error.

It is asked, why Plato, who is generally so clear, is obscure in this instance. Mr Grote thinks that this was caused by the fear of a prosecution for impiety. There may possibly be something in this, though such an assumption becomes very dangerous when made an instrument of interpretation. But there is, perhaps, more of truth in the remark made by Professor Jowett, that Plato "could write in one style but not in another," that he "had not that command of his materials that would have enabled him to produce a perfect work of art," and that "as his knowledge is fragmentary and unconnected, his style partakes of the same character." The difficulty of this passage is only one of many confirmations of the same writer's observation that in the *Timæus* "the great master of language was writing on a theme with which he was imperfectly acquainted, and had no words to express his meaning."

word, being added to make explicit the general notion implied in the particular phrase.

¹ Aristotle himself observes that if the Earth had an orbit, there must

be *τροπαί* of the fixed stars. This is enough to prove that he could not himself have made the mistake which in a careless quotation he unconsciously attributes to Plato.

L. CAMPBELL.

NOTE.—A distinguished mathematician, Professor Fischer of St Andrews, has observed to me that when Mr Grote speaks of the Earth as "packed" round the axle, he has no right to add "and fastened." The Earth might be "packed" round the rigid axis, yet

not fastened to it. The axis of a cylindrical spindle, of finite or infinitely small thickness but adamantine, might be smooth and turn within the fixed Earth without friction, only held in a fixed direction by her immobility. All that was *fastened* to the axis, as the starry Heavens, might turn with it. Or the axis might be fixed in the Earth, but the pivots of the Heavens might work in its extremities. The same friend adds: "I always understood that the Greeks accounted only for the geometrical motions by geometric conceptions: the idea of force, and forces acting dynamically, was quite beyond them. Plato who would not admit ἀγεωμετρήτους, could not make the blunder to make the Earth turn together with the starry sphere in 24 hours to account for the daily motion of the stars. One must revolve at a certain rate, or both, but in opposite directions and at half the rate (if uniformly), to save the phenomena."

PLATONICA¹.

Gorgias, p. 520 E. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἵτιόν ἐστιν ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν.

Deleto glossemate, τοῦτο αἵτιόν ἐστιν ὅτι, legendum Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι μόνη κ.τ.λ.

Quae in Praefat. editionis meae, p. ix. de scriptura Gorg. p. 478 E reperiuntur nunc revocanda censeo.

Politia, p. 563 D. ὥστε καὶ ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι.

Displicet medium προσφέρηται, et legendum proculdubio προσφέρη. Etiam in Gorg. 481 A soloece legitur etiamnum ἀναλίσκηται pro ἀναλίσκη quod in ed. mea restitui. Idem soloeismus in Aristoph. Nub. 481 ὅταν τι προβάλωμαι σοφόν.

Ibid. 581 B. καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει. Pr. τούτων leg. πάντων.

Ibid. E. καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι. Sic Bekk. et omnes recentiores. Mihi praeferenda videtur lectio cod. F. τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ποικίλων.

Ibid. p. 564 C. ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Omittenda praepositio ξύν, utpote a consuetudine Graecis usitata aliena.

Ibid. 567 D. ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῶ. At quam tandem mercedem? otiosus videtur articulus, et fortasse legendum ἐὰν μό-

¹ Sent to Prof. Baiter of Zürich, who is preparing a new edition of his Plato.

νον μισθὸν διδῶ. Justo subtiliora videntur quae Stallb. disputavit in annot.

Ibid. 578 c. ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. Fors. leg. εὖ μάλ' ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. (= in tali argumento.)

Ibid. 585. καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες. Transponenda videntur verba ut res cum praegressa similitudine congruat—quod enim dolor ad nigrum colorem, id doloris absentia ad fuscum—quare legendum puto καὶ πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπον ἀφορ.

Ibid. 589 D. εἰάν μοι, ἔφη, πείθεται. Leg. cum Stobaeo εἰάν ἐμοί ἔφη, πίθεται.

Ibid. 604 c. γίνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι. Nescio an haec Graece dicantur. Lege potius πρὸς τῷ ἰᾶσθαι, usu satis obvio, ut in Phaedro, 249 D πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος.

Euthyd. p. 285. παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἂ λέγουσιν, εἰάν ἐθέλωσι μεταδιδόναι. Aptius videtur ἂ φέρουσιν.

Ibid. 287 B. οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ (al. ἀποκρίνει,—η.) Legendum puto οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀποκρίναι, ἅτε γιγνώσκων κ.τ.λ.

Ibid. 290 B. οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς τέχνης ἐπὶ πλεόν ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι. Vix explicari possunt vulgata. Vide an leg. οὐδέν, ἔφη, τῆς θ. τέχνης κ.τ.λ. coll. Phaedr. 271 E. ἢ μηδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὧν ἤκουε λόγων = nihil ei prodesse ea quae audiverit. Isocr. Antid. 315 D. ὧν οὐδέν μοι πλέον γέγονεν = οὐδέν ἀπολέλαυκα τοῦ πράγματος, ut ipse supra dixerat. (Angl. "from which I have reaped no advantage.")

Sophist. 238 E. ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα. Fors. ἂ. τε καὶ νῦν ὁμως. Neque enim huic loco apta νῦν οὕτως.

Ibid. 245 E. πάνυ μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν. Scribendum opinor πάντῃ μὲν. Saepius enim confunduntur πάνυ et πάντῃ. (πάντας cum Eusebio Heindorfius.)

Ibid. 248 D. Μανθάνω, τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν...fors. leg. Μανθάνω· τόδε λέγετε, ὡς.

Ibid. 261 c. τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον. Scr. τὸ λεγόμενον delete additamento, κατὰ τ. παροιμ.

Ibid. 262 D. διὸ λέγειν τε καὶ αὐτόν. Sensus videtur postulare διὸ λέγειν γε ἤδη vel tale quid (λέγειν τε καὶ ὀνομάζειν αὐτόν—ἐπεφθεγξάμεθα R. B. Hirschig.)

Ibid. 263 E. καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἴσμεν ὄν. Pro αὐτό leg. f. αὐτόδ' ἴσ. ὄν. [Sic etiam teste Baitero F. W. Wagner, Mus. Rhen. XI. p. 474.]

Ibid. 265 D. τῶν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι. Nescio an melius δοξασόντων.

Politicus 307 D. τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς οἰκεῖα σφέτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν διαφόρων ψέγοντες ὡς ἀλλότρια. Legendum nisi fallor, τὰ μὲν ἐπαιν. ὡς οἰκεῖα, τὰ σφέτερα, τὰ δὲ....

Philebus 41 D. προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν λόγον.

Veram puto lectionem Codd. Bodl. et Vat. περιῖστώμεθα. Conf. Aeschin. c. Ctes. p. 83. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁρᾶτε τοὺς πύκτας περὶ τῆς στάσεως ἀλλήλοις διαγωνιζομένους, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς...μάχεσθε, καὶ μὴ ἑᾶτε αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς ἔξω τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους περιῖστασθαι.

Ibid. 46 D. τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον πικρῷ γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον, μετὰ δυσάπαλλαξίας πάρον, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον ξύστασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

Haud male conjecit Sydenhamus (Vers. Anglica Platonis t. III. p. 509 not.) pro πικρῷ γλ. μ. Platonem scripsisse γλυκύ-πικρον. Erat enim hoc vocabulum inter τὰ λεγόμενα, sc. decantata, id quod de vulgatis dici non potest.

Sapph. Fr. 43. ἔρως δηῦτέ με λυσιμέλης δύνει,
γλυκύπικρον ἀμάχανον ὄρπετον.

Plut. Symp. v. c. 7, p. 681 B. τὸ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ρεῦμα τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐντήκει, καὶ ἀπόλλυσι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀλγηδόνι μεμιγμένης, ἣν αὐτοὶ γλυκύπικρον ὀνομάζουσι. Galen. T. XI. p. 586, ed. Kühn γλυκύπικρον, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν ἔρωτα προσαγορεύουσιν, φανεῖται σοι τὸ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν (sc. ἀψινθίας καὶ μέλιτος) διὰ παντὸς ἀμφοῖν ἀήθη τινὰ μίξιν μεμιγμένοι (vulg. et Kühn μεμιγμένην).

Ibid. 47 C. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, σώματι τὰναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην...ταῦτα ἔμπροσθεν μὲν διήλθομεν. Locus minus expeditus, in quo varia tentarunt edd. Legerim ἐν ψυχῇ, ἥ σώματι κ.τ.λ. (quatenus corpori contraria affert). Facillime potuit excidere posterius ἥ.

Hipp. II. p. 366 B. Δυνατὸς δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἄρα ὃς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται ὅταν βούληται.

Perpendenti quae sequuntur apparet scribendum esse δυνατὸς δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοτ' ἄρ' ὅς ἂν ποιῇ τότε ὃ ἂν βούληται; collato praesertim Gorg. 472 D ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἄρ' ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας.

Hipparch. 230 οὔτι πᾶν γε τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.

Ita edd. soloece. Distinguendum οὔτι πᾶν γε' τουτι μοι ἀνάθου. Ad quae infra respondet Socrates ἀνατίθεται τοίνυν σοι τοῦτο.

Ibid. 215 C. ἃ γὰρ Ὀλυμπος ἡὔλει Μαρσύου λέγω τούτου διδάξαντος. Expeditior fit sensus si pro τούτου legamus τοῦτον. *Marsyae dico, qui istum, sc. Olympum, erudit.* Mox ad Marsyam refertur ἐκείνου.

Legg. 895 E. ΑΘ. Ἀρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὐ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν; ΚΛ. Ναί. ΑΘ. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. Μῶν οὖν οὐ ταῦτόν ἐκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν. Ita Edd. prava partium dispositione. Scribendum proculdubio, ΚΛ. Ναί. τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν κ.τ.λ.

Ibid. 890. τέχνη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ τινι φύσει. Leg. οὐδ' ἢ τινι φύσει. Sic 919 D, μηδ' ἦν τινα διακονίαν.

Ibid. 861. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὥς ἔμπροσθεν νῦν δὴ καλῶς ἐλέγομεν. Dele importunum additamentum ἔμπροσθεν.

Critias 111 B. τοῦ λεπτοῦ σώματος τῆς χώρας μόνου λειφθέντος. Dele v. σώματος. Supra enim legimus τῆς γῆς ὅση πείρα, ut nunc τὸ λεπτόν τῆς χώρας.

W. H. THOMPSON.

ON THE PLACE OF A FRAGMENT OF ÆSCHYLUS.

No. 437 DINDORF, 124 NAUCK.

χαλκὸν ἀθέριτον ἀσπίδος ὑπερτενῇ

Restored by Blomfield (pref. to Agamemnon p. x.)

χαλκὸν ἀθέριστον ἀσπίδων ὑπερτενῇ.

B. however, who renders ‘non messum,’ either did not know or rejected the explanation of *ἀθέριστον* which will nevertheless perhaps generally recommend itself as in the main the right one—*ὁ ἀθερίζων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔχων λόγον.*

Though this line has been assigned to the Agamemnon it can find no place there and the conjecture that for *Αἴσχυλος* *Ἀγαμέμνονι* we should read *Μέμνονι*, is obviously of no weight, if we can make the words, with the necessary restoration, fill satisfactorily a void elsewhere.

I suggest that the line should be inserted between ll. 559, 560 of the Septem contra Thebas, where Mr Paley instead of altering the text with Porson and Hermann, prefers to suppose a lacuna

εἰκὼ φέροντα πολεμίας ἐπ’ ἀσπίδος·

* * * * *

ἔξωθεν εἴσω τῷ φέροντι μέμψεται.

The passage with its context will then run

*ὃς οὐκ ἔασει γλῶσσαν ἐργμάτων ἄτερ
ἔσω πυλῶν ῥέουσιν ἀλδαίνειν κακὰ,
οὐδ’ εἰσαμείψαι θηρὸς ἐχθίστου δάκους
εἰκὼ φέροντα πολεμίας ἐπ’ ἀσπίδος*

* χαλκὸν ἀθέριστον· ἀσπίδος δ' ὑπερτενῆς
 ἔξωθεν εἶσω, τῷ φέροντι μέμψεται
 πυκνοῦ κροτησμοῦ τυγχάνουσ' ὑπὸ πτόλιν.

It is important to notice the description of the figure here spoken of, as given before (ll. 539—544). It is τὸ πόλεως ὄνειδος ἐν χαλκηλάτῳ σάκει. 'The figure of the Sphinx,' says Mr Paley, interpreting ll. 541, 542, 'was of metal, embossed or hammered out ἔκκρουστον, and rivetted to the shield.' It was displayed in mockery to the Thebans. If there be anything in the conjecture here offered, the meaning will be that it is now destined, by the blows it will get, to be reversed upon *its bearer*, as if blaming him for the hard usage it receives. Thus, understanding πυκνοῦ κροτησμοῦ κ.τ.λ. to explain both ἀσπίδος ὑπερτενῆς and τῷ φέροντι μέμψεται, we might render :

'Nor will Actor permit to enter the gates him who bears upon his shield the image of the hateful monster, the spiteful brass; but bent back over the shield inwards from without, the image will blame its bearer, by reason of the incessant battering it will encounter.'

D. C. TOVEY.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF WRITTEN HISTORIES IN THE TIME OF THUCYDIDES (B.C. 470—400).

THUCYDIDES, in the first twenty-three chapters of his history, in which he manifests the greatest desire, and evidently has taken the greatest pains, to give some trustworthy information about the earlier state of Hellas and its inhabitants, nowhere gives any indication of having had *written* histories (in the true sense of the term) to appeal to. Nowhere (in my opinion, and Dr Arnold on I. 20 takes the same view) does he give us any good reason to suppose that he had seen or even heard of the history of Herodotus, though it had probably been completed some twenty, if not thirty years before the Preface to Thucydides' history was composed. That this Preface or Introduction is an after-thought is shewn by the fact that he more than once refers in it to the *end* of the Peloponnesian war,—ἐς τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου¹. If he had known Herodotus' history, he certainly would have appealed to an author who incidentally says so much about the early history of the Peloponnesus, e.g. in VI. 51 seqq. This narrative, Mr Blakesley remarks, "is extremely valuable, as containing the genuine Lacedæmonian traditions relative to the condition of their country at the period immediately following the Heraclide invasion." And yet Thucydides (I. 9), says λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμη παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι,—a remarkable passage, as showing that tradition was recognised as the source of history at that period. To suppose that any feeling of jealousy or rivalry prevented

¹ I. 13 and 18.

mention of *written* Greek Tragedies occurs in Arist. Ran. 1409 (i.e. B.C. 405), where Euripides is requested to take his 'books,' or papyrus-rolls, *ξυλλαβεῖν τὰ βιβλία*, and weigh them against those of Aeschylus.

Whether the expression in Ran. 53, *ἐπὶ τῆς νεῶς ἀναγιγνώσκοντί μοι τὴν Ἀνδρομέδαν*, refers to reading a MS. of the Andromeda on board ship, or, which is more probable, to the name of the ship itself written on the prow or stern, cannot be determined. But Pindar, in sending an ode which he had composed B.C. 468, sends it from Thebes to Syracuse by an *ἄγγελος*, who is specially requested to give oral instructions (Ol. vi. 88—92). Were the verse in Aesch. Suppl. 947 certainly genuine, which is unlikely,

οὐδ' ἐν πτυχαῖς βίβλων κατεσφραγισμένα,

an argument of some weight might be founded on it in favour of the early writing of books; though at the utmost it need not include more than short scrolls of papyrus-paper. But in fact, it is a mere interpolated supplement, in a lame and halting metre, of the undoubtedly genuine verse that precedes, *ταῦτ' οὐ πίναξιν ἐστὶν ἐγγεγραμμένα*.

Whatever may be thought of this obscure, but really important question, it is at all events very difficult to reconcile the constant appeal that Thucydides (writing as late, or nearly so, as B.C. 400) makes to 'hearsay,' *ἀκοή*, and 'tradition,' *μνήμη*, with the existence of any trustworthy or recognised written histories that were known to himself. Thus, in i. 9, he says, 'it is stated by those who have received from their predecessors *by memory* the clearest accounts of the history of the Peloponnesians;' and in chap. 20. he observes that 'men receive the *hearsay accounts* of past events, *τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων*, from each other alike without putting them to the test of inquiry,' *ἀβασανίστως*¹. And again in the same chapter he adds that 'there are many other facts even of the present age, and *not passing away from memory by time*, *οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα*, that the Greeks have wrong notions about.'

¹ The word *ὁμοίως* seems to imply that a different degree of credit attached to

different narrators of events. Compare also i. 73, *καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ*

Which remark he illustrates by the popular belief in a Πιτανάτης λόχος, the double vote of the Spartan Kings, and their ignorance of the true facts about Hippias and Hipparchus the sons of Peisistratus.

With the above clause in Thucydides we should compare (and without any prepossessions from the commonly-received opinions about early Greek writers) the remarkable expression in the first chapter of Herodotus, to the effect that he has made an ἀπόδειξις, an *ocular display* (so to say), and given a visible and written form to his history, 'that the deeds of men may not become ἐξίτηλα, effaced from memory, and as it were colourless and evanescent¹'. This sentence alone goes far to prove that he had no knowledge of any written text, and was himself trying a new device to remedy the acknowledged want of fixed and definite historical records. For although inscriptions on στήλαι and records in temples, treasuries, or guild-halls (πρυτανεία), nay, *incised* sentences (Ar. Thesm. 778) on κύρβεις or σανίδες, of laws, precepts, and regulations, short letters and messages on δέλτοι and πίνακες, medical prescriptions (Eur. Alc. 967), treaties and compacts (ῥήτραι) on bronze or copper tablets, &c., did without doubt then exist, still this was quite a different thing from a portable history written with ink in a book; and so, to speak generally, I think it very probable that Herodotus was the first Ionic, Thucydides and Hellanicus the first *Attic* writers of systematic history. If this view is true, what are we to think of the views commonly taught in our Greek histories², of Peisistratus having "edited Homer," and collected a library at Athens, not to say, of a list of both his-

λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἢ ὅψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων. It is also to be observed that the terms εὔρεῖν and εὐρίσκειν are applied to the investigations made into the early history of Hellas (I. 1, 20, and 22). In I. 42, only tradition is appealed to, νεώτερός τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου μαθὼν. And *ibid.* 23 we read of τὰ πρότερα ἀκοῇ μὲν λεγόμενα, ἔργῳ δὲ σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα. All these phrases combine to show that

history was only known at Athens from oral instruction.

¹ From Aesch. frag. Niobe 146, Dind., and Xen. Oecon. x. 3, we know that ἐξίτηλος was applied to the fading colour of dyes.

² Dr Smith's "Student's History of Greece," p. 104, "He (Pisistratus) is said to have been the first person in Greece who collected a library, which he threw open to the public; and to

torians and philosophers (exclusive of poets) whose written works are assumed to have existed long before the period when Herodotus wrote his work?

It would, however, be rash to deny that a class of literary persons called *λογογράφοι*, as distinct from *λογοποιοὶ*, existed in the time of Thucydides. He mentions them, though with some contempt, applying to them the verb *συντιθέναι* and not *συγγράφειν*, which he invariably uses of his own history (as he gives *συγγραφή* to that of Hellanicus), in I. 21. In this passage he has been thought to allude to Herodotus, and his pleasing and amusing style of composition. He says there that *λογογράφοι* are not to be trusted, because they have made their narratives more attractive than true,—*ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον*. It is to be observed too that he here expressly associates the *λογογράφοι* with the poets¹; and a little consideration will show that he is referring to the then universally prevalent custom of oral recitation, and to the desire of the *λογογράφοι* to amuse their audience at the expense of strict truth. There is no reason to suppose that he meant a pointed attack on Herodotus, of whom, of course, he may have heard, without having seen or in any way known the matter of his writings. The remark is probably general. Herodotus himself clearly followed the practice of the *λογοποιοὶ* and the *λογογράφοι* in so far studying the tastes of his hearers as to relieve and intersperse his history with numerous pleasing anecdotes and amusing, not to say comical digressions. In public recitation², though not in private reading, such a method of treatment is almost necessary, and it must have been especially so for the lively Greek. In truth, this view alone supplies the right key

him posterity is indebted for the collection of the Homeric poems."

¹ So Pindar combines *λόγιοι καὶ αἰδοί*, *Pyth.* i. 94. In *Nem.* vi. 47 he says that *λόγιοι*, or chroniclers, have 'broad roads,' *πλατεῖαι πρόσοδοι*, for doing honour to Aegina, i.e. ample themes for their tales of prowess. Such doubtless were the *λόγοι* or oral stories with which Patroclus enter-

tained Eurypylus in *Il.* xv. 393.

² The tradition (given in *Suidas*) that Thucydides heard the history of Herodotus read at the Olympian games, may be so far true as showing that his written history was intended primarily for recitation and not for private reading, like our books,—which, indeed, is all but impossible from the very nature of the case.

to the understanding of Herodotus' anecdotal method of composition. The fact is, that he occupies precisely a middle position between the *λογογράφοι* or 'story-writers,' and the true *ξυγγραφεὺς* or historian. His work is, so to say, interlarded with stories and lively digressions, such as those about Croesus and Solon, Cleobis and Biton, the thief in the treasury, the droll tale in VI. 129, about the origin of the saying *οὐ φροντὶς Ἰπποκλείδῃ*, and that in the same book (ch. 125), about the ridiculous figure of Alcmaeon, son of Megacles, carrying off the gold dust in his mouth and shoes from the treasury of Croesus. The charm of these stories is, that they are all given as incidents in history; the critical faculty, which we so severely exercise in distinguishing the false from the true, was not possessed by an Athenian audience, who cared only to relieve the *σπουδαῖα* by the *γελοῖα*. Such anecdotes as those which compose the bulk of Aelian's *ποικίλη ἱστορία* were doubtless the stock-in-trade of the *λογογράφοι*. Thucydides appears to me to allude to them quite generally, and not to point to Herodotus in particular, when he says (I. 21) that the accounts of the *λογογράφοι* were more attractive than true¹. The general inference then is, that Thucydides had a contempt for the *λογογράφοι* as mere talewriters, and even contrasted with their compositions his own and his contemporary Helianicus' more systematic *ξυγγραφή* or History. His own history, he adds (I. 22), is not a mere *ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν*,—still dwelling on the non-reading education of an Athenian audience, and on the temporary and ephemeral nature of the compositions intended only for recitation.

But while Thucydides professes a graver and more conscientious duty than he felt the *λογογράφοι* of his time cared to undertake, viz. that of chronicling facts as they were, I cannot resist a suspicion that on one or two topics, in themselves of a sensational nature, he has not been able to resist the temptation of writing to interest rather than to accurately inform his hearers, or perhaps, of following too implicitly the stories told by others. For

¹ In later times, it may be remarked, the *λογογράφοι* were essayists or journalists; and in this sense both Plato and Demosthenes use the term.

example, the account of the siege of, and escape of the prisoners from, Plataea, in Bk. III., is full of very marvellous statements, some of which can hardly be reconciled with probability, or indeed with the site and present remains of the walls of that city. So also the description of the capture and almost total destruction of the Athenian army in Sicily, at the end of the seventh book, seems full of, to say the very least, palpable improbabilities. It is possible that he himself had misgivings that, as he says in I. 22, the non-mythical nature of his history would prove somewhat dull to his hearers, ἐς ἀκρόασιν τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ατερπέστερον φανεῖται. We need not however attribute to him any intentional desire to exaggerate or misrepresent; but I think we may easily concede that in some details of his history he followed popular accounts which he had no means of strictly verifying.

Although in Plato's time we begin to get a clear glimpse of an established written literature (chiefly in the way of Treatises), yet we are not to suppose books could have been in the hands of the many, or accessible to any but Sophists and professed teachers. Even Demosthenes alludes to the lives and deeds of such men as Alcibiades and Cleon being *talked of* rather than *written about*; λέγεται ποτὲ ἐν τῇ πύλει κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἐκείνην εὐδαιμονίαν Ἀλκιβιάδης γενέσθαι (Mid. p. 561), —φασὶ Κλέωνα τῶν ὑμετέρων προγόνων στρατηγούντα Λακεδαιμονίων πολλοὺς ἐν Πύλῳ ζῶντας λαβόντα, μάλιστα ἐν τῇ πόλει εὐδοκιμῆσαι (πρὸς Βοιωτ. II. p. 1016). The exploits of such citizens were probably made generally known even B.C. 350, by recitals at feasts and banquets; just as we know from Aristophanes that stories from Aesop, speeches from tragedy, the praises of heroes, citations from Homer or the lyric poets, were given by memory on these occasions¹.

As far as I am aware, Plato nowhere shows that he had heard of Thucydides², and perhaps the History was but little

¹ See Arist. Nub. 1365. Vesp. 566. 580. 1175. 1225 seqq. Pac. 1267 seqq. Eccles. 680.

² The Thucydides mentioned in

the *Meno* and *Laches* is a different person—the statesman who was son of Melesias.

known during the life of the great philosopher, who died as late as B.C. 347.

But *if* it be really true, that Thucydides did not know of Herodotus, nor Plato of Thucydides (and I am not assuming either point), it is a subject for thought and inquiry to what extent *Reading* existed at Athens as a literary pursuit. From a remarkable expression in Plato¹ it may be questioned if the primary motive of authors was not rather to *leave behind them* wisdom and truth than to instruct or amuse their contemporaries².

F. A. P.

¹ ἐκγονα ἐαυτῶν καταλείπειν, Symp. p. 209 D.

² Since these remarks were written (Nov. 1872), Mr Cox's History of Greece has appeared. I may now refer to

Chap. I. Book II. of that work, especially to p. 265, and Appendix K, Vol. II. p. 606, in confirmation of much that I have said.

THE ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΝ ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ OF SOCRATES.

IN an instructive note upon Prof. Archer Butler's Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, the Master of Trinity sums up, as follows, the teaching of modern scholarship in regard to the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον of Socrates :

“Socrates always speaks of τὸ δαιμόνιον or δαιμόνιον τι, ‘a divine or supernatural somewhat’ (‘divinum quiddam,’ as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to define, and to which he never attributes distinct personality; speaking of it, now as a ‘sign,’ σημεῖον, *Phaedr.* p. 242 B, now as a φωνή, or ‘voice,’ *Apol. S.* p. 31 D. This voice or premonitory sign he undoubtedly referred to a divine original; see *Xen. Mem.* IV. 3, 12, 13; but he nowhere indicates the particular deity from whom he believed it to emanate. According to Schleiermacher this δαιμόνιον ‘denotes the province of such rapid moral judgments as cannot be referred to distinct grounds, which accordingly Socrates did not attribute to his proper self; for instance, presentiment of the issue of an undertaking; attraction and repulsion in reference to particular individuals.’” Vol. I. p. 375.

So far the modern authorities are in general agreed. But at this point a question presents itself which has been, and continues to be, variously answered: What did Socrates mean by describing his presentiment as the ‘divine sign’ or ‘voice’? It is commonly assumed that the phrases ‘divine sign,’ ‘voice,’ indicated metaphorically the value which Socrates attached to his presentiments, and that his presentiments differed from the presentiments of other men only in their greater precision and accuracy. M. Lélut however, in his work entitled ‘Du Démon de Socrate,’ has maintained that the ‘voice’ was a

hallucination, and that Socrates was insane, being subject not only to hallucinations, but also to delusions. I am myself disposed to think that Socrates was liable to hallucinations of the sense of hearing, but that there is no reason to believe that he was subject to delusions, or that his mind was deranged.

Having thus indicated my own theory, which may be regarded as a modification of that of M. Lélut, I proceed first to give a brief summary of the evidence afforded by the writings of Xenophon and Plato; secondly, to review the various theories which have been maintained by modern scholars; and thirdly, to argue that the theory of hallucination accounts for much which on other hypotheses is left unexplained, without necessarily obliging us to assent to M. Lélut's startling assertion 'que Socrate était un fou.'

I begin with the testimony of Xenophon contained in the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium*.

Memorabilia I. 1 §§ 2—9. The charge brought against Socrates of seeking to introduce new divinities (δαιμόνια) arose in the main from his assertion τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν. He was in reality as innocent of any attempt to introduce new divinities as those who, believing in μαντική, observe ὄρνιθες, φῆμαι, σύμβολοι, and θυσίαι. Such persons conceive, not that the birds or the passers-by know what is for the interest of those who derive auguries from them, but that the gods διὰ τούτων τὰ συμφέροντα σημαίνουν; and this was the belief of Socrates. Only, whereas most people say that the birds or the passers-by bid them do a thing or abstain from it, Socrates described exactly his own experience (ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγεν), and said τὸ δαιμόνιον σημαίνειν. According as τὸ δαιμόνιον προὔσῃμαινε, he frequently warned his associates to do this, and not to do that: and experience justified his admonitions. Plainly he believed thoroughly in the warning, or he would never have risked being thought by his associates either a knave or a fool. He had indeed a profound belief in μαντική, but thought that the aid of μαντική should be sought only περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἕπως ἀποβήσοιτο. It is our duty, he said, to discover for ourselves how to act in those matters which can be determined by human reason, but we should en-

deavour to ascertain by *μαντική* the will of heaven in regard to those matters *ἂ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἴλεω σημαίνειν*. Cf. I. 1 § 19, II. 6 § 8.

I. 3 § 4. *εἴ τι δέξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν*, nothing could have persuaded him to neglect the warning; those who *παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιούσιν τι*, are, he said, no better than fools.

I. 4 § 15. In an argument *περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου*, i.e. *περὶ τοῦ θείου*, Aristodemus says, that he will believe that the gods care for him *ἔταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ σοὶ φῆς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν*. Socrates replies that the gods send warnings *διὰ μαντικῆς* to the Athenians and *τέρατα* to the Greeks in general: did Aristodemus think himself specially neglected by them?

IV. 3 §§ 12, 13. Socrates dwells upon the care which the gods show for us when, being consulted *ἢ ἀδυνατούμεν τὰ συμφέροντα προνοεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων*, by means of *μαντική* they signify to us *τὰ ἀποβησόμενα* and tell us *ἢ ἂν ἄριστα γίνονται* (sc. *τὰ ἀποβησόμενα*). Euthydemus suggests that the gods must have an unusual kindness for Socrates, if unasked they *προσημαίνουν ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἂ μὴ*. Socrates goes on to show the propriety of honouring *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, i.e. *τὸ θεῖον*.

IV. 8 §§ 1—5. Whereas some might think that the result of the trial convicted Socrates of falsehood in the assertion *τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἅ τε δέοι καὶ ἂ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν*, especially as he himself declared that *τὸ δαιμόνιον* resisted him when he attempted to prepare a defence, there were, in Xenophon's opinion, several circumstances which combined to render Socrates's death at that juncture happy, easy, and glorious.

Symposium. 8 § 5. Antisthenes says that Socrates sometimes refused to converse with him *τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος*.

Thus, in the undoubted writings of Xenophon, the sign is a warning, which it would be folly to neglect, either to do or not to do, not superseding ordinary *φρόνησις*, but dealing with those uncertainties in respect of which other men seek guidance by means of *μαντική*. It indicated *ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἂ μὴ* (*Mem.* IV. 3 § 12), including not only *τὰ συμφέροντα* (*Mem.* I. 1 § 3), but also *ἅ τε δεῖ καὶ ἂ μὴ δεῖ ποιεῖν* (*Mem.* IV. 8 § 1).

Socrates believed in it profoundly, and never disobeyed it. Xenophon does not say wherein the divine warning consisted: he merely records Socrates's habitual phrase, describes the effect of the sign upon Socrates's conduct, and declares his own conviction of the sincerity of Socrates's belief in it. The phrase used (τὸ δαιμόνιον σημαίνει) indicates neither voice nor vision: indeed it would seem that the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον, as used by Xenophon, never means the sign itself, but always the divine power to which Socrates attributed it.

In the *Apologia Socratis* however, §§ 12, 13, Socrates is made to say *καινά γε μὴν δαιμόνια πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ εἰσφέροιμι λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅ, τι χρὴ ποιεῖν*, thenceforward pursuing the argument in the manner of *Memorab.* I. 1 § 3: but I think that we may fairly assume that this treatise is spurious.

I come now to Plato, who has (besides passages in the *Theages*, of which I shall have something to say in the sequel,) the following notices of the sign.

Apolog. 31 D. Socrates says that the reason why he had never engaged in politics was to be found in a fact which he had often mentioned, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. This voice had forbidden him to engage in politics.

40 A. Socrates remarks that, whereas ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν, on the present occasion τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον had not forbidden him to enter the court or restrained him in the course of his defence καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. He infers that his condemnation is a good, not an evil, for otherwise τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον would have interposed.

Phaedr. 242 B, C. ἥνικ' ἔμελλον, ὧ ἡγαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν—καί τινα φωνὴν

ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἔα ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. He adds that even whilst he delivered his former discourse he had had misgivings, ὥς δὴ τοι μαιτικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ.

Euthyd. 272 E. Socrates was about to leave the Lyceum when ἀνισταμένου μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. He stays and is rewarded by a conversation with two sophists.

Euthyphr. 3 B. Euthyphro supposes that the accusation is due to the fact ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίνεσθαι.

Rep. VI. 496 C. Socrates was prevented from deserting philosophy by τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, a phenomenon which was, he believed, unique or almost so.

Theaetet. 151 A. When pupils who had left Socrates wished to return to him, τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον sometimes allowed, sometimes forbade him to take them back.

Alcib. I. 103 A. δαιμόνιον τι ἐναντίωμα interfered for a time to prevent Socrates from conversing with Alcibiades. Cf. 124 C, where Socrates says that his ἐπίτροπος, God, had until that day forbidden him to address the boy.

Thus in the Platonic dialogues (exclusive of the Theages) the sign is a voice which warned Socrates not to do something, never to do anything. He heard it frequently, and on the most trifling occasions. The phenomenon dated from his earliest years, and was, so far as he knew, peculiar to himself. All the instances of it recorded by Plato, are, to use Xenophon's phrase, περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ὥπως ἀποβήσεται: the voice tells Socrates ἂ μὴ χρὴ ποιεῖν, and in every case but one Socrates assumes that he is told to refrain because the act contemplated is *inexpedient*. In the exceptional case (*Phaedr.* 242 B, C), Socrates, who has already felt misgivings, is warned at a precise moment of time not to go away without expiating his error: thus this admonition falls strictly within the province of μαντική, and is distinguished from what we call the voice of conscience. The phenomenon is styled τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον, or τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον. It is momentary, not continuous. Finally, there is nothing to indicate that Plato was not convinced of the sincerity of Socrates's statements in regard to it, nothing

to indicate that Plato supposed that in speaking of this divine sign Socrates was indulging his accustomed irony or speaking metaphorically.

I proceed to state the various explanations which have been given of the sign, adding in each case my reasons for thinking that they do not fully accord with the notices contained in the works of Plato and Xenophon, and that they cannot be regarded as more than partial representations of the facts.

The question before us is, What did Socrates mean when he said that he was from time to time warned by a divine voice to abstain from something which he was meditating?

(1) It has been maintained that in making this assertion Socrates was guilty of a pious fraud; that his claim to supernatural revelations was "das Erzeugniss einer politischen Berechnung." But (a) this hypothesis is at variance with the whole tenor of his life, and in particular would involve the theory that his profession of belief in *μαντική* was insincere: (b) the divine sign would surely have been introduced to loose great knots, or at all events on selected occasions, rather than to guide him in trivialities: (c) Xenophon expressly rejects as absurd the theory that Socrates was not thoroughly in earnest in what he said about the sign.

(2) It has been maintained that in speaking of the divine sign the philosopher was only indulging his accustomed irony. But (a) Xenophon's explicit statement, as well as all the notices contained in his writings and in those of Plato, are evidence that they, at any rate, believed in the sincerity of Socrates's assertions: (b) it is difficult to imagine why Socrates should have persistently used for so many years a phrase which was obviously misunderstood by his intimates, who were well acquainted with his usual irony: (c) in fact an irony so deceptive and so long maintained differs in nothing from imposture.

I turn now to those theories which admit the sincerity of Socrates's assertions.

(3) The sign has been identified with the voice of conscience. But (a) Socrates thought it supernatural, and in all probability unique, whilst he could hardly have claimed the monopoly of conscience: (b) the sign neither applies moral laws,

nor criticizes past actions; "das sokratische Dämonium hat es weder mit der allgemeinen sittlichen Norm zu thun, die ja gerade nach Sokrates Sache der klaren Einsicht sein soll, noch auch mit der sittlichen Beschaffenheit schon vollendeter Handlungen" (Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. 1, p. 67): (c) the sign is concerned, not with the moral worth, but with the result, of future action (Zeller, *ibid.*); e.g. in the case of the trial, Socrates infers that it is to his advantage to die, not that he is justly condemned: hence in the *Memorabilia* its function is identified with that of *μαντική*.

(4) The sign has been regarded as a general belief in a divine mission. But (a) it dealt with individual cases: (b) it occurred on trivial occasions: (c) Socrates dated his mission only from the time when Chærephon consulted the Delphic oracle and brought back the celebrated answer, whilst the sign was familiar to him from his boyhood: (d) according to Plato, the sign did not prompt, but only checked his actions.

(5) According to Prof. Zeller and to¹ many modern authorities, the sign was "a presentiment of the utility or inutility of certain actions, the inward voice of Socrates's individual tact. He had listened to it attentively from his earliest years; and in the sequel, in consequence partly of his experience and penetration, partly of his knowledge of himself and exact appreciation of what was in harmony with his individuality, it had attained to an unusual degree of accuracy. Its psychological origin having escaped his observation, the spirit of his times led him to attribute it to a direct divine revelation." (Zeller, p. 68.)

Now this theory seems to me good as far as it goes: but does it explain all the statements of Xenophon and Plato? If

¹ "La grande habitude de faire des expériences donne aux manouvriers d'opérations les plus grossiers un presentiment qui a le caractère de l'inspiration. Il ne tiendrait qu'à eux de s'y tromper comme Socrate, et de l'appeler un *démon familier*. Socrate avait une si prodigieuse habitude de considérer les hommes et de peser les circonstances,

que dans les occasions les plus délicates, il s'exécutait secrètement en lui une combinaison prompte et juste, suivie d'un pronostic dont l'événement ne s'écartait guère. Il jugeait des hommes comme les gens de goût jugent des ouvrages d'esprit, par sentiment." Diderot, *De l'interprétation de la Nature*. Œuvres, Vol. I. p. 429. Cf.

the divine and customary sign was no more than "the inward voice of Socrates's individual tact," (a) how was it distinguished from the ordinary action of the deliberative faculty? (b) how was it that Socrates alone possessed it? (c) how was it that he did not urge his associates to cultivate their tact in like manner? (d) how are we to explain Socrates's unhesitating belief in its superhuman character?

(6) It only remains to regard the sign as a psychological hallucination, illusion, or delusion to which Socrates was subject. Accordingly M. Lélut has maintained in a work entitled 'Du Démon de Socrate' that Socrates was mad ("que Socrate était un fou"), that he believed himself to be attended by a personal genius perceived certainly by the sense of hearing, perhaps also by that of sight, and that these false perceptions or hallucinations grew with his years and with his conviction of their divine origin, until he persuaded himself that he was able by a sort of moral magnetism ("par cette sorte de magnétisme moral") to exercise a beneficial influence upon his associates, and that at last the hallucination became so strong that it determined him at the trial to throw away his chance of acquittal by a wilful defiance of his judges. Finally M. Lélut quotes, as apt parallels to the case of Socrates, the cases of persons who have been liable to hallucinations combined with inconsequence of reasoning and delusions in regard to personality¹. See also M. Littré's *Médecine et Médecins*, p. 82, where M. Lélut's theory is vigorously enforced. Thus stated, (and I think that I have

Hegel's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 77.

This explanation is as old as Plutarch, whose *περί τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου* should be read by those who are interested in the inquiry; see especially cc. 11, 20. It is obvious that various theories were current in his time, and, as I think, that no important testimony was then extant which has since been lost. M. Lélut, as we shall see, quotes him as unhesitatingly as he would Xenophon and Plato.

¹ "Mais il ne faut non plus se le

dissimuler, le génie porté ainsi jusqu'à ses extrêmes limites, usant d'un instrument trop tendu, et s'y abandonnant à toute la violence, ou à toute la profondeur de ses inspirations, le génie est bien près de cet état déplorable dont on lui a quelquefois donné le nom. Un pas de plus, et l'intervalle est franchi; et au lieu de Galilée, vous avez Cardan, au lieu d'Alexandre, Mahomet, au lieu de Mélanchthon, Luther, au lieu de Platon, Socrate; et c'est ce pas, en effet, que ce dernier a franchi. Cette pensée exclusive, vive, ardente,

in no way exaggerated the degree of insanity which M. Lélut attributes to Socrates,) the theory of hallucination is certainly untenable, M. Lélut not having distinguished between the evidence of Xenophon and Plato on the one hand and that of Plutarch and even later writers on the other, still less between the evidence contained in the undoubted works of the two authors first named and that contained in writings which, though attributed to them, are reasonably suspected by modern critics¹. In consequence of this reckless acceptance of all testimony whether contemporary or not, M. Lélut has overstated the facts of his case, and is thus led to conclusions which have been not unnaturally condemned as extravagant by most scholars. "Recently," says Prof. Zeller, "Lélut has undertaken to prove 'que Socrate était un fou'—a category, in which he places not only Cardan and Swedenborg, but also Luther, Pascal, Rousseau, and others. His chief argument is the assertion that Socrates not only believed in the reality and personality of his *δαίμόνιον* but also was subject to frequent hallucinations of the sense of hearing, which he mistook for its utterances. Those who know how to interpret Plato and to distinguish the genuine from the apocryphal will not need a refutation of the statements of fact upon which this theory rests."—Zeller, p. 64. Mr G. H. Lewes again mentions M. Lélut's book, but does not think his theory worth controverting. In my judgment, though based upon evidence imperfectly sifted and consequently involving an over-statement of

sublime, qui ne produisait tout à l'heure que ces singularités qui ne donnent que plus de piquant au génie, et cette concentration qui ne doit attirer sur lui que le silence du respect, cette pensée a changé de nature; elle a revêtu le caractère d'une image, d'un son, d'un objet extérieur en un mot. Elle s'est faite corps: *verbum caro factum est*; et le sacrifice a été consommé; et l'humanité qui s'enorgueillissait naguère des prodiges d'une raison sublime et créatrice, n'a plus qu'à se

voiler la tête, pour pleurer la perte, désormais irréparable, d'un de ses plus glorieux enfants." Lélut, *Du Démon de Socrate*, p. 195.

¹ For the justification of these statements, see pp. 214—220 of M. Lélut's work; where, in order to prove that Socrates was liable not only to hallucinations of sense but also to delusions of mind, he cites the *De deo Socratis* of Apuleius and the *Theages* attributed to Plato.

the facts, it contains a very considerable element of truth. With a view to the reduction of it to its proper limits, I formulate my objections to M. Lélut's doctrine as follows: (a) the *σημεῖον* was audible only, not visible: (b) though Socrates inferred that the voice was divine, he never pretended that he was attended by a god or genius who influenced his pupils and his friends, or that he had any direct knowledge of the source whence the voice proceeded: (c) there was nothing irrational in the matter of the warning, nothing at which Socrates might not have arrived by the exercise of that tact attributed to him with good reason by Diderot, Prof. Zeller, and others; the sole peculiarity of the warning was the manner of its occurrence¹: (d) in fact Socrates was undoubtedly eccentric, but there is no trustworthy evidence that he was subject to aberrations of reason or to delusions in regard to fact, or to anything more than simple hallucinations of the sense of hearing.

(7) I am now in a position to state my own view, which is a modification of M. Lélut's. I conclude from an examination of the passages which I have quoted from Plato and Xenophon, that Socrates was subject, not to delusions of the mind, but only to hallucinations² of the sense of hearing, so that the rational suggestions of his own brain appeared to him to be projected without him, and to be returned to him through the outward ear. Thus the matter of the warning was suggested

¹ It may be objected perhaps that the warning not to prepare a defence was irrational: but who can say that it was inconsistent with Socrates's lifelong principles and practice, and that the argument of the *Crito* is not a sufficient justification of his conduct?

² "If a person sees, hears, or otherwise perceives what has no existence external to his senses, he has a *hallucination*; if he sees, hears, or otherwise perceives that which has no such external existence as he perceives, or perceives it with erroneous form or qualities, he has an *illusion*; and if, though perceiving external objects as they really exist, he believes in the

existence of such objects, or conceives such notions of the properties and relations of things as are absurd to the common sense of mankind, he has an insane conception or a *delusion*, the ground of the falseness of conception being not error, but a morbid condition." Maudsley ap. Reynolds's *System of Medicine*, Vol. II. p. 20. "By hallucinations we understand subjective sensorial images, which, however, are projected outwards, and thereby become, apparently, objects and realities. By an illusion is meant the false interpretation of an external object. It is an hallucination when I see human forms while in reality no man is near,

by the normal action of Socrates's reason; the peculiarity of the phenomenon was the hallucination of the sense of hearing by which Socrates heard the conclusion, at which he had arrived naturally and rationally, embodied in spoken words uttered apparently by an unseen bystander. The value of the warning was due to the excellence of the tact which Socrates had developed: whilst the reliance which he had learnt by experience to place in the warning became to him a reason for regarding it as a mantic sign from heaven. Thus I am able to unite the theory of a specially developed tact with the theory that Socrates was liable to hallucinations of the sense of hearing, and at the same time to dispense with that part of M. Lélut's theory which has horrified most of the writers who have considered it from the points of view of history and philosophy. According to my view the voice was heard by Socrates to deliver a warning which in its matter resulted from the healthy exercise of his reasoning powers: whilst, according to M. Lélut, his reasoning powers were seriously affected¹.

It now becomes necessary to inquire whether the line which I have attempted to draw between simple hallucination of one of the senses and hallucination of one of the senses accompanied by aberration of mind is recognized by modern writers upon diseases of the brain.

The following extracts from Professor Griesinger's *Mental Pathology and Therapeutics* (New Sydenham Society, 1867) would seem to show that simple hallucinations of the sense of hearing are not uncommon, and that hallucination does not necessarily imply mental disease.

or hear a voice which has not spoken; it is an illusion when I take a bright cloud in the heavens for a fiery chariot, or when I believe that I see an old friend when a stranger walks into the room. In hallucination there is no external object, it is a false sensation; an illusion is a false construction, a transformation of a peripheral sensation." Griesinger, *Mental Pathology and Therapeutics* (New Sydenham Society), p. 84.

¹ In fact I held that the contemporary evidence completely justifies the doubt suggested by M. Donné (*Journal des Débats*, March 12, 1853, quoted by M. Lélut, p. 61); "Nous tenons donc Socrate, non seulement pour un homme assujetti aux misères humaines, dont la figure ne doit pas seulement rayonner d'une gloire divine, mais pour un halluciné, ayant des visions, des apparitions et des auditions imaginaires. S'en-suit-il qu'il fût fou?"

“Hallucinations are not entirely confined to states of mental disease. It is well known that in dreams—to which we shall again refer—inebriation, vertigo, and analogous states, phantasms of sight are produced. But even exclusive of these states, hallucinations are not uncommon in persons not insane.... Nothing would be more erroneous than to consider a man to be mentally diseased because he had hallucinations. The most extended experience shows rather that such phenomena occur in the lives of very distinguished and highly intellectual men, of the most different dispositions and various casts of mind, but especially in those of warm and powerful imagination.... Indeed, judging from what we have heard and observed on this subject, hallucinations doubtless occur also in men of very average minds, not as *rare*, but as *frequently overlooked* phenomena. The man who is mentally healthy either views such hallucinations with calmness and consideration, because he recognizes them as originating subjectively (Nicolai and others), or he believes in their reality, either because his reflection does not possess the premises necessary to judge of these phenomena, because superstition, sluggishness of thought, love of the marvellous, obscure and restrict their correct interpretation; or because certain dispositions, passions, and emotions (fear, anger, joy, &c.), suspend reflection and calm consideration; or even because they are borne out by hallucinations of several senses, of sight, of hearing, of cutaneous sensibility, and thus the means of rectifying one of the errors is itself falsified.

“Hallucinations alone, even when considered true, are not sufficient to constitute insanity. For this there must also exist a general profound perversion of mind or fully developed insane ideas. In order, however, to consider hallucinations as true, it is necessary that, thanks to them, the whole of the healthy sensorial perceptions be perverted; and therefore, hallucinations, when considered as true, are, of course, a very near step to insanity, and especially where a morbid perversion already exists. In the still moderate commencing stages of insanity the hallucinations fix and root themselves so easily that very often they are then considered as causes of the entire disease. According to our opinion, it is only in rare cases that we can assign to

them this position. We believe, rather, that hallucinations must be considered as symptoms of already existing, although perhaps still moderate, irritation of the brain." pp. 90—92¹.

"There is a particular kind of hallucination of hearing to which it is difficult to give a name, viz., those internal voices without sound, mere lively ideas, which appear to the patient as speaking and answering. They are described by certain of the insane as *spiritual*, as 'the voice of the soul,' &c. (*mental hallucination* of Baillarger). There are all possible varieties of them, even to the loudest cry of voices." p. 100.

"An individual who had hallucinations of hearing remarked, that he could himself call forth the words which the voices subsequently spoke, and this aided him in recognizing them as deceptions (Holland, 'Chapters on Mental Physiol.,' 2nd ed., p. 52). The communications of Sandras are also very remarkable ('Ann. Méd. Psych.,' VII. 1855, p. 542) regarding special hallucinations in a disease where the special thoughts and requirements were heard as voices. The voice answered to mental questions of the patient as a third person, but always replied in the sense of his wishes²." p. 89.

Thus it would appear that cases of hallucination are not wanting, in which 'the thoughts transformed into external sensorial impressions' are perfectly rational. Perhaps the pe-

¹ See also M. Brierre de Boismont, *Des Hallucinations*, p. 552: "Ainsi, dans notre opinion, les hommes célèbres que nous venons de citer, et beaucoup d'autres encore, ont pu avoir des hallucinations, sans que leurs desseins, leurs actes, leur conduite, en aient été influencés, sans qu'on puisse les accuser d'aliénation, différence énorme qui les sépare des hallucinés aliénés, dont les conversations, les actions, les gestes ont toujours un cachet de folie, qui ne sont l'expression d'aucun besoin, ne remplissent aucune mission, en un mot, ne paraissent d'aucune utilité à leurs semblables."

M. Brierre de Boismont refers to the case of Socrates, but apparently does

not know how completely the contemporary evidence justifies his view of it.

² "The answer is very significant which a melancholic gave to Esquirol, who spoke to him regarding the falseness of his hallucinations of hearing. 'During conversation he said to me, 'Do you think sometimes?' 'Without doubt,' said I. 'Very well; you think quietly, and I, I think aloud.''" Griesinger, p. 90. This patient being described as a melancholic, his is a case of hallucination and something more, not of simple hallucination. It would seem too that all his thoughts were uttered aloud, not merely, as with Socrates, some of them.

culiarity of the case of Socrates was the length of time during which the hallucination was repeated unaccompanied by mental derangement. In the following instance we may fairly distinguish two periods, one during which the hallucinations were the transformations of rational thoughts, another during which the hallucinations were accompanied by mental aberration.

“A patient in the York Dispensary used to complain bitterly of a voice repeating in his ear everything that he was reading; and on one occasion he distinctly heard the same voice commanding him to throw himself into a pond in his garden. He obeyed the voice; and when removed from the water and asked why he had done so rash an act, he replied that he much regretted it, but added, ‘*he* told me that I must do it, and I could not help it¹.’” Bucknill and Tuke’s *Manual of Psychological Medicine*, p. 138.

Thus, on the one hand, it would appear from the foregoing extracts, that modern authorities admit the existence of hallucination of sense not accompanied by derangement of reason: and on the other, the evidence of Xenophon and Plato seems to limit Socrates’s disorder to simple hallucination of sense. M. Lélut however, who apparently makes no distinction between their testimony and that of Plutarch, finds himself constrained to regard the hallucination of the sense of hearing as only a part, and the least important part, of Socrates’s malady. Apparently he bridges over the gulf which separates the evidence of Xenophon and Plato from the traditions of after ages by means of the Theages, a dialogue wrongly, as I think, attributed to Plato. As I have taken no notice of it in my outline of the Platonic testimony, it is now incumbent upon me to show how the view of the sign represented in it differs from that represented in the other dialogues, and next to indicate the reasons which induce me to agree with the many modern

¹ This case, despite some striking resemblances, differs materially from that of Socrates. So long as the voice heard by this patient merely repeated ideas already present to his mind, it resembled that which haunted Socrates: but when it urged him to an act

which he *regretted*, the patient had passed into a stage at which, as I conceive, Socrates never arrived. Socrates, so far as we can tell from the evidence before us, never would have heard a voice telling him to do that which he regretted.

critics who expunge it from the Platonic Canon. In brief, the Theages differs from the other dialogues in making the *δαίμόνιον* a distinct god, who not only guides Socrates in the choice of pupils (or, more exactly, in the rejection of pupils), but also determines the amount of progress which the pupils make: nay, Theages suggests, and Socrates does not reject the suggestion, that they should attempt to conciliate the god by prayer and sacrifice. Thus the dialogue, if retained, not only gives countenance to the statement of M. Lélut, that Socrates believed in a personal divinity who attended upon him, but also, as I have said, fills the gap by which the evidence of the two disciples is separated from the traditions of later writers. Obviously the discrepancy between the statements of the Theages and those of other dialogues is in itself suspicious; but it becomes something more than suspicious, when we find that the very passages into which the questionable statements are introduced are borrowed from some of those dialogues. Thus the author of the Theages borrows from the Theaetetus the account of the interference of the sign to prevent Socrates from taking (in the Theaetetus from taking *back*) certain pupils; but, in the very middle of the passage borrowed, introduces the novel statement that the *δαίμόνιον* determined the amount of progress which the pupils made. In fact, the author of the Theages has misunderstood the phrase *οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη* (*Theaetet.* 150 D): hence the interpolation. Similarly, towards the end of the dialogue, he states that virtue was communicated to the pupil by the mere presence of Socrates, and in a still greater degree by contact with him; whereas in the Symposium, 175 D, E, we have a passage, at once similar and wholly inconsistent, in which Socrates ridicules the anxiety of Agathon to sit next him, as though virtue passed by mere contact from the one to the other. It is obvious that this combination of identity of expression with occasional inconsistent interpolations affords a very strong presumption against the dialogue; and our suspicions are in some measure strengthened by the occurrence in it of several words and phrases which cannot possibly have been used by Plato. For a more complete criticism of the Theages, I would refer the reader to

Schleiermacher's and Stallbaum's introductions, in which, as it seems to me, the *νοθεία* of the dialogue is clearly made out.

My theory is then, in brief, as follows: Socrates was subject to hallucinations of the sense of hearing, which, so far from implying any aberration of his reasoning faculties, were the momentary expressions of the results of rapid deliberation, and derived an extraordinary value from the accuracy and delicacy of his highly cultivated tact.

HENRY JACKSON.

PROPOSED EMENDATIONS OF THE TEXT OF ORIGEN
AGAINST CELSUS. Books I. II. III. IV.

HAVING gone through the First Four Books of *Origen against Celsus*, with especial regard to the accuracy of the generally well-preserved Text, I wish to call the attention of scholars to a few passages, which seem to require emendation; and to the corrections proposed by others, or by myself.

The various readings of the eight MSS. collated by De la Rue are given in the foot-notes of his Edition. (Paris, 1733.)

Mr Coxe, the Bodleian Librarian, has kindly supplied the following account of three MSS. now in Oxford.

1. *Bodleian*. Numbered in Bernard's "Catalog. Codd. MSS. Angl." 2275; now Cod. Misc. Gr. 21. Sec. xv.

2. *Bodleian*. Bernard's Catal. 3037. Now Cod. Misc. Gr. 36. Contains only the 1st Book, and beginning of 2nd, to ἡλθε πρὸς αὐτόν, c. 2. De la Rue's Ed. p. 388, l. 17. Sec. xvi.

3. *New College*. Cod. MS. 146, Sec. xvi., given by Cardinal Pole.

These are probably the *tres Anglicani* mentioned by De la Rue, T. i. p. 315, n.

The critical notes of *Elie Bouhereau*, appended to his French Translation of the Eight Books against Celsus (Amsterdam, 1700), seem better than any that I have met with; those of *François Guët*, (given by De la Rue,) often ingenious, more often rash, and at variance with sound principles of emendatory criticism.

Charles Ashton, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge (1701—1752), has left a copy of Spencer's Edition (Cambridge,

1758), with some good marginal notules, and useful references, in very small neat writing; this volume was kindly lent to me by the present Master, and one of Ashton's proposed corrections will be found below.

The references to page and line are to my own edition of the Four Books, where a table will be found giving the corresponding pages of Spencer's Edition, which has no division into chapters.

BOOK I.

C. 1, p. 1, l. 13. *εὐλόγως ἂν οὗτος...ὥς πρὸς τοὺς Σκύθας παρανομίαν, καὶ συνθήκας...ποιήσαι ἂν* the *ἂν* preceding seems to require a verb following; Q. *παρανομήσαι*.

C. 23, p. 19, l. 23. *καὶ οὐκ ἐρεῖ λόγος παραδέξασθαι.....* For *ἐρεῖ*, read *αἰρεῖ*: see Bk. VII. Ch. 7, *τοιούτους γὰρ καὶ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ δεῖν εἶναι*: and Euseb. Eclog. Proph. p. 1, l. 7; p. 10, l. 11, &c.

C. 49, p. 47, l. 5. *οὐ γὰρ ἂν καταβαλὼν τὰ ὑπὸ Χριστιανῶν λεγόμενα...περιέθηκε τῷ τοῦ Ἰουδαίου προσώπῳ...De la Rue suggests καταλαβών. A slighter change, καταβαλῶν, gives the sense required by the context; and so in IV. c. 32, p. 264, c. 3.*

C. 57, p. 55, l. 9. *ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν σωτήρα αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰουδαῖός φησιν.* Read *αὐτοῦ* (and in Bk. II. c. 77, l. 1). See II. c. 74, ὁ Ἰουδαῖος αὐτοῦ, and II. c. 73, l. 1, c. 77, p. 152, l. 22, 3.

BOOK II.

C. 13, p. 91, l. 12...*κατὰ τήνδε τὴν νομιζομένην θεοσέβειαν ὁ Σικάριος ἀγωνιζόμενος βιοῦν...Ashton, in margin; ἀναγνωρισμένος* better perhaps *ἀνεγνωρισμένος*.

C. 51, p. 125, l. 8. *δοκεῖ μοι παραπλήσιος εἶναι τῷ τιθέναι μὲν...Read τιθέντι.*

C. 53, p. 127, l. 18. *περὶ δὲ Μωϋσέως εἶπῃ ἂν ὁ ἀπιστῶν.* Read *εἴποι*. See p. 128, l. 11.

C. 53, p. 127, l. 24. *ἐὰν δὲ ἀναστῇ...καὶ δώσει σημεῖον.* Read, as in LXX. Version, *δῶ σοι*.

C. 56, p. 131, l. 16. *πῶς οἴονται τὸ παραπλήσιον...De la Rue; "videtur scribendum, οἶόν τε." The same correction is required, Bk. III. c. 3, p. 159, l. 17, and III. c. 22, p. 174, l. 20.*

BOOK III.

C. 10, p. 165, l. 4. οὐχ ὑποτεμνομένας. Bouhereau. "Legendum videtur, οὐχ ὑπομεμνημένας." Better, F. J. A. Hort, οὐχ ὑποτιμωμένας, not alleging as an excuse; see II. c. 25, p. 104, l. 9, καὶ μεθ' ὑποτιμήσεως.

C. 19, p. 171, l. 21. ἄρ' ὦ γενναῖε...Read ἄρ', ὦ γ. with notes of interrogation after λόγου and φαῦλα.

C. 29, p. 182, l. 12. πολλῶν κρείττους...Read πολλῶ. Ashton.

C. 76, p. 225, l. 7. ὥς εἴ τις μεθύων εἰς μεθύοντας παριὼν κακηγορεῖ τοὺς νήφοντας ὥς μεθύοντας. Read κακηγοροῖ.

BOOK IV.

C. 8, p. 238, l. 22. καὶ δεῖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταῦτα ἀφανισθῆναιἄψασθαι τοῦ περὶ μερίδων λόγου, καὶ σαφηνίσαι De la Rue. "Hæschelius in textu, ταύτας, sicque omnes MSS. male."

Spencer, text, ταῦτα ἀφανισθῆναι, marg. ταύτας. Read, ταῦτα σαφηνισθῆναι.

C. 14, p. 243, l. 15. ἀπαγγελίας· read ἐπαγγελίας.

C. 19, p. 248, l. 19. οὐ φῆς, ὦ Κέλσε. Ashton. σὺ φῆς.

C. 20, p. 249, l. 17. πληρωθέντα τὸν βίον πάσης κακίας δεῖσθαι τοῦ καταπεμπομένου ἀπὸ Θεοῦ. Read δεῖσθαί του. See IV. c. 2, p. 232, l. 17, 21, IV. c. 3, p. 234, l. 14.

C. 39, p. 275, l. 9, ἄρα γὰρ.....Spencer, ἄρα γὰρ. Q. ὄρα γὰρ.....See passim, ὄρα οὖν, ὄρα δὴ, ὄρα δέ.

C. 46, p. 283, l. 10. ἴδωμεν ἂν τὸν Ἰωσήφ,...Read ἴδοιμεν ἂν...

Ibid. ἐλόμενον κατακλεισθῆναι ἐν φυλακῇ, ἥπερ ἀπολέσθαι τὸν σῶφρονα.

De la Rue, "Legendum videtur νοῦν σῶφρονα, vel τὸ σῶφρον." Read ἀποθέσθαι. See Ep. to Ephes. iv. 22, ἀποθέσθαι ὑμᾶς...τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον.

C. 85, p. 322, l. 31. εἰ δ' ἅπαξ βλέπει. Read βλέποι.

C. 90, p. 328, l. 16. ἐνεργείας ... Correct from Philocalia, ἐναργείας.

C. 93, p. 332, l. 2. εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβαίνων τῇ σοφίᾳ εὐρών... Correct from Philocalia, εὔρεν.

C. 99, p. 337, l. 23. οὐκ ἀλλήλων (χάριν, sc.), ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ πᾶν ἔργον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὅλων. Read, as Bouhereau suggests, πάρεργον, i.e. secundario.

WILLIAM SELWYN.

ON THE NEWLY EDITED POEMS OF DRACONTIUS.

THE year 1873 has made an addition considerable in extent, if not in quality, to the extant fund of Latin poetry. In the National Library at Naples is a paper MS. of the closing xvth or early xvith century, containing in 115 pages ten poems of Dracontius, the last of them copied twice. Of these poems one, the *Helena*, 655 hexameters on the Rape of Helen, had already been published in the *Appendix ad opera edita ab Angelo Mai* MDCCCLXXI p. 10; and its existence, as well as that of the remaining nine poems, was known as far back as 1813, in which year Cataldo Iannelli not only contemplated an edition of the *Helena* and *Medea*, but actually printed some sheets; though, for reasons stated in an Italian letter sent by Antonio Iannelli, assistant librarian in the Naples Library, to the present editor, M. de Duhn, and appended to his preface, pp. iv, v, it did not see the light; a fatality which seems also to have befallen Mai's contemplated edition of the *Helena* till after his death.

The ten poems, as now printed by M. de Duhn from the Naples MS., are as follows :

1. *Praefatio Dracontii discipuli ad grammaticum Felicianum, ubi dicta est, metro trochaico cum fabula Ylae.*

A preface in 21 trochaic tetrameters.

2. *Exp. praefatio trochaicis uersibus dicta. Incipit Ylas.*
163 hexameters on the rape of Hylas.

3. *Exp. fabula Ylae. Incipit praefatio ad Felicianum grammaticum, cuius supra, in auditorio cum adlocutione.*
20 hexameters.

4. *Exp. praefatio. Incipit adlocutio. Uerba Herculis cum uideret Hydrae serpentis capita pullulare post caedes.*
53 hexameters.

5. *Controversia de statua uiri fortis. uir fortis optet praemium quod | uolet. pauper et diues inimici. bellum incidit ciuitati. diues fortiter | fecit: reuersus praemii nomine statuam petiit et meruit. secundo fortiter | egit: reuersus petiit praemii nomine asylum fieri statuam suam et | meruit. tertio fortiter fecit: reuersus petiit praemii nomine caput | pauperis inimici. pauper ad statuam diuitis confugit. contradicit.*

167 hexameters.

Quaestio: At inquires: sed pauper inimicus insidians potuit de morte diuitis cogitare.

15 hexameters.

Quaestio. At inquires: sed potest uenenum pauper diuiti secreta obreptione supponere.

41 hexameters.

Quaestio: At inquires: sed legi parendum est quae sanxit ut uir fortis optet praemium quod uolet.

106 hexameters.

6. *Epithalamium.*

122 hexameters.

7. *Epithalamium Ioannis et uitulae.*

159 hexameters.

8. *Dracontii opus de raptu Helenae.*

655 hexameters.

9. *Deliberatiua Achillis an corpus Hectoris uendat.*

36 hexameters.

At inquires: si post uitam animae corpora sua despiciunt, pro Hectore cur rogamus?

41 hexameters.

At inquires: dolorem meum leniam, percussorem Patrocli canibus et uolucris si dederò laniandum.

154 hexameters.

10. *Draconci Medea.*

601 hexameters.

To these, with the exception of the *Helena*, hitherto inedited poems, M. de Duhn appends the already well-known *Satisfactio* of Dracontius, a Christian poem in 316 Elegiacs, addrest to the Vandal king Guthamund, 484—496 A.D. (Teuffel, Hist. of Rom. Lit. II. p. 519). That the author of the *Satisfactio* is also the author of the new poems seems probable from the line *Temnit praedo cibos quos non facit ipse cadauer* occurring in both (*Satisf.* 143, *Hel.* 360). But the new collection must not be judged from the *Satisfactio*, they are very superior to it in every particular, especially the *Helena* and *Medea*, which are composed with a careful attention to rhetorical and metrical rules; and, though sometimes defaced by the prosodiacal laxity of the epoch, mainly in proper names, e.g. *Ēolus Polydāmās Clōthō Admētus Hēcuba*, and in lengthening final short syllables either *in arsi* or before a double consonant *Aiacīs haec, Phrygēs ego, uidēt hic, zonā flammatur, inuidiā Priamo, terrā strepitum*, but sometimes without these excuses, as in *muliēris quamuis*, and most outrageous of all *quōque* (twice); give unmistakeable proof of the systematized and artificial preservation of classical quantity long after the time when every kind of barbarism had set in. In fact, so careful, as a rule, is the prosody, that it may safely be asserted that a large number of the cases where it is violated are owing to the corruption of the MS. Several of these have already been removed by Bücheler, Bährens, and Ribbeck. I here add some corrections of my own, some of them mere changes in the punctuation, a remedy which has been successfully tried by Ribbeck, Rhein. Mus. XXVIII. 461—473, whose highly instructive, though not always convincing article, I have kept before me throughout. Throughout the poems elision is of the utmost rarity.

Praef. 6. If the MS. reading is rightly quoted in the App., the line may have ended *tunc pauor interritas*. In v. 1 *renarrant* is probably right; the *ut* corresponds to *taliter* in v. 12.

II. 37 sqq.

ut non pia patris

Oscula nata petat nec natus matris amator,

Dulce nefas cupiat frater uitietque sororem.

This seems to be the proper punctuation: *nec*, i.e. *nec pia oscula petat natus*.

81. *Moxque dei uultus uestiuit imago Naidís.*

In VII. 35 a line ends *et Naidas amnes*; hence so violent a change of quantity as *Nāīdis* is improbable. On the other hand, there would be nothing violent in *Nāīdis uestiuit imago*. A similar transposition of words has taken place in VIII. 133, *Me Fortuna petens et Pyrrhus ingens exspectat*; unless indeed this is, as I at first thought, a corruption of *Pyrrhus agens exspectat*, a spondaic ending not more impossible than the unusual *exutas Herculeas opes* of II. 150.

III. 11 sqq.

*At si temperies rerum opportuna negetur
Infecunda forent squallentia uiscera terrae
Et limus obducit ager deceptus inhaeret.*

Here *limus*, *deceptus* are manifestly corrupt: *limus* is probably *lumas*. Paul. Diac. p. 120 M. *Luma* genus herbae uel potius *spinae*. Varro, L. L. v. 137, mentions *falces lumariae et sirpiculae* together: *deceptus* may therefore be *et sirpus*. If *forent* is genuine, it is probably subj. of *forare*, a rare, but not unclassical, word.

14—16.

*Discipuli sic quippe silent si forte magister
Tollatur, doctrina potens qua praeduce dictor
Antistesque tuus.*

For *dictor* read *dicor*, 'the training with which to guide me in the path I am called capable, and a master in your craft.'

IV. 28.

*Hostes deesse mihi dixi post bella leonis
Quem nullo mucrone peti nec uestibus ullis
Implicui fretus manibus, †nec maurus ad illum
Cuius pelle tegor. nunc fortiter ecce †tabescent
Tertia bella gero quae caedes passa resurgunt.*

For the corrupt *nec maurus*, a participle would seem to be required, *mactandus* or *lacerandus*: for *tabescent* perhaps *capessens*.

v. 24.

*qui colla propinqui**Ciuis et insontis nititur truncare cruentus.*

It is difficult to believe that Dracontius wrote *nititur*; perhaps *sinitur*, cf. 246 *Pauperis, o ciues, languentia colla sinetis Carnificis truncare manum?*

50.

*Laetantur mites, gaudebat turba reorum**Et ueniam meruisse putant.*

The imperfect *gaudebat* is meaningless; read *gaudebit*. For *mites* Bücheler suggests *maesti*; I propose *dites*, the rich, who with such a shield to protect them, have no fear of being punished for their crimes.

108—110.

*Sic sapiens olim Romana potentia iussit**Ne pereat Carthago nocens inimica senatus,**Et populi Aeneadum cotem uirtutis habendam.*

This is the natural punctuation, not after *Aeneadum*, as de Duhn.

133.

*Sorbeat ereptum uel morsibus illa cruentis**Uel uiuente iecur.*

Ereptum need not be altered; so *Amputet eripiens uictricia colla bipennis*. Orest. 145.

194.

*pauidos informat egestas**Diuitiae uires praestant animosque resumunt.*

Obviously *infirmat*.

199.

*nec laedat honestos**In commune bonus totos defendat et ornet.*

Bücheler *bonos*, which is harsh metrically, and odd grammatically, in spite of *totos qui uicit Hiberos* in 209. The words *in commune bonus* seem to explain *totos*, whether *totos* is 'them all,' i.e. all the *honesti*, or 'the whole community.' In 212 *sorbere* seems to prove that Ribbeck is right in reading *mulgere* in VIII. 414, for the MS. *mulcere*, a correction which had also occurred to me.

218.

*pius inde Camillus**Missus in exilium nec Romula tecta uideret*

*Ni satis offerret, victor licet, exul ab urbe,
Cum Romanorum Gallis vexilla tulisset
Exul et extorris meruit de clade triumphum.*

For *nec* read *ne*.

v. 307.

imitare leones

*Quos feritas generosa iuuat superba temnentes
Ingruere fremitusque dare procul ore cruento
Nobilis ira solet, subiectis parcere gaudent.*

For *superba temnentes*, Bücheler proposes *super arma tenentes*. Possibly Dracontius wrote *super ense ruentes*.

vi. 69.

*Pan calamis perflare melos, Bacchaeque rotari
Sileno saltante placent.*

If *placent* is not a late use for 'are delighted,' *calent* 'are eager' might be the required word. Cf. vii. 86, *Mox studium calor omnis abit*.

122. *Floribus et vestris crescat generata propago.*

Rather *moribus*.

vii. 132, 3.

*Nam deus omnipotens compungit corda dolentis
Quando iubet pietate sua ueniamque relaxat.*

Lubet seems obviously right.

viii. 31 sqq.

*Iam gremium caespes, iam surgens herbida tellus
Stabat et aetherium fuerant herbosa tribunal.*

I see no necessity for altering this. 'Already the sod, already the grassy ground rising into a knoll stood as a bower, and turfy spaces had been the place of judgment for immortals.'

Gremium might, I think, well be applied to a retired recess in the woods such as would be suitable to the arbitration of Paris.

31. *damnantur morte parentes*
Damnantur fratres et quisquis†in morte propin-
quus,
Aut cognatus erat, cunctis mors explicat una.

De Duhn reads *quisquis in urbe*, Bährens and Ribbeck *quis-
 quis sorte*; possibly *quisquis amore*.

104. *Uera fides pietas quatiunt†mors corda parentum*
Admissumque nefas generosa mente futetur
Fusus in ore rubor. Paridis mox colla lacertis
Adligat.

Mai or Iannelli changed *mors* to *mox*, no doubt a very favourite word with Dracontius. Here, however, it is unusually weak, and still weaker with *mox* so immediately following. Perhaps the true reading is *quatit intima corda parentum*. If so, *uera* (which Ribbeck changes to *uerba*) should be kept.

178. *si forte profanus*
Hunc feriet quicumque reum, sit in urbe sacerdos.
Cedo loco si forte meo pius esse†recucasat,
Pontifices Helenus Laocoon sacrata potestas
Cedent oranti uel amysticus extat uterque.

Reading with Iannelli and Mai *recusat* and *cedent*, I translate 'If any unconsecrated person happen to strike this guilty man, let him be priest in Troy. If he happen to refuse the task, let him know I am ready to retire from my place in his favour. The priests Helenus and Laocoon, officers solemnly consecrated, will retire at my entreaty, as surely as each of them is duly initiated.' Cassandra is speaking; she is ready to resign her priesthood to any one who kills Paris; and she vouches for Helenus and Laocoon doing the same, as surely as they are themselves solemnly consecrated.

308. There should be no note of interrogation after *Quis uicit*, upon which the following clause *ut istud Audiat Alcides* obviously depends.

319. *non uilis pignoris Ajax* seems to mean 'no mean sort of son:' a curious extension of the genitive of quality.

407. *Sed celso de monte uident ut in arce sedentes
Pascua rura nemus fontes et flumina prata
Per campos gestire pecus.*

Can *flumina prata* be for *fluminea prata*? There are not wanting similar examples, x. 566: *Aera saeva petit uolitans quadriga uenena*, 'the poisonous chariot,' and so perhaps in v. 68: *si uincla gerens ergastula portet*, where Bücheler reads *perfert*, the right reading may be *putet*, 'if he rots in wearing prison chains.' Cf. Ovid's *fraxina uirga*, Her. xi. 76.

410. For *Et* I would read not *ut*, but *At*.

413. The infinitives *potare* and *edere* (? *mandere*) seem to depend on *exultant*. Ribbeck has cleared up much difficulty here by altering de Duhn's punctuation. *Mulgere*, as he shews, depends on *Quantus amor*!

451. *Respicit ad templum Ueneris, cui turba precantum
Uel conventus erat, mox uertit iter ad aras.*

Bücheler changes *iter* into *iturus*, Ribbeck into *ut intret*; it seems more likely that *iter* represents *inter*, hence *mox inter uertit ad aras* 'turns aside to the altars.'

461. *Et sic orsus ait* is, I think, a designed anacoluthon, like Aen. ix. 403, *et sic uoce precatur*; there seems no reason for supposing a verse to be lost. In 260 *postquam legatio Troiae sedit* (*sederat* de Duhn) *et Antenor placida sic uoce profatur*, it is more doubtful, perhaps wrong, as Ribbeck considers it to be in both passages.

515. If this line is here inserted out of its place, Ribbeck's view that it follows 503 is the most plausible that is likely to be suggested. But may it not after all be right where it is? The asyndeton is not unlike the general tone of the passage *Reginam laudabat amans, culpare maritum Coeperat absentem*, and the loosely annexed participle *Adiungens* in 516. The meaning would be, 'he had begun to blame the absent Menelaus because Helen had been left to neglect and solitude, had been forced to visit the rites and temple of Venus,' viz. to obtain some relief by prayers to the goddess, or in the ex-

citement of the festival. At any rate *uel templa* ought not to be altered, as this use of *uel* is a characteristic feature of all the newly discovered poems. See the examples in de Duhn's appendix, and cf. especially x. 362 *ad pellem uel templum Martis abire*.

529.

*mox hæc est verba locutus
Tyndaridis faciles quatiunt suspiria sensus.*

De Duhn would change *mox* to *uix*, and so Bährens and Ribbeck. This *mox* occurs again in a passage where it has little meaning 608, *Nam quicumque memor Heleni mox dicta tenebat*; and in both places perhaps conceals one word, *Phrix* or *Frix*.

648. *Ite pares sponsi iam omina tetra probastis
Martis.*

Rather *iam iam*.

IX. 58.

*Anne Parin fortuna iubet? qui crine madenti
Inter lanigeras gaudet latuisse puellas.
Nec mater ueneranda iubet; quod laudis habetur,
Hoc agit, et pugnam thalamis exercet adulter
Pectore femineo.*

In each verse *iubet* should, I think, be retained: neither success in battle, nor the voice of Hecuba are likely to order Paris to the field of battle. He is busied with the one thing considered honourable, love. So v. 253, *Laudis erit fateor pro libertate perire*.

x. 87.

*Hymenæus ad illum
Mittitur; huic fluctus produnt spumantibus undis.*

Bücheler proposes *hunc*. I believe that *huic* is right: 'to him (viz. Hymenæus), the waves betray where Cupid is by the seething of the waters,' and this agrees with what immediately follows *Ut pelagus caluisse uidet*.

105.

*Cinnama cui folium nardum tus balsama amomum
Informant post secla pyram reditura.*

Folium is explained by Isidorus Origg. xvii. 9. 3.

*Folium dictum quod sine ulla radice innatans in Indiae
litoribus colligatur. Quod perforatum lino siccant Indi atque
reponunt. Fertur autem paradisi esse herba gustu nardum
referens.*

107.

*et uerberat alas
Ut flammasciscat avis, sic nascitur ignis
Ante alitem ambrosios iam consumpturus odores.*

There can be little doubt that *ante alitem* is a corruption of *ante diem* (*ditem*), cf. 103, *Pectinat ante diem*.

421.

*cuicunque iubebis
Colla parat feriat.*

De Duhn gives *paro*; better *para*.

R. ELLIS.

ON TWO PASSAGES OF STATIUS' SILVAE.

I. 6. 12.

*Quidquid nobile Ponticis nucetis,
Fecundis cadit aut iugis Idumes,
Quod ramis pia germinat Damascus,
Et quas praecoquit †Ebusia cannas.*

IT is generally supposed that the extraordinary word *Ebusia* is another form of the island Ebusus, *Iviça*, as *Cēa* is of *Cēos*. But no instance is quoted of such an use, and if Statius did employ the word in this way he was guilty of two irregularities in one word. For the first syllable of *Ebusus* is short in all the instances which I have been able to find in Latin or Greek poetry, and Dionysius Periegetes, as well as his translators Avienus and Priscianus, all use the form *Ἐβουρος Ebusus*: cf. Strabo 167. To add to this difficulty by the equally unusual process of converting the substantive *Ebusus* into an adjectival *Ebusia*, and this with no special reason for the elongation of the penultima, is a feat much beyond Statius, and may safely be pronounced impossible. Happily the remedy is not very far off. The commentators seem right in explaining the line of the sugar-cane, which to the Romans was known, I believe only, in connexion with the East. Seneca, Epist. 84. *Aiunt inveniri apud Indos mel in harundinum foliis, quod aut ros illius caeli aut ipsius harundinis umor dulcis et pinguior gignat.* Luc. Phars. III. 235—237. *Quaque ferens rapidum diuiso gurgite fontem Vastis Indus aquis mistum non sentit Hydaspen, Quique bibunt tenera dulces ab harundine sucos,* where the Scholiast says, *Agroetes significantur Indiae ulterioris*

populi, qui cannarum uiridium caudicibus tunsis siue tritis mella dicuntur exprimere. Plin. H. N. XII. 32. Saccharon et Arabia fert sed laudatius India; est autem mel in harundinibus collectum, cummum modo candidum, dentibus fragile. Isidor. Origg. XVII. 7. 58. In Indicis stagnis nasci harundines calamique dicuntur, ex quorum radicibus expressum suavissimum sucum bibunt, unde et Varro ait:

*Indica¹ non magna minor arbore crescit harundo
Illius e lentis premitur radicibus umor
Dulcia cui nequeant suco contendere mella.*

In this passage of Varro Atacinus some of the MSS. of Isidorus give *magnum in ebore* (Riese, Varron. Saturae, p. 264), others *magnum in arbore*; a proof that *ebore* and *arbore* might be confounded. And such I think is the fact in the passage of Statius; for *ebosia* therefore read *arbor Inda*.

S. II. 3. 31 sqq.

*Illa deam pariter surgens hostemque proteruum
Vidit, et in fontem niveos ne panderet artus
Sicut erat, cum ueste ruit, stagnisque sub altis
Pana sequi credens ima latus implicat alga.*

35. *Quid faceret subito deceptus praedo? neque altis
Credere corpus aquis hirtae sibi conscius audet
Pellis et a tenero nandi rudis: omnia questus,
Immitem † Bromium stagna inuida et inuida tela,
Primaevam visu platanum cui longa propago,*
40. *Innumeraeque manus et iturus in aethera uertex,
Deposuit iuxta uiuaeque aggressit harenae.*

Statius has transferred in this poem the mythology of Greece to the hills of Rome. He represents Pan pursuing the nymph Pholoe over that part of the Caelian where in his own day the house of Atedius Melior stood, perhaps, as may be

¹ The first of these lines is also found in the Scholia to Lucan III. 237, edited by Usener, and the reading *minor* thus fixed against Voss's conj. in Isidorus, *nimis*.

inferred from v. 22, at that part where it faces towards the Aventine.

Pholoe sinks exhausted on the bank of a stream, and is on the point of being seized by her ravisher when Diana, angry at the repeated perils to which her retinue is exposed from the wantonness of Pan and the Satyrs, rouses her, as she is sinking into sleep, by a lightly thrown arrow. What must the baffled ravisher do? His body is too rough and he is too little practised in swimming to plunge in. All he can do is to complain of his ill-luck, and leave some record of his love and its failure. What then does he complain of? Of the jealous waters, the jealous arrow, and *Bromius*.

It is obvious that *Bromius*, if by that name is meant Bacchus, can have no place here. But *Bromius* is also the name of one of the twelve sons of the nymph Calyande, and these twelve sons of a nymph wedded the twelve daughters of a Naiad Polyxo (Apollod. ii. 1. 5). We might therefore suppose that *Bromius*, as a kinsman, possibly as a suitor, had in some way interfered to prevent the rape of Pholoe. But if so, Statius would, I think, have mentioned it; whereas not a hint is given of any such intervention. Scaliger, who saw the difficulty, changed *Bromium* to *Brimo*, a name of Hecate in her angry mood, and here synonymous with Diana. The emendation has been accepted by the editors of the *Silvae* generally, and if it could be shewn that Statius wrote *Brimun* (*Brimum*), as accus. of *Brimo*, might be considered very plausible. But *Bromium* and *Brimo* (*Brimon*) are not very close, palæographically; at least there is a word much more nearly resembling it, and with a special significance to the occasion. Athenæus xiv. 619 F. speaking of songs commemorating unhappy love, the *Καλύκη*, the *Ἀρπαλύκη*, the *Νόμιος*, adds to these a Maryandynian dirge, which recorded how a youth named Bormus, of surpassing beauty, whilst occupied in superintending his farm and procuring some water for his reapers, was drowned (*ἀφανισθῆναι*). The dirge was itself called *Βῶρμος*, or *Βώριμος* (Pollux iv. 54) and, like the Lityerses mentioned by Theocritus x. 42, was specially connected with the country and rural occupations. Pollux says he died in the chase in

summer; a slight variation on the account of Athenæus. To this Bormus, himself lost in a stream, and probably addressed in some of the songs bearing his name as a wrathful power whose agency caused similar untimely disappearances, I suppose Statius to allude here. If any one objects that Bormus is a local deity, I reply that so also was Lityerses; yet Theocritus shews that the name had become a general one, and doubtless the legend also: and the same remark holds of the Linus and the Maneros. The name Βῶρμος occurs also in the Schol. to Apoll. R. II. 710, where the Laurentian MS. gives Βάρμνον.

R. ELLIS.

ON SULPICIAE SATIRA.

Bährens in a recent edition of this Satire supposes with Carutti that in vv. 53—56 *Conuenit ut uespis quarum domus arce Monetae Turba tegens strictis per lutea corpora telis. Ast ubi apes secura redit, oblita fauorum Plebs fraterque una somno moriuntur obeso*, a conflict between wasps and bees is described, such as is mentioned by Pliny H. N. XI. 61. But if, as seems probable, Sulpicia was here following Homer Il. II. 257 sqq., cf. ὁδῶ ἐπὶ οἰκίᾳ ἔχοντας with *domus*, καὶ ἀμύνει οἷσι τέκεσσι with *Turba tegens* and *Suadet amor patriae et captiua penatibus uxor*, there can be no allusion to bees in the passage, any more than in the similar passage of Lycophron Al. 180 sqq. Hence *apes* in v. 55 must be wrong. L. Müller proposed for this *res*; perhaps *opis* may be right, a genitive depending upon *secura*, 'with no further care for defence.'

In v. 60 *uti quondam Smyrnalibusque peribat* I have long suspected the corrupt *libusque* to represent *Lirusque* (*Lerusque*). The line might then be *uti quondam dum Smyrna Lerusque peribat*, the allusion conceivably to Pherecydes of Leros who seems to have emigrated and gone to settle in Athens.

R. ELLIS.

ON THE SIXTH LETTER OF ISOKRATES.

THE sixth letter of Isokrates is inscribed τοῖς Ἰάσονος παισίν,
To the children of Jason.

Analysis:—‘One of our envoys has brought me word that you asked him privately whether I could be persuaded to come and take up my abode with you. For the sake of my friendship with Jason I would gladly consent; but many things hinder me. First, old age. It would not become me to leave Athens *now*, when, if I were abroad, I ought to be hastening back to die. Next, to say the truth, I do not trust Athens. Her alliances, I see, are short-lived. Should her alliance with you prove so, I, living with you, would have to side with friends against friends.

‘I will try, however, to discuss your affairs as I would have done if I had come to you.

‘Now—you have to consider what kind of life and what kind of reputation it is that you wish for; whether you desire honours given by, or extorted from, your fellow-citizens; and then you must shape your course accordingly.

‘To me the life of a private man seems better than that of a king, and the honours of a republic pleasanter than those of a monarchy.

‘I know that this view will have many opponents, especially among those who are about you now. They reckon only the power and the pleasures of royalty, ignoring its troubles and its dangers. But your real friends ought to state fairly both sides of the question.’

At this point the fragment breaks off. Who were the children of Jason to whom this letter was written, and what was its occasion and date?

The only notices of the letter which I have been able to find agree in supposing that it was written immediately after the death of Jason. (1) Dobree, *Adden.* I. 284, says 'statim, ut videtur, post Jasonis mortem.' In a modern Greek edition of Isokrates, vol. 2 of Didot's *Ἑλληνικὴ βιβλιοθήκη*, the commentator says—*εἰκὸς οὖν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην γεγράφθαι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὸν πατρὸς θάνατον τοῖς παισίν.*

Jason, tyrant of Pherae and tagos of Thessaly, was assassinated in OL 102. 3, 370 B. C. The facts known about his successors may be summed up thus¹:—

370. On the death of Jason, his brothers Polydoros and Polyphron become joint tyrants of Pherae and tagoi of Thessaly. Polydoros is soon after murdered by Polyphron.

369. Alexander, son of Polydoros and nephew of Jason, murders Polyphron and reigns in his stead.

359. (Diod. xvi. 14 says 357, but see Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* and Schäfer's *Demosthenes.*) Alexander is murdered at the instigation of his wife Thebe, by her brothers, Tisiphonos, Peitholaos and Lykophron. Thebe and Tisiphonos, the eldest brother, share the chief power.

358. Tisiphonos dies. Lykophron and Peitholaos presently avail themselves of the distraction caused by the Phocian War (357 B. C.) to establish a joint tyranny at Pherae.

352. Philip of Macedon deposes Lykophron and frees Pherae.

Now there is nothing to show that at Jason's death in 370 there were any children of his in a position like that of the persons to whom Isokrates wrote, i.e. with the choice open to them of being tyrants or the chief citizens of a free city. According to Diodoros and Xenophon, the two brothers Polydoros and Polyphron simply succeeded Jason at once, as joint tyrants and tagoi. There is no hint of any interval during which children of Jason's were his recognised successors; far less of any debate about the future form of government such as that to which the letter of Isokrates refers.

The clue to the real occasion of the letter seems to be given

¹ From Diod. xv. 60, xvi. 14, and Xen. *Hellen.* vi. iv. 3.

by a fact noticed incidentally by Plutarch in his life of Pelopidas, and by no one else, so far as I know. In connection with the capture of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pherae, he has to mention Thebe, and he describes her as *θυγάτηρ μὲν Ἰάσονος οὔσα, γυνὴ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου* (c. 28).

Thebe, wife of Alexander the nephew of Jason, was, then, herself the daughter of Jason. The letter of Isokrates was written to Thebe and her brothers Tisiphonos, Peitholaos and Lykophron, in 359 B.C., soon after the death of Alexander, Isokrates being then 77.

Now Diodoros says of them (xvi. 14):—‘At first they had great acceptance as despot-killers; but afterwards they changed their minds, made a bargain with hireling troops, and set themselves up as despots; and after putting out of the way many of those who wrought against them, and bringing their power up to a noteworthy strength, they seized the government.’

Isokrates wrote before they had wholly ‘changed minds,’ but while, as he says, flatterers were ‘spurring them on to despotism’ (*ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννίδα παροξύνοντες* § 12). The embassy from Athens, noticed in § 1, had no doubt been prompted by the hope that the government of Pherae was about to become democratic.

R. C. JEBB.

ON THE HOMERIC WORDS ἈΤΑΡΤΗΡΟΣ ἘΠΙΤΑΡΡΟΘΟΣ ΠΡΟΘΕΛΥΜΝΟΣ.

THE first two words may be considered together, as they appear to illustrate a curious corruption, or rather perhaps commutation of the digamma and the dental τ. I don't mean that a labial thus passes into a dental, but only that the unwritten digamma, in one or two words where the metre required a certain number of syllables, was conveniently represented by some other letter, as by τ. A similar instance is ἐπηετανός, which was originally ἐπιετανός, (ἐτος, ετος, *vetus*,) and in which the necessary five syllables are retained by the insertion of the η as an equivalent to the ιF. In ἀταρτηρός, which is found twice in Homer (Il. i. 223, Od. ii. 243), evidently as a synonym of ἀτηρός, 'mischievous,' I cannot doubt that the original form, ἀατηρός, which we know was also ἀφατηρός (Pindar has the Aeolic ἀβάτα, i.e. ἀφατα, Pyth. III. 24), was sustained or rendered more easy for metrical recitation, by pronouncing or writing it with the τ and the ρ, which are merely euphonic accretions. It is, therefore, like ἐπηετανός, a pseudo-archaic form; it was preferred to ἀατηρός, although such forms as ἀᾗατος or ἀᾗᾗτος (ἀν-αφατος), ἀᾗσεν or ἀᾗσεν, ἀεσίφρων, ἀᾗσάμην, ἀᾗται, &c., all which Buttmann has discussed at considerable length in the Lexilogus, were allowed to remain with an *hiatus*. Indeed, these words themselves, which are strictly synonyms of ἀτάω (of which, however, only the passive present is found), and so, in all probability, nothing but shorter forms of the same verb, seem to show that the τ is no part of the root. If it was, like the F, it may have dropped out, as it has in the old Latin forms *suntod*, *bonod*, *ted*, &c. Hence we have ἀνα—τα (comp. ἀρε—τὰ), ᾗτ—έω, ἀά—ω, but ἀτᾗσθαι for ἀφατᾗσθαι (comp. ἀρετάω). No doubt the participle ᾗτέοντα may stand

for ἀατέοντα, if we suppose the *a* to be long and the word pronounced ἀτοῦντα by *synizesis*, in Il. xx. 332,

Αἰνεΐα τίς σ' ὦδε θεῶν ἀτέοντα κέλευει
ἀντία Πηλεΐωνος ὑπερθύμοιο μάχεσθαι;

or, if the *α* be regarded as short, the neuter ἀτέω may have been coined by rhapsodists on the analogy of μαρτῦρω and μαρτῦρέω, κῦω and κῦεω, κῦρω and κῦρέω. The fact that Herodotus uses ἀτέοντες in VII. 223, in the sense of 'deluded,' 'infatuated,' seems to be some guaranty that the word really belonged to the Ionic dialect of his time. And the short *α* in ἀτάσθαλος, which has some analogies to ἀταρτηρὸς (all those words involving the notions of sin, delusion, and consequent harm), will sustain the short *a*, and tend to shew that the digammated ἄφατα is only a varying form of the first syllable.

A somewhat more curious corruption is ἐπιτάρροθος, 'an ally,' used several times in Homer, and acknowledged, I believe, to be a lengthened form of ἐπίρροθος, though the principle of the lengthening has not been pointed out.

Like ῥάκος, ῥόδον, ῥῆγος, *frigus*, the word ῥόθος took an initial digamma, still retained in our derivative *froth*. Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1387,

λάβεσθε κώπης ῥόθιά τ' ἐκλευκαίνετε.

Now this word, a guttural sound *hroth*, formed by *onomatopœa*, was extended to a dissyllable *heroth* or *wheroth*, like *world* for *woruld*, and as *Feikosi* became *εἵκοσι*, *Φισάμενος* *εἰσάμενος*, &c. Then ἐπιφερροθος was a word of five syllables, and by a kind of metrical necessity it passed into ἐπιτάρροθος. It is curious to find such a monster form as τάρροθος in Lycophron, 360, 400, &c., noticed in Liddell and Scott under ἐπιτάρροθος. I know it is a *dictum* with philologers, that *ε* does not pass into *α*. To my mind it is simply a question whether τέρροθος or τάρροθος is the easier or more natural pronunciation. As for the sense, ἐπίρροθος is analogous to ἐπίκουρος, 'one who adds himself to the κοῦροι, or κουρήτες,' the fighting-men. So one who goes to the noise of the fray, ἐπὶ ῥόθον, brings aid to those hard pressed. Hesychius thus rightly explains ἐπίρροθος by ἐπίκουρος, βοηθός. And thus Aeschylus speaks of death as

παγκλαύτων ἀλγέων ἐπίρροθον, a resource and assistance in griefs, Theb. 368. In the sense of applauding or assenting, ἐπιρροθεῖν means 'adding to the general buzz or tumult.' (Eur. Hec. 553.)

The adjective προθέλυμνος belongs to a large class of words, all more or less nearly connected with the root *θε* or *dhā*, 'to place,' through its nasalised form *θεμ*. Thus we have θέμεθλον and θεμείλια, 'foundations;' the adjective θεμέλιος, θέμις, 'law or justice;' θελεμός, for θεμελός, 'staid,' 'tranquil,' 'composed;' another form of which is θεμερός, the terminations in -ερός and -ελός being most frequent. The transposition of λ and μ is euphonic, much as Ἀγλαυρος for Ἀγραυλος, 'field-singer' (an epithet of the *cicada*), and κλοτοπεύω for κλοποτεύω, to be a κλοπέτης or κλέπτης, Il. XIX. 149. Aeschylus has θεμερῶπις αἰδώς, 'staid modesty,' Prom. 134, just as ὄμμα ἥσυχον, 'a quiet eye,' expresses modesty in Suppl. 199. Hesychius has θέμερον and θεμερύνεσθαι (compare σεμνύνω, μεγαλύνω), and θεμέρη, βεβαία, σεμνή, εὐσταθής; θεσμός, 'an ordinance,' is like δεσμός from δέω, and θέμα, 'a theme,' like πόμα. From the correlation between *setting* and *fixing* we have θεμῶσαι in Od. IX. 486, 542, where the wave carried or *set* the ship to the shore,

θέμωσε δὲ χέρσον ἰκέσθαι,

just as *θοός*, 'quick,' and *θοῶσαι*, 'to sharpen,' χάραξ, 'a pointed stick,' and *χαράσσω*, 'to scratch,' &c.

As for *θάλαμος* and *θυμέλη*, 'an altar, or altar-step,' though both might involve the idea of placing, it seems safer to refer the former to the root *θαλ*, as in *θαλερός*, 'flourishing and blooming,' the latter to *τυφ* or *θυ*, 'to burn,' as in *tus*, *θύος*, *θύειν*, and probably *θείον*, 'sulphur.'

Thus προθέλυμνος will mean, just like πρόρριζος, 'far-down to the very foundation,' and τετραθέλυμνος will mean a shield that has 'four layers or foundations' of hide or other material. Hesych. θέσεις τέσσαρας ἔχον, τετράπτυχον. In Ar. Pac. 1210,

οἷμ' ὥς προθέλυμνόν μ', ὦ Τρυγαῖ', ἀπώλεσας,


the meaning is *funditus*, 'utterly,' πανώλεθρον, and so προθέλυμνους ἔλκετο χαίτας, Il. X. 15, 'he tore up his hair from the very roots.' In Il. XIII. 130,

φράξαντες δόρυ δουρὶ, σάκος σάκει προθελύμνῳ,

the sense appears to be 'shield with deep-set layers.' It may, however, be fairly doubted, if the rhapsodist, in this instance, really knew the full meaning of the word he was using. As for the form *θέλυμνος*, I think it is for *θέλεμος* pronounced *θέλεμμος*, like *νώνυμνος* and *δίδυμνος*, *ἀτέραμνος* and *ἀτεράμων*, from root *τερ* (*τείρειν*, *terere*). Hesychius recognises the intermediate form *θέλεμνον*, which he explains *ὅλον ἐκ ῥιζῶν*. So *Ἰππόδαμνος* and *Εὐδάμνιππος* are for *Ἰππόδᾶμος* and *Εὐδᾶμιππος*, by the strong pronunciation of the double *μ*, and not from a present form of the verb, *δάμνημι*.

I have now a few remarks to add¹ on a well-known passage in *Od.* i. 442, where the old nurse Euryclea is described as putting the young Telemachus to bed, and shutting and fastening the door by drawing the bolt internally from the outside.

There was a simple, but very ingenious contrivance, by which a door-latch could be so fastened from the outside that neither from within nor from without could it be opened by a single hand. This was done by a moveable bolt that was shot into a staple in the doorpost within, simply by pulling a string from without; and when this string, which hung down externally, was tied to the door-ring, the bolt could not be drawn back from within. The plan is thus shown, *A* being the external, *B* the internal plan of the door.



¹ This account of the Homeric door-fastening was illustrated by a small working-model.

It is obvious that if the bolt (*cd*) moves freely between the staples or sockets that keep it in the horizontal position, by pulling the string that runs through the hole (*e*) on the outside, it will be shot into the staple fixed in the door-post, and so prevent the door from being opened on the outside. And again, by tying the string to the ring, *κορώνη*, (*f*), the person within is himself a prisoner till some one from without unties it; and even then none but the person within can thrust the bolt back.

A latch-key, however, was used for opening the door from without. We have an account of this in *Od.* XXI. 46:

*αὐτίκ' ἄρ' ἥ γ' ἱμάντα θοῶς ἀπέλυσε κορώνης,
ἐν δὲ κληῖδ' ἤκε, θυρέων δ' ἀνέκοπτεν ὀχῆας
ἄντα τιτυσκομένη.*

The thong being untied from the ring externally, a key was inserted in the key-hole (*g*) to strike back the bolt from the socket in the door-post. A small pin on the upper part of the bolt near where the thong was fastened, could be caught by the key, and the bolt thus drawn back.

Dr Hayman, who has explained, with his usual care and research, this arrangement, in *Append. A.* 15 to the 1st Volume of the *Odyssey*, (where I am glad to find that he nearly agrees with my view, which however was formed independently,) suggests that when the thong was tied outside to the ring, the person inside might have let himself out by slipping the thong from a button or crook on the bolt. In this case, however, there would have been no use in tying the thong to the ring. I rather fancy the contrivance was designed to prevent the escape of slaves, who might indeed have cut the thong, but then they might not have been allowed any instrument for the purpose.

F. A. P.

ON A PASSAGE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

IN the latter part of the famous passage in Plato's Republic (VI. p. 488 Steph.), where the Athenian democracy is satirized under the image of a mutinous ship's crew, an emendation seems to be required, on grounds both of language and of sense. In the first place, we have in the present text, as given by all the best manuscripts, a quite inexplicable substitution of nominative for accusative. We are asked to "conceive the sailors" (*νόησον...τοὺς ναύτας...*), then their actions are described by a long series of accusative participles, till we come to the following:

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾗ, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μὴδ' ἐπαίοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὥρων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὸς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει εἰάν τε τινες βούλωνται εἰάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατόν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν.

Now no doubt there are several instances in Plato's writing of nominative participles introduced in an asyntactic manner. But in all such cases there is some involution of thought or complication of construction which explains how the writer felt impelled to break off and make a fresh start with an absolute nominative. For such an abrupt change as we have

here in a series of simply connected participles I can conceive no reason and have found no parallel. Accordingly Bekker, Stallbaum and others adopt the remedy, more simple than satisfactory, of reading *ἐπαίοντας...οἰομένους*.

But these editors do not seem to have noticed a still more serious difficulty in the meaning of the sentence as it now stands. In the first part of the passage above quoted Plato complains that his fellow-citizens mistake a mere party tactician for a statesman : "they call him...κυβερνητικὸν who shows a talent for co-operating ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι." In the latter part he is made to say the exact reverse, "they do not think the art or practice of keeping the helm whether certain people like it or not (ὅπως κυβερνήσει εἰάν τέ τινες βούλωνται εἰάν τε μὴ) can be combined with κυβερνητικῇ." The correspondence between the two clauses beginning with ὅπως is so complete that I do not think the inconsistency can be avoided by giving a different turn to the meaning of the second passage: and yet it is impossible to suppose that Plato could have contradicted himself thus flatly within the limits of the same sentence.

On these grounds I am inclined to believe that in the last line of the passage Plato wrote *οἰομένῳ*, referred back in thought to the preceding *αὐτῷ*. The construction thus resulting would have a slight irregularity (*ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ...ποιεῖσθαι...ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει...οἰομένῳ*), but one, I think, easily admissible in such a style as Plato's. And it seems clear that it must be the true statesman who sees the impossibility of acquiring along with his proper art the quite different art of getting and keeping power: and not the party leaders, ignorant as they are of the profound study necessary for true statesmanship.

I am confirmed in this view by finding that Grote's interpretative instinct led him to attach this meaning to the passage: though how he managed to extract it from the text before him, I am unable to say. "They never reflect" (he writes in his abstract of the Republic) "that the genuine steersman has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial art, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose, he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice

in keeping his hold on the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or not."

When *οἰομένῳ* had once been misread *οἰόμενοι*, it is perhaps not surprising that the immediately preceding participle *ἐπαύοντα* should also have been altered to the nominative. The intermediate reading (*ἐπαύοντα...οἰόμενοι*) is still found in some of our authorities.

H. SIDGWICK.

ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF CERTAIN WORDS IN ENGLISH TERMINATING IN *SK* AND *SH*.

1. Words terminating in *sk*.

The etymologies I am about to propose concern but a few words, and such only as cannot be satisfactorily traced back to Anglo-Saxon sources, and in which the *sk* and *sh* final constitute no part of the root. As my theory with regard to these terminations is, that they represent no genuine growth within the English language, but are immigrations or adoptions from a foreign, though closely allied, idiom, the Icelandic, I will introduce my subject by a few general observations on what I take to be the origin of these terminations, the Icelandic reflexive pronoun *siðk*; and the manner chiefly in which it attaches itself to verbs and adjectives in Icelandic.

The Icelandic language has a peculiar mode of forming its verbal medium, by adding to the signforms of the verbs pronominal suffixes, *mk* to the first person sing. and plur. of the present and past tenses of indicative and subjunctive, as well as to the first person plur. of the imperative, and *sk* (cf. however pages 278—79) to the second and third person of the same forms, as well as to the infinitive and the present participle, and the past participle in the neuter gender: e.g. *ráðsk* to counsel, to rule.

INDICATIVE.

Present.		Past.	
<i>Sing.</i>		<i>Sing.</i>	
1.	<i>ráðumk</i>	1.	<i>ráðumk</i>
2.	<i>ræðzk</i>	2.	<i>rèðzk</i>
3.	<i>ræðsk</i>	3.	<i>rèðsk</i>

<i>Plur.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
1. ráðumk	1. rèðumk
2. ráðizk	2. rèðuzk
3. ráðask	3. rèðusk

SUBJUNCTIVE.

Present.	Past.
<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Sing.</i>
1. ráðimk	1. rèðimk
2. ráðizk	2. rèðizk
3. ráðisk	3. rèðisk
<i>Plur.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
1. ráðimk	1. rèðimk
2. ráðizk	2. rèðizk
3. ráðisk	3. réðisk

IMPERATIVE.

<i>Sing.</i>	<i>Plur.</i>
2. ráðsk	1. ráðumk
3. ráðisk	2. ráðizk
	3. ráðisk

INFINITIVE.

ráðask

PARTICIPLE.

Pres. (*rare*)

ráðandisk

Past (neut.)

ráðizk.

Generally this mode of forming the verb-reflexive in Icelandic is ascribed by the grammarians to two suffixes, a personal, *mk* = *mik*, me, and a reflexive, *sk* = *sik*, se; but in reality the suffixes are three originally, *mik* for the first person, *þk* = *þik*, te, for the second, and *sik* for the third, as shewn here:

(ek) ráð-u-mk¹ (= mik), *I counsel myself.*

(þú) ræð-þk (= þik), *thou counsellest thyself.*

¹ *ræð-mk*, the regular, is an unpronounceable form; hence *ráðumk*, where *á* is due to the influence of

u. Probably this form is 1 pers. plur. adopted instead of the unpronounceable one.

(hann) ræð-sk (=sik), *he counsels himself.*

(við, vèr) ráð-u-mk¹ (=mik), *we counsel ourself.*

(þið, þèr) ráðið-þk (=þik), *you counsel yourself.*

(þeir) ráða-sk (=sik), *they counsel themselves.*

From the formal peculiarity of the suffix to the 2nd person, the phonetic bulk of which is made up of dental aspiration, it was inevitable that it must speedily vanish, on account of the verbal inflexion immediately preceding it throughout the whole of the weak conjugation, and in a very large number of instances in the strong, mouthing in pret. ind. and subjunctive either into a dental tenuis, *t*, or a dental aspirate, *ð*, whereby an unpronounceable accumulation of dental sounds was produced: *tþk*, e.g. *sköð-uðutþk*, *ðþk*, *þurkuð-uðþk*. Any endeavour on the part of the organ of speech to pronounce correctly a dental tenuis or a dental aspirata + a dental aspirata must end in a dental sibilans, hence *ðþk* = *zk*. But *z* and *s* having at a very early period become very similar in sound, this second person of the medium, and, in lapse of time, the first too, but for different reasons, hid its origin under the guise of the third, *sk*, and the medium at last assumed the following forms:

(ek) ræð-sk,

(við vèr) ráðumsk

(þú) ræð-sk

(þið, þèr) ráði-sk

(hann) ræðsk.

(þeir) ráða-sk.

The meaning which this suffix gives to the verb is (1) a reflexive: *ráða-sk* to counsel one's self, to resolve; *firra-sk* to distance one's self, to recede; *dreifa-sk* to spread one's self out, to disperse; (2) a reciprocal: *berja-sk* to beat each other, to fight; *hittask* to hit each other, to meet; *klóask* to clutch each other; *bítask* to bite each other (of horses fighting) &c.—and, very rarely, (3) a passive one: *kalla-sk* to be called; *lemja-sk* to be beaten &c.

I think that in point of time this use of the pronoun *sik* (leaving *mik* and *þik* now out of consideration) is anterior to its attachment to the Icelandic adjective, a mode of attachment which differs in one essential point from the verbal one,

¹ Should really be *ráðum-mk*, but ther, wherefore the former is dropped. two *ms* cannot be pronounced toge-

inasmuch as it thrusts itself in between the root and the termination: thus of *níð* contumely, libel, shame, we have *níð-sk-r* shamefully stingy, fem. *níð-sk*, neut. *níð-sk-t*; of *brjót*, the root in *brjóta* to break, we have *brey-sk-r* (should be spelt *breyzkr* = *breyt-sk-r*), *brey-sk*, *brey-sk-t*; of *þrjót-r*, an intractable person, we have *þrjót-sk-r* obstinate, of *Dan* we have *dan-sk-r*, of *Jót-i* *jót-sk-r* spelt *józkr*, of *Eng*, the root in English, *en-sk-r* (for *eng-sk-r*) &c. This termination always implies individuality and intensity; it is as if it added "in himself," "in itself," to the characteristic already ascribed by the root of the adjective to the person or the thing to which it refers. By the lapse of time these adjectives gave growth to abstract feminine substantives which invariably terminate in *a*: *breyskr breysk-j-a*¹ brittleness, *níðskr níðsk-a* niggardliness, *þrjótskr þrjózka* obstinacy, &c.

Thus we see that the pronominal *sk* serves in the Icelandic language to produce reflective, reciprocal and passive modes of conjugation; reflective adjectives as well as abstract substantives.

In the dialects, immediately derived from the Icelandic, the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish languages, this grammatical figure is also traceable in the threefold manifestation to which I have called attention already, except that in Danish no abstract substantives can be formed of the reflexive adjective; with the difference, however, in the verbs, as to the form, that the *k* is dropped, as to the meaning, that they receive mostly a purely passive sense. Thus Icelandic

kallask	becomes	Swed.	kallas	Dan.-Norw.	kaldes
dyljask	„	„	döljes	„	dölges
skiljask	„	„	skiljas	„	skilles
röskr	„	„	rask	„	rask
ferskr	„	„	färsk	„	fersk
vonzka	„	„	ondska		
			brådska		

As far as the verbs are concerned, the formation of the

¹ The *j* is a mere auxiliary for the purpose of preventing the *ey* receding back to its primitive form *au*.

medium or the passive by a reflexive suffix after the fashion of the Scandinavian languages ceases at once when we cross the boundary into the domain of the Teutonic idioms, which form their passives by a circumscriptive process. The same being the case with the English, old and modern, it seems to be evident that, when English verbs terminate in *sk*, or *sh*, and it can be satisfactorily accounted for, that this termination forms no part of the root, in such cases we must accept the proposition, that the form in question is of a Scandinavian origin. I am inclined also to apply the same principle to adjectives about which more will be said hereafter. In passing, I may mention that I think the German termination *sch* in verbs and adjectives, is to be explained by the German possessive *sich*, but on a different principle, in many cases.

After these preliminary remarks I come to the subject of this portion of my paper: the derivation of the verbs terminating in *sk*, three in number; *bask*, *risk* and *busk*, and the two adjectives: *brisk* and *frisk*.

The verb *bask* is generally not explained etymologically in English dictionaries. In a late edition of Dr Webster's dictionary, however, a derivation has been attempted, I believe for the first time; here *bask* is compared with "Dutch *bakeren*, *zich in de zon bakeren* to bask in the sun, Germ. *bächern* and *bächeln* to revive by warmth; *bahen* to nourish; O. H. Germ. *bahan* akin to *bachan*, N. H. Germ. *backen*, Eng. *bake*."—These derivations leave two important points unexplained: the absence in *bask* of the palatina *k* (*h*) which constitutes an important radical element of the alleged primitives, and the presence in it of *sk* which forms no part at all of the same primitives. The derivation I propose meets both these difficulties in a satisfactory manner.—In ancient times it was a common custom throughout Scandinavia for people to have hot-air baths at their houses. This custom the Scandinavians doubtless adopted from the Fins, who bathe in the same manner to this day. The heated bath-house was called *baðstofa* bathing stove, a word which in Iceland signifies to this day the warmest room in the home, the sitting-room, although the use of it for bathing purposes has long since been abandoned. The hot-air

being the element in which it was common and customary to effect bathing by a languid repose, the tendency to repeat on a hot summer's day the habits of the bath-room brought the phraseology of the one element into the other. Hence the common phrase *at baðask í sólinni* to bathe in the sun, in the hot sunny air. This reflexive form, *baðask*, I take to be the immediate source of *bask* brought about by the process first of dropping the dental aspirate, *ð*, which, phonetically speaking, is a weak and evanescent element in the word; and then contracting *ba-ask* into *bask*. Here, I think it must be conceded, we have to deal with an undoubted Scandinavian immigrant.

Risk. Little heed had been given in English dictionaries to the derivation of this word until Diez' dictionary of the Romance languages appeared. Since that time his etymological illustrations of the Italian verb *risicare* have been copied in English dictionaries more or less fully. Diez' etymologies are these: "Span.: *ar-riscar, ar-riesgar*; Portug.: *riscar, arriscar*; French: *risquer*, in *gefahr setzen, wagen*. Substantives: Ital.: *risico, risco*; Span.: *riesgo*; French: *risque* *gefahr*. Span.: *risco* heisst klippe, steiler fels, und dieses führt auf *resecare*, abschneiden, so dass man sich eine steile höhe als etwas abgeschnittenes dachte: nicht anders verhält sich schwed. *skär* klippe zu *skära* abschneiden. *Risco* könnte ein schifferausdruck sein, zuerst den gefährlichen felsen, dann die gefahr, bezeichnend, wofür nachher die scheideform *riesgo* aufkam. Dazu stimmt auch neupr. (New Provenc.) *rezegue* gefahr, *rezegá* abschneiden, mail. *resega* säge und gefahr, vb. *resegà* sägen und wagen, die nur von *resecare* herkommen können. Auch pg. *risca* strich (schnitt), *riscar* ausstreichen, sind hierher zu rechnen."

There are several points in these derivations, and especially in Diez' inferences, which seem to me rather of a venturesome nature. Schematizing the derivations we get for

		<i>risk</i>	<i>cliff</i>	<i>saw</i>
Verbs:	Ital.	risicare	_____	_____
	Span.	ar-riscar	_____	_____
		ar-riesgar	_____	_____
	Port.	riscar	_____	_____

		<i>risk</i>	<i>cliff</i>	<i>saw</i>
		ar-riscar	—	—
	French	risquer	—	—
	New Prov.	rezegá (to cut off)	—	—
	Milan.	resega	—	—
<i>Subst.:</i>	Ital.	risico	—	—
		risco	—	—
	Span.	riesgo	risco	—
	French	risque	—	—
	New Prov.	rezegue	—	—
	Milan.	resega	—	resegà

The Spanish is the only language in which risk and rock occur in a kindred form; in none of the others is the notion of rock implied in the words meaning risk, nor, as far as I have been able to ascertain, in any kindred form. Now Diez makes the Spanish *risco* a kind of starting-point, a root-word, from which he derives the abstract meaning of the rest; first, on the tacit assumption of formal identity, and secondly on the express assumption, that it might have been a sailor's term signifying, what Spanish dictionaries do certainly not countenance, "*a dangerous rock*," instead of a rock simply, and then, by a conscious metaphor, I presume, "*danger*," *gefahr*, which, however, is not the primary meaning of these words, *das wagniss* being the word which expresses it properly. Risk, namely, in all these languages has exactly the same meaning as it has in English, an assumed, potential danger, not an absolute and unmistakeable one. *Risco* being moreover radically connected with *resecare*, and meaning sheer rock, is even thereby still less likely to have become in sailors' language an equivalent for danger; for it is the hidden and low rocks, not the sheer and prominent ones, which constitute the greatest element of danger at sea. Thus, as there is nothing to shew, that *risco* even in Spanish means danger, and as no Romance language possesses a cognate word meaning rock and danger, I think it is a safe inference that this word and the words in the Romance languages which mean *risk* are radically disconnected.

In mediæval Latin this word appears in the form *riscus*, *risicus*, *risigus*, and in mediæval Greek as *ρίδικον*, a fact not noticed by Diez, nor by Littré, nor, as far as I have been able to ascertain, by Spanish or Italian lexicographers. The Latin forms occur as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth century¹, and the Greek somewhat later, according to Ducange. In French *risque* does not, according to Littré, occur till the sixteenth century, and then as a military term, equivalent to *coup de main*, Littré quoting the passage: "la risque (coup de main) de Monbrun, Mirabel et autres, avec 400 chevaux." I have been unable to ascertain when the word occurs first in Italian and Spanish. But it is safe to infer from the French that it is not an ancient word in these vernaculars; as also that the Low Lat. *riscus* or *risigus* represents the form of the word before it was adopted in the various Romance idioms.

Now comes the question, whence came the word into Low Latin? Here we must take into account the real meaning of the word: to commit one's self to a daring deed, to venture. By the very nature of the thing such a word would necessarily form a military term among war-waging people. But that it did not do it in French till very late, if it really ever became a technical military term in that language, is proved by Littré's observation adduced above. And as it did not do so in French, it may be safely inferred that neither was it so used in Italian and Spanish. Diez, at least, knows no such use of it in those languages. I surmise therefore that it is not a genuine Romance word, but an importation. But whence? In no Teutonic dialect can I find any form at all likely to have been the primitive source of the word. In Old English (= Anglo-Saxon) I also search in vain as well as in early English. In fact the word does not even occur in the English version of the Bible or in Shakespeare. It is apparently a modern adoption in English,

¹ I will give here the earliest example adduced by Ducange from "Statuta Massiliensis civitatis, cum capitulis pacis juratæ inter Carolum Andegaviæ, Provinciæ et Forcalquerii Comitem, et Massilienses, scripta per Joh. Darnandi, qui vivebat ann. 1277.

1295. et 1305.":

Constituimus, quod si quis alicui aliquod mutuum fecerit vel faciet portandum in aliquod viagium ad fortunam vel *riscum* ipsius mutuantis, pro quo mutuo specialiter pignus a debitore sibi traditum est, &c.

and has made its way into it from the French. There is therefore a strong probability that the word is not a genuine Romance word; and it is certain that it is not a Teutonic or a Saxon word.

But whatever may be the real origin of this word, I will now adduce an Icelandic one which means exactly the same thing as does risk in all the languages in which it occurs, and which I think stands in perfectly correct phonetical relation to the Low Latin forms of the word. I mean the strong verb *ráða*, the active sign forms of which are *ráða*, *rèð*, *rèðum*, *rèði*, *ráðit*, the reflexive *ráðask*, *rèzk*, *rèðumsk*, *rèðisk*, *ráðizk*. In the active it means to counsel, in the reflexive to counsel one's self, to make up one's mind, to betake one's self, to venture, to risk. In the reflexive form the word occurs most commonly in the sense to risk a charge, an attack on the enemy, and is the technical word for that kind of action. The standing military phrase for to attack is *ráðask á* prop. to counsel one's self on (onward), *ráðask á fjandmennina* to counsel one's self on (against) the enemy. As, on the other hand, the standing phrase for to risk a thing, the result of which may be doubtful, is *ráðask í* to counsel one's self into, to risk undertaking, to venture. The phonetic identity of *rèzk*, pronounced *riesk*, and *risc*, in the Low Lat. *risc-us*, is in itself obvious, in fact the phonetic turn of the reflexive all through, *á* broken into *ie* (*è*), seems to me to constitute no difficulty for phonetically tracing *risc-us* back to it. And since both sense and form favour the derivation, I am inclined to trace all these forms to the Icelandic *ráðask*.

I think it is very probable that the word got into the Low Latin from the Northmen, who not only ravaged the coasts of the Romance nations, but also won lands from them and settled there. In this manner I account for the derivation of risk.

Busk. This verb is generally allowed by scholars now to be an undoubted Scandinavian immigrant, from the Icel. *búask* to get ready. Dr Latham, in his edition of Johnson's dict., however, declares himself against this derivation, but without advancing any scientific reason therefore.

From the verbs I pass on to the adjectives terminating in *sk*, of which I have only two to mention, *brisk* and *frisk*.

Brisk is derived generally from the Welsh *brysg*, with which it is said to be identical in meaning. I am unable to say whether the *y* in the Welsh word would reproduce itself in English as *i*, although there is perhaps little doubt that that would be the form of it, seeing that one of the two sounds of *y* in Welsh is = Engl. *i* in *fit*. But to me it is somewhat strange that a word for so common a notion as is implied in *brisk* should have to be borrowed; and although I am inclined to think that the termination might be of extraneous character, I think the root may be English. We have an Old Engl. word, *bredan*, to twist, turn, plait, which in early English (Chaucer) becomes *braid*; this word corresponds to the strong Icelandic verb *bregða*, *brá*, *brugðum*, *brygði*, *brugðit*, which in the reflective signforms becomes *bregðask*, *bráumk*, *brugðumk*, *brygðimk*, *brugðizk*; the sense is to turn, to turn about (*bregða vit*), to draw (*bregða sverði*, draw sword), to move swiftly (as lightning) (*bregða fyrir*). If an adjective were to be formed from the root of this word imparting to anything the idea of quick movement, the form must necessarily be *bragðskr* or *brygðskr*, with a meaning *fond of*, *apt to*, *ready to* move quickly and swiftly, but neither form occurs. From the root of *bregða* are derived various forms, verbal and substantival, with *i* for a radical vowel, as *brigða*, to turn in the sense of deceiving, *brigði* (turn) deceit, *brigzli* reproach, &c., and, remarkable enough, the root of the English word *bred-* represents an identical change in the word *brid-le*, that which is twisted or braided or platted, referring to the workmanship of the reins (?) or to the use of the bridle, as that which is twisted round the horse's neck or head (?). On phonetic grounds I don't think there are any sufficiently valid reasons against the possibility of *brisk* being derived from *bred-an* or *bregða*. But I only mention this mode of derivation as a possible, and even a plausible, one, in case the inter-phonetic laws between Welsh and English should be found not to countenance such an adoption on the part of the latter as *brisk* from *brysg*. I would finally call attention to the fact, apropos of the phonetic relation between *brysg* and *brisk*, that the long held-to derivation of *task* from Welsh *tasg* is now most properly being fast abandoned by English etymologists.

Frisk is not a form-variation of *brisk*, nor is the reverse thereof the case; for *f* and *b* are uninterchangeable letters in the Scandinavian languages and in English; but it is, in all probability, another form of the more common form *fresh*. The family of this word falls into two main branches, one with a radical syllable *fri* or *fre*, the other with the radical syllable *fer* (*fär*):

	Fri-Fre.	Fer- (-är-)
Old High Germ.	<i>frisc</i>
Middle High Germ.	<i>vrisch</i>
Mod. High Germ.	<i>frisch</i>
Mod. Dutch	<i>frisch</i>
Danish	<i>frisk</i>	<i>fersk</i>
Swedish	<i>frisk</i>	<i>färsk</i>
Mod. Icelandic	<i>frískr</i>	<i>ferskr</i>
Mod. Engl.	<i>frisk, fresh</i>
Old French	<i>fres, freis</i>
Mod. French	<i>frais, fraische</i>
It., Span., Port.	<i>fresco</i>
Welsh	<i>ffres</i>
Armen.	<i>fresk</i>
Anglo-Saxon	<i>fersc</i>
Low Dutch	<i>versch</i>

From this scheme we see that each root-syllable has a distinct sphere of its own among European languages, *fri* being Teutonic, *fre* Romance, and *fer* Scandinavo-Saxon. The question then is, whether we have here before us one word or more than one; whether, in fact, the syllables *fri* and *fre* are identical in themselves, and represent an identical root with *fer* and *fär*. As regards the Scandinavian forms *frisk*, *fersk*, there are insurmountable formal difficulties in the way of tracing them back to a Scandinavian root identical with that from which *fer* and *fär* draw their origin; in fact, such a root-identity can only be maintained on the ground of a metathesis *literarum*; but even that expedient leaves the important fact unaccounted for, that in one case the root-vowel becomes *i*, in the other *e*; a fact equally unaccountable whether the metathesis is supposed to proceed

from *fersk färsk* to *frisk* or the reverse. This proposition is still further borne out by the sense and use of the two words. In no case can the one supply the sense of the other; in no case can the one be used correctly for the other. In one case only can *frisk* and *fersk, färsk* be applied to one and the same substance, namely water, in all other cases their applicative use is poles asunder; but even as regards water, the sense of each is as distinct as possible: *fersk vand* (Dan.) and *färsket vatten* (Swed.), meaning fresh water in the sense of not brackish; Germ. *süßes wasser*; but *frisk vand* (Dan.) and *friskt vatten* (Swed.) meaning fresh water, in the sense of cold-sparkling, purling, Germ. *frisches wasser*. Observe that the English *fresh* embraces both senses. Here, then, we have form, use and sense all equally strongly warring against a Scandinavian root-identity lying hidden in these two words. I venture, therefore, even with the grave authority of the editors of Grimm's German Dictionary against me, to conclude that *frisk* comes from a root distinct from that from which *fersk färsk* draws its origin. This latter root I trace to the verb *fara* (Icel. and Swed.), *fare* (Dan.), *faran* (Anglo-Sax.); in the Icelandic the root produces *ferð*, travelling, in Danish *færd*, in Swed. *färd*. The vowel-change from *a* to *e* in the Icelandic is as regular as from *a* to $\left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{æ} \\ e \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$ in Danish, and from *a* to *ä* in Swedish. To the root *fer* attaches itself here an *sk* in Scandinavian, and an *sc* in Anglo-Saxon, for which I venture to let the observations in the beginning of this chapter stand as explanations. The quality then which *fersk* implies is movement as a constitutional element, and *fersk* is he or that which is apt, given to movement and motion, motive; *fersk vand* = fresh water, *i. e.* running water as opposite to stagnant water.

I have shown now that a root must be sought for *frisk* different from that to which I have traced *fersc*. This root, I think, may safely be said to exist in the Old Teutonic word *fri*, which, though it may have made its way into Scandinavia at an early date, is scarcely, I think, to be taken as a genuine Scandinavian root-form, because it does not occur in any Icelandic or Norse writing of the classical period, or down to

the fourteenth century. In the Scandinavian dialects the form which takes the place of *fri* is *frjáls*; so that, apparently, the Teutonic form comes down from the Gothic *freis*, and the Scandinavian from the Gothic compound *frei-hals*. The Teutonic form *frisch* or *frisc* does not seem to be very old. It does not occur in Anglo-Saxon at all, nor in the Nibelungen Lied. It may therefore be concluded that its common use is posterior to the XIII—XIV. centuries. The termination I hold to be a Scandinavian immigration; and, parenthetically, I may remark that in the earlier stages of the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon idioms the words terminating in *sc* or *sch* are strikingly few; they increase in number as the language becomes cultivated. The same phenomenon manifests itself with regard to Icelandic also.

Thus I think it may be taken for granted that the word *frisk*, in all its wide range, is of undoubted Teutonic origin, the hesitation which the editors of Grimm's dictionary express on the subject notwithstanding.

The fundamental meaning, in general, may be said to be: endowed with free qualities, with qualities wherein the energy of freedom makes itself manifest, *vegetus*, whence, of course, a variety of senses through a great variety of usages is derived.

As to the English form of the word, *fresh*, it is noticeable, that it is one not derived from Anglo-Saxon, but from the Teutonic source through a French channel, as the root-vowel proves, being *e* not *i*. But although the form is Romance, the meaning combines the meaning of *fersc* with that of the Teutonico-Romance form. The Englishman buried the Anglo-Saxon body, but saved the soul of it to be a second occupant of the immigrated Romance frame.

2. Words terminating in *sh*.

It is a noticeable fact that words terminating in *sh* are in remarkably few cases traced back to Anglo-Saxon equivalents. In several cases German and Dutch etymologies are brought to bear, but they seem to me to do in most cases the service of collateral illustrations, rather than to constitute a derivative

source. It is a general rule that *sh* in modern English represents *sc* in Old English, *sk* and, in certain cases, *s* in the Scandinavian dialects, and *sch* in German, no matter whether it constitutes a part of the root or forms the termination. Etymologies which show a deviation from this rule must, I think, be looked upon as doubtful, unless satisfactory reasons can be adduced for their accuracy. The following are the few monosyllabic verbs, the etymologies of which I venture to suggest on the present occasion.

Blush is defined by Webster, who represents the latest phase of English lexicography, "to redden in the cheeks or face from a sense of guilt, shame, confusion, modesty, diffidence or surprise. 2. to bear a blooming red color." In the last edition, by Goodrich, the following etymologies are adduced: Swed. *bloss*, Icelandic *blossi*, *blys*, Danish *blus*, *blusse*; the Swedish word means flame, the Icel. words flame and torch, the Danish a torch, and to flame. In these etymologies the conditions are absent which constitute a safe derivation; none of them represents the origin of the *h* in the English word, nor, as far as I can see, the exact meaning of it. They all relate to flame; the Swedish and Icelandic cannot be applied to the face, except by questionable poetical license, to a flushed, burning face. The Danish *blusse* is applied to the face in the phrase *at blusse i ansigtet*, to be flushed in the face. But the sense of shame need not necessarily be implied in the use. These etymologies, therefore, I think may be discarded. Instead of them I connect the verb with the Icelandic *bljúgr* bashful, shy, coy; Danish *bly*, Swedish *blyg*. From this is formed the substantive *blygd*, abashment, shame, and from that again the Icelandic trans. verb *blygða* to make bashful, the reflexive form of which is *blygðask*, also occurring in the form *blygjask* to be bashful; the reflexive form is found in Swedish *blygas*, and in Danish *blues*. *Blygjask* is, no doubt, the older form of the verb directly derived from *bljúgr*, as are also the forms of the sister dialects. This form I take to be the etymological equivalent for *blush*, brought about by dropping the short *a* and restoring the weak derivative vowel *y* (or *ypsilon*) to its original form *u*.

Clash, "to make a noise by striking against something." In Goodrich's edition of Webster these etymologies are adduced: German *klatschen klitschen*, Provinc. Germ. *kleschen*, Danish *klatske* and *kladske*, Pol. *klaskác*. With regard to these etymologies, it is to be observed that the Danish is a masonic term, applied to the sound which the clot of mortar thrown from the mason's trowel against the brick-work produces. The quantity of mortar which the trowel holds is a *klat*, clot; the verb itself is reflective in form, and has, according to the testimony of the editors of Grimm's dictionary, given to the German language the verbs *klatschen*, which occurs first in the 17th century, and is now a common German word, and met with in the weakened forms *klätschen*, *kletschen*, and *klitschen*. The *t* being radical in all these forms, it is impossible that they could constitute the root-source from which *clash* could be descended; for the English language not only holds firmly to roots terminating in *t*, but is particularly fond of that root-termination, wherefore such a great number of roots terminating in Old English in *c* terminate now in *t + ch*, the *ch* being a device of a vital law of the language for the purpose of propping up the *t*. In this case, if the Danish form were the primitive form of the English word, it must have assumed the form *clatsch* instead of *clash*. The provincial German *kleschen* comes nearer, but the vowel-difference between the two words prevents the German from being the parent of the English. Both words must therefore be traced to an older form, a form in which the root terminates in *k*. This form, I think, we have in the old Scandinavian weaver's term *kljá*, to strike the woof, in weaving; a verb derived from the stones called *klé*- plur. *kljár* by which the Scandinavians of old used to stretch their weft. The reflexive form of the verb is *kljásk*, to strike one against the other, known particularly from the common phrases: *illa kljásk kollóttir hrútar*, hornless rams strike (fight) badly, and *ilt er at kljásk við kollóttan*, it is ill to have to fight with the hornless one; *i. e.*, with the hornless bull whom you can't take by the horn, used metaphorically of a shifty person who takes care not to commit himself. I think this etymology is obvious and needs no further explanation.

Gush, "to issue with violence and rapidity," is in Webster derived from low Germ. and Dutch *gudsen*; then it is said to be allied to N. H. G. *gieszen*, O. H. Germ. *giozan*, *giutan*, O. Sax. *giotan*, A.-Sax. *geotan*, Icelandic *giota*, Sw. *giuta*, Dan. *gyde*. In these etymologies it is to be observed that as the root of them all terminates in a dental media or tenuis, they cannot, any of them, form the derivative source of *gush*; besides, there is nothing in any of them to account for the *h* in the termination. A nearer etymology would be obtained from the Scandinavian *gjósa*, to gush, only it cannot form a reflexive mode, and can therefore not very well stand in immediate derivative relation to gush. From *gjósa* is derived *geysa*, to rush, gush, which in the ancient writers occurs mostly in the reflective form *geysask*. Now, as *gjósa* is a word apparently confined to the Scandinavian languages, I at least can find no Teutonic equivalents to compare it with; and thereby also *geysask*, which I take to be the immediate derivative origin of *gush*, we have in that word one more instance of Scandinavian immigration, I think. The way in which I explain the transition from *geysask* to *gush* is the following: the *a* must drop first, of course, being the weakest part of the word, then we have *geys'sk*; the two *s*'s being equal to one in sound before a *k*, one must drop, and we have *geysk*; the root-vowel (*e + y = au = u*) representing a primitive *u*-sound, must, as is invariably the case under similar circumstances, return in the English mouth back to its original.

Flush, interpreted by the lexicographers, generally, "to flow and spread suddenly," is derived in Goodrich's edition of Webster from O. H. G. *flusc*, loose, flowing, *fluz* from *fliuzan*, Old Dutch *fluysen*, A.-S. *fleotan*. It must be an accident only, that the mod. H. G. *fliessen* is not adduced too. Here again the root-dental stands in the way of the direct derivative connection. The Icelandic offers a closely-allied word in the verb *flóa*, in which exactly the same notion is implied as in *flush*, namely, "to flow and spread suddenly," to over-flow, to flood. It is on the ground of this exact congruity of the sense of the two words that I am led to suggest *flóa* as the primitive of *flush*. I am aware that objections may be raised against this derivation;

these especially: that *flóa* is not known to occur in the reflexive form, and it may be a matter of doubt how far the sense allows it to assume such a form; and, secondly, that the vowel-combination *ó-a* could hardly produce a short *u*. To the first objection I answer that the word *can* assume the reflective form, that is to say: it is possible; to the second, that if such a form as *flóask* were to be naturalized in the English language, it can only be adopted under the form *flush*; as *sh*, in monosyllables, at least, suffers only an open vowel to stand before it, and in reducing *flóask* to an English-sounding word, the process would be, of course, first to drop the weak *a*, when *flósh* would be left; that sound being closed, the nature of the language requires the substitution of its nearest broad relative *u*, hence *flush*. But, considering that this derivation is open to objections, I put this observation forth as a suggestion only.

Rush, "to move or drive forwards with impetuosity." In Goodrich's edition of Webster this word is accompanied by a magnificent derivative outfit: "A.-S. *hriskjan* to shake; *hrysk*, *hryska* a bursting, rushing; *hrisjan* to push; *hrysjan* to cast down; *hreosan* to rush, shake; Goth. *hrisjan* to shake; Fris. *hrüsse*, L. Germ. *rússen*, to fall down; Swed. *rusa*, to be forcibly carried along; O. Sax. *hrisian*, to be shaken; Swed. *ruska*, Dan. *ruske*, Icel. *ruska*, L. Germ. *rusken*, *rúskén*, to creak, N. H. Germ. *rauschen*, *ruischen*." By schematizing this somewhat multifarious parentage, we get:

A.-S.	Goth.	Fris.	L. Germ.	Swed.	O. Sax.	Dan.	Icel.
<i>hriskian</i>	<i>hrisian</i>	<i>hrüsse</i>	<i>rússen</i>	<i>rusa</i>	<i>hrisian</i>	<i>ruske</i>	<i>ruska</i>
<i>hrysk</i>			<i>rusken</i>	<i>ruska</i>			
<i>hryska</i>			<i>rúskén</i>				
<i>hrisian</i>			N. H. Germ.				
<i>hrysjan</i>			<i>rauschen</i>				
<i>hreosan</i>			<i>ruischen</i>				

Of these etymologies I do not think one is to the point, with the exception of *hrysk* and *hryska*, and perhaps *rauschen*. All the rest refer to the fundamental notion of shaking, trembling, which, of course, has nothing to do with *rush*. There is nothing against taking the Anglo-Saxon *hrysc* or *hryska* as a root-word

of *rush*, if it is really a *bonâ fide* Saxon word. But it is suspicious that no corresponding verb should exist in A.-S., as also that Bosworth should know no other authority for the word than Somner's dictionary of 1659. As a cognate, if not the primitive source of the word, I adduce here the Icelandic verb *ryðja*, to clear away obstacles in one's way; formed from *ruð*, a kindred word to *rjóðr*, a clearing in a wood; the reflexive *ryðjask* is to break one's way through obstacles. This is the common form of the verb; an older form is the weak verb *hryðja hruddi*, and corresponding to *rjóðr*, *hrjóða-hrauð*, *hroðit*, a military term used in sea-fighting: *hrjóða, skip, navem propugnatoribus nudare*. The reflexive of the weak verb assumes the form of *hryðjask, hruddisk, hefi hrúzk*, and of the strong verb *hrjóðask, hrýzk, hruðusk*. With the root-vowel sound there is no difficulty, as it points in all these forms to the primitive *u*. With the dental aspirata *ð* there is no difficulty, either, because it is an evanescent element in all words which happen to migrate into a language of monosyllabic tendencies—that is, supposing *rush* owes its origin to Scandinavian sources. Its etymology, however, is most easily accounted for, by connecting it with *ryðja*, of which the form which most frequently gives rise to English monosyllables, the past participle of the reflexive (*hefi*) *ruðzk*, stands in absolutely correct primitive relation to *rush*. The etymological affinities between these Scandinavian words and *rush* must, at any rate, replace the irrelevancies of Webster's Dictionary.

Smash is interpreted by the lexicographers "to break in pieces by violence; to dash to pieces; to crush." In Dr Latham's edition of Johnson the etymology of the word is disposed of by the German *schmeissen*; in Goodrich's edition of Webster, the word is derived from the Swedish *smisk, smiska*, and from the Germ. *schmiss, schmitz*. The derivative source traced by Dr Latham, has nothing to do with the word *smash* at all, being the H. Germ. form of the Old Engl. or Anglo-Saxon, that is to say Old Low Germ. *smitan* to throw away, New Engl. *smite*, Danish *smide*; to smite, beat, blow. The Swedish and German derivations adduced by Goodrich all refer to the same root as *schmeissen* and mean the same thing. They

all miss the very point of the sense of *smash*, which is breaking to pieces. I still venture to propose a Scandinavian solution. From the word *smár*, the root of which is *smá*, comes the verb *at smá* to render small, of which the reflexive form is *smásk* to become small, to be made small. In the Icelandic this word is chiefly used in the metaphorical sense, to become little in the eyes of the world, to be despised. But there is no doubt at all, that originally it was applied to things being lessened by being broken. It forms in Icelandic one instance of common occurrence where concrete notions have grown abstract from sheer eld. Such a case is interestingly illustrated by the word *skömm*, shame, which etymologically is derived from *skammr*, short, and means therefore originally shortness, because it was once upon a time the legal term for a grave irreparable bodily injury, whereby a man was lessened in limb for life, whence the modern sense of it, shame. But although there is no doubt that *smá* once meant to render small, and *smásk* to be rendered small, and the sense of the verb perfectly agrees with the fundamental notion implied in *smash*, there is, none the less, a difficulty involved in this derivation; namely this: how the reflexive form of the Scandinavian word, supposing we have here to deal with a Scandinavian immigrant, can admit of an active sense in English. This is not a very weighty objection, however, because the Icelandic verb reflexive lies so close on the confines of the verb deponens, that I think it quite plausible that a verb leaving its parent soil as a reflexive, may turn up in its exotic existence as an active one. In the case of *smá* there are several circumstances favourable to such theory. From this verb develops a kind of verb, which is really of a reflexive nature, *smækka*, to become small in one's self; yet that verb is an active one as well, meaning to make small, and is of very frequent occurrence. *Smækka* is a later form which grows out of the verb as a natural successor to its older reflexive form when that has fallen into disuse. Now, although I cannot positively aver, that the successor performs the exact functions of the predecessor, yet I am inclined to think that there is every probability in support of it, and that *smash* in sound and meaning reflects this old Scandinavian word.

Slash. Dr Latham, in Johnson, refers to the imitative or onomatopoeic principle, while Goodrich refers it to the Icelandic *slasa*, to afflict with bodily injury. I think neither explanation satisfactory. I refer the word to the Icelandic *slá* to smite, beat, of which the reflexive form is *slásk* to beat mutually; also to beat, intransitively, as in the phrase *at slásk vit* to knock against. I don't think there is any real difficulty in the way of this derivation.

Crush. Dr Latham makes an onomatopoeic word. Goodrich on the other hand compares it with the Swedish *krassa* to crush and the Icelandic *krassa*, translated to grind, which it does not mean, it being only a modern adaptation of the Danish *kradse*, Germ. *kratzen*, to scrape, to scrawl, and being identical with these words in sense. But the Swedish *crossa* stands no doubt in a very close relation to crush, although the latter form can scarcely be immediately derived from it. In close affinity to *krassa* is another form of the same root-word common to all the Scandinavian dialects: Icel. *kreysta*, Danish *kryste*, Swedish *krysta*, all meaning to squeeze, crush; these forms are clearly traceable to their primitive sources in sign-forms of the Gothic strong verb *kriustan* to craunch. The Swedish *crossa* and *kryste* stand in collateral relation to each other, *krassa*, pointing to an earlier form independent of the Gothic *kriustan*. Here the question is to which branch to refer *crush*. I think the conclusion is inevitable, that *sh* stands here exceptionally for *st*; because a reflexive form *cross-ask*, supposing that indeed such a form did exist, could scarcely come out in English as an active verb; and *kreysta* in Icelandic cannot very well form a reflexive mode. But, however the relation between the final *h* in crush and the dental tenuis in the forms adduced may be disposed of, there can be no doubt that crush is not an onomatopoeic word.

Of adjectives terminating in *sh*, I can only deal with one at present, the word *rash*. The etymologists refer it to the kindred Teutonic and Scandinavian forms, Germ. *rasch*, Dan. and Swedish *rask*. But they leave us pretty much in the dark as to the primitive sense of the word. In the prose Edda there is a story told of the vessel *óð-rærir*, also occurring in

the forms *Odreyrir*, and *Oðrerir*, in which the dwarfs Fjalar and Galar, having slain *Kvasir*, the primitive incarnation of poetry, preserved his blood, blended with honey, which made such a miraculous beverage that whosoever drank of it became a poet. *Rerir*, or *reyrir*, or *rærir* in this case means the mover, stirrer, and *óð* is the accusative form of *óðr* poetry, *odreyrir* therefore is the song *stirrer*, song-mover. This *rærir* stands in direct radical connection with the verb *hræra*, which, in the Scandinavian dialects, Swedish and Danish assumes the form *röra* and *röre*, to move, stir; from the same root descends immediately the Icelandic *röskr* brisk; and *Röskva*, the brisk one, was the name of Thor's handmaiden, both forms therefore being of undoubted antiquity. Now *röskr* is a form produced by assimilation of the *r* in *rör*, which generally is swallowed up by an immediately following *s*, especially if it be followed by a palatal tenuis. The original and fundamental sense is therefore 'given to moving,' 'apt to stir.' And this is the underlying sense of the word both in German and English, although in the latter language its sense has mostly entered the field of abstraction by this time.

EIRÍKR MAGNÚSSON.

LOVE AMOR. LOVE NOUGHT.

IN witnessing English games I have often wondered what could be the meaning of the phrase which, in calling over the score, is used to signify the nought of it. The word employed is *love*. Thus while there is no score on either side the game stands at *love* all. I have inquired diligently as to the real meaning of the word, and have always had the ready answer that it meant *amor*, affection, and was derived from the common phrases "to play for love," "to play for the love of the game," and that love simply meant *amor*, affection or, say, fondness, fond interest, as also that the preposition *for* was used here in a causal sense—for the sake of, out of. I have heard no other explanation given of the phrase. As to the first part of the explanation, it may be observed that it seems not quite natural somehow to say that a game is played for affection's sake which is played for nothing; for surely experience teaches clearly enough that the affection for a game is all the greater when it is played for stakes. As to the second part of the explanation, it seems to me that the natural sense of the preposition *for* is passed by and the unnatural one is adopted. Surely *for* means here *about* (Greek *περί* c. gen.), love being the stake for which the game is played; and "to play for love" therefore would mean to play for winning the loser's love or affection. Perhaps some one better versed in the literature of the *parlements d'amour* and the love-courts of the middle ages than I am, may be able to throw some light upon this phrase, which I am thus obliged to leave in its obscurity undisputed.

But whether the phrase to *play for love* has anything to do with love in score-counting or not, I think love in this sense has nothing to do with *amor*, affection or fondness. This I infer from a cognate word with identical signification occurring in the Edda of Sæmund the learned in the lay of Sigurd the dragonslayer, *Sigurðarkviða fáfnisbana*, II. 9 (Professor Bugge's edition):

As the three gods (*Æsir*) *Oðinn*, *Hœnir* and *Loki*, wandered one day along a certain river, they came upon an otter on the bank, feasting upon a fresh-caught salmon. *Loki* took up a stone and hit the animal in the head and killed it. The gods then flayed off the body the skin and bore it along with them on their wandering further. In the evening they came to the home of a certain *Hreiðmar* with whom they got night-quarters and to whom they showed gleefully their good catch. But *Hreiðmar*, seeing the skin of the otter, found that it was indeed that of his own son, and by the aid of his sons he took the gods prisoners and forced them to promise to pay in ransom for themselves as much weregild for his son in gold as would fill the skin inside and cover every hair of it outside. *Loki* undertook the gathering-up of the ransom, and when the gods thought they had faithfully paid the weregild they called *Hreiðmar* to examine the skin and the gold. One hair was still uncovered and *Loki* had to hide it with a precious ring of which he had robbed a helpless dwarf, and on which the dwarf had pronounced a dire spell. In the not over-complimentary exchange of words which followed the full pay, between *Loki* and *Hreiðmar*, the former transmitted to the ring the curse which it bore from its former owner, and *Hreiðmar* answers:

<i>Rauðu gulli</i>	The ruddy gold
<i>Hygg ek mik ráða munu</i>	Methinks I fain shall keep
<i>Svá lengi sem ek lifi;</i>	So long as I live;
<i>Hót þín</i>	Thy threats
<i>Hræðumk ekki lyf,</i>	Dread I not a love (whit),
<i>Ok haldit heim hëðan.</i>	And begone hence homeward.

The sense of *lyf* here admits of no doubt at all; whatever may be its etymological sense, in contextu here it means "a

bit." Its form has nothing to do with any word in Icelandic meaning love. It is identical in form with *lyf* meaning herb, then healing herb, medicine ; but I think it may be doubted that their identity goes further than the bare form. I think the conclusion is irresistible that *lyf* in Icelandic and *love* in score-counting in English must be cognates. True, as love is used now, it apparently means *nothing* ; but that cannot be its etymological sense ; it has no negation in it, and must therefore be a term for *something* which, however, in value, amounts to nought. Anyhow, I think this Icelandic and very ancient parallel suffices to prove that *love*, in English, meaning *amor*, is a distinct word from *love* meaning no *right* in scoring.

EIRÍKR MAGNÚSSON.

CATULLUS' 54TH POEM.

THE lost manuscript of Catullus, from which directly or indirectly all the others are derived, would appear to have handed down this trivial and uninteresting poem in the following shape, if we take no account of two verses repeated without meaning from a former poem, or of the heading which belongs to the next poem and has been wrongly inserted in this one:

Otonis caput oppido est pusillum
Et eri rustice semilauta crura
Subtile et leve peditum libonis
Si non omnia displicere vellem
Tibi et sufficio seniore cocto
Irascere iterum meis iambis
Inmerentibus unice imperator.

In the third number of our Journal I examined at some length the 29th poem in which Cæsar and his friend Mamurra are assailed with so much wit and truculent virulence. The last two lines of our present poem contain a direct reference to the other, the *unice imperator* here distinctly pointing to the *imperator unice* there. It is however for critical purposes only that I now discuss this 54th poem, not for any historical or personal references, which are altogether unknown and, if they were known, would probably turn out to be of no importance whatever.

Three slight and manifest corrections were soon made in the manuscript text: *Otonis*¹ at once became *Othonis*; for *sufficio*, which does not appear to be a Latin name, from the time of Scaliger *Fuficio* or *Fufecio*, a well-known name, has been generally read; and *seni recocto* soon took the place of the

¹ *Otonis* I take to be the reading of the archetype, not the *Octonis* of most of the existing MSS. The Latin *ct* became *t* or *tt* in Italian; and for this reason an Italian would instinctively translate his own *tt* back into

ct: Giotto calls himself *Ioctus*. For *otonis* then a scribe would at once write *octonis*, which he would know to be a Latin word. For similar reasons I believe the archetype had *eri*, not *heri*, in the 2nd line.

unmeaning and unmetrical *seniore cocto*, Scaliger clinching this emendation by these words: 'glossarium interpretatur ἀπεφθον γέροντα cum hunc locum in animo haberet.'

But after these obvious changes have been made, most of the critics, old and new, look upon the poem as mutilated and unintelligible. Victorius speaks of its Cimmerian darkness; Muretus says that a Sibyl alone could interpret it, that it manifestly consists of mutilated fragments of different epigrams, incapable of being understood or corrected. Scaliger's emendations are clumsy and his explanations wrong. Of recent editors two of the most eminent, Lachmann and Haupt, assume two lacunæ, one after the third, the other after the fifth line. I will quote the poem in the shape in which it is presented to us by the two most recent critical editions. Ellis prints it thus:

Othonis caput oppido est pusillum;
 †Et Heri rustice, semilauta crura,
 Subtile et leue peditum Libonis.

At non effugies meos iambo

 Si non omnia displicere vellem
 Tibi et Sufficio seni recocto

 Irascere iterum meis iambis
 Inmerentibus, unice imperator.

The verse in Italics is a fragment of Catullus which Mr Ellis supposes to belong to this poem; which in Lucian Mueller's edition becomes two poems and assumes the following shape:

LIIII.

Othonis caput oppidost pusillum
 * * *
 Neri rustica semilauta crura,
 Subtile et leve peditum Libonis.
 * * *

Si non omnia displicere vellem
Tibi et Fuficio seni recocto

LIIII^b.

Irascere iterum meis iambis
Inmerentibus, unice imperator.

Though I dissent with diffidence from so many eminent authorities, I cannot conceal my belief that the poem is quite entire and unmutilated, and that the change of one other letter will render it perfectly intelligible, dispel the Cimmerian darkness and enable us to dispense with the Sibyl's assistance. Before offering any further explanations I will print the poem as I think Catullus may have written it:

Othonis caput (oppido est pusillum)
et, trirustice, semilauta crura,
subtile et leve peditum Libonis,
si non omnia, displicere vellem
tibi et Fuficio seni recocto:
irascere iterum meis iambis
inmerentibus, unice imperator.

The proper interpretation of the whole poem appears to me to depend primarily on the right understanding of the words *si non omnia*; and for this

via prima salutis,
quod minime reris, Graia pandetur ab urbe;

or rather, I should say, not from a Greek city, but from the city of the Trojan Antenor. It is not known who Otho or Libo or Fuficius was, but it is plain that the poet means to say that Otho and Libo were favourites of Cæsar and Fuficius, standing in the same relation to the former as he had scurrilously described Mamurra as doing in the 29th poem. I could wish, he says, that Otho's head (right puny it is) and, you thorough clown, those half-washed legs of his, and Libo's offensive habits, if not everything else about them, should disgust you. Then pretending to recal his former quarrel with Cæsar, he breaks off abruptly with the words, 'you will be enraged a second time with my innocent iambics, O general without peer.'

Vulpius of Padua saw, as I have said, that this was the meaning of *si non omnia*, and he has illustrated the expression from Cicero pro Sestio § 7: 'ut ille...si non omnem, at aliquem partem maioris sui deponeret.' But the phrase may be illustrated by other passages which I have given in my note on Lucretius III 406 'Si non omnimodis, at magna parte animai Privatus'; II 1017 'Si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est Consimilis'; Lucil. I 33 Muell. 'Si non amplius, at lustrum hoc protolleret unum.' The *at* in these passages makes the antithesis more distinct, but it can hardly be necessary in a style like that of Catullus.

Schwabe, and before him Doering, accept the explanation of Vulpius, but like most of the editors they make more than one quite unnecessary alteration in the text. Thus nearly all omit the *est* of v. 1; but the parenthesis appears to me to add force to the expression; and parentheses are a very marked feature of most Latin styles, as I have shown in my Lucretius. With our present passage compare Seneca Hippol. 35 'At Spartanos (genus est audax Avidumque ferae) nodo cautus Propiore liga.' Then in v. 2 Schwabe with most others changes *rustice* to *rustica*; but the vocative is much more spirited and emphatic, the *semi-lauta crura* marking the coarse rustic. Of course I do not pretend that my reading 'Et, trirustice' is more than plausible; but I change but a single letter, and T and E are among the letters most frequently confused. With *trirusticus* I would compare not only *trigeminus*, but also Plautus' *trifur*, *trifurcifer*, *triparcus*, *trivenefica*. It is possible Catullus wrote *ter rustice*; it is quite possible too that a new name lurks in the manuscript reading, such as *Heri*, which many adopt. But, I confess, I think that the passage is more spirited without this third name, and that it is more probable Catullus should speak of Cæsar and Fuficius as having the same relations with the same two persons than with the same three. This point however must remain uncertain: on the general meaning of the whole poem I feel no uncertainty whatever; or rather I would say that I should have felt none, if so many distinguished scholars had not found it so unintelligible.

Catullus 22, 12

Hoc quid putemus esse? qui modo scurra
aut siquid hac re tristius videbatur,
idem infaceto est infacetior rure,
simul poemata attigit.

Scurra has the same meaning here which it has in Plautus: a townbred fine gentleman, the opposite of one brought up in the *infacetum rus*: 'Urbani assidui cives quos scurras vocant'; 'Tu urbanus vero scurra, deliciae populi, Rus mihi tu obiectas. The 'homo venustus et dicax et urbanus' of v. 2, and the 'bellus ille et urbanus' of 9 are expressions synonymous with *scurra*. Compare too Pliny epist. IV 25 3, who is imitating Catullus, though the *scurriliter* there has at the same time the bad sense which it afterwards acquired. It is plain from the whole context that the *tristius* of manuscripts in our passage is quite out of place, and nearly all critics and editors have adopted Pontanus' conjecture *tritius*. But *tritius* seems to me hardly more appropriate than *tristius*: at first sight the *tritae aures* of Cicero might appear somewhat in point; but that only means 'ears much practised' on some subject. The *scurra* is the very opposite of what is trite and commonplace. The latest editor Mueller is not satisfied with *tritius*, and reads *scitius*.

There is a word which seems to me exactly suited to the context and, when rightly explained, as near perhaps to the manuscript reading as *tritius*. Lexicons quote from Quintilian *iudicium acre tersumque; elegiae tersus atque elegans auctor*; and the like from him and others. He uses too the comparative: 'multum eo est tersior ac purus magis Horatius.' Nonius quotes Varro and Cato for the older form *tertus*. Thus Lucretius has *fictus* for *fixus*, and *artus*, *fartus*, *sartus*, *tortus* always retained the *t*. Catullus then wrote, I believe, *tertius*, and *s* was written over the *t* to explain the meaning: thus *tertius* would readily pass into *tristius*.

Catullus 25, 4—7

Idemque Thalle turbida rapacior procella,
 cum diva mulier arios (*or aries, or aves*) ostendit oscitantes,
 remitte pallium mihi meum, quod involasti,
 sudariumque Saetabum catagraphosque Thynos.

The second line in this extract is one of the most desperate in Catullus: fifty conjectures have been made by critics and editors, old and recent; not one of which I believe has found much acceptance. All the explanations of *diva* for instance strike me as thoroughly unsatisfactory. Though I do not think that the conjecture I am going to offer is likely to be received with more approbation than former ones, I yet venture to give it, in the hope that it may perhaps present the question in a new light. This then is what I propose:

Conclave com vicarios ostendit oscitantes.

What suggested the reading to my mind was first the very common substitution in manuscripts of *d* for *cl* as in Catullus 7, 5 *ora dum* for *oraclum*; 68, 43 *sedis* for *saeclis*; and next the frequency with which our archetype confuses *a* and *co*; many instances of which confusion I have given in p. 23 of the third number of our journal. Thus *conclaveco* might pass into *condava*, *com diva*; and then *muicarios* into *mulierarios* or something else that looked like Latin.

Conclave was a room that could be locked up, if necessary, and might be used for a storeroom, a bedroom, a diningroom, or the like. The *vicarii*, who are often spoken of by writers and in inscriptions, were the slaves of slaves and were employed in any menial capacity. Probably then at some feast these *vicarii* would have charge of such articles as are mentioned here, and when they were off their guard, Thallus would take the opportunity of pouncing upon the things in question. It has always seemed to me more probable that they should be stolen in such a way as this, than taken from the person of their owner.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

VETERI VETUS HOSPES AMICO.

ILLE ego qui quondam Grantae sub moenibus altis
Errabam magno musarum instinctus amore,
Munro care, tibi peritura poemata pango.
Ut me grata tui scribentem stringit imago!
Te pono ante oculos jubeoque adstare, neque absens
Alloquor absentem: usque adeo mihi corde sub alto
Vivit forma viri, vultus, color, ingenium, vox.

Versiculos laetus legi et bis terque relegi
Laetior usque tuos. Quantum, si viveret, ipse
Confessurus erat *Gravius* tibi me quoque tantum
Confiteor debere. At per vestigia vatis
Peligni minus isse reor te, maxime Munro,
Quam signasse novum sermonem, dum tibi musam
Nasonis numerosque repraesentare videris.
De sermone tuo morem gere pauca monenti.
Si qua forte satus Romana gente fuisset
Aeschylus atque elegos voluisset adire Latinos,
Talem crediderim scripturum carmina vatem
Haud aliena tuis: qui stant quasi marmore versus
Et similes solido structis adamante columnis.

At puto de verbis *it iter*, si versa retrorsum
Sic starent *iter it*, flueret numerosior ordo.
Nonne Maro *via vi* posuit bis, *vi via* nunquam?
Ni fallor, Sophocles iterans *it it* edidit unus.

Verum hoc non poteram jejunum scribere carmen
Nec tibi gratari—quanquam est mora longa bilustris—
Cum Lucreti operum interpres praestantior audis
Quam rerum naturæ Lucretius ipse.

Magnum opus et numeris plenum omnibus, unde perenne
Nomen erit Munronis et aeternabitur aere,
Plurima lectorum durando saecula volvens.

Haec quae scriberet Evander longinquus habebat.


Unum oro super: ad fines te si bona nostros
Fors fumusque ferat, noli me abscondere vectus—
Vectus Hyperboreos in montes ignibus ales;
Sed quando 'Scotus volucer' te volvet ad Arcton,
Lentior allabens Dunelmi respice turre
Tergeminas molemque piam super urbe sedentem,
Oblitusque Caledoniae paulisper avitae
Huc deflecte pedem, memoris memor hospes amici.

T. S. E.

DUNELMI,

Id. Apr. MDCCCLXXIV.





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